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Abstract 
The Counter-Discourses of Femininity 
 
 
This thesis is devoted to Elizabeth Bowen‘s search for the new counter-
discourses of femininity that encompass undeniably important questions of 
subjectification and identification. It analyses the two chosen novels: The House in 
Paris (1935/1976) and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes (1968/1999) as the primary 
bibliography and as Elizabeth Bowen‘s successful exercises in laying the foundations 
for her precursory philosophy of narrativization of identity through the analysis of the 
following processes: the search within the external and internal relations of selfhood 
and otherness and a better understanding of the founding concepts of maternity, 
femininity, and gender. It uses various theories of feminist scholarship postulated during 
the last thirty years of the twentieth century until the first decade of the new century.  
Moreover, the thesis focuses on the ideas of narrative, hermeneutical and 
dynamic approaches to the themes of identity and gender. The theoretical deliberations 
are, thus, based on the writings of Nancy Chodorow, Julia Kristeva, Elizabeth Grosz, 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guatarri, Emmanuel Levinas, and Paul Ricoeur 
among many others.  
The thesis ventures to prove the existence and understanding of the new 
discourses of identification that can be found in Bowen‘s fiction, and which, I believe, 
re-position the female subject within existing narratives of culture and consequently 
power. Here, the female subject is seen as purely different in itself, disseminating life, 
multiple and dynamic, which opposes the traditional understanding of male/female 
binary opposition. Only this way can one reach a better understanding of the personal 
and subjective topography that can offer a solution to the growing threat of desiccation 
and displacedeness of every I. 
Above all, the thesis defends the idea that identity is built upon narrative 
hermeneutical processes that require the subject to respond to the necessity of 
translating, understanding and welcoming the other. This way an attempt to de„sire‟ the 
language can be made to make claim for the new discourses of femininity understood as 
desiring, fluid and autonomous. 
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                                                          Resumo  
 
Esta tese de doutoramento intitula-se The Counter-Discourses of Femininity e 
procura encontrar e defender um novo discurso feminista ainda que não militante. O 
trabalho constitui uma investigação sobre os complexos processos de identificação e 
subjectivização com base no sujeito feminino em discurso. O estudo resulta de uma 
prolongada e detalhada investigação no âmbito de um percurso de doutoramento em 
Estudos Literários iniciado com especialidade como Literatura Inglesa e também 
desenvolvido em áreas como os Estudos de Identidade e de Género, na Faculdade de 
Letras da Universidade de Lisboa  
A tese de doutoramento é um olhar crítico sobre a escrita de Elizabeth Bowen e 
procura analisar os dois romances escolhidos, The House in Paris (1935/1976) e Eva 
Trout, or Changing Scenes (1968/1999), a partir da crítica e teoria literária pós-
modernista, incluindo perspectivas como a psicanálise e a teoria feminista.  
Os textos críticos escolhidos para elaboração deste trabalho de doutoramento 
dividem-se em dois grupos sendo o primeiro grupo dedicado às questões de 
narratividade da identidade, construção de temporalidade, corporalidade, e à psicanálise. 
Os autores escolhidos são Mikhail Bakhtin, Gilles Deleuze, Emmanuel Levinas, Paul 
Ricoeur, entre outros. Assim sendo, os conceitos-chave Bakhtinianos abrangem o 
carnavalesco, o riso, como também o dialogismo. A escrita de Deleuze elucida ideias 
como o dinâmico ‗becoming‘, a existência de forcas molares e moleculares na 
construção da identidade, diferença, Corpo-sem-Orgãos, rizoma, ‗becoming-little-girl‘ e 
‗becoming-woman‘. O enfoco em artes cinematográficas e conceito de imagem-
movimento fundamentam a teorização da temporalidade na tese. As teorias de Levinas 
dizem respeito à melhor compreensão do outro, como à necessidade de acolher o outro 
na esperança de melhor vivência da natureza humana. Ricoeur, por sua vez, elucida as 
ideais já presentes nos outros teóricos referentes à dinâmica relação entre o eu e o outro, 
ajudando a uma melhor reflexão sobre o si mesmo como um outro. As ideias-chave de 
Ricoeur abrangem as questões de temporalidade compreendida como contínua e 
vinculada ao presente, e de hermenêutica com a sua base em textos sagrados do 
cristianismo. A identidade narrativa de Ricoeur é aqui usada para melhor argumentação 
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sobre a maneira como a realidade de uma pessoa é configurada pela sua percepção de 
eventos no mundo. A tese, seguindo Ricoeur, privilegia a escuta e a tradução de 
discurso do outro e também a atenção profunda à assimetria possível no diálogo que por 
sua vez enriquece qualquer identidade. O segundo grupo de textos críticos centra-se na 
crítica feminista estabelecendo o seu vínculo com o primeiro grupo através da escrita de 
Julia Kristeva, cuja obra acolhe tanto as questões de natureza psicanalítica como as de 
natureza feminista. A par de Julia Kristeva são ainda usados textos de Judith Butler, 
Nancy Chodorow, Elizabeth Grosz, Luce Irigaray, Toril Moi e Adrienne Rich. 
Consequentemente, as ideias expostas são: a maternidade como instituição e como uma 
experiência privada, a linguagem feminina baseada em teorias essencialistas, a 
identidade performativa, a (de)construção de género, a critica às dicotomias binárias, e a 
política e representação feminista. 
São precisamente as atenções críticas do segundo grupo que servem aqui de base 
para melhor compreensão e (re)descoberta de um novo discurso feminista na obra de 
Elizabeth Bowen. Assim, esta tese de doutoramento avalia a construção e elaboração de 
vários processos de identificação e subjectivização implícitos no corpus escolhido.  
Em primeiro lugar a tese de doutoramento assenta em dois conceitos-chave para 
a construção e melhor percepção de identidade, sendo eles: (I) a ideia de becoming ou 
seja, construção e vivência dinâmica de vida que naturalmente contradiz conceitos como 
essencialismo, sedimentação e o simples ser; (II) o conceito de maternidade que aqui é 
concebido não como função ou papel biológico somente pertencente à mulher, mas sim 
como um modo de vivência que define relações entre o eu e o outro, compreendido 
como o estranho e o estrangeiro, que se revelam tanto no exterior como no interior da 
identidade. É destes novos conceitos de maternidade e de dialogismo que decorre o 
interesse do estudo pela exploração de conceitos como a mãe arcaica ou fálica, o 
semiótico, o simbólico e a chora. As palavras-chave que definem o novo discurso 
feminista proposto aqui são as seguintes: autonomia relacional, agency, alteridade, 
multiplicidade, hermenêutica e o carnavalesco. Todas as referências e escolhas teóricas 
nesta tese decorrem da compreensão de que algumas das disparidades na percepção da 
escrita de Elizabeth Bowen poderão advir de uma atenção insuficiente, devido às 
complexidades teóricas apresentadas pela autora. Tais só podem ser compreendidas e 
descodificadas com as recentes descobertas no campo psicanalítico e feminista que na 
tese ajudam a redefinir um novo mapa semiótico da autora. 
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A dissertação de doutoramento está dividida em três capítulos sendo que o 
primeiro incide sobre a crítica literária e psicanalítica recolhida. O capítulo é intitulado 
―Discussion. The Dialogue and the Difference.‖ É dividido pelos conceitos e ideias- 
chave que têm como função guiar o leitor pelas descobertas nos capítulos seguintes. O 
segundo capítulo é intitulado ―The House in Paris. (M)Other and Child‘s Boundary 
Crossing‖  e incide sobre um dos primeiros romances da Elizabeth Bowen – The House 
in Paris (1935). Este romance desde logo apresenta o interesse de Bowen por processos 
intrínsecos à identidade, nomeadamente os mutuamente exclusivos, dialogismo e 
abjectivismo, encarados como praxis teórica no encontro do eu e o outro. O segundo 
capítulo estuda também os processos compreendidos como (re)descoberta da mãe, ou 
seja redescoberta de um modo de ‗fazer‘ ou ‗actuar‘ maternidade. O capítulo investiga a 
aprendizagem de um novo discurso feminista que assenta em ideais de necessidade de 
diálogo, caridade e responsabilidade perante um outro. Este capítulo avalia também os 
processos de becoming, acentuando elementos tais como dinamismo de vida, 
multiplicidade, mobilidade e heterogeneidade a par de ritualização, de subjectivização e 
o Gótico conceito de consumir o outro. O terceiro capítulo intitula-se ―Eva Trout – a 
Journey towards New Discourse‖ e incide sobre o último romance da Elizabeth Bowen 
– Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes (1969). Este romance é aqui entendido como o mais 
representativo de um novo discurso feminista na obra da autora. É em Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes que as tendências pós-modernistas na compreensão de identidade são 
mais visíveis e mais bem tematizadas. Por sua vez, este capítulo apresenta uma análise 
detalhada dos processos teóricos apresentados nos primeiros dois capítulos com a sua 
cuidadosa contextualização no romance. Entre os conceitos-chave destacam-se aqui o 
carnavalesco, a monstruosidade, a alteridade, a imagem-movimento e a imagem-tempo, 
como também a dinamização e narrativização de vida. Mais uma vez o enfoque central 
é dado à construção de maternidade como primária, dinâmica e omnipresente em todos 
os processos de identificação. 
As perspectivas críticas formuladas nos primeiros três capítulos estão presentes 
na última parte da tese, ―Conclusion‖. As conclusões acentuam mais uma vez todas as 
tendências e descobertas teóricas que fazem parte de um novo discurso feminista, tal 
como é apresentado por Elizabeth Bowen e compreendido como múltiplo, fluído e não 
essencialista. É sublinhada a necessidade de ir contra um futuro sem linguagem e de se 
impulsionar a proliferação de uma nova hermenêutica de palavras, imagens e sinais. 
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Neste capítulo também se propõe a procura de uma chamada topografia identitária de 
Elizabeth Bowen que assenta na melhor descolonização de discurso feita através de um 
novo conceito compreendido como „de„siring‟ of the language‟ – de-masculinização e 
desapropriação de discurso devido à sua ‗specula(riza)tion‘ narrativa. Por sua vez 
desiring of the language atravessa todos os temas previamente apresentados 
acentuando, mais uma vez, as ideias-chave como maternidade, female desire e desire in 
language que podem ser aproveitadas por novas teorias feministas no geral. 
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Introduction. 
 
This doctoral thesis is a consequence of the author‘s undaunted and unabashed 
belief in the precursory character of Elizabeth Bowen‘s fictional and non-fictional 
discourses: the counter-discourses of femininity and identity as such, that had come to 
precede the findings of late twentieth century feminist theory. Since the modern 
feminist scholarship, mainly that from the decades encompassing the seventies, eighties 
and nineties, was interested in the processes of active identification of the female 
subject, it is the author‘s strong conviction that Bowen anticipated its findings through 
her heightened sensibility towards the question of the brittle, delicate and yet dynamic 
self.  
Furthermore, this work conjugates a four-year investigation into Bowenesque 
elaboration of the new textual and non-textual discourses only decipherable thanks to 
the theoretical concepts of hermeneutics, dialogism and narrativization of discourse. As 
a result other key terms delineate the investigation of this work among them: 
responsibility, care for the other, becoming, alterity, the grotesque, and, above all, 
motherhood.  
This thesis takes as its nexus Elizabeth Bowen‘s longer fiction, psychoanalysis, 
philosophy and literary theory. It is destined to be an inter-textual reading between 
Elizabeth Bowen‘s two novels – The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes – as well as chosen feminist studies, along with psychoanalytical and 
philosophical theories of the development of subjectivity and identification, above all in 
relation to the female discourse.  
One of the important questions that arise when contemplating Bowen‘s literary 
oeuvre is whether it is sufficient to recognize the foreigner – whether it is sufficient to 
welcome and accept the stranger within oneself. An answer should be found to the 
aporia of transgressive subjectivity that like a Mobius strip captures the sense of 
interconnectedness and change. Are men usually centre-stage and women confined to 
the margins and if so what are the disruptive forces that inevitably underlie the status 
quo? These very questions will reflect the huge disruptions and transformations in how 
one sees identity and femininity embedded in the processes of subjectification. There 
are all sorts of questions central to feminist scholarship and psychoanalysis that I 
examine in this thesis. As such they are issues that have become important due to a wide 
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range of theoretical findings used in this work as well as Bowen‘s own prefiguration of 
new discourses of femininity. 
 It is for this reason that the thesis will postulate a greater focus on the idea of 
becoming – becoming the outsider while becoming oneself, and embracing the other 
while creating the self. The stranger the subject enters into a dialogue with can be the 
stranger represented as the child- or the little-girl-within, the female monster or the 
deeply entrenched archaic mother. However, in the process of reconfiguring the mother 
function it is not the biological motherhood that should be highlighted but rather the 
mother function expressed by the concepts of care, fluidity and multiplicity. Denial of 
performing these functions subjectively and against the law of the phallus stands for a 
denial of selfhood. Consequently comprehending and incorporating the new language of 
identity will mean a de„siring‟ of the language of power. It will stand for returning to 
the basic concepts of desire in language and decolonization of discourse. 
In the end, the question of what constitutes Bowen‘s private and public 
topography will be answered. The desideratum should be searched for in the new 
shapes of selfhood. These will need to be discerned both in the public and the private 
scenes.  
Consequently having the above in mind, this thesis will seek to understand 
better the operations of subjectification within different discourses a subject may 
produce – especially those operations that point towards the differentiation of the 
feminine from the masculine. Both of these filters of analysis are to contribute to a 
major discussion of re-thinking discourse and performance as gender dependent, as well 
as re-thinking the canon in women‘s literature, where Elizabeth Bowen came to occupy 
a secondary position. 
Philosophy and psychoanalysis are useful tools and yet their usefulness may be 
deceiving. On one hand, they are useful while attempting to solve the problems of the 
continuum or (dis)continuum between the subject formation and that subject‘s 
subsequent production. Within this preserve, the aporia of identity is made up of 
relations to the (maternal) body as well as relations to the social order – the symbolic 
and semiotic representations of identity. Decoding of the (dis)continuum is a primary 
and inter-textual process and the analytical tools present a chance of tracing the 
permutation of subject during a production of a text – cultural or literary. However, in 
using philosophy and psychoanalysis, it is necessary to remember the importance of the 
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text in question – the text that is being analysed. For analysis is, too, an inter-textual or 
rather inter-discursive process, aiming at the establishing of meeting point between the 
private sphere of the text and the public sphere of its meaning, changeable according to 
readership, context and tradition.  
Furthermore, it is of utmost importance that analysis promotes the text and its 
author in the first place, and pursues its own goals in the second place – the goals of 
enriching, developing and reinforcing equality between the discourses of the self and 
the other, the feminine and the masculine. 
As a result, this work has as its objective a two-fold task. Above all, it aspires 
to understand the writing of Elizabeth Bowen, as an example of a centre-defiant writing, 
able to contribute to the problematic of gender equality and identity formation. This, I 
signal in the thesis‘ title – The Counter-Discourses of Femininity. Elizabeth Bowen‘s 
work creates an illusion of middle-brow realist fiction that too often fell into the 
category of fiction for women with all the depreciative connotations of the term. For 
many causes Bowen was not considered canonical in her own twentieth century, this 
had happened ―for various contingent reasons – of background, geography, 
temperament and opportunity, for instance, and probably of gender too‖ (Corcoran, xiii, 
in Walshe, 2009). However, Bowen‘s materialist/realist discourse skilfully drills the 
plots that it consequently dissolves through a search for the deeper structures of 
identification and subjectification. And hopefully, the new theoretical tools of ascending 
critical schools of feminism, Queer theory and psychoanalysis will be able to respond to 
all the alternative directions that Bowen‘s fiction takes us towards. As with the material 
part of human life, the desiccation of traditional discourse is more painful and more 
palpable that the vanquishing of human lives, which according to Bowen is inevitable. 
Elizabeth Bowen remains defiant in her mockery of common truths, as well as in their 
blatant reinforcement. This apparently paradoxical side-by-side of the formal 
conforming style as well as a new and disruptive discourse accounts for the breaks 
within the false appearance of identity and continuity. Elizabeth Bowen‘s style has a 
capacity to figure the undoing of the symbolic and the subject of the symbolic. Her 
narrative is a continuous dis-appropriation of propriety. The exposure of narratives 
underlying the dogmatic discourse stands for a capacity for change – ―a kind of 
drivenness‖ (Corcoran, xiii, in Walshe, 2009) behind every self ―following in their own 
footsteps, of knowing only by going where it is they have to go‖ (Corcoran, xiii, in 
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Walshe, 2009). As in Bakhtinian carnivalesque discourse, exposure allows one to be 
what one is and to become somebody else. It allows for highlighting the false 
seamlessness of our identities by insisting on the presence and power of the gaps that 
bind identities together, making them possible, at the same time leaving them 
vulnerable to their destruction and transformation. As much as in Elizabeth Bowen the 
discourse is a reiterated performance, her narrative is a spectacle, where identities are 
continuously re-assembled and re-montaged, bearing in mind that when one writes 
identities the term not only refers to the plots of Bowen‘s works but also to the identities 
of the reader who chooses to embark on the adventure of being ‗changed‘ in the process 
of responding to Elizabeth Bowen‘s discourse. In Elizabeth Bowen‘s literary oeuvre and 
thanks to Elizabeth Bowen intellectual contribution all discourses‘ and all fictions‘ 
coherence is dissolved.  
Having the above in mind, the thesis seeks to understand better the operations 
of subjectification within different discourses a subject may produce – especially those 
operations that point towards the differentiation of the feminine from the masculine. 
Both of these filters of analysis are to contribute to a major discussion of re-thinking 
discourse and performance as gender dependent, as well as re-thinking the canon in 
women‘s literature, where Elizabeth Bowen came to occupy a secondary position. 
This study takes as its nexus Elizabeth Bowen‘s longer fiction, psychoanalysis, 
philosophy and literary theory. It is destined to be an inter-textual reading between 
Elizabeth Bowen‘s two novels – The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes – as well as chosen feminist studies, along with psychoanalytical and 
philosophical theories of the development of subjectivity and identification, above all in 
relation to female discourse.  
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PART I 
 
 
The Counter-Discourses of Femininity: 
 
Discussion. The Dialogue and the Difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
 
1. Narrative Identification. 
 
Elizabeth Bowen‘s topography oscillates somewhere between amorphousness 
and a concrete material detail, the desideratum being that however fluid and alternative 
identity it still requires estimation. However generic and homogenous it may appear, 
Bowenesque identity can be considered relational and multifarious. As such, moving 
towards the ideas of nomadism, displacement and identitarian travelling, we must first 
focalize on the concepts of narrativity in identification.  
In Time and Narrative, Paul Ricoeur postulates that identity is constructed not 
as identical with itself, self-referential and unitary but by a means of detour from 
oneself to the other: 
 
the identity of this ‗who‘ therefore itself must be narrative identity. (. ...) Without the 
recourse to narration, the problem of personal identity would in fact be condemned to an 
antimony with no solution. Either we must posit a subject identical with itself through the 
diversity of its different states, or, following Hume and Nietzsche, we must hold that this 
identical subject is nothing more than a substantialist illusion (…). (Ricoeur, 1984, 246) 
 
Our identity is incomplete. The very fact that we are seeking identities means 
that we don‘t have them. We are always dispossessed. There is no ―proper‖ self. 
Narrative identity obliges the subject to acknowledge the existence of the other. It opens 
new worlds of molecular bodies in becoming. Textual production, in which I am oneself 
as well as other to oneself, offers ―creative or imaginative substrate to action‖ (McNay, 
2000, 22). As the site where intersubjectivity is constructed, it is a form of agency that 
can ―underline certain transformations within gender relations‖ (McNay, 2000, 22). It 
allows the condition of possibility of certain types of autonomous agency understood as 
the ability to act in an unexpected fashion or to institute new and unanticipated modes 
of behavior‖ (McNay, 2000, 22). Narrative identity is the identity of character; it is also 
the identity which bridges idem and ipse where that narrativity stands for dialogism 
between ipse and idem similar to oneself and another. Writing about selfhood as 
adulthood and childhood as otherness in discourse, Bowen expresses her faith in 
reciprocal relationship between sameness and otherness. She says that ―The child lives 
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in the book; but just as much the book lives in the child. I mean that, admittedly, the 
process of reading is reciprocal.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 51)  
That said, we are subjects in our and others‘ stories, the narratives of identity 
being intricately interwoven. The feminine is a subject of a masculine story/identity – 
the mother subjects in the child‘s narrative and the child surfaces as a latent agent in an 
adult‘s narrative. In ―Notes on Writing a Novel‖ Bowen writes that ―Speech is what the 
characters do to each other‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 41). Contextualization can also be seen 
from a different angle – that which escapes the existence of the external other, so that 
acts have their meaning even if no one receives them, especially in the case of 
perlocutionary acts, performed/enlivened by saying something. This guides us towards 
the role of agency in subjectification. In fact the other is still there but within the subject 
whose role it is to decode, translate and acquire the stories it encounters, both the 
narratives outside and inside oneself.  
The interplay of selfhood and otherness challenges the existential 
phenomenology of being used as a means of ontological analysis. Narrative 
construction of identity, as it has became to be known, rejects the idea of transcendental 
ego and claims after Heidegger that the possible outcomes and destinies of philosophy 
are inevitably intertwined with human existence, and thus with temporality and with 
historicality, taking into account not only the needs of the I but also the requirements of 
the other. The science of being qua being does not go beyond the particular thing and 
the Cartesian other, making it difficult to understand who is the audience that 
individuals use when thinking about the self, and how the division between the self and 
other fluctuates between the internal and external worlds. 
In a similar manner, the substantialist idea that all subjects have intrinsic 
properties does not exhaust the problematic of the self, especially if we bear in mind as 
Heidegger did the constant exchange through language in use. As has been noted in 
various post-modernist studies, for the post-structural Foucauldian subject it is of more 
importance to be able ―to engage in self-transformatory practices of the self‖ (Khan, 
2006) than to reach the understanding of its metaphysica since metaphysica is a fallacy. 
Narrative identity shifts our interest in the self and other towards the discussion 
of corporeality. The definition of boundaries of self and other crosses the boundaries of 
bodies. And yet, this phenomenon of reflexivity, ―does not fully address the problem in 
which the material body may impact on this self-styling, resisting conscious attempts to 
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change, or significantly distracting from them‖ (Khan, 2006). The definition of 
boundaries of self and other crosses the boundaries of bodies. The emphasis on the body 
in literature revolves around questions of to what extent ―each person is for himself his 
own body‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 319). That said, we may ask to what extent the body 
becomes one‘s corporeal and mental criteria of identity. The body and the world as a 
perceiving thing are intricately intertwined since it is through the body that we gain a 
sense of belonging and it is through the body that the influence of ―habitus, roles, and 
identifications‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 319) are channelled. Consequently, it is through the 
body that passivity of existence is transformed into active participation of the world. 
The knowledge of the other transcends our view, but is manifest precisely by presenting 
itself to a range of possible views, just like looking at and from different angles of the 
body. As such, the essential partiality of our view of things as being presented only in a 
certain perspective and at a certain moment in time does not diminish their reality. The 
object of perception is immanently tied to its background, that is, to the body, which 
becomes the nexus of meaningful relations among objects within the world. Inevitably, 
as Ricoeur writes in Oneself as Another ―the constancy of a self (…) finds its anchor in 
its own body‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 319). The body is the site of dialectics between the 
concepts of the self, sameness, selfhood and otherness as well as the permanent 
condition of experience. It becomes inevitable that the body constitutes the landscape 
and perceptual gestalt of selfhood. In this way we should treat identity as a temporal 
and spatial phenomenon that could be designated as the territories of war1. 
Lois MacNay has written in her Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject 
in Feminist and Social Theory, that we owe to the scientific presuppositions of the 
phenomenology of the body what can be called ―generative understanding of 
subjectification‖ (McNay, 2000, 164). To better account for a plurality of subject 
identifications that may overlap and even cooperate rather than work at odds, McNay 
asks us to consider Paul Ricoeur‘s work on narrative because it allows a sense of 
temporal fluctuation to enter into the discussion on subject cohesion. A similar use of 
these two concepts can be found in Paul Ricouer who also claims that the 
phenomenological construction of the self relies on the social relations the subject 
                                                 
1 See, Celine Magnot, ―Elizabeth Bowen‘s London in The Heat of the Day: An Impression of the City in 
the Territory of War.‖(1995). http://www.literarylondon.org/london-journal/march2005/Magot.html 
Retrieved April 11, 2009. 
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engages into, and which affect the subject‘s embodied self. Presentation which is a way 
of self-explanation and transformation becomes a manner of exercising agency over 
one‘s own discourse. This maintains itself meaningful as long as it is representative of 
the self and a product of the self. A discourse produced by a subject may not be 
compliant with the dominant ideology but exercise an ionizing effect on the hegemony. 
In order to better understand subjectivity, especially the female one for the purpose of 
this study, we must take into account three elements of production: the material and 
symbolic aspects of subjectification, identity and coherence of the self, and the 
relationship between individual psyche and the larger social world. 
The emphasis on the body in literature revolves around questions of to what 
extent ―each person is for himself his own body‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 319). That said, we 
may ask to what extent the body becomes one‘s corporeal and mental criteria of identity 
since it is through the body that we gain a sense of belonging and it is through the body 
that the influence of ―habitus, roles, and identifications‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 319) are 
channelled. One of the major weaknesses of much of modern sociology, for instance 
seen in Pierre Bourdieu‘s work, is its ―failure to consider sufficiently the gendered 
habitus.‖ (McNay, 2000, 32) 
In corporeality, it is through the body that passivity of existence is transformed 
into active participation in the world. As has been noted earlier, it is in the body that 
―the constancy of a self (…) finds its anchor in its own body‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 319). 
This does not, necessarily, mean that the body is the slowing-down element of selfhood. 
Rather, it is a filter of patterns and styles – a body creates its own character that cannot 
be prescribed to others but responds to the constant yet homogenous metamorphoses of 
the body. As such the body is the site of dialectics between the self, sameness, selfhood 
and otherness.  
Even though one‘s own body and mind can be a source of suffering, it is 
through the interaction with sameness and otherness that the mind is exposed to 
suffering inflicted by others. ‗Undergoing and enduring‘ belong to a dimension that is 
enhanced by the act of suffering.  
 
But we must go further and take into account more deeply concealed forms of suffering: the 
incapacity to tell a story, the refusal to recount, the insistence of the untellable – phenomena 
that go far beyond mishaps and adventures, which can always be made meaningful through 
the strategy of emplotment. (Ricoeur, 1994a, 320) 
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Mental violence and repression stimulate forms of bodily performance – and 
this perpetuates the operations of further repression directly resulting from the search of 
the perpetrator inside oneself. The bodily chronotope changes into that of living dead – 
escaping Butlerian sedimentation of living, but also marking bodily desiccation. 
Bowen‘s work dramatizes the stilling of the body through her narrative failure to reach 
the other. This process may be called the Bowenesque ―burgeoning discourse‖ as 
already used in literature (Backus, 1999, 49). Bowen‘s novels problematize ―repression 
of crude material techniques of surveillance and physical coercion‖ which ―correspond 
to Foucault‘s earlier emphasis on discipline and punish‖ (Backus, 1999, 49). Almost 
like Richardsonian characters Bowen‘s characters experience suffering which 
commences with unusual ―decrease of the power of acting, experienced as a decrease of 
the effort of existing.‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 320) In sedimentation of life ―the reign of 
suffering, properly speaking, commences‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 320). Only those characters, 
which we will consider of extraordinary personal dynamics, manage to remain in 
motion – only those characters, with emphasis on the female ones, manage to attain a 
certain level of relative discursive autonomy. This will be juxtaposed against the 
theories of Jurij M. Lotman as well as feminist theories that defend in their scope the 
idea of relationally autonomous self and boundary-crossing, as exemplified in the 
novels The House in Paris (1976) and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes (1999).  
Using the idea of narrative identity with its emphasis on spuriousness of 
subjectification and a sense of temporal fluctuation helps us read into Bowenesque 
characters and either their inability to act, or activity in surplus. It is both in their 
passivity and activity culminating in certain autophagy that the body consumes itself or 
devours the other in an overwhelming desire to live. It is in this ―perversely asocial 
desire, enforced repetition and the Unhemlich‖ (Corcoran, xiv, in Walshe, 2009) that a 
rejection of conventional existence is written in. It is the repressed desire towards life 
and death that originates in suffering often accompanied with autophagous wants. Since 
an early age, autophagy becomes a means of ―assertive action that symbolically 
recapitulates the infant‘s original break with the nursing mother‖ (Backus, 1999, 52) as 
in Raymond F. Hilliard‘s description of ritual cannibalism and femininity in his text 
entitled ―Clarissa and Ritual Cannibalism‖ (1999).  
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In his study, Hilliard draws on Pierre Fauchery‘s description of ritual sacrifice 
of women as a topos central to the representation of women in the eighteenth century 
European novel. It is not merely a ritual sacrifice, according to Hilliard, but ritual 
cannibalism that delineates the discourse on femininity starting with eighteenth century 
fiction. In suffering subjects auto-consume themselves but they too consume the other 
in living with the other that is perceived as a source of suffering. As such suffering is a 
double edged sword. The origins of such can be traced in the long process that gave rise 
to the introduction of the capitalist family cell already described by Foucault. 
Cannibalism and authorial autophagy can also be linked to mother-child dyad and the 
child devouring the mother‘s breast, as well as textual practice of showing tempting 
femininity through exposing female pleasure drawn from eating, drinking, or smoking, 
and thus attracting the male gaze. 
Contrary to what Pierre Fauchery postulates as a purely aesthetic value of 
female sacrifice, the cannibalistic discourse has its policing role. In suffering dominant 
discourses are voiced, transformed and deciphered. Bearing this in mind, what Paul 
Ricoeur seems to be choosing to highlight in suffering escaping presentation is that it 
results from two overlapping instances of living – victimization as a result of passivity 
as well as compulsory passivity as an essential part of any human relationship on which 
hegemonies are built.  
 
Most of the sufferings are inflicted on humans by humans. The result is that most of the evil 
in the world comes from violence among human beings. Here, the passivity belonging to 
the metacategory of one‘s own body overlaps with the passivity belonging to the category 
of other people; the passivity of the suffering self becomes indistinguishable from the 
passivity of being the victim of the other (than) self. Victimization appears then as 
passivity‘s underside, casting a gloom over the ―glory‖ of action. (Ricoeur, 1994a, 320) 
 
This we may compare with the discourse of femininity as produced by 
traditionally obligatorily passive subjects victimized in hegemonic power relationships 
between subjects.  Many a times the victimized subject, here a woman, is responsible 
and compliant with the oppressor. The woman and the mother tempt for the philosophy 
to which peripheries she belongs but whose existence she also promotes. As such, we 
must also stress that any form of action or agency is inevitably related to the process of 
victimization, notably because it is a direct result of anxiety felt in the face of horror and 
disillusionment. Nevertheless the answer to oppression seems to be found in self 
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presentation and iterability of this self-presentation of which most refined and 
developed examples will be found in Bowen‘s Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. 
If we break the complex process of presentation into two parts, we see that it 
functions based on two approaches to the subject as proposed by Ricoeur. Ricoeur 
describes two manners of performing identity – ‗identifying reference‘ and ‗self-
designation‘ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 31). Identifying reference is revealed in an interlocutory 
situation, when ―speaking subjects designate to their interlocutors which particular they 
choose to speak about out of range particulars of the same type‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 31).  
 
Physical bodies and the persons we ourselves are constitute (…) basic particulars in the 
sense that nothing at all can be identified unless it ultimately refers to one or the other of 
these two kinds of basic particulars. (Ricoeur, 1994a, 31) 
 
To Ricoeur, identity is concealed in the category of idem, that is, it is revealed in 
sameness rather than in selfhood since the interlocutors refer to the same thing. This 
meaning, if there exists ontology of particulars it is not related to what they are but 
rather to what they refer to. This process being more fluid contradicts the essentialist 
philosophy of being, making the idea of becoming and presenting solid foundations of a 
subject‘s identity. 
 
By placing its main emphasis not on the ‗who‘ of the one speaking but on the ‗what‘ of the 
particulars about which one speaks, including persons, the entire analysis of the person, as a 
basic particular is placed on the public level of locating things in relation to the 
spatiotemporal schema that contains it. (Ricoeur, 1994a, 32) 
 
Through narrating the self subjects discursively constitute themselves what 
here is delineated as ‗the narrative identity‘. This idea is concealed in the hermeneutical 
notion of selfhood and sameness which can be divided into numerical identity: being 
one and not many and qualitative identity: being substitutable; both are identities in the 
sense of sameness. Character is “the set of distinctive marks which permit the re-
identification of a human being as the same, through its identification with the external 
particular namely by the descriptive features that will be given. This way the individual 
compounds numerical identity and qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity and 
permanence in time.” (Ricoeur, 1994a, xx)  
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The identity of character emploted, so to speak, can only be understood in terms of this 
dialectic [of concordance and discordance]. (. ...) The narrative constructs the identity of the 
character, what can be called his or her identity, in constructing the story told. It is the 
identity of the story which makes the identity of the character. (Ricoeur, 1994a, 147-8) 
 
The ‗I‘ is not inherent to cogito but is an interpretation of a causal type. The ‗I‘ 
is taken as a cause of what is, the effect of its own effect. The I is the result of the 
exchange between the I and the other that has left a visible mark on the other. The 
iterability of the idea of effect of one‘s own effect can be better explained in Ricoeur‘s 
theory of mimesis, which he divides into Mimesis One, Mimesis Two and Mimesis 
Three. Mimesis One refers the subject to its ability of the pre-figuration of the field of 
action. This is similar to what J. L. Austin notices in human discourse, namely the idea 
that we expect the other to be able to decipher the meaning of our words and that the 
other has the competency to follow the syntagmatic order of narration. Mimesis Two 
stands for emplotment that is configuration of the field of action. Mimesis Three stands 
for translating the emploted, fictive experience into actual lived experience. Therefore, 
in this cyclical process of Mimesis One, Two and Three the subject not only re-interprets 
the narration of the other but also its own narration of re-interpretation, and the whole 
process reinforces the subject‘s narration of the (within) the cosmological time. It is 
precisely in suffering that mimesis helps the subject share the narrative between itself 
and the other – the narrative, which refers to the knowledge of their vulnerability – 
―from the suffering Other there comes a giving that is no longer drawn from the power 
of acting and existing, but precisely from weakness itself‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 188-9). 
Closely related to the idea of mimesis are the ways of building an intra-subject, 
or sharing the suffering with the other through translation, exchange of memories, 
forgiveness. For Ricoeur they form the basis of human existence in time founded on the 
ideas of reciprocity and redemption. In transitions from Mimesis One to Mimesis Two 
and then Mimesis Three a relationship of reciprocity is established between the personal 
narrative and the chronotope of the present. It is based on the body‘s participation in the 
world similar to the transmission established between our ―present acting and suffering‖ 
(Kearney, 2004, 63) and effects of historical meaning. 
Subjectivity to Ricoeur is a philosophy of translation as well as philosophy as 
translation. In Kearney‘s On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl Minerva we read that the very 
human existence is a mode of interpretation of otherness which selfhood encounters 
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over time and needs to reconfigure in its own discourse. In his book, Kearney explains 
that Ricoeur ―argued (…) that the meaning of Being is always mediated through an 
endless process of interpretations - cultural, religious, political, historical, and 
scientific.‖ (Kearney, 2004, 1) As such, narrative identity becomes synonymous with 
hermeneutics of being as ―the art of deciphering indirect meaning‖ (Kearney, 2004, 1) 
and it is an ability to decipher meaning from somebody else‘s point of view. As has 
been written the ―shortest route to the self [happens] through the other (…)‖ (Kearney, 
2004, 2). Thus, the self ―returns to itself after numerous hermeneutic detours through 
the language of others to find itself enlarged and enriched by the journey.‖ (Kearney, 
2004, 2) That said, in this thesis we will see how the self of a little boy and a little girl 
returns ‗home‘ from the/a house in Paris, driven again in a swerving taxi, having 
accomplished its journey through the personal and cultural discourses of the father, the 
mother and the stranger, where the guiding lines of The Strand Magazine are no longer 
needed and lost. We will too see eponymous Eva Trout on her own personal journey 
through the concatenations of lives, texts and discourses. Bearing this in mind, the 
conclusion will be sought following the idea that all meaning is inter-subjective but 
never objective or radically relative, that is subjective. Through Ricoeur‘s and Bowen‘s 
work we will try to see how the  
 
narrative understanding provides us with both a poetics and an ethics of responsibility in 
that it propels us beyond self-reference to relation with others. (. ...) This extension of the 
circle of selfhood involves an ‗enlarged mentality‘ capable of imagining the self in the 
place of the other. (Kearney, 2004, 173)  
 
In feminist studies, the iterability of selfhood is most evident in the self‘s close 
relations to the other based on the concept of both devout care and autonomy. The self‘s 
hermeneutical detour through various discourses can, for instance, is rendered in the 
concept of motherhood, which characterizes the mother‘s infinite responsibility to the 
other. Similar to that, a post-modern ethical philosopher Emmanuel Levinas compares 
ethical responsibility to a maternal body that bears the other in the same without 
assimilation. In explicating this trope, he refers to a biblical passage in which Moses is 
like a ‗wet nurse‘ rearing ‗others‘ whom he has neither conceived nor given birth to. 
The child as the other is both part of and exceeds the confines of the self – the mother. 
In fact, the Catholic faith stretches this comparison to the New Testament where the 
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Church finding is compared to a maternal body whose head is represented by Jesus and 
the rest of the body by the Church‘s members in Diaspora on earth. The Church is too a 
mother and Jesus Christ simultaneously takes on the maternal function towards the 
Church‘s members. Drawing on the founding Christian concepts the construction of 
feminist has been enmeshed into the conceptualization of motherhood. It has been 
argued that femininity depends particularly on the concepts of ethical substitution and 
the material practice of mothering, where autonomy and sexual difference play a larger 
part. The relationship between the mother and the child are best found on the idea of 
reciprocal autonomy and relational care. Through the metaphor of suckling, as well as 
Christian partaking in Christ‘s sacrifice through the act of communion, both the mother 
and the child can be found within one another. The child when found within the mother 
can open up new paths to understanding identity. Elizabeth Bowen too writes that if she 
―could read [my] way back, analytically, through the books of my childhood, the clues 
to everything could be found‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 51). 
As in the mythos of motherhood, both on the private and public planes, the 
subject transcends itself in a detour from selfhood to otherness, dialogical response to 
the creation of a myriad of possible worlds.  
 
the original potential of any genuine myth will always transcend the confines of a particular 
community or nation. The mythos of any community is the bearer of something which 
exceeds its own frontiers; it is the bearer of other possible worlds. (Kearney, 2004, 123)  
 
The mythos of motherhood is the bearer of other possible selves and others. It carries 
the load of cultural investment in the categories of womanhood and selfhood through 
motherhood and care.  
Relatively, the very same mythos casts a new light on the modern Irish fiction 
written by women, of which examples can be found in writing by Emma Donoghue, 
Marry Morrisy, Mary Rose Callaghan, and Jennifer Johnston.  Their woman-authored 
worldview centres on an acute sense of inseparateness of childhood and adulthood. 
There the intertwinedness of concepts of the mother and the child informs personal 
narratives of trauma and violence, as well as underscores the discourses of mutual care 
and responsibility of indistinguishable subjects of the child and the adult in one female 
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body2. What arises is the idea of iterability of the subject that is mobile in constructing 
conjoined categories of representation. 
The idea of iterability implicates the subject‘s involvement with time for the 
purpose of narrative identification can be described as three-fold3. Its three-foldeness 
refers to its extra-temporal character as in Lyotard.  On the other hand, its three-fold-
ness present contradicts the idea of the contemporary. In this understanding, 
contemporariness is archaic and juxtaposes the idea of chronology. One may compare 
this non-contemporary understanding of the present to Nietzschean philosophy of the 
future. As a result, manifestations of the present are precisely past events or archaic 
problems. This may be best explained in the work of a feminist and literary critic Avital 
Ronell4 and her ‗posthumanist‘ philosophy. In her oeuvre Avital Ronell points towards 
a cyclical understanding of culture. She admits vaguely that what has been happening 
today has been happening for a long time now. In the three-fold understanding of the 
present, the emphasis is shifted from the present towards the process of narrativity, 
Nietzschean circle of events, towards the relationship the addresser develops with the 
addressee, or in other words the relationship the self develops with the other. Non-
contemporary present obliges the subject to deal with the mythoi, the symbols, the 
signifiers that transcendent the grasp of the cosmological present, whereas in fact their 
retaining their constant character since the narrative construction of self becomes a 
constant fact for the subject and a day-to-day necessity.  
The generative explanation of categories of historical memory – without which 
there is no actual knowledge – as proposed by Ricoeur corroborate Ronell‘s ideas since 
even ―traditionality means, in short, that ‗the temporal distance which separates us from 
                                                 
2 As Patricia Coughlan writes in one of her texts on Bowen ―Bowen‘s intense interest in childhood and its 
formation of the adult self is one of the most characteristic aspects of her vision, and potentially aligns her 
with Klein‘s pioneering work in child analysis‖ (Coughlan, 2009, 57). The unquestionable and 
undividable relationship between a child subject and an adult subject in one female narrative has been 
called by Melanie Klein a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the original paranoid-schizoid position informs 
all future relationships a subject fosters with others, where this very position is based on the relationship, 
either negative or positive, a child has with his or her primary caregiver, most often the mother. 
3 Paul Ricoeur writes in his Time and Narrative 3 Vols. (1983, 1984, 1984) about the idea of the three-
fold present developed by St Augustine in his Confessions and roughly understood as distention of 
temporality and selfhood towards God and the eternal life. 
4 See Avital Ronell, (2008) 
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the past is not a dead interval but a generative transmission of meaning‖ (Kearney, 
2004, 63). Generative transmission is yet another facet of maternity based subjectivity. 
However, this also makes one consider that many problems women and then feminism 
faced in the past are still alive. Similarly Ronell agrees that what is happening nowadays 
may have been triggered by what has already happened – it may be controlled by the 
political powers of the past or by linguistic constructions of the past5 , which in our case 
inevitably signify time-penetrating powers of the phallic hegemony. Following Slavoy 
Zizek‘s pronouncement on the modern world, there has never been a society that, at the 
level of individual and communal micro-practice, was regulated to such a great extent6. 
There has never been a society whose subjects found their performative practices so 
much controlled. According to Zizek, the notion of censor operations of state 
apparatuses is based on the presupposition of Lacan‘s paradox where God is considered 
dead at hand of the ever-growing necessity and obligation of every subject to be one‘s 
own god. Curiously, in such cultural discourse almost everything becomes prohibited to 
facilitate the subject‘s quest for pleasure. Such is the paradox of modern permissiveness 
– one is obliged to achieve absolute pleasure, according to nowadays‘ extreme 
materialism, and yet to do so one finds oneself in a totally controlled and regulated 
society. The modern pleasure principle is criticised by Bowen in that her female 
characters find themselves cast into the growing paralysis of ‗what next‘ – if they reject 
matrimony, as in The Hotel (2003b) or The Last September (1998c), they are unable to 
enact any other role, and their seem castrated of their generative power. What becomes 
obvious is that, in Bowen‘s fiction, one should take on the responsibility for not only 
present and future, but the past too. As to the modern times, Zizek explains that 
nowadays maximal fulfilment is obligatory but without the dangerous aspect of it: Colin 
Powell‘s idea of war without war, or virtual sex without sex. If one agrees with this 
hedonistic vision of the reality based on the Nietzschean idea of the lust man, where 
                                                 
5 One may find parallel interest about the operations of the past and ―desiccation of reality‖ in Bowen‘s 
longer and shorter fiction. 
6 Zizek expresses his preoccupation with hegemonic ideologies operating on the subjects on many 
occasions. The example of the micro-practice and control was given during Zizek‘s lecture at The 
European Graduate School in August, 1999 in a talk entitled ―The Super Ego and the Act.‖ 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/the-superego-and-the-act/ 23 April, 2009. For further 
reading on the concept of ideologies and subjectivity see Slavoj Zizek, Mapping Ideology (1995). 
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everything is permitted but deprived of its substance – the implications for gender 
practices need to be considered, especially at the level of female category and 
construction of femininity or motherhood. Casting away the responsibility for the other 
can produce a ghetto of fairly homogeneous feminism. It follows that, in feminism, this 
can be expressed as the idea of regulated liberties, which ―echoes the concern expressed 
by Butler and other feminist theorists urging one to think of political agency and change 
within gender norms in non-propositional terms‖ (McNay, 2000, 58). Regulated 
liberties echoes what Avital Ronell calls after Wordsworth ―the legalized exclusion‖7, 
which has characterized the marginal character of women over the centuries. Through 
peaceful assimilation of the tools of hegemonies into colonized territories, this process 
―provides a way of obviating simplified theories of oppression and is useful for an 
understanding of what are perceived to be significant assertions of women‘s autonomy‖ 
(McNay, 2000, 58). It is only through the actual materiality of concepts and language 
that language can triumph over the concept, including the concept of a subject. This can 
only be carried out through the force of a critical clearing and does not imply the shell-
shock stoppage of devastation. 
Many terms that refer to the dynamic character of identification have already 
been mentioned. Among them there should be re-mentioned the hermeneutics of being, 
performativity and iterability of the subject. The question of iterability echoes that of 
narrative identity and can best be described as a movement to and from or from the 
inside towards the outside epitomized in Virginia Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse (2000) and 
the contradictory movements of Lily and Mrs Ramsay, as in constantly opposite 
fluctuations of the category of mother and daughter in the process of identification. 
Iterability stands for the reiteration of subjectivity while repeating given acts that 
position the self by reference to a previous pattern of behaviour recognized by 
significant others. Hence, identity forms certain behavioural patterns of performativity, 
which the others are expected to read so as to build a sense of our narratives. Iterability 
of socially accepted behaviours as well as gender performativity have been at the core 
of Judith Butler‘s philosophy of identification and engenderment. The salient thesis of 
her work is that gender is performed rather than directly inborn, so that ―identity is 
performatively constituted by the very ‗expressions‘ that are said to be its results‖ 
                                                 
7 See, William Wordsworth The Prelude (1850): ―All institutes for ever blotted out, that legalized 
exclusion, empty pump Abolished, sensual state and cruel power.‖ (Wordsworth, 2004, 351)  
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(Butler, 1990, 25). According to the theories of reiteration that are based on Nietzschean 
nihilism of being there is no being behind the doing of it. In Bodies that Matter Butler 
develops her theory of relationship between the concepts of iterability and 
performativity,  
Performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and 
constrained repetition of norms. And this repetition is not performed by a subject; this 
repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes the temporal condition for the subject. 
This iterability implies that 'performance' is not a singular 'act' or event, but a ritualized 
production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of 
prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and 
compelling the shape of the production, but not, I will insist, determining it fully in advance 
(Butler 1993, 95). 
Butler suggests in both of her shorter texts entitled Critically Queer and 
Melancholy Gender, that the child/subject‘s ability to grieve the loss of the same-sex 
parent as a viable love object is barred. According to Freud and his notion of 
melancholia, such repudiation results in a heightened identification with the other that 
cannot be loved. This again results in enacting gender performances which allegorize 
and internalize the lost love that the subject is subsequently unable to acknowledge or 
grieve. As such masculinity is based on the idea of conceptual avoidance where  
a masculine gender is formed from the refusal to grieve the masculine as a possibility of 
love; a feminine gender is formed (taken on, assumed) through the incorporative fantasy by 
which the feminine is excluded as a possible object of love, an exclusion never grieved, but 
‗preserved‘ through the heightening of feminine identification itself. (Butler, 1993, 25) 
 
In this situation narrative presentation of subjectivity complements Butler‘s use of 
temporality in performance since we may infer that Butler‘s model is overly invested in 
the idea that subjectivity is a process of sedimentation in time. It thus weakens the over-
all project to liberate the concept of female agency from the monolithic concept of 
Freudo-Lacanian lack. Whereas in Butler the focus of the analysis falls on the discursive 
production and types of self-representation, in narrative identification this shifts towards 
time frames in which performance and performativity happen. What this makes visible 
are the operations of agency within a hostile discourse – life happens and concatenation 
continues. 
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 Recently, Butler has shifted her attention towards the issue of fallibility of 
narrativity. She has posed a question of what it means to give an account of oneself if 
one is not transparent to oneself, if either one‘s language is not understood or one does 
not speak the language of discourse fluently enough. She asks a questions about the I – 
whether it is accountable for its accountability, when it seems the least stable element in 
narration - the structures of address and the other (the addressee) being the other two 
important elements in narrativity. Butler‘s discourse on identification and engenderment 
has a tendency to shift from positive criticism of narrativity towards the criticism of it. 
She very often focuses on the negative aspects of dialogism, where there is an obvious 
failure between the addresser and the addressee visible in asymbolia, melancholy or 
problems with accountability for what the subject has given an account of. According to 
Butler, melancholia experienced by the subject is the result of the laceration of the 
super-ego. In melancholia, the other who is marked as lost becomes part of the super-
ego of the subject. For instance, Freud noted that in melancholia the subject continues to 
commune with the other internally. In psychoanalysis, this is mirrored by the conflicting 
relation the child has towards the mother – especially the female child, whose violent 
insertion into maturity, thus phallic discourse, has forbidden her to mourn the lost 
territory of the maternal semiotic8. This difficult relationship between the female child 
and the mother is made worse where the female child becomes a mother herself and 
sees the phallic definition of motherhood imposed on her maternal practices. Now she 
needs to devote herself to the child like the Madonna to Christ and take pleasure in 
emulating herself for the other. It may be that to emend the trauma emphasis needs to be 
given to re-experiencing/re-living childhood again and re-finding the body of the buried 
mother. Kristeva writes that in the process of childbearing the woman becomes re-
united with the body of her own mother. Otherwise, melancholia or in other words the 
refusal to mourn, can set and result in what Freud called moral masochism – either 
murder or suicide according to Judith Butler. That said, one may question the origins of 
                                                 
8 In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva finds intertextuality functions within the semiotic chora, 
that is the womb or receptacle of becoming, a space of pre-linguistic, prelapsarian plenitude initially 
totally identified with the maternal body. It is through this relationship towards the semiotic chora that  
women manage re-configuration of the male author‘s anxiety of influence into a female affiliation 
process, in which ―(…) the daughter of too few mothers, today‘s female writer feels that she is helping to 
create a viable tradition which is at last definitively emerging‖ (Gilbert and Gubar, 1984, 50). 
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matricide and whether it is an essential step on a child‘s development towards maturity 
or whether it is a mere result of phallic politics against mourning the loss of the mother, 
the loss of the semiotic where the self co-exists peacefully with the other. Even though 
identification and subjectification have been based on operations of narrativity, it by no 
means signifies a peaceful and reciprocal relationship between the I and the other. 
Judith Butler notices that very often the I constructs itself at the expense of the other. 
The life of the I is the result of the death of the other. Women are not expected to mourn 
the loss of their singularity but rather to rejoice in their emulation for the other. The 
female claim for subjectivity provokes crisis. Those who survive the insertion into the 
father‘s parole develop a discourse of uneasiness of those who endure the phallocentric 
oppression. It may well be said that this uneasiness in part contradicts what Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar supported as the first version of female affiliation complex in 
The Madwoman in the Attic (1984), where ―the son of too many fathers, today‘s male 
writer feels hopelessly belated‖ (Gilbert, Gubar, 1984, 50) and the daughter feels 
strengthened thanks to her heritage. More influenced by the work of Harold Bloom, 
Gilbert and Gubar came to see poetic influence as what Freud called anxiety-principle 
or melancholia. 9 
In response to Helen Vendler‘s criticism of Feminism and Literature: An 
Exchange Gilbert and Gubar write  
 
as we noted in a chapter of The War of the Words10 entitled ―Forward into the Past: The 
Female Affiliation Complex‖ rivalry between women is fostered both by a need for 
                                                 
9 See also ―Forward into the Past: The Complex Female Affiliation Complex‖ (In Historical Studies and 
Literary Criticism. Ed. Jerome J. McGann. 1985, 240-65) – here Gilbert and Gubart reconsider their 
understanding of the female affiliation complex and grant it a more Bloomian reading. They offer women 
three ways of dealing with authorial anxiety. The first one is identification with the male precursor, the 
second one is rejection of both paternal and maternal influences; the third one is embracing maternal 
tradition.  
10 In No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century: The War of the Words 
(1989) Gilbert and Gubar focus on the demise of any single normative definition of the feminine and the 
rise of masquerades of femininity amounting to female female impersonation as well as later male male 
impersonation. 
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(exclusive) male approval and, more importantly, by an anxiety about the contamination 
associated with a shared oppression. (Gilbert, Gubar, 1990)11 
 
Following that of Judith Butler, today‘s female author feels belated by her 
experience of oppression and a growing uneasiness she came to feel towards those 
women who engage in commonly accepted female practices. It is not only that in 
maturation a subject jettisons parts of itself to strengthen the borders of its super-ego, it 
too jettisons the other, obliterates it to construct itself at its expense and in opposition to 
the other. Furthermore the operations of melancholia not only put in question the 
subject‘s relation to the other but also the subject‘s truthfulness to itself. In performing 
gender and identity the subject may remain unfaithful, opaque and incomprehensible to 
itself, as Butler has highlighted.  In narrativity, the story we tell and how we tell it may 
be untrue to whom we really are. And yet, even though many times incomprehensible, 
the path to self-understanding may be in constant re-telling the story – ―the self comes 
to know itself by retelling itself‖ (Kearney, 2004, 110) in diverse performative 
practices.   
Faced with a lack of linguistic proficiency or transparency, the subject is 
equally obliged to engage in a circle of interpretation using hermeneutic of imagination, 
which ―provides us with projects of action‖ and which faces ―back to the being that is 
revealed and forward to the language that is revealing‖ (Kearney, 2004, 41). Kearney 
writes that, 
  
Imagination can be recognized accordingly as the act of responding to a demand for new 
meaning, the demand of emerging realities to be by being said in many ways (…) the poetic 
image places us at the origin of the speaking being (…) and respond[s] to the desire of 
being to be expressed. (Kearney, 2004, 40-41) 
 
The hermeneutic imagination does not merely rely on linguistic analysis of the texts, 
which for various reasons may be impossible for the subject to convey, but it opens up 
onto different worlds and texts. As Ricoeur writes in his De l‟Interprétation: essai sur 
                                                 
11 This citation comes from an exchange of a series of critical letters between Gilbert, Gubar and Helen 
Vendler. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/3531 - Feminism and Literature: An Exchange. Felicia 
Bonaparte, Susan Gubar, Sandra Gilbert, Camille Paglia, Vol 37, nº13, 16 August, 1990. Retreived 
August 13, 2007. 
24 
 
Freud ―expressivity of the world comes to language through the symbol as double 
meaning‖ (Ricoeur, 1965 in Kearney, 1998, 151). Performativity is an art of double 
meaning, the iterability of a sign and a symbol is an event when  
 
language produces composite signs where the meaning, not content to designate something 
directly, points to another meaning which can only be reached (indirectly) by means of this 
designation. (Ricoeur, 1965 in Kearney, 1998, 151) 
 
In a similar fashion subjectification is also based on the processes of iterability. 
A detailed analysis of iterability of a subject can follow two separate and yet 
complimentary and equally dynamic tropes. The first trope runs through Deleuzian 
postmodern epistemology of being as a desiring machine - an open-ended entity whose 
identity depends strictly on fluid and ever-mutating connections between other entities 
as will be explained later in this chapter. If analyzed separately constituting elements of 
systems, according to Deleuzian materialism, remain meaningless. To feminism 
Deleuzian thinking offers a chance of theorising the difference and becoming a category 
free from its previous patriarchal encumbrances. The second trope of iterability is the 
trope of narrativity of the self – the ipse-dynamic self, ―where the subject becomes, to 
borrow a Proustian formula, both reader and writer of its own life. Selfhood is a cloth 
woven of stories told‖ (Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004, 108-109). This trope too includes the 
elements of mutability and change but it retains a special kind of moral compromise 
towards the self. It has a compromise of  
 
enduring identity of a person, presupposed by the designation of a proper name (…) 
provided by the narrative conviction that it is the same subject who perdures through its 
diverse acts and words between birth and death. (Kearney, 2004, 108) 
 
   This understanding of selfhood not only focuses on the future but offers feminism a 
chance to re-examine its past, thus diversity, in constructing present stories. 
In Ricoeur, hermeneutics of narrative identity is based on Heidegger‘s notion 
of temporality as the crucial element to mould subjectivity. To him, identity is made up 
of stories told and stories received. This on its part bases itself on the idea of a human 
subject being capable of constant questioning oneself being able to reinterpret and 
acquire the stories that constitute one‘s identity and a manner they are told in. 
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Identification as a dynamic and temporal concept has long drawn attention of 
the younger generation of postmodern scholars in culture and literature. As an example, 
in ―The Repetition of Violence: Dialogue, the Exchange of Memory, and the Question 
of Convivial Socialities.‖ Couze Venn, whose research has long centred on the 
questions of identity and narrativity of the human subject, re-establishes the importance 
of narrativity percolating through the dyad of the self/other as in Ricoeur‘s oeuvre. In 
the theory of life narratives, Ricoeur‘s concept of narrative identity corroborates the 
discourse of being in its arbitration between  
 
the phenomenological and the cosmological apprehension of time, that is to say, the 
mediation between time as lived, inscribed in activities in the world, and encrypted (that is, 
at once inscribed and encrypted) in life narratives, and time in the singular, the intuition of 
a dimension that cannot be derived from the experiential but encompasses and transcends it. 
(Venn, 2005, 286)  
 
Narrativity is a dynamic process not only because of it being a dynamic 
exchange between two subjects but also because it is an active mediation between 
historical knowledge, epistemological judgement and political calculations without 
necessarily seeking any ‗objective reality‘. It is an exchange between the domain of 
existing practices and discursive practices that construct knowledge. Narrativity is of a 
similar structure to that of the hermeneutic circle as a closed circuit but in a constant 
forward motion. What drives narratives forward are the internal pressures for greater 
internal coherence. As such narrativity remains a-temporal at its core and at the same 
time temporal in its relation to the outside. It is propelled forward through the constant 
operations of forces from within and outside of it. Narrativity is hence a place of power 
production since in it both private and public discourses merge indistinguishably. With 
its shifting time frames, narrativity enables us to de-construct and re-construct the other, 
and through that the self, from the relational and ontological perspectives. For this 
reason the most private and unimportant stories transform themselves into stories of 
public importance – stories told in Bowen‘s fiction carry with themselves conscious and 
subjective narratives of critical character, directed at notions of femininity, power 
relations and identity.  
Owing to the operations of narrativity, which assents on the idea of mediating 
the past and the future through the present, the subject can overcome the problem of un-
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representability of time. Narrativity locates itself in the present – the present of the 
subject‘s mind and the subject‘s body (or rather the sum total of it) which is the voicing 
place for the meaning of the past and the future. By narrativity we ―express the lived, or 
phenomenal, aspect of the temporality of being‖ that can be designated as (Venn, 2005, 
287) finitude. We then shift it towards monumental temporality of being the so-called 
infinitude and that which St Augustine addressed as God‘s eternity. Even though 
philosophy aims at the metaphysical aspects of life, there is no denying that it opens up 
to a plethora of everyday discourses as identity representative. The discourses on 
femininity are constructed from everyday lives and experiences and have an urgent 
character. Since traditionally from the age of the Enlightenment women, among other 
marginalized groups such as the idiots and the children, are barred from having 
memories, their immediate surroundings and their bodies become the sites where the 
new women‘s discourse is created12.  
Narrativity is a means of uniting the place (Dasein13) of the subject‘s existence 
with the idea of monumental time through a detour of present, past and future. If, in 
general, the relationship the subject has with the other is volatile and changing over time 
and through different points of view – the binary opposition of the female and male 
subject forming the ethos of the phallocentric discourse undergoes the same changes. 
At the core of narrative identity lies the idea of temporal discontinuity that 
suggests that change and exchange between genders is uneven ―arising from the 
increasingly dysfunctional effects of the dominant economy of clock time for both 
women and men‖ (McNay, 2000, 112). Narrativity has a double effect on lives of both 
men and women, on one hand pulling their biographies apart, on the other trying to 
standardize them in an attempt to create legible meaning.  This reveals ambiguity of this 
process, ―the effect on the lives of men and women of having to negotiate this 
multiplication of narratives is ambiguous‖ (McNay, 2000, 112) and yet it may 
                                                 
12 This idea is tackled in the thesis in the chapter on Eva Trout and the spaces of alterity. 
13 In Being and Time Martin Heidegger describes Dasein as being-in-the-world (the word Sein standing 
for ‗being‘). In Dasein being and the world are reciprocally disclosed. What follows is that ―when Dasein 
does not exist – independence does not either‖ (in Bernard Magnus‘ Heidegger‟s Metahistory of 
Philosophy. Amor Fati, Being and Truth. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1970). Richard 
Kearney writes that Dasein means that ―Being must be (…) understood as a temporal horizon of human 
existence‖ (Kearney, 2004, 36). What is more, Dasein takes philosophy to embrace the idea of 
hermeneutics of existence. 
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contribute to a breakdown of traditional gender relations. As such narratives become 
―biographies in transition‖ (McNay, 2000, 113) where gender is negotiated to the extent 
the limits of our bodies offer. However, the idea of ipseity shows us that biographies are 
entangled with but not entirely reducible to corporeality (idem).  Following that of 
Simone de Beauvoir woman‘s body is body is one of the ―essential elements‖ but ―not 
enough to define her as a woman‖ (Beauvoir, 1972, 69). Corporeality is not lived in a 
straightforward manner but disrupted by temporality. The internal and external 
chronotopes merge in a process of mediation. The dialogue between ipseity and idem 
identity based on the non-adequation of the gendered self to a corporeal identity permits 
the possibility of autonomous action.  
Filtering narrative identity through the intricacies of gender relations is simply 
placing them within the limits of power relations, something that Paul Ricoeur fails to 
do. The feminist concern should fall onto the question of gender differences being 
transformed into social inequalities. The concept of narrative identity gains viability 
thanks to its translation into the public sphere. Similar to that, we see Elizabeth Bowen 
merges the dynamics of narrativity with a concern with power relations. In her ―Out of a 
Book‖, Bowen states that ―What applies to people, applies to books‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 
50), the narratives. She exposes the ―emergence, contestation and coexistence of 
narratives‖ (McNay, 2000, 115) as interrelated with ―cultural struggle and relations of 
illocutionary force‖ (McNay, 2000, 115). Bowen struggles to understand to what extent 
is narrativity equal to agency reduced to intentionality of subjects as opposed to its 
inevitable exteriorization and sedimentation within the social realm. It may be that 
women‘s narratives are not entirely integrative and liberatory and yet they are not solely 
a product of the hegemonic discourse. The co-existence of the I and the other during 
self-formation points to its reflexivity and thus subject position within a distinct 
gendered narrative. Women‘s narratives may not be entirely integrative and liberating 
thus as a result they lead to dis-identification as used to ―capture the ambiguities 
inherent to the process of identification through which subjectivity is stabilized‖ 
(McNay, 2000, 103). Judith Butler uses the notion of dis-identification, which 
symbolizes the relation to hegemonies ―as neither one of recognition and consent 
(identification) nor refusal and rebellion (counter-identification)‖ (McNay, 2000, 103). 
Dis-identification may be a key concept to understanding Bowen‘s creation of female 
characters in her longer fiction. Dis-identification is a relational view denoting 
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dislocation ―arising from the deployment of the tools and symbols of the dominant by 
the marginalized‖ (McNay, 2000, 103). That said, Bowen is by all means aware of the 
fact that human understanding is historically situated, making hers the claim that total 
objectivity is illusory and playing with this presupposition in creating her characters. 
Since the task of hermeneutics is to uncover the history and tradition, Bowen‘s 
challenge is to uncover the underlying dominant history and tradition behind her 
narratives. However, she makes no secret of her use of hegemonic culture, not so much 
in resignation in the face of its omnipresentness but in recognition of its 
interdependence on the marginal. As in Ricoeur‘s From Text to Action (1991) the past 
cannot free itself from the present as much as it is embedded in the same concept of 
innocence and care for the other  
 
Historical knowledge cannot free itself from the historical condition. It follows that the 
project of a science free from prejudices is impossible. (. ...) Man‘s links to the past 
precedes and envelops the purely objective treatment of historical facts. (Ricoeur, 1991, 76) 
 
Historical condition directs feminist interest towards temporal meditation on 
identity where it pictures the ―ebb and flow of the experience of sexual identity as it is 
mediated through other social roles and practices‖ (McNay, 2000, 111). Bowen reveals 
herself to be aware of the temporal complexity and discontinuity in her longer fiction, 
making to a disruptive effect of time as exercised over our lives in both her novels The 
House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes.  In Bowen, dis-identification is 
complemented by the idea of narrativization of the self when its self-identification is a 
means of reiterating autonomous subjectivity. 
In her work Bowen interweaves different temporal planes of cyclical and linear 
times - her discourse on women‘s temporality is on one hand embodied and on the other 
hand it makes claim to a different embodiment than that of a biological time as usually 
ascribed to women. 
Narrative identity finds fertile ground in the field of cultural studies where 
scholars attempt to re-asses their national narratives. In an essay entitled ―Telling 
Identity Stories: The Routinisation of Racialisation of Irishness‖ (2005) Elaine 
Moriarty, a sociologist at Trinity College, Dublin, focuses on a dialectical approach to 
discourses, narratives and identities in twentieth first century Irish culture of ‗the Celtic 
tiger economy‘. She bases her criticism on the premise of representational and 
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ontological narrativity being a crucial element in constructing a subject‘s identity. She 
writes that ―story telling is a mediated discursive practice whereby meaning is 
constructed through a relational communicative production between past and present, 
memories and imaginings, discourses and representations‖ (Moriarty, 2005, 6.914). In a 
similar manner, in ―Reclaiming the Epistemological ‗Other‘: Narrative and the Social 
Constitution of Identity‖ Somers and Gibson put forward an idea of 
 
distinguishing representational and ontological narrativity. While initially there was a 
preoccupation with narratives as modes of representing knowledge or explaining social life, 
more substantial claims about narratives propose that ‗social life is itself storied and that 
narrative is an ontological condition of social life. (Somers and Gibson, 1993, 38) 
 
From the idea of analyzing national and personal narratives, whose common 
denominator is that they are performative and iterable, as a fundamental move towards 
understanding identity formation, the concept of performativity of narratives is 
recapitulated again:  
Narratives in this way are more than informative, they are also performative as argued by 
theorists of narrativity such as Judith Butler (1990, 1993, 1997), Paul Ricoeur (199115) and 
Couze Venn (1999), who suggest that narratives are never fixed, they are subject to change 
at the moment of telling, they can be interpreted in new ways, enriched with new meanings 
or liberated of old ones. (Moriarty, 2005)  
 
As it has been mentioned, narrative identification is a dynamic process based 
on exchanging texts and performing or rather, after Jean-François Lyotard, ‗presenting 
roles‘. Even though we agree that the idea of performance is the founding one of the 
subject‘s singularity, the premise of depending on the operations of the other both from 
inside and outside is important too. According to Judith Butler performative narratives 
rely not so much on the existence of external audience but on the extent to which they 
                                                 
14 Here Moriarty comes close to Ricoeurian dialectical traditionality that creates its own idiom of identity 
based on the values of the past, the present and a belief in common future, as well as the rapport that the 
narrative and historical time manage to establish through the common concepts of suffering and action. 
Retrieved October 13, 2008 from website http://www.socresonline.org.uk/10/3/moriarty.html 
15 For further elucidation on hermeneutics and texts, the nature of meaning, of action, of interpretation 
and of subjectivity, see, Paul Ricoeur, (1991). 
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are repeated as discourse. Bodies that Matter, reject the idea of singularity of 
performance  
 
[P]erformativity is (...) not a singular ‗act‘, for it is always reiteration of a norm or set of 
norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status (...) it conceals or dissimulates the 
conventions of which it is a repetition (Butler, 1993, 12).  
 
This leads us to acknowledge the difference between the performative subject 
and its routinized performance. Repeated performances then have the cumulative effect 
of normalizing their own assertions. The less we question these norms the more 
successful they become at achieving authority as natural or ideal. If we return to 
Moriarty‘s research, the connection to normativity is a key concept to understanding the 
difference between performance as a singular act and performativity as routinised. 
Therefore, the performative subject cannot be separated from the normalised 
routinisation process of which it is a part, both as subject and object.  
 
This constitutive matrix is key to my argument that the enactment of narrativity is 
concurrently a mode of knowledge creation, the transmission of knowledge and the product 
of such power/knowledge systems. In this sense narratives are constitutive of the way we 
experience life (Butler, 1993), and as Ronit Lentin argues, narratives are also 
transformative, because in constructing the self, they can also bring about a transformation 
of society (Lentin, 2000, 101). Hence, Paul Ricoeur‘s (1991) assertion that life becomes 
human by being articulated in a narrative way enables me to theorize (...) as site where 
meaning is created and identity is constructed. (Moriarty, 2005, 2.9) 
 
The routinisation is an effect of the subject‘s urge to perform and becomes 
visible in all its textual practices. The idea of femininity must, therefore, be constructed 
from texts told, performed and received. Since on the outside textual practices are 
embedded into a temporal frame, they soon disseminate exposing the operations that 
constructed them, depending on, as Venn says ―the questions one asks, and on the point 
of departure and the point of arrival‖ (Venn, 1999, 120). As such, ―The tensions of the 
male/female bond are temporally conceived (…) and hence obviously volatile‖ (Butler, 
1993, 45). They are essential for the dialogical formation of identities but as they tear, 
they are a source of dissemination as well. Moriarty is right to reach back to The 
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Location of Culture in which Homi Bhabha sees the ambivalence of the self/other or 
self/stranger dyad. Henceforth, Moriarty writes that,  
 
Indeed, according to Bhabha the practices of classifying, separating and dichotomising 
contain the potential for their own destruction. The appearance of the stranger contributes 
to the quest for the rearticulation of identity and belonging, and at the same time provokes 
uncertainties around the fixity of the nation. (Moriarty, 2005, 7.4) 
 
The mother /child dyad has received attention not only from male postmodern 
scholars but from female scholars too, among them many feminists. As has been 
mentioned the mother/child dyad is most exemplary of the hermeneutic exchange 
between selfhood and otherness. It not only possesses a secondary character to the 
development of the self and other as already existing, but seems to be one of the 
primary processes in the subject‘s development. This is marked by the idea of abjecting 
the mother, as well as prior to that, semiotic habitation of the world of bliss designated 
as the maternal before entering the father‘s parole. If we understand the mother/child 
dyad founding of the self/other binary opposition, we are able to prove how turbulent 
these relations are. Carrying a possibility of dissemination and constitution, the 
categories of mother and child are both exclusive and inclusive. Owing to the 
deconstructive character that both of them exercise mutually, their position within the 
discourse can be extremely unstable and volatile. This contradicts the idea of stable 
centre and periphery that these concepts should form. As such, one should look at the 
mother/child dyad not as at a stable and exclusive binary but rather as a multitude of 
different discursive positions through which seeps a myriad of different power 
operations. Similarly to what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick postulates in her Epistemology of 
the Closet (2008), one must try to look beyond binary divisions and rather analyze the 
power effects they produce. To Sedgwick, it is unimportant to insist on deciding 
whether sexuality is a kind of natural given or a Foucauldian ‗historical construct‘. Of 
all, it is more urgent to see through the aftermath of such distinction. Henceforth, it may 
be useless to procure a unique definition of categories such as motherhood, gender, 
heterosexuality and homosexuality as these concepts are too volatile and multiple. It is 
of more importance to look at the processes of routinisation and institutionalization that 
shape our embodied existence and facilitate even the most radical and indeterminate 
actions. All gender and sexual categories serving as generalizing, they escape 
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categorization since they depend on far more factors than normatization of gender 
divisions and roles. And yet it goes without denying that they are most exposed to 
manipulation as they form a structure on which hegemonies rest and power relations are 
distributed. However, it seems far more productive and genuine (not to perpetuate the 
operations of generalization) to understand how individual subjects behave when 
enacting these categories in different social and temporal context. As Bowen says in her 
essay ―Out of a Book‖, ―It could lead to madness to look back and back for the true 
primary impression or sensation; (…)‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 53). As such one should rather 
strive to re-create ―what was created for me‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 53). 
As an example, gender to Judith Butler is a sum total of attenuated and 
politically coerced performativity. To Butler writing in Gender Trouble ―gender is an 
‗act‘, as it were, that is open to splitting self-parody, self-criticism, and those hyperbolic 
exhibitions of the ‗natural‘, that in their very exaggeration, reveal its very phantasm tic 
status‖ (Butler, 1990, 146-7).  The extent to which individual subjects are autonomous 
to exercise agency over determinate forms of social life should rather be measured. In 
feminism an interpretative engagement with certain lived dimensions of gender 
subjectivity is important simply to understand the social conditions of possibility for 
effective political agency. 
The concepts of autonomy and agency have long been criticized and baffling 
for modern feminism. The most recent voices have raised questions to what extent 
gendered identity should not be shifted to post-identity approach. McNay writes about 
this claim as paraphrased in her own words. Over the last few years, several influential 
feminists have argued that feminism should shift its focus from issues of gender identity 
in order to engage with a more general set of post-identity concerns. The claim is that 
the preoccupation with gender identity has enmeshed feminism in a politics of 
recognition which is too often essentialist and balkanised and which, ultimately, 
prevents feminists from engaging in broader democratic debates. 
To this McNay responds that post-identity cannot answer the issues of 
embodied experience of determinate subjects. At the same time it fails to explain agency 
as indeterminacy. Recently, a greater scholarly focus has fallen on the implications of 
the meaning of gender on concepts such as identity, autonomy and agency, where the 
reality of the post-colonial times is continuously delinated by the unresolved theme of 
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traditionality. One of the voices belongs to Alya Khan who rightly summs the original 
and much criticized meaning of unrelational agency  
 
as a capacity that can best be theorized as potentially exercisable by the abstract and 
discrete rational-logical individual-chooser of modernity - a figure that has been much 
criticized by feminists of many persuasions for its exclusivity and hidden masculine bias  
(not least because of its disembodied and socially disembedded nature. (Khan, 2006)  
 
If it is difficult to speak about autonomy within the feminist paradigm, 
especially taking that autonomy and agency are the terms from masculine dominant 
discourse dictionary. Similarly, it is extremely difficult to talk about the idea of 
autonomy within mother/child relationships. In a reference to this problem, Khan 
reminds us that many feminists ―have rejected the concept altogether, suggesting that 
any characterization will be inadequate for praxis aimed at eradicating women‘s social 
oppression‖ (Khan, 2006). As a result the concept of autonomy may be considered in 
feminist studies as conceptually forced and strained. Another American feminist who 
devoted most of her life to the four ‗f‟s‘: family, friendship, feminism and ‗f‘ilosophy, 
Marilyn Friedman says that: ‗a subject need not be absolutely unified, coherent or 
transparently and incorrigibly self- aware in order to exercise autonomy; she need 
merely have those traits to a sufficient degree‘ (Friedman, 1993, 220). Autonomy means 
in fact separating oneself from the bulk of essentialist feminist philosophy. But by doing 
so, we need to redefine the concept of autonomy against the popular male definition 
that, in the end, is too a fantasy and a fraud. Unfortunately, the idea of total autonomy, 
one‘s wish to distance oneself from- and reinforce one‘s individuality does not only 
form a typically masculinist discourse but is also an essential part of much of 
psychological aesthetics of the fin de siècle. Fiction about desire ―to be free from one‘s 
class, one‘s gender, one‘s marriage and reproductive function (…) to live aesthetically‖ 
(Gagnier, 2000, 53) tends to automatically be anti aesthetic ―showing how social 
institutions oppose the aesthetic life‖ (Gagnier, 2000, 53). Yet, the ideas of desire and 
ultimate individual need persist even in our consumer culture making a claim that after 
all taste is an exogenous concept, whereas desire, autonomy and agency precede it. 
Consumerism then, is a concept split between culturally controlled performance and 
initial autonomous desire independent of a need. The division between worker and 
consumer was traditionally gendered, the latter being female as an inevitably passive 
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element in the system of distribution of goods. However, through enhanced 
consumerism one may claim a way to a new discourse on agency autonomy, originally 
male concepts. Rightly so, in Bowen‘s fiction there is a passage from passive to active 
consumerism as a means of achieving of what Elizabeth Grosz calls ―an embodied 
subjectivity or psychological corporeality‖ (Grosz, 1994, 22). To have a building 
influence on the subject this concept needs to be redefined. In a newly sexed body the 
body of a consumer and a mother are a point at which agency, autonomy and desire 
meet. 
In Bowen‘s fiction, the concepts of autonomy, agency and desire are 
juxtaposed in analysis of two opposing ways of life – that of consumer who experiences 
operations of ideologies as relationships to the universe through commodities, and that 
of a mother. Furthermore the concepts of mother/child dyad, autonomy, agency and 
desire are understood to influence the concept of subjectivity and the concept of unified 
self.  
Developing the traits of empathy, nurturance, taking the role of the other 
necessary for good mothering is a far more challenging task. These are the very traits 
that often remain underdeveloped or atrophied in the men‘s life history. In motherhood, 
informed by the ethics of ‗care‘ like the concept of relational autonomy, the mother 
takes on the role as the other for the child – the other within, as opposed to the father 
who is an unequally concomitant outsider. It is through the mother that the world‘s 
operations of desire to achieve things through the other are installed, as admits Lacan. 
Within the figure of the mother, desire originally de-centered by the world‘s structures 
gains a centre again within the apparently inseparable mother/child dyad –oneself as 
another. According to Lacan, in their first year of life children try to phantom what their 
mother desires. In this cluster of similarities, mother‘s desire too is changed through the 
child‘s desire. In Lacanian analysis it obviously is the phallus that the mother desires for 
herself and so this influences the choices the child makes over time to procure a closer 
relationship with the father. Be it different for male and female child, the appearance of 
the father if highly questionable as to its role in imposing the father‘s parole, does bear 
a profound influence over the father himself. The father‘s desire is changed through the 
child. Within the attempt to move towards symbolic parenting, the man needs to 
become a mother rather than a father figure. As a result all categories are understood as 
relational. 
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Relational autonomy thus emphasizes two coordinates: on the one hand, the 
concrete and yet relational context forming values, desires, images (including self-
images) and, on the other hand, the space that is beyond this influence. Central for this 
space – and this makes up the autonomous dimension – are the capabilities of critical 
reflection and self-reflection as well as feelings, memory, and imagination. Relationally 
conceived autonomy thus does not imply that one creates values and desires ex nihilo or 
that one mysteriously escapes altogether from social influences but rather that one is 
able to fashion a certain response to it. Relational autonomy that hinges at the idea of 
fertile imagination is clearly intertwined with the dynamic and constructive character of 
narrativity of subject that has been traditionally banished from fostering memories. 
Imagistic thinking has a central role in self-reflection and self-construction. As Catriona 
Mackenzie writes in her ―Imagining Oneself Otherwise‖:  
 
We use mental imagining not only as a mnemonic device or to provide us with pleasurable 
relief from the humdrum of our daily lives but also as an aid in understanding ourselves and 
others. (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 127)  
 
Imagining has an affective and performative force influencing the bodily sensations and 
responses constructive of a narrative self. Drawing on our earlier discussion on time in 
imagining, namely in centrally imagining, experiential memory, and previsagement, the 
time merges into a three-fold present.  
In that Bowen approximates herself to ponder the process of self-definition 
which relies on the following elements: ―the point of view, the self-conception and 
values, ideas, commitments and cares‖ (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 133) that are of 
matter to the subject. Bowen‘s characters struggle with the dominant notion of stability 
that implies that the subject who ―is persistently internally divided or whose sense of 
self is seriously fragmented cannot achieve the kind of reflective equilibrium necessary 
for unified agency‖ (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 135). However, what Bowen sees is 
that the very concept of agency, and not the construction of subjectivity, remains faulty 
in the dominant discourse, the former having to be re-worked and re-thought to better fit 
the marginalized feminine cause. The question that Bowen poses refers to the character 
of the unity - what it means and when (if ever) it is achieved.  
In the introduction to The House in Paris (1976) A. S. Byatt writes 
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It is not simply authorial sleight-of-hand that gives Elizabeth Bowen the authority to open 
her fictional account of Leopold‘s origins with a claim that an imaginary mother, like a 
work of art, can tell the truth because she is not encumbered by either time or conventions. 
(Byatt, 1976, 11)  
 
Precisely, it is rather the idea that in imagination has an affective and 
performative force constructive of a narrative self. In the keywords of imagination, 
timelessness and unconventionality lies the subject‘s agency for greater self-definition 
and self-knowledge. Imagination, like art, has a role of self-understanding and self 
refection, and when not abstracted from oppressive socialization ―can erode competence 
at rational consideration by restricting person‘s capacities for imagining with sufficient 
sensitivity and seriousness major alterations in the prevalent gender system‖ (Benson, in 
Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 124). 
As a great advocate of art, Virginia Woolf wrote to her artist sister Vanessa 
Bell ―One should be a painter. As a writer, I feel the beauty, which is almost entirely 
colour, very subtle, very changeable, running over my pen, as if you poured a jug of 
champagne over a hairpin‖ (Woolf, 1947, in Goldman, 1998, 233-234). Writers, 
according to Woolf, do not attend art exhibitions ―to understand the problems of the 
painter‘s art. They are after ―something that may be helpful to themselves‖ (Woolf, 
1947, in Goldman, 1998, 139). What Elizabeth Bowen does is shift the category of a 
mother to the space of imagination so that she sublimes it into a poetic category capable 
of escaping ‗either time or conventions‘ enclosed in the categories and in fixed 
practices. Those who do follow the routes of conventional practices are, according to 
Virginia Woolf ―irresponsible dragon-flies, mere insects, children wantonly destroying 
works of art by pulling petal from petal‖ (Woolf, 1947 in Goldman, 1998, 139). The 
conventions of dominant discourses start to operate on us in early infancy. Bowen 
writes on the role of imagination and its origins in art,  
 
All susceptibility belongs to the age of magic, the Eden where fact and fiction were the 
same; the imaginative writer was the imaginative child (...) It could lead to madness to look 
back and back for the true primary impression and sensation. (Bowen, 1999k, 53) 
 
If one moves on to compare Bowen‘s literary choices, which result in so called 
‗fine-drawn sensibility‘ and the novel as object (A. S. Byatt Introduction to Penguin 
edition of The House in Paris), inexorably shaped and limited by its own internal laws‘ 
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to those of Vanessa Bell, one does stumble upon more similarities. Vanessa Bell‘s 
paintings are resistant in showing ―representations of observed objects‖ (Goldman, 
1998, 146). Jane Goldman writes that as Vanessa ―moves on from this period of total 
abstraction, her painting reverts to more naturalistic imagery, but ‗with hindsight her 
entire career bears down relentlessly on this point of technical and conceptual 
sophistication‖ (Goldman, 1998, 146).  Ultimately, Vanessa Bell finds herself unable 
―to abandon subject matter in favour of pure abstraction‖ (Goldman, 1998, 146). In a 
letter to Leonard Woolf she explains herself of her choices giving an example of a 
painting by Picasso, which inspired her emotions strongly: 
 
but it wasn‘t changed when weeks afterwards it was pointed out to me by chance that the 
blue was a lake. (. …) The picture does convey the idea of form, of what you call secondary 
form I suppose, but not the idea of form associated with anything in life, but simply form, 
separated from life.  As a matter of fact we do first feel the emotion and then look at the 
picture, that is to say, look at it from the point of view of seeing its tertiary form – at least I 
do. The reason I think that artists paint life and not patterns is that certain qualities of life, 
what I call movement, mass, weight have aesthetic value. (Goldman, 1998, 146) 
 
Elizabeth Bowen, too, struggles between the necessity of realist description and 
the generative value of aesthetic impression, 
 
Blurs and important wrong shapes, ridgy lights, crater darkness making the face unhuman 
as a map of the moon, Mrs Michaelis, like the camera of her day, denied. She saw what she 
knew was there. Like the classic camera, she was blind to those accidents that make a face 
that face, a scene that scene, and float the object, alive, in your desire and ignorance. (HP, 
118) 
 
To Bowen words, symbols used between lovers are also used for ‗their ring‘ not only 
their meaning. Literalness is deadly to love, art and life itself. Still, we grow up into the 
male discourse of action and ―talk between different races‖ (HP, 157) that is serious, 
where ―that tender stillness lovers employ falls flat‖ (HP, 157). If only we ―had learnt to 
dread that kind of talk‖ (HP, 157) – and Bowen does believe that our gender practices 
are learned and not innate – we ―would have suffered more‖ (HP, 157). 
If Bell considers that life in art has an aesthetic value she does not advocate art 
as pure mimesis but underlines its ability to give an extra quality or value to what we 
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find as something purely tertiary. She takes concepts from nature and reality and 
separates them from life. Similarly, Bowen draws from reality and social order and 
aesthetises concepts by either overdoing them in a grotesque way or creating characters 
that totally contradict the accepted order. Here, in the first group we may find her 
examples of dominant elderly femmes or children trying to imitate adults in their social 
behaviour. The second group brings Bowen‘s examples of motherhood or teenagehood 
at a conflict with reality. Vanessa Bell regards ‗flat patterns‘ as unconnected with 
movements inspiring artists. She sees life in circular modes, just as her sister Virginia 
who ascribes circular logic to that of orality and women‘s narratives (to be found in 
Montaigne16). One could easily impose order on such linear movements rather than 
move with their ‗pulse‘. Furthermore linear logic, the one that either moves vertically or 
horizontally, admits binary oppositions and all these Bell, Woolf and Bowen wanted to 
escape. To Bell form and content are not exclusive of one another and add up to the 
aesthetic emotions drawn from art and fiction. To Elizabeth Bowen, the old values and 
the new concepts are not exclusive of one another, showing the tension between them 
may be productive. Bowen‘s writing exposes the importance of subject and the subject 
matter over form, not creating purely an impressionistic fiction but fiction of significant 
                                                 
16 Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), ‗the father of anti-conformist French spirit‘, is known as one of the 
most influential writers of French Renaissance and a direct influence on writers such as Descartes, 
William Shakespeare, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nietzsche and Virginia Woolf. His Essays (Montaigne, 
2004) are interplay between sceptical philosophical divagations and personal stories and anecdotes, which 
was later summed up by Montaigne in a statement ‗I am myself a matter of my book‘. His ‗What do I 
know?‘ question gave origins to his surprisingly modern dialectics of the self, later taken up by many 
philosophers among them Nietzsche. Montaigne was educated along a minutely tailored educational plan 
authored by his father. As such, Montaigne spent the first three years of his life among peasants to 
comprehend the simple people, whom he was to help thanks to his education. After tutorials with 
aprofesional teacher, Latin soon became Montaigne‘s first language resulting in Montaigne‘s reasonably 
late introduction to French and his curious attitude towards it. The purpose of education was to offer 
Montaigne a possibility of learning at the highest standards of his time but at the same time to make it his 
own choice, so that even as a young boy he would attend to books out of his free will – otherwise he was 
allowed to play freely. Montaigne was offered constant intellectual and spiritual stimulation in most 
modern ways of play, exercise and solitary meditation and  was sent to prestigious schools. He read law at 
university and entered a legal career. He also was an essayist and a translator. Montaigne‘s relation to the 
spoken, vernacular language, as well as, his informal style was of utmost interest to Virginia Woolf and 
her ideas on women‘s discourse. 
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sense of subject matter. In Bowen technique is related to the subject matter and in that 
she remains faithful to the illusion of a realist novel. Within this form one discovers the 
spuriousness of reality and the importance of the subject matter which add up to the 
overall meditation on subjectivity. The theme of passivity is connected to darkness and 
night according to Simone de Beauvoir. 
The theme of art as the preserve where the signifiers can be filled with new 
meaning has led us back to the motif of art and artist in Virginia Woolf, which she 
reinforced in her To the Lighthouse and A Sketch of the Past. Similarly, if we choose to 
believe that Karen‘s husband – Ray in The House in Paris stands up to his decision of 
giving Leopold a home – and ―his first lesson in spatial liberation‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 
248) Leopold may become a subject that through the language of the father posits itself 
in the space where the mother could have been, ‗semiotizing‘ itself into the economy of 
dominant heterosexuality, safeguarding that way an apparent happiness. That said we 
may cite Kristeva on paternity as necessary to compensate and belittle ―the archaic 
impact of the maternal body on man‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 263)17,  
 
The maternal figure increasingly appears as a module, a process, present only to justify this 
cleaved space; she is again the ergasterion, privileged space and living area. Moreover, the 
very human, that is, psychological passion between adult and child seems to be displaced 
from woman toward a man. (Kristeva, 1980, 264) 
 
We see Ray as occupying the paternal space, empty and to be filled, ―And there had 
been his father. He [Leopold] expected her account of what is really (…)‖ (HP, 67) 
Without any doubt, if male autonomy stands for integration and steadfastness, 
mothering and begetting of a child disrupts the subject‘s unity in a new and lengthy 
subject constitution process. According to Nancy J. Hirshman before agreeing upon the 
concept of autonomy, women must first decode the concept of freedom. Hirshman says 
that ‗in order to determine what that might be, women must be freed from the multiple, 
intersecting and overarching, barriers that pervade patriarchal society‘ (Hirshman, 2003, 
39). In order to do that, women must become aware of the masculine discourses 
underlying culture and society as well they must define the term of freedom according 
                                                 
17 Kristeva believes that the paternal figure enters to curb the overpowering jouissance but also its 
‗terrorizing aggressivity‘ when a man needs to admit his fear of the maternal body but also the trauma he 
experiences at separating from it – ‗a threat that he immediately returns to that body‘ (Kristeva 1980, 263) 
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to feminism. Khan, however, decides to continue her analysis of autonomy that she 
understands as ―self-governance and self-determination‖ (Khan, 2006). That said 
however, ―when thinking about changing gender identities, it seems to me that an 
account of autonomy may be extremely valuable‖ (Khan, 2006) maternity seems to be a 
more complicated matter. Relational autonomy appears as the key concept reinforced in 
the writing by Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar that offers some insight on the 
matter in their co-edited work entitled Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on 
Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self18. Furthermore, developing the idea of relational 
autonomy in society, Elizabeth Sperry writes on relational autonomy in her 
―Foucauldian Power, Relational Autonomy, and Resisting through Friendship‖:  
 
Relational autonomy theorists contend that autonomy is fundamentally social in nature. Far 
from requiring a complete independence from others, autonomy is made possible only 
thanks to forms of dependence and interaction with others. First, in our society potentially 
autonomous agents are constructed as such only through extended periods of dependency 
on others, usually in family settings. Indeed, insufficient or ineffective nurturing during 
childhood makes more difficult the attainment of autonomy in adulthood. Certainly others 
must provide food and shelter in order for young children to be able to attain autonomous 
adulthood. But young children are not merely physically dependent on others; they must be 
taught language, various behaviours, the rudiments of self-control, the concept of values, 
the resources of their culture, and the possibility of relations with others. The development 
of autonomy is thus not possible in the absence of social relations, including relations of 
dependency. (Sperry, 200519) 
 
She insists that to become autonomous we need to engage into relations with 
others – autonomy is thus developed against the other but from the close relationship 
with the other. In her paper on human dialogue Sperry continues that:  
 
Second, adult autonomy is maintained in relationships with others. It is difficult to imagine 
a would-be autonomous agent successfully maintaining her sense of self in the absence of 
all human interaction, not only because the psychological costs of absolute loneliness 
would be immense, but because an agent continues to work out her sense of self through 
social interaction. Linda Barclay notes that ―our ongoing success as an autonomous agent is 
                                                 
18 See, Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self at 
International Society for Universal Dialogue Sixth World Congress: Humanity at the Turning Point: Re-
thinking Nature, Culture and Freedom. Helsinki, Finland, 2005) 
19 Retrieved May 13, 2007 from website: http://isud.org/Sperry.DOC 2005 
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affected by our ability to share our ideas, our aspirations, and our beliefs in conversation 
with others. It is unlikely that any vision or aspiration is sustained in isolation from others. 
(Sperry, 2005) 
 
To Elizabeth Sperry, also the concepts of temporality and consequently 
narrativity are important: 
 
 
We rely on others for emotional support, for intellectual interchange, and to supply the 
context in which many of our own projects can be pursued. Autonomous agents have 
various goals and desires—to publish a book, to maintain a healthy marriage, to invest 
wisely for retirement, and so on—which require cooperation from others. Additionally, 
each of us continues to alter our sense of self and our life plan in response the input and 
actions of agents around us. (Sperry, 2005) 
 
Social practices are highlighted too – again discursive only thanks to contextualization: 
 
Finally, the self‘s own concepts and values are made possible through social organization. 
This differs from the developmental point that we learn our culture‘s language, concepts, 
values, and available life plans in early childhood socialization; the claim here is that these 
elements themselves are culturally created and sustained. The very words and meanings we 
use to reflect on our preferred path of individual self-development are ―constituted by social 
practices,‖ as is the value of reflecting on our own self-development. Social practices are 
necessary for autonomy in that they produce its raw matter. (Sperry, 2005) 
 
It is through the relation to the other that we are able to create our narrative 
self-constitution. As Bowen writes in The Last September, we ―further penetrate each 
other mutually in the discovery of lack‖ (Bowen, 1929/1998c, 166). Yet the question of 
re-identification remains the same – ‗what makes someone the same person over a 
period of time, or more adequately during their lifetime‘? 
 An analysis of one‘s ongoing narrative of embodied subjectivity is necessary 
to encompass one‘s claim to identity. One can choose the so-called ‗longer route‘ in 
engaging into the three models of relating oneself with the other that is translation, 
narrative hospitality and forgiveness. This too corresponds to experience, description 
and abstraction. Autonomy is necessary in the process of reinterpreting the stories of the 
other as one‘s stories, even through undergoing and suffering. 
Autonomy again takes us back to the aporia of selfhood and otherness as well 
as problems of defining the boundary between the self and the other. This owes itself to 
the statement that one‘s personal discourse constantly merges with the discourse of the 
other and that we are all subjects in each other‘s stories. By no means is it possible to 
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define that which belongs to the preserve of the selfhood and that which belongs to the 
preserve of otherness. Like in translation, it is impossible to draw a fine line between 
the source and target languages but rather it is necessary to acknowledge the idea of 
approximation over time. One may even ask whether there is such a thing as selfhood 
and otherness – consequently what is that we call natural for a category and what is that 
we call an imitation of a category, based on the constant interaction of oneself with 
otherness. Elizabeth Bowen too seems preoccupied with the problem of imitation in the 
context of war-time experience responsible for ―the dislocation and the dispossession of 
a whole society‖ (Lee, 1999, 228). ―All we can do is to imitate love or sorrow‖ writes 
Bowen in her short story ―The Happy Autumn Fields‖. Hermione Lee finds it to be a 
―the language of wartime London‖ (Lee, 1999, 154) that is ―disjoined and ugly‖ (Ibid, 
1953) and about ―displacement and alienation‖ (Ibid, 152), as well as ―the thin 
inadequateness of the present‖ (Lee, 1999, 153) Similar mood can be felt in Bowen‘s 
radio play of 1946, where a young soldier finds himself conversing with Trollope about 
his adoration for fiction. ―We‘re homesick (...)‖ (Bowen in Lee, 1999, 180); selfhood 
needs the other, a point of reference –we long for imitation, for a stable narrative – 
otherwise our lives become imitations. The lack of the other amounts to a failure in 
certainties – there is no translation of feelings between the receiver and the sender. The 
discovery of alterity-within in Bowen‘s fiction prepares characters to relate to the other 
as other. 
In her text ―Word, Diyalogue and Novel‖ Kristeva pronounces herself on the 
concept of intertextuality that considers any text to be ―a mosaic of quotations (…) the 
absorption and transformation of another.‖ (Kristeva, 1987, in Moi, 1985, 37) Discourse 
production is, according to Kristeva, a rewriting, a quoting of the other – it is an active 
process of interaction/adaptation with/to the other, bargaining the meaning of words and 
concepts. Within this process of adaptation Kristeva points to a discursive change from 
diachrony into synchrony. The binary discursive schema of diachrony/synchrony is 
replaced by a synergic flow of information – equal for the dialoguing sender and 
receiver. The flow can, however, be disrupted by what Bakhtin referred to as a plethora 
of additional meanings outside of the dialogue – ―between the word and its object, 
between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, 
alien words about the same object, the same theme‖ (Bakhtin, 1981, 276). 
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The process of enacting, translating and interacting with the other can 
symbolically be represented in the imagery of holding hands. The symbol of many 
hands intertwined may take on a deeper meaning if we understand it to be of similar 
nature to performative speech in J. L. Austin, or further, performative words, phrases 
and sentences as described by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick that extend the existing 
significations into new directions. Performative symbols can be ‗transformative‘, 
creating an instant change of personal or environmental status, or ‗promisory‘ 
describing the world as it might be in the future. And since selfhood stumbles upon 
different others their momentary meeting may result in, to use the linguistic terms, a 
happy or unhappy (felicitous/infelicitous) meaning, which cannot be described in 
qualitative terms of true and untrue. Felicitous and infelicitous escapes binary meaning 
of simplistic either/or because it does not imply immediately and externally regulated 
ethical paradigm. 
 If we look closely at the paintings analysed by Julia Kristeva in her 
―Motherhood According to Bellini‖ (1980), what strikes us at first glance is the 
recurring motif of hands as a symbol of positive motherly love as well as negative want 
of subjugation and power. Elizabeth Bowen‘s fascination with hands too seems to be 
embedded with different narratives in her longer fiction. In The Death of the Heart 
(1938) Irene, dying of cancer in a cheap unheated hotel is portrayed hand in hand with 
her daughter Portia. Despised and ridiculed by everyone, she transmits great dignity, the 
family she and Portia form is more ―holy‖ than the supposedly ―holy family‖ (Bowen, 
1938/1998a, 88) Major Brutt sees in the Quaines. Earlier in the novel, Portia is 
described sleeping in the same bed with her mother ―overcoming, as far as might be, the 
separation of birth‖ (Bowen, 1938/1998a, 88). When the imagery of hands is brought 
again into the text by Anna Quaine it is in a pejorative sense to demean late Irene, 
stripping her of any dignity. In a particularily cruel manner Anna is describing Irene as a 
small creature with little wet hands. The trope of a desire of union between the I and the 
other symbolised by the motif of hands appears in the narrative many times. The 
satirical description of Seale on Sea, the house of Anna Quaine‘s former governess and 
the step mother to Daphne and Dicky too has a turning moment of holding hands 
between Daphne and Eddy. Portia is sent to Seale on Sea when the Quaines decide to 
spend a holiday alone in Capri exhausted with Portia‘s burdensome otherness. We also 
find out that Anna herself had been orphaned at an age yet tenderer than that of Portia‘s 
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as we are given an opportunity to learn about Anna‘s photograph with a little kitten – 
holding it tight in a strangling manner. In The House in Paris the motif of hands appears 
again. Leopold stays with his hands tucked into his pockets in a moment of emotional 
breakdown. Hands are joined in the moments of passion, and they leave imprints on 
grass where lovers reveal their sentiments, they are scalded in foreshadowing conflict 
and they are described as gloved and fidgety in the case of secretive Naomi. The motif 
of joined hands, however, is the most obvious symbol of dialogism, since it 
metaphorically stands for a capacity to interact with the other – the capacity to embrace 
the other. 
Touching, holding hands etc are metaphors for relationships, consummation of 
love and male/female rite of enlivening their roles as such. In the middle part of The 
House in Paris, much of narrator‘s attention is given to Max‘s and Karen‘s hands and 
touching. Hands are central to the emotional landscape Bowen presents us with – hands 
are the revelation of everything that is beyond, something which is invariably remote 
and hidden. ―Karen‘s empty white gloves lay on the table between them; he turned one 
over, intently looking at it. Nerves in her fingertips began burning (…).‖ (HP, 136) 
Now, ―(…) he drew the cigarette from between her fingers (…) and with his fingers 
began to explore her hand‖ (HP, 145) 
It is not in vain that the imagery of hands gains ground over any other imagery 
in The House in Paris, for if we argue that the novel is a narrative of childhood and 
parenthood, it inevitably transforms itself into the narrative of self and other. In using 
the imagery of hands, Bowen does not only highlight the message of a possible union 
between oppositions, but also permits her characters to touch – touch and delimitate 
borders. Julia Kristeva writes about the concept of the abject disturbing borders in The 
Powers of Horror,  
 
How can I be without border (...) in that compelling, raw, insolent thing in the morgue's full 
sunlight, in that thing that no longer matches and therefore no longer signifies anything I 
behold the breaking down of a world that has erased its borders. (Kristeva, 1982, 11)  
 
Kristeva relates the lack of borders to the mother/child dyad, to the most 
originary opposition between I and other. This corroborates the imagery of holding 
hands in Bowen‘s The Death of the Heart and casts some interesting light on the 
importance that The House in Paris devotes to hands as both a positive and negative 
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symbol. Hands elicit both disgust and horror precisely because they explore the 
boundaries of the body, the boundaries of the self and the other - the notion of the 
border as a site of demarcation and undecideability between the self and the other. 
Furthermore, modern feminist criticism has spoken extensively about the 
prominence and power of the male gaze (Rosie Braidotti, Judith Butler) as well as the 
masculine hierarchy of the senses giving advantage to the sight over the touch as 
rendered in Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenological account of a man becoming immune to 
all sexual stimuli supplied to him via the sense of sight. Of the five senses, touch is the 
most physical, tangible, and intrusive – it draws the attention to the ancient divide 
between the feminine soma and masculine psyche. It also points towards female 
sexuality as more sensitive to touch rather than sight. However, a deliberate use of the 
imagery of hands and touch can become a ground for a contradiction to the hierarchical 
relations within the binary system of patriarchal thought. Women, traditionally the 
passive receptors of masculine action, can become the agent of action in space – a space 
demarcated by female aesthetics. This contradicts the idea that women can only exist in 
a state of arrested suspension or stasis – it contradicts patriarchal gender differentiation 
between female passivity and masculine activity.  
In Bowen hands will not be reduced to offering a maternal support, nurturing 
life tenderly - they are given engendering powers, they are given an equal status in the 
dialogue between the I and the other. They will be masterful in the sense that they wil 
become the vehicle for transgressing the abjectable where leaving the mark on the grass 
is both the privilege of Karen‘s and Max‘s to create  performative neologisms in a new 
discourse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
2.  Feminism. 
 
Rubin Gayle, in her ―The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‗Political Economy‘ 
of Sex‖ (1975) engages in an extensive analysis of female oppression as perpetuated 
throughout the centuries by the phallocentric hegemony. She bases her analysis on the 
idea that the founding sex/gender dyad that divides men and women into centres and 
peripheries respectively is a limiting mode of production enmeshed into discourses in 
all societies and clearly aimed at subordinating and objectifying women. Through the 
concepts of gender and compulsory heterosexuality women, according to Gayle, are 
consigned to a secondary position in the father‘s parole, where the marginalized and 
peripheral discourse is that of the mother. Another influential feminist theorist Nancy 
Chodorow approximates herself to Gayle‘s theory admitting that it is through women 
and their role as mothers that the social organization of gender is centralized and 
defined. The child forms its ego in reaction to the dominating figure of the mother. It is 
also through the mother that the Oedipal and pre-Oedipal stages are enacted however 
with different results on men and women, where the former transit to take command of 
the symbolic, and the later are subjugated as the symbolic‘s passive elements. As Rubin 
continues, power distribution between the feminine and the masculine ―is implicated in 
the construction and reproduction of male dominance itself‖ (Gayle, 1975, 9) through 
subjugating of women into state defined roles of mothers and wives.  
Rubin Gayle starts her study of symbolic engenderment with an analysis of 
Freud and Levi-Strauss where she argues that neither of these men managed to resolve 
the issue of female oppression through their analyses of the unconsciously developing 
psyche. Instead both of the scholars used the category of woman as raw and discartable 
material in their analysis of phallocentric world. Gayle pursues the work of Engels, 
paraphrasing his ideas on social organization. On the materialist level, this explains how 
the society is divided into the public and private spheres. Any social organization, under 
which the people of a particular historical epoch and a particular country live, is 
determined by both kinds of production: the stage of development of labour on the one 
hand, and of the family on the other. Based on that, Rubin develops her argument of the 
kinship systems as well as the gift theory as founding of the dominant male discourse. 
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Kinship becomes a key term in Gayle‘s work and will be used here in the thesis as the 
propelling force behind the distribution of power in both The House in Paris and Eva 
Trout, or Changing Scenes with the inclusion of the incest taboo and the Foucauldian 
capitalist family cell.  In his founding study The Elementary Structure of Kinship Levi-
Strauss writes that exchanging women as a gift is an elementary and crucial element of 
forming social structures into kinship systems where male individuals with no 
biological affinities are bound together. Gift transactions are basic in all societies and 
marriage is seen as the most valuable of all.  With a gift of a woman kinship and blood 
ties are established which is far greater than other simple gifts of reciprocity. The 
exchange or traffic of women further creates a distinction between the gift and the giver. 
Traditionally it has been the male who gives and receives women, thus immediately 
creating the power distinction between the active giving/receiving party and the passive 
circulating one. In most societies, the women receive no benefit from the exchange and 
thus they are seen only as a conduit creating relationships between men.  
I would argue that feminist assertions of the commonality of women as a group 
as represented in kinship unwittingly contribute to the regulation of gender relations. 
And yet, membership of the class of women is not the inescapable consequence of 
biological femininity. As has been said in the previous section, gender identities are not 
expressions of an essential core but performances built from citations and imitations 
specific to a given context. In this way, performances that subvert, confuse, or ironize 
gender norms have the power to unsettle or even unseat those norms, as will be shown 
in the following chapters of this thesis.   
Furthermore, interestingly, the kinship systems were tightly related to Anglo-
Irish culture, which saw English Christianity try to erase the original patterns of social 
existence among the Irish (Backus, 1999). Similar to that, it is also within the paradigm 
of kinship systems that society functions in Bowen‘s fiction – the kinship of adults and 
the kinship of children, the kinship of women and that of men. Between these structures 
a practice of trafficking goes on. The kinship systems in Bowen‘s fiction construct their 
incest taboos and gift exchange patterns. Rubin understands incest taboos as  
 
 
the sexes into two mutually exclusive categories, a taboo which exacerbates the biological 
differences between the sexes and thereby creates gender (...) thereby enjoining 
heterosexual marriage. (Gayle, 1975, 178) 
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 And yet, in her last novel, Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes, Bowen raises the 
issue of inheritance from the father to the daughter, and to which extent the daughter 
can control the inheritance. Bowen finds in kinship systems obstacles constraining to 
women. Among them there are the asymmetrical theory of gift, giver and exchange, 
obligatory heterosexuality and the paradigm of empowerment of women. But 
controversial as it may seem, Bowen sees a possibility of empowerment and 
dissemination of male hegemony thanks to kinship inheritance and the power 
acquisition it implies. Without economic power, the Woolfian room of one‘s own and in 
case of Bowen the inheritance of one‘s own, Bowen‘s early writing shows a world 
where women are denied prestige, and more important, they have less control over such 
basic matters as their fertility patterns, their marriages (if, when and with whom), their 
premarital sex, their access to extramarital sex, their household activities, their levels 
and types of education, and their freedom to move about and pursue diverse interests. 
Thus, according to Bowen, economic power has important consequences for what 
women can, or cannot do in a society. This however remains safeguarded only with the 
category of man constructed under a prerogative that it should remain stable and 
centred. Should it become decentred by the issues of homosexuality, withdrawal from 
language or poverty, as in The House in Paris for example, the idea of stable exchange 
changes its character. A woman, according to the phallocentric discourse, lives as a 
foreigner; a man can never become one. With the apparition of the idea of foreignness, 
the category of male power is easily deconstructed as it too is enacted in performativity 
and may be ‗derailed‘ from its path of normative engenderment, through the operations 
of narcissism as will be postulated for both of the novels analysed here.  
The idea of de-masculinization of kinship systems and the male category in 
general through non-normative sexualities among men and narcissistic conflicts has 
been quite popular in theory. What should be noted is that the very prototype of male to 
male exchange has led critics to accuse the dominant hegemony of homosociality. Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick writes about this phenomenon extensively in her Between Men. 
English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire, which has been considered the 
founding tenet of Queer Studies. Sedgwick argues in her work that ―concomitant 
changes in the structure of male ‗homosocial desire‘ were tightly, often causally bound 
up with the other more visible changes‖ (in Chodorow, 1999, xiii). Kosofsky Sedgwick 
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postulates that the universally accepted and advocated patterns of male affinity, 
―mentorship, entitlement, rivalry, and hetero- and homosexuality‖ (in Chodorow, 1999, 
xiii) were directly related to class and social divisions and when dissolved could not be 
analysed without connection to women and gender structures. Feminist discourse in 
literature does not change theory or becomes feminist only by ―slotting mothering 
person, friend, or infant‖ (Lloyd, 2005, 113) into the places traditionally occupied by 
men. Bowen would certainly agree with the remark that ―what must come next is the 
challenge of thinking through what is involved in relations of interdependence‖ (Lloyd, 
2005, 113) building ―the desired re-conceptualization of the self‖ (Lloyd, 2005, 113). 
Ideally, a new discourse on identification, power and even violence distribution must be 
created to avoid a similar auto-destruction of the feminine subject. 
It follows that an attempt can be made in applying to Bowen‘s fictional 
discourse informative competence theory that has been used in feminist studies on 
women‘s autonomy. According to this theory mostly postulated by Paul Benson20, 
autonomy is an ability to perceive critically courses of action competently by relevant 
normative standards. Cultural competence is a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and 
policies that come together in a system or agency or among professionals and enables 
the system, agency, or professionals to work effectively in cross-cultural situations 
In her conscious analysis, an agent must feel in control of the normative 
language but she may not necessarily identify with it. As a result, an autonomous agent 
should be able to structure a critique of norms and see through their falsity. Relational 
and conscious autonomy of discursive literacy will be again key terms of this work that 
will encompass their textual consequences on the idea of motherhood, femininity and 
family. It is with Gayle‘s analysis of Freud, that our attention is shifted to children. 
During the Oedipal stage children are engraved with the conventions of sex and gender, 
psychoanalysis and its descriptions of sexuality are nothing more that the dominant 
discourses of social structures based on the theory of kinship systems. Since Levi-
Strauss‘ understanding of subject relies on the definition of its gender- ―the divergent 
                                                 
20 Based on Paul Benson‘s theories the self-determination that distinguishes autonomous choice and 
action consists in the reflective expression of the agent‘s deep and pervasive wants and values, where the 
agent has reflectively reaffirmed them. What the agent cares about deeply, on reflection, comprises her 
‗perspectival identity‘. Autonomous actions are those that arise, in appropriate ways, from reflective 
consideration of relevant elements of that identity. 
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social destinies of the two sexes can therefore be traced‖ (Gayle, 1975, 83). We have 
already said that the kinship system, on which a society bases itself according to Levi-
Straus, functions via the exchange of women between male subjects, creating therefore 
an oppressive system for female subject. Gayle‘s sex/gender systems rely strongly on 
the idea of children within kinship systems and their education in favour of obligatory 
patterns of sexuality. This idea goes parallel to Foucault‘s understanding of sexuality as 
an effect of the discursive operations of power and institutional indoctrination as well. 
In her conclusion on normative sexuality and kin Gayle therefore rejects 
psychoanalytical views defending the idea that human sexuality is of biological/libidinal 
origin. She, in her part, prefers to favour sexuality‘s social stratification – Bowenesque 
interest in social consequences and not the private ones. This analysis allows Gayle shift 
her attention from biology and dominant discourses on sexuality and move towards a 
broader understanding of gender discourses as expression of all aspects of human life 
and not simply the +/- phallic paradigm.  
The above analysis will help us go back to the earlier introduction on dialogical 
identification. In this work we will be able to move from self-referential Cartesian 
selfhood towards a dialogical understanding of identity as constructed within the 
self/other dyad. Sexuality, according to Gayle, is not merely derivation of gender, as 
noted earlier. Therefore, in the comparison of Rubin‘s and Ricoeur‘s studies we can see 
some similarities. In his Wonder, Eroticism and Enigma, Ricoeur distinguished three 
cyclical layers in the general understanding of sexuality. The first layer enclosed 
sexuality within religious myth and ritual. The second layer saw the separation of the 
sacred and the sexual during the rise of the great world religions – sexuality was 
restrained and pushed into a family cell to serve procreation of human kind. In recent 
years that are encompassed in the third layer according to Ricoeur, there was a move 
towards a transcendental and more spiritual understanding of sexuality, and yet it 
continues to be separated from the sacred. In psychology, sexuality rises to have great 
importance if forming a person and it has been argued that a mature subject recedes in 
his or her sexual relationships with others to achieve the wholeness similar to that of a 
mother-child dyad. Similarly Chodorow postulates that motherhood reproduces itself 
cyclically so that the relationships towards the maternal too have a cyclical character. 
That said if in anthropology founding kinship systems rely on sex/gender oppositions, it 
is of urgent necessity to take advantage of this characteristic. Hence, what Chodorow 
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may in fact postulate is not putting an emphasis of binary cyclical oppositionism, but 
rather, on the cyclical characteristics of female relational kinship visible in the operation 
of motherhood. Similarly, what we will find in Bowen is a cyclical iterability of a 
subject that in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes will gain a name of concatenation, where 
all discourses are interdependent and interconnected. 
As mentioned earlier, Margot Gayle Backus devotes her studies to the Anglo-
Irish context, writing a detailed analysis of literature beginning in nineteenth century 
and encompassing the modern times. In her work, Backus argues that the Anglo-Irish 
tradition perpetuates a myth of a national other through the operations of gender, 
sexuality and maturation. The Anglo-Irish tradition posits a ―seamless coherence 
between intrapsychic and national subjectivities, extending and replicating settler 
colonialist symbolic relations‖ (Backus, 1999, 19). What Backus notices as most 
prominent, however, is not continuity in the settler hegemony but rather a breakdown of 
the system, the cyclical Bowenesque concatenation. This she believes originates in the 
growingly appearing marginal discourses created by people of homosexual orientation, 
women and children, whose ―victimization is nowhere forbidden; what is forbidden is to 
(talk) about it‖ (Backus, 1999, 19). What permits the coming out of their voices is the 
breakdown synthesized by many internal tensions in creating ―an abstract national 
identity above local cooperation and identification‖ (Backus, 1999, 19). It originates at 
the breakdown of selfhood and otherness. This, in her study, Backus shifts to the 
creation of new gothic aesthetics. In this sense the gothic becomes associated with the 
metaphor of ―unauthorized margins of modernity‘s mutating dominant order‖ (Backus, 
1999, 15) returning into Irish literature through the Gaelic revival. Backus stance is 
corroborated in writings by scholars such as Judith Halberstam (Skin Shows: Gothic 
Horror and the Technology of Monsters, 1995), Anne Williams (Art of Darkness: A 
Poetics of Gothic, 1995), and Maggie Kilgour (Communion to Cannibalism 1990; The 
Rise of the Gothic Novel, 1995). Elizabeth Bowen‘s work too is informed by the 
aesthetics of the Anglo-Irish tradition, which Backus is prompt to use as material for her 
study. In her work Backus poses a more general question about the nature and 
hermeneutics of a family and its constituting units, namely the mother and the child by 
analyzing the reinforcingly emerging patterns of the nuclear family‘s discourse, 
consolidated and politicized over two centuries in Anglo-Irish literature. This study, 
however, takes the Anglo-Irish influences further, seeking their reflection in the new 
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aesthetics of writing about gender, time and maternity in Bowen‘s longer fiction, with a 
clear emphasis on The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. 
Furthermore, the discussion on motherhood, the family cell and children is also of great 
interest to feminism in general and certainly makes for one of the most important parts 
in my study of Bowen and Bowen‘s feminism. 
If the patriarchal discourse relies on the formation of the nuclear family, the 
family relies on the creation of the myth of motherhood and the idea that motherhood 
increases women‘s worthiness. According to this philosophy motherhood is described 
as the only fulfilling role an adult woman can take on21. Within the patriarchal discourse 
the idea of fulfilling motherhood is juxtaposed against that of childlessness, especially 
by choice. That said, as much as the patriarchal discourse Bowen‘s work is too 
underpinned by the idea of childlessness, and later lone mothering. The hegemonic 
discourse is based on this apparently binary opposition of mother/non-mother created 
solely in relation to the woman‘s biological generative powers.  Similarly, Adrienne 
Rich says in her Of Woman Born that,  
 
the gulf between mothers and non-mothers (even the term is pure negation, like ‗widow‘, 
meaning without) will be closed only as we come to understand how both childbearing and 
childlessness have been manipulated to make women into negative quantities, or bearers of 
evil. (Rich, 1995, 249) 
 
Within the matrix of language, Rich points to the linguistic shackles that have 
been imposed on the concept of childlessness defined as ‗unchilded‘, ‗childless‘, ‗child-
free‘. And yet there is ―no familiar, ready-made name for a woman who defines herself, 
by choice, neither in relation to children nor to men‖ (Rich, 1995, 249). The words that 
the English vocabulary possesses are synonymous of a lack – they encumber the 
category of a woman with negative quality, since she is ‗less‘ something/ she is 
somebody less a child – somebody less the other22. The category of woman is 
                                                 
21 It is by no means puzzling that in Irish society the myth of glorious and fulfilling maternity has always 
been juxtaposed against deterring women from having children through male disclamation from any 
responsibility over the mate‘s welfare and the offspring well-being, which has been documented in 
Patricia Kennedy‘s Maternity in Ireland: A Woman - Centered Perspective (2002). 
22 This idea of femininity as a lack is obviously constructed on the more general and ubiquitous binary 
division of the woman lacking the penis and the man having the penis. 
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constructed by ‗relatedness‘ as Rich notices, relatedness towards a centre outside of 
herself. Even, as Rich explains ―the ancient meaning of the word ‗virgin‘ (she-who-is-
unto-herself) is obscured‖ (Rich, 1995, 249).  Women merely exist in a context, in 
relation to, as the Virgin Mary exists in relation to God, as an Amazon exists in relation 
to procreation. Therefore, since the category of a woman is constructed by relatedness – 
a binary opposition, it has been entrenched by various polarities such as woman-man, 
woman-mother, mother-amazon, ―matriarchal clan or guerillers‖ (Rich, 1995, 250). As 
Rich points out, in primitive societies recognizing matriarchy all women were mothers, 
what had no direct relation to their age, social status or function – even little girls were 
called mothers. That said, Rich argues that ―the ‗childless woman‘ and the ‗mother‘ are 
a false polarity, which has served the institutions both of motherhood and 
heterosexuality‖ (Rich, 1995, 250). ―There are no simple categories‖ (Rich, 1995, 250) 
and this statement seems to lie behind Elizabeth Bowen‘s work. One of the arguments is 
that Elizabeth Bowen pursues the intricacies and implications of a statement that 
motherhood and childlessness are a false polarity.  As we will see in this thesis, Bowen 
endeavours to signal this problem in The House in Paris and works on it more 
extensively in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. Consequently, if motherhood and 
childlessness are false binary oppositions, what is their implication? What are the 
implications of this statement to daughters, to a child within ourselves, to a daughter as 
we, half of the population, are? Would we be able to move away from defining 
motherhood as a biological function and childhood as a transitory stage in life? 
 
We are, none of us, ‗either‘ mothers or daughters; to our amazement, confusion, and greater 
complexity, we are both. Women, mothers or not, we feel committed to other women, are 
increasingly giving each other a quality of caring filled with the diffuse kinds of 
identification that exist between actual mothers and daughters. (…) Mothering and 
nonmothering have been such charged concepts for us, precisely because whichever we did 
has been turned against us. To accept and integrate and strengthen both the mother and the 
daughter in ourselves is no easy matter, because patriarchal attitudes have encouraged us to 
split, to polarize, these images, and to project all unwanted guilt, anger, shame, power, 
freedom, onto the ‗other‘ woman. But any radical vision of sisterhood demands that we 
reintegrate them. (Rich, 1995, 253) 
 
So rather than by binary opposition and partial gaze, a male gaze, we need to 
re-construct the category of a woman/daughter/mother from the perspective of a 
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mutual gaze. The mutual gaze is what Rich describes to ‗fasten‘ a child to a mother: 
―the depth, calm, passion, of that dark blue, maturely focused look‖ (Rich, 1995, 31). 
As postulated in The Reproduction of Mothering ―psychic differentiation and 
structuralization arise (…) out of a child‘s experience of relationship‖ (Chodorow, 
1999, 43-44) and it is the relationship to the mother that is crucial here. As a result, 
Chodorow defends maping of the spaces of motherhood for every woman so that ―core 
psychological and interpersonal experiences for women can be understood in terms of 
(…) internal mother-daughter lineage‖ (Chodorow, 1999, viii) since ―mothers, by 
virtue of their gender, experience daughters as (…) like them.‖ (Chodorow, 1999, viii) 
If according to Chodorow girls undergo the pro-Oedipal and Oedipal phases in a 
different, incomplete and more prolonged way than boys owing to their more 
prolonged and deeper relationship with the mother – the mother becomes here more of 
a conceptual category. That said, if we read closely Bowen‘s passage in The Last 
September referring to its main character Lois seeing a crack in the washbasin full of 
water every time she attempts to clean herself, we see the eternal divide between the 
mother and daughter in the semiotic space symbolized by water – the eternal divide 
between the known and the unknown, and the self and the other.  
 
She lifted her water jug and banged it down in the basin: she kicked the slop-pail and 
pushed the washstand about. ... It was victory. Later on, she noticed a crack in the basin, 
running between the sheaf and a cornucopia: a harvest richness to which she each day bent 
down her face, Every time, the water clouded, she would see the crack: every time she 
would wonder: what Lois was – She would never know. (Bowen, 1929/1998c, 60) 
 
The relationship of otherness and selfhood becomes even more prominent 
when one tries to ‗see‘ oneself and wash off/abject the mother as in Kristeva‘s theme 
of matricide, an operation that will be analysed here in this chapter. Seeing oneself 
clearly is, then, impossible to according to Bowen for the question of identity is left 
many times unanswered in her fiction. What may be more fruitful for the subject is 
rather performing oneself – moving on and becoming. If one cannot ‗kill‘ the mother 
as exemplified in matricide, one may seek to take the mask of motherhood off 
following the idea that motherhood, as ‗womanliness‘, is a masquerade and that it is 
easy to debunk most of its myths. This manifesto has been much defended by Susan 
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Maushart who based her The Mask of Motherhood23 on the very much influential 
essay by Joan Riviere24 – ―Womanliness as Masquerade‖. Both of this text will be 
used in my work to defend the idea of greater fluidity of motherhood as well as 
subjectification as such. Multiplicity of women is nowhere else more visible than in 
the figure of a mother. This implies again that we use the ideas of Kristeva and among 
them the idea of semiotic chora, as Bowen‘s back-to-the-wombishness, which will be 
elaborated on in both of the chapters about The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes. The growing necessity of going back-to-the-wombishness may be a 
reminder that, in fact, subjectivity requires the Lacanian third term, this being – a 
woman, and a mother. The third term will be analysed in the thesis as underlying 
personal relationships of both of the novels analysed here. The third term will then 
encompass the ideas of the archaic and the buried mother, the dialogical triad of 
mother-child-father, as well as non-binary dyad of self and other gathered together 
under the gaze of Deleuzian little girl. 
The renunciation of the mother and daughter-within will take us back to Paul 
Ricoeur and his notion of selfhood and otherness, lived through attentiveness, 
translation, and forgiveness. Indirectly, motherhood, womanhood and otherness are 
yoked together in Chodorow‘s statement that ―many women feel intuitively connected 
to others‖ (Chodorow, 1999, viii) and both draw and translate this ability from/onto 
mothering. Chodorow writes that ―both daughter and mother experience this 
relationship intensely, such that it contributes in profound ways to the creation and 
experience of self‖ (Chodorow, 1999, xii) as well as the other.  
The problematic of motherhood too resonates with Ricoeur‘s understanding of 
dialogical subject at its most in the founding concepts of being, that is in enduring and 
suffering – just as motherhood is often described as embedded in enduring and 
suffering and experienced as such. Adrienne Rich comments on the implications of 
suffering during motherhood so that,  
  
                                                 
23 See Susan Maushart, The Mask of Motherhood: How Becoming a Mother Changes Our Lives and Why 
We Never Talk About It. (2000) 
24 Retrieved October 13, 2008 from website: 
http://www.mariabuszek.com/kcai/DadaSurrealism/DadaSurrReadings/RiviereMask.pdf 
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the suffering of the mother, the primary identification of woman as the mother – were so 
necessary to the emotional grounding of human society that the mitigations, or removal of 
that suffering, that identification must be fought at every level, including the level to 
question it at all. (Rich, 1995, 30) 
 
One may argue that what this doctoral thesis will aim at is to understand the 
category of a ‗natural‘ woman and mother, who is denied any further identity by the 
phallocentric discourse but who, at the same time, resists cultural determinism. Even 
though, mothering abides ―structurally induced psychological processes‖ (Chodorow, 
1999, 7) its practices are extremely difficult to be generalized and divided into natural 
and unnatural, in spite of the fact that the masculine discourse strives to enclose the idea 
of (un)natural into easily measurable categories. Since Bowen‘s discourse remains both 
innovatory and engaged dialogically with the phallic order it is the role of the reader to 
decode the meaning and implications of the category ‗unnatural‘ which Bowen seems to 
be actively challenging. Henceforth a question arises: does Elizabeth Bowen present us 
with the category of ‗un-natural‘ woman and mother and what are the practices to make 
one think so? 
 Along with the reading of Adrienne Rich the idea that children and mothers 
are the causes of each other‘s suffering makes us reconsider Ricoeur‘s argument of 
anger, suffering- ―the suffering of ambivalence‖ (Rich, 1995, 21) - and enduring in the 
relationship oneself constructs with another. 
Suffering and enduring are indiscartable elements of motherhood, and they are 
so in a construction of any dialogical identity. During pregnancy and breastfeeding 
―women are urged (…) to imitate the serenity of madonnas‖ (Rich, 1995, 35). The 
imagery of the Madonna is nowhere more evident than in the writing by Julia Kristeva. 
Kristeva wrote about the theme of Madonna and the Child in relation to the theme of 
motherhood in general. However she also wrote about the clichéd concepts that the 
category of woman was to fill in – the virgin, mother and whore. Chodorow writes that 
―the biological experiences involved in pregnancy and mothering, and unconscious as 
well as conscious fantasies about these, are deeply central to many women‘s sense of 
self and one of the central meaning for women of motherhood‖ (Chodorow, 1999, xiii). 
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In her Of Woman Born Adrienne Rich raved against the stigma of impurity of female 
body connected to pregnancy in patriarchal discourse. 25 
Recently Kristeva has come back to her idea of motherhood as metaphorical of 
the self/other dyad. In Le génie feminine Kristeva links the theme of motherhood with 
the Christian concept of Agape. She writes,  
 
When the female subject has succeed in negotiating the complex manoeuvre, imposed on 
her by the primary and secondary Oedipal complexes, she has the opportunity of acquiring 
this strange maturity that the male so often lacks, torn as he is between the macho phallic 
pose and regression to the infantile state. Equipped with this maturity, the mother can 
welcome the child, not as phallic or narcissistic prosthesis (as he so often is), but as the real 
presence of the Other: perhaps the first, or even the only possible, and which inaugurates 
the nation as a network of connections, based no longer on Eros but on its sublimation in 
Agape. (Kristeva in Ingman, 2007, 556) 
 
After all, as it must be mentioned, the concept of Agape corresponds with the 
idea of a-sexual love, which may be a means for Kristeva to escape the biological +/-
penis binary opposition contested by many feminists. 
                                                 
25 In Sorties Helene Cixous proposes a re-working of the concept of bisexuality, which in a centre 
organized world came to signify neutral, neither feminine-only nor masculine-only. Cixous, however, 
ventured to unveil bisexuality‘s positive meaning. The first meaning for bisexuality Cixous came up with 
was that of bisexuality as a fantasy of a complete being, a unity between two elements merging into one 
whole. The second meaning for bisexuality was that of ability to find within oneself the two sexes:                                          
―Evident and insistent in different ways according to the individual, the non-exclusion of difference or of 
a sex, and starting with this 'permission' one gives oneself, the multiplication of the effects of desire's 
inscription on every part of the body and the other body.‖ (Cixous, 1998, 582) What the two sexes came 
to signify is not merely the relation of the masculine and the feminine but the relation of self, the subject 
with the other: ―(…) the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the dwelling place of the other in me – the 
other that I am and am not, that I don't know how to be, but that I feel passing, that makes me live – that 
tears me apart, disturbs me, changes me, who? – a feminine one, a masculine one some? – several, some 
unknown, which is indeed what gives me the desire to know and from which all life soars. This peopling 
gives neither rest nor security, always disturbs the relationship to 'reality', produces an uncertainty that 
gets in the way of the subject's socialization. It is distressing; it wears you out; and for men, this perme-
ability, this nonexclusion is a threat, something intolerable.‖ (Cixous, 1998, 582) 
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Kristevan Herethics, which operates outside the Law of the father, is 
motherhood and as Ingman writes it ―is a relational, dialogic practice of love in which 
recognition of alterity takes precedence over identity‖ (Ingman, 2007, 30).  
The call for the symbolic mother does not remain unanswered in Bowen‘s 
fiction that reproduces relationships women foster towards each other. If we look closer 
at Bowenesque mothers, they are rarely (with the exception of Eva Trout) represented as 
in the process of bringing up their young offspring. The younger characters in Bowen‘s 
fiction are usually orphaned. Most of the time Bowen reinforces a motif of a young 
woman and her usually older and ambiguous female friend for whom the young woman 
develops an infatuated admiration. While the biological mothers tragically disappear 
from narrative, Bowen‘s discourse comes to rely on the construction of symbolic 
mothers who very often fluctuate from the centre to the margins. The symbolic mother 
in Bowen is able to be extra-narrative since the culturally constructed mother has died. 
As Kristeva notices culture is based on the process of exclusion. However, what is 
interesting in Bowen is that she makes an attempt at separating maternity as ―symbol or 
ideal and motherhood as institution‖ (Hansen, 1997, 32), a move for which Adrienne 
Rich in her Of Woman Born has been given much feminist acclaim. Since childbearing 
is synonymous with distant past for mothers in Bowen, they seem to perpetuate he 
feminist message found in These Our Mothers, or: Disintegrating Chapter written by a 
French critic Nicole Brossard. Bowenesque mothers are symbolic mothers since they 
―have killed the womb‖ (Brossard in Hansen, 1997, 33). Brossard claims in These Our 
Mothers that,  
 
Each woman can profit only to the extent that she becomes a symbolic mother. That is 
when she stopped bearing children. (. ...) If she wants to survive, a woman must assert 
herself in reality and become recognized as a symbolic mother: incestuous in power but 
inaccessible sexually for reproduction. She then completely fills the space of desire and so 
can appropriate for herself the work of the other. Strategic inversion: the symbolic woman-
mother has lost her womb. (Brossard in Hansen, 1997, 33) 
 
The conceptualisation of mother/daughter dyad reinforces the idea of 
multiplicity and open-endedness in constructing a narrative of identity. Such 
deconstructive/constructive dyads are many in Bowen‘s fiction, and they too can be 
found in other examples of modernist fiction such as Virginia Wool‘s writing. Looking 
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for a literary parallel for Bowenesque surrogate mother/daughter dyad as in The Hotel, 
Last September, The House in Paris etc one finds a similar narrative in that of Mrs 
Ramsay and Lily in Virginia Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse. To the Lighthouse sets to 
explore the figure of the mother – the beautiful and mysterious Mrs Ramsay.  
 
Repeated, rephrased, reformulated thought out the text, the questions about Mrs Ramsay, 
her life, and the lives of those who surround her are not answered but are confronted with a 
series of oppositions. Male and female, father and mother, life and death, light and 
darkness, affirmation and destruction, enclosure and separation – lighthouse and window  - 
all appear to find in the text a third term of resolution. (Hirsh, 1989, 109)  
 
Motherhood is characterized by constant ebbs to and fro like those of semiotic 
and liquid pulsations in Kristeva – gradual separation and reunification, where the 
movement outside is positive, and the movement inside is negative. To exemplify that 
critics point to the gradual spatial progression of encounter between Lily and Mrs 
Ramsay, which can be juxtaposed to the movement inside as in Bowen‘s The Hotel or 
Woolf‘s The Voyage Out. The movement in To the Lighthouse is from the indoors 
towards outdoors, ―from the bedroom, to the dining room and finally to the beach, 
which occasions a return to the steps and Lily‘s vision‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 111), whereas in 
The Hotel even if the characters venture outdoors, ―from this improbable place‖ 
(Bowen, 1927/2003b, 168) – the hotel – the more improbable it becomes to fit into the 
inconceivable discourse outside of the safe harbour of their enclosed habitat.  
And yet Virginia Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse describes Lily as negatively 
emotionally dependent on Mrs Ramsay and seeking to understand and learn the world 
filtered through Mrs Ramsay. This has been read as ―indicatory of Lily‘s immature and 
self-annihilating desire for fusion with the mother, a desire she must outgrow, resolve 
and reframe so as to separate from Mrs Ramsay and finish the painting‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 
112). What if the desire for fusion with the mother underlying one‘s subjectivity is 
never to be outgrown from – what if its proliferation marks a subject‘s passage towards 
adulthood? True enough, Virginia Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse is a narrative of a 
daughter – the mother is only mediated. In Elizabeth Bowen‘s fiction, what begins as a 
narrative of a daughter turns to be a narrative of a mother. As in Kristeva, ―The child‘s 
arrival extracts woman out of her oneness and gives her the possibility (...) of reaching 
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out to the other, the ethical‖ (Kristeva, 1997 in Ingamn, 2007, 382) – of becoming a 
child herself.  
Following feminist psychoanalysis, especially if we remember Chodorow‘s 
object-relational account of identity, ―women experience a sense of self-in-relation‖ 
(Chodorow, 1999, iii) during the process of their identification.  The idea of self-in-
relation is ―in contrast to men‘s creation of a self that wishes to deny relation and 
connection‖ (Chodorow, 1999, iii). Within psychoanalysis a prominent thematicization 
of the masculine and the feminine has been based on the negative construction of gender 
that is a negative paradigm of identity construction. A theory has been constructed that 
‗the individual emerges from constraint‘ or negative binary opposition reworked by the 
statement ‗I am oneself because I am not the other‘. It has been argued that such 
understanding does not offer a sufficient insight into ―the dynamics of subjectification 
and, as a consequence, offers an etiolated understanding of agency‖ (McNay, 2000). It 
follows that feminism has been widely influenced by two tenet theories of 
psychoanalysis, namely Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault. In the first place as has 
been just noted, for Lacan, meaning results from a negative relation between signified 
and signifiers. Women, it is widely argued, are the result of double negativity – no 
phallus and no maternal affiliation within the language of the father. And yet many have 
argued that this description lacks the socio-historical specificity – if women are double 
lack and if original identity is receding as it undergoes aphanasis, how is it that certain 
individuals manage to exercise a great amount of agency and autonomy, maintaining 
strong identity traits. Nancy Chodorow corroborates this idea in saying that ―culture… 
does not determine the personal meaning of gender‖ (Chodorow, 1999, xii). What is 
more, linguistics offers another set of obstacles to Lacanian theories. A further difficulty 
arises in translating Lacan into feminist discourse as a result of meaning being 
constructed based on the sexual difference, vertical difference (Barat, 200726).  
In the second place, Foucault too seems to be wrought with theoretical traps 
since he fails to give a full account of subject‘s agency. The first part of his larger 
oeuvre until the 1
st
 volume of The History of Sexuality reduces subjects to docile bodies 
of no determined internal agency. The second part of Foucault‘s work focuses on his 
notion of aesthetics of existence and seems not sufficiently detailed and too random. 
                                                 
26 Retrieved March 13, 2009 from website: http://americanaejournal.hu/vol3no1/barat 
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Faced with the difficulties arising from the available theory on identification 
and engenderment, feminism has chosen to invest into the problematic of agency. That 
said, it has focused greatly on analyzing women‘s productive and autonomous actions in 
the face of cultural constraints and within environment that limits women‘s right to act 
and choose. In feminist thought, the above has gained a label of relational accounts of 
agency and autonomy and has been worked through by Habermasian feminism. 
Relational accounts of agency and autonomy ―tend to emphasize the constitutive role of 
intersubjective dynamic in the establishment of gender identity‖ (McNay, 2000, 11). 
Interestingly for this thesis, McNay maintains after Nancy Chodorow and Carol 
Gilligan ―the intersubjective dynamic is paradigmatically expressed in the mother-child 
dyad which, as has been widely pointed out, has the effect of naturalizing the process 
through which gender identity is assumed‖ (McNay, 2000, 12). 27  
On the opposite pole situate themselves accounts of discursive construction of 
subject, which give primacy to embodiment that ―replaces dichotomous formulations of 
the relation between mind and body with monistic and more dialogical conceptions.‖ 
(McNay, 2000, 13) Discursive or narrative construction of subject is said to respond to 
historical and relational dynamic within sex-gender systems, which have been 
considered in this theory historical and material. As a proponent of this theory Nancy 
Frazer has accused Foucauldian symbolism of having led to underemphasise of 
―underlying issues of economic disadvantage.‖ (McNay, 2000, 15) McNay explains that 
for Frazer it is crucial to recognize that gender is simultaneously constructed along 
symbolic and material dimensions in order to undo the false antithesis between a 
politics of recognition and one of redistribution‖ (McNay, 2000, 15). It should be 
insightful for this work to compare Frazer‘s preoccupations with socio-economic 
operations within the process of identity formation with that of Bowen‘s emphasis on 
economic and class origins.  
Above emphasis on within-place-ness or Dasein takes theories of identification 
to recognize the habitus and prominence of temporalization of narrative. The notion of 
                                                 
27 Criticism of these theories highlights their reliance on sexual difference in identity construction as well 
as overt emphasis on maternal accounts of agency, which are insufficient to explain changes within 
patterns of gendered behavior catalyzed by tensions arising from the expansion of women‘s role beyond 
that of mothering. In my opinion, however, this criticism does not take into account the fact of the 
category of mother being a fluid category nowadays not only referring to biological mothering.  
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habitus is more directly linked with that of Pierre Bourdieu in feminist thought. McNay 
argues that ―Bourdieu‘s understanding of habitus as a generative rather than a denoting 
structure is expressed in a dialogical temporality denoting both the ways in which norms 
are inculcated upon the body and also the moment of praxis (…)‖ (McNay, 2000, 32). 
The notion of habitus not only highlights the idea of symbolic violence or the 
operations of domination fueled by the phallocentric discourse – it emphasizes the 
subject‘s complicity with the system ―that enables the institution to attain full 
realization‖ (Bourdieu, 1990, 57). According to this logic, gender differences are 
somatized ―within the bodies of individuals‖ (McNay, 2000, 37), within feminine 
bodies that perpetuate ―the circular logic where the cultural arbitrary is imposed upon 
the body in a naturalized form whose cognitive effects (doxa) result in the further 
naturalization of arbitrary social differences‖ (McNay, 2000, 37). It is of extreme 
importance for this study to analyze the processes of somatization or naturalization of 
negative identity practices carried out by many women in Bowen‘s fiction, even after, 
as Bourdieu points out, ―the objective conditions of its emergence have been dislodged‖ 
(Bourdieu, 1990 in McNay, 2000, 42).  
Habitus as a set of individual patterns of behaviour will highlight in the thesis 
certain solitude of every subject that prompts it to become a foreigner within itself. As 
such women will be placed at the margins and will be seen as belonging to the obscure 
spaces of alterity – they will be foreigners to language and text. Search for female 
autonomous habitus will be of great necessity, habitus that, on one hand, will 
encapsulate the idea of the semiotic place of plenty common to all, and, on the other 
hand, will respond to the female need for autonomous and relational recognition. 
The notion of temporalization of narrative corroborates the notion of identity as 
a set of bodily practices rather than externally imposed norms. According to Elizabeth 
Grosz, the body is a transitional entity. According to Judith Butler it needs to be 
perceived through ―temporalized regulation of socio-symbolic norms and practices‖ 
(McNay, 2000, 33).  The subject is constructed in ―the process of materialization‖ 
(McNay, 2000, 34). Teresa de Lauretis claims that ―narrativity over-determines 
identification.‖ (Lauretis, 1984, 9) As such, narrativity is a process that allows identity 
to be mediated between the pseudo-alternative of pure change and absolute identity. 
Even though Ricoeur gives priority to narrativity as his main analyzing tool, feminism 
has been too aware of the pitfalls narrativity may hide. McNay explains that  
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The positioning of the female subject in narration involves a potentially conflictual double 
identification with, on the one hand, the masculine gaze of the spectator and, on the other, 
the female object of the gaze. (. ...)The narrativizing of marginal experiences, whilst 
essential to the establishment of submerged female identities, never takes place in isolation 
from pre-given ideological forms. For a narrative to be meaningful and to acquire some 
degree of social authority, it must draw to some extent on culturally dominant discourses of 
truth-telling (…). (McNay, 2000, 84, 98)  
 
That said the problem of dominant discourses in narrativity undercuts the ideas 
of agency and autonomy. And yet, the concept of hermeneutical iterability seems to 
offer a way out of this entanglement in this use of the concept of hermeneutics, which 
captures the active role the subject plays in the process of identity construction. In 
hermeneutics, despite the existence of compulsory dominant discourses, their 
implications are distorted and re-worked by the subject in practice that by the means of 
―transfer from the Same to the Other, in empathy and imagination‖ (Kearney, 2004a, 
100) brings the Other ―that is foreign‖ (Kearney, 2004a, 100) closer. This issue is taken 
up Bowen‘s use of the concept of a foreigner that, on one hand is debilitating and self-
perpetuating, yet on the other hand offers a way out of the debilitating circles of 
hegemonic homophonism and narcissistic egoism as corroborated in both The House in 
Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. Hermeneutics stands against the very ideas 
of Lacanian aphanasis and double negativity, which have not taken into account the 
socio-historical context of the subject‘s existence, as well as his or her active role in 
―sedimentation and inauguration of meaning‖ (Kearney, 2004a, 57). Henceforth, 
confrontation with inherited signification implies that,  
 
With regard to gender identity, the hermeneutic idea of the pre-interpreted nature of 
experience provides the way of considering how the ambiguities of the process through 
which the individual appropriates gender norms are worked through at the level of self-
identity. How it may be, for example, that, despite the compulsory nature of heterosexual 
norms, there seems to be a lack of correspondence between these norms and individual 
practices. (McNay, 2000, 77)  
 
On the whole the transfer from otherness seems to be possible thanks to the 
marginal place of women within discourse and their constant necessity to translate 
everything from the father‘s parole into ‗the mother tongue‘. In Nations without 
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Nationalism, Kristeva sees women as particularly capable of translating between the 
known and the strange, between selfhood and otherness. As such, women as capable of 
trespassing the delimitating line of the hegemonic hermeneutical circle of norms. In 
Bowen the outsider character of some of her female subjects safeguards their position as 
possible translators of the new, the strange and the other into the discourses of selfhood. 
There seems to be an underlying presupposition that ‗there is something rather than 
nothing‘, where the new and counter ―the effort to live – the desire to exist‖ (Changeux 
and Ricoeur, 2002, 229) feminine seems to be the driving factor behind Bowenesque 
plots. 
Furthermore, women must likewise look into the future for the wise child in a 
leap inwards ―that produces prolific in-between space and other, alternative ways of 
knowing‖ (Braidotti, 2006, 6). Teresa Casal notes that this ―challenge (...) is outlined in 
the opening lines of Hugo Hamilton‘s second volume of memoirs The Sailor in the 
Wardrobe (2006).‖ (Casal, 2008, 5): 
 
People say you‘re born innocent, but it‘s not true. (. ...) You inherit your identity, your 
history, like a birthmark that you can‘t wash off. (. ...) We are born with our heads turned 
back, but my mother says we have to face into the future now. You have to earn your own 
innocence, she says. You have to grow up and become innocent. (Hamilton, 2006, 1) 
  
This ―transitional paradigm‖ (Kearney, 2006, xvi) contributes to Bowen‘s 
understanding of the child‘s surfacing violence as a surplus of inter-subjective struggle 
as ―allegoriz[ing] the conflicts and abuses that characterize the modern world (Attridge, 
2004, 32). To Bowen it is only through piecing up together the cracked and violent 
memory of childhood that a subject may find itself at peace within the discourse of 
adulthood. Otherwise, the experience of un-signified selfhood may become disabling, in 
that one may paraphrase Ricoeur‘s explanation of the interdependence between the 
private and the public of which destruction is bilateral – ―the suppression of the private 
entails the destruction of the public‖ (Ricoeur, 2004, 13) – the suppression of the child 
entails the destruction of the adulthood through the operations of infanthood inherited 
violence. It is the cyclical coming together of the child and the adult that renders 
liveable the life of a fully developed subject. ―Narrative serves as a necessary (...) 
condition for ethical resistance to evil‖ (Kearney, 2003, 104). 
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What is then the new feminine discourse that this thesis defends? It is the 
narrativization of the cyclical experience of otherness as best rendered through the 
symbolic categories of the mother and the child. This new hermeneutical discourse of 
female and further maternal creativity presupposes relationships of relational kind, 
where each approximation of the self and the other does not merely replicate the 
hegemonic culture but creates new meanings and new trajectories for every self, e-
naturalizing what has become habitual and naturalising what still dwells on the margins. 
Personal narrativization is a means of recovering agency according to Bowen, even if it 
is enacted on the post private plane of one‘s memory of childhood and the present of 
adulthood. Narrativization is a means to remain visible against the philosophy that 
demands self-erasure from women. It compels us to listen and look even at the 
traumatic experiences that have long seemed to resist textuality. It is a means of 
reasserting the female voice after ―coming to terms with the complexities of life and 
art.‖ (Casal, 2008, 207) 
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3. Matricide. 
 
The advocates of psychoanalysis often defend the process of matricide an 
infant needs to undergo in its quest for maturity. Yet, the idea of matricide, abjection of 
the mother needs to be correlated with the idea of finding the buried mother and purging 
her. It has been pointed out (Kristeva, Nikolchina) that matricide is ―the silent engine‖ 
(Nikolchina, 2004, 1) driving the female subject towards identification. Similarly to the 
narrative of Melanie Klein, ―the loss of the mother – which for the imaginary is 
tantamount to the death of the mother – becomes the organizing principle for the 
subject‘s symbolic capacity‖ (Kristeva, in Nikolchina, 2004, 129-130) for identification. 
Abjection of the mother and matricide are core operations of identification according to 
phallocentrism and psychoanalytical interdisciplinary studies, which Kristeva evolved 
from her studies of Melanie Klein. The fantasy of killing the mother represents a double 
risk for women. On the one hand, it may be absorbed by the phallocentric discourse as 
depletion of the mother, which may result in ―perennial optimism‖ and ―forgetfulness‖ 
(Nikolchina, 2004, 2). In doing so the phallocentric discourse is able to implant a divide 
between the pre-symbolic existence of the subject connected with the mother and the 
symbolic existence of the subject immersed now in the language of the father, where a 
new meaning for the term mother can be constructed. On the other hand, the matricide 
fantasy, constituting the first image, on the subject‘s-to-be quest for subjectivity and 
language, becomes a source of life-long conflict between the child and the mother. 
Furthermore, the matricide fantasy is far more negative a symbol that Freud‘s Oedipus 
complex, where the latter, while producing a temporary trauma, has as its goal a 
peaceful transition from a boy‘s infatuation with the mother to a male adult‘s 
corroboration with the father. In a situation where there is not a male parent, a boy‘s 
inclusion into the phallocentric discourse is safeguarded by a network of kinship 
systems between adult males. In a similar situation, where there is no female parent to 
set one‘s maturation against, a girl‘s identity development is daunted with her having no 
‗history‘ to relay upon, no female tradition to ease her introduction into the language. 
The lack of female tradition has already been noted by many female authors of 
reference, among them Virginia Woolf, who admitted to having found no ―tradition of 
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the mothers‖ (Woolf, in Nikolchina, 2004, 2) or Elizabeth Barrett Browning who looked 
―everywhere for grandmothers and found none‖ (Browning in Nikolchina, 2004, 2). In 
Women and Fiction, Susan Cahil notes Virginia Woolf‘s interest in aesthetising as in 
her ―strange spaces of silence‖ (Woolf, in Cahil, 2002, 77) that stretch between solitary 
female pronouncements, which could count for the female tradition, alternative to that 
represented by the angel in the house and perpetuating the phallocentric discourse. That 
said, in killing the angel in the house, Woolf too commits a matricide, that is ―realized 
as rejecting or even ‗vomiting‘ the maternal body‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 3). And yet, ―the 
extreme nature of matricide is emphasized by the impossibility of incorporation or 
integration of the murdered mother‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 3). One surprising conclusion, 
after pondering the texts by Woolf, may be that the angel in the house is after all the 
archaic mother, whose body needs to be abjected, but whose history needs to be 
translated and embraced by feminism. Kristeva says that ―fear of the archaic mother‖ 
(Kristeva, 1982, 77) translates itself into the ―fear of her generative powers‖ (Kristeva, 
1982, 77) - so that, as Adrienne Rich concludes in her Of Woman Born, a girl wants to 
live her life ‗her own way‘. The fantasy of matricide establishes the first boundary 
between selfhood and otherness, which may be bridged not only in the process of giving 
birth to a daughter‘s daughter but also in a series of relationship women can have with 
each other – relationships of discursive sisterhood, non-generative motherhood, 
relationships between the self and the other, oneself and one‘s mother, oneself and the 
child within.  
Since the category of motherhood stretches from the subject‘s personal 
experience of having a mother and living a relationship with her to mothering the 
subject‘s own children, or engaging in the relationships of mother-daughter character – 
matricide takes on a more ambiguous meaning let alone that of killing one‘s own 
mother. It may mean rejecting motherhood or suffering from female affiliation complex. 
Julia Kristeva writes in her Tales of Love that  
 
we live in a civilization where the consecrated (…) representation of femininity is absorbed 
by motherhood. (. ...) that is a fantasy that is nurtured by the adult (…) of a lost territory 
(…) [and] a representation of primary narcissism . (Kristeva, 1987, 160) 
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As such feminism tends to ―identify motherhood with that idealized misconception‖ 
(Kristeva, 1987, 161). Consequently, ―it rejects the image and its misuse.‖ (Kristeva, 
1987, 161) 
The female affiliation (complex) may be found in French and American 
feminist writing. The relationship between the self and the other will lead towards a 
feeling of anxiety, whose origins are rooted in the anxiety of authorship Gilbert and 
Gubart described as a founding tenet for female authorship (The Madwoman in the Attic 
1984). They later re-worked the theme in No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman 
Writer in the Twentieth Century (1987) as anxiety felt by many women towards other 
women where ―rivalry between women is fostered both by a need for (exclusive) male 
approval and, more importantly, by an anxiety about the contamination associated with 
a shared oppression‖28 (Gilbert and Gubar, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 See, Helen Vendler, (1990). ―Feminism and Literature‖ Vol. 27(9), The New York Review of Books.  
and Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar ―Feminism and Literature: An Exchange‖ 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/3531 
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4. Desire and Becoming. 
 
The capitalist society, according to Gilles Deleuze‘s and Felix Guttari‘s Anti-
Oedipus (2004a), tricks people into believing that desire is a natural response to lack, so 
that the process of consumption is boosted and perpetuated. To quench desire subjects 
move from its life-giving fantasy towards the real-life fulfilment or substitution, that is 
fetishization. To contradict this belief, however, Deleuze argues that it is the desire that 
produces the ever-fleeing idea of lack.  Desire is constructive and dwells outside of the 
preserve of fantasy, as Freud suggests. One of the major critiques made by Deleuze on 
Freud is that of the Oedipal complex underlying the desire and lack dyad.  Deleuze 
takes it out of the private sphere of the subject and stretches it outside into the world, 
making a basis of all production. Desire is, then, not confined to the family cell, but 
undermines all modes of production and interaction within society.   
To better understand identification processes Deleuze proposes in his Anti-
Oedipus co-written with Felix Guattari that all life should be perceived as a machine 
and functions literally like a machine. Life is, in the first place, a conjunction of 
mechanisms that only gain concrete ‗intentions‘ or  take up diverse functions on being 
joined with other systems in different contexts. This understanding of life places a great 
emphasis on the existence of the other that brings meaning to the subject but itself is 
meaningless. It also points to the existence of different dominant ideologies which 
impose themselves on systems making uniformed ready-made definitions to sustain 
those very systems. Namely, patriarchy has its own ideological discourse or apparatus29 
defining categories of a woman, mother and family that only functions when joined 
with a predefined set of apparatuses. As a result Deleuze proposes existence of pre-
defined dominant discourses contradicts uniqueness of life. In A Thousand Plateaux 
(2004b) Deleuze develops his principle of life as based on the idea of lines of flight 
                                                 
29 Louis Althusser writes that the Ideological State Apparatuses are a number of realities which present 
themselves as specialized institutions and have their proper discourses of ideology and repression. As 
such they are part of both the public and the private domains. See, Louis Althusser. (1989). ―Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses‖ in Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays. London: New Left Books pp 
170-86. 
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―where mutations and differences produce not just the progression of history but 
disruptions, breaks, new beginnings and ‗monstrous‘ births‖ (Colebrook, 2002, 57). To 
Deleuze, every concept is an open ended idea with its plethora of lines of flight. On the 
level of concrete examples there may exist a number of situations that fall under the 
category of motherhood or womanhood that escape the path carved for them by the 
dominant discourse. The before inevitably encapsulates the now ―before there is a 
‗child‘ who relates to a ‗mother‘ – before there are these social selves – there is a pre-
personal perception‖ that is perpetuated by ―ideas, sense or the imagination‖ 
(Colebrook, 2002, 82). Similarly, Deleuze describes this process as molecular 
experiences taking on a shape of molar formations. In other words, in the process of 
schizoanalysis that occurs during the molecular formation, one is able to distinguish 
between separate schizzes, which represent mobile fragments or impersonal parts 
assembled into ―randomly gathered affects‖ (Colebrook, 2002, 83). Subjectivities are 
myriad of anonymous voices in that discursive ―characters are diverse events and 
histories (…) contracted habits and contemplations (…) events of life (…) a life that is 
nothing outside of this singular expressions‖ (Colebrook, 2002, 83). As a creator of 
open-ended characters Bowen writes about imagination and fiction in books that were 
―power-testing athletics for my imagination‖ (Bowen, 1946/1976, 51). She writes in her 
―Out of a Book‖, ―The characters in the books gave prototypes, under which, for 
evermore, to assemble all living people‖ (Bowen, 1946/1976, 51). Fiction gave Bowen 
imaginative powers to assemble identities from the affects and percepts, as well as 
molecular units the characters ―always moved in a blur of potentialities‖ (Bowen, 
1946/1976, 51).  
Since the other is a myriad of possible differences, one‘s personal other points 
towards the enormous diversity of one‘s self. In concepts of womanhood, motherhood 
or any other, the analysis should not centre on their primacy or given immanence, but 
rather on their legitimacy or illegitimacy within different cultural contexts. Norms are 
not immanently constant and given – what may not agree with the concept of 
womanhood in a patriarchal discourse is not necessarily in conflict with the concept of 
womanhood in any other discourse. Similarly, if we take the concept of motherhood we 
see that different periods in history understood motherhood in different ways through 
the lenses of diverse kinship systems, religious tenets, biology and legal laws and 
common social standards. What analysis should procure to discover are the hegemonies 
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underlying discourses and their variations, and at the same time it should recognize 
different histories and events, which have constructed subjectivities. In deciphering the 
intricacies of assembled schizzes common binary oppositions should be discarded. 
Human machines are structural only to the extent of their assembly like nature and yet 
the conjunctions of elements are random and ever-changing. Similar to this analysis, 
Julia Kristeva suggests a new approach to discourse through her idea of a revolution in 
the poetic language. It relies on disentangling subjects and their signs, signified from 
their signifiers and becoming strangers to language altogether. The body without 
organs, Deleuze describes as an open ended desiring machine has something in quality 
with Kristeva‘s melancholic, ―collapsing either into blank asymbolia or into an 
overflowing chaos of ideas that he fails to put in order‖ (Kristeva, 1989, 45). The 
melancholic‘s speech impairment is paradoxically triggered by a highly efficient 
cognitive processing and Kristeva admits that  
 
such hyperactivity with signifiers is displayed in the melancholic‘s capacity to connect 
distant semantic fields in a way that recalls the puns of hypomanics. This is aligned with his 
outstanding cognitive insight as well as the manic depressive‘s inability to make a choice or 
a decision. (Kristeva, 1989, 70) 
 
 Only matricide seems to represent a viable alternative to asymbolia30 and it 
can be substituted by the art of fetishist representation contradicting the idea of 
existence of a lack as in Leonardo da Vinci‘s painting that Kristeva analyzes 
thoroughly. Kristeva writes in her Black Sun that  
 
If loss, bereavement and absence trigger the work of imagination, persistently fostering it as 
much as they jeopardize and mar it, it is also to be noted that the work of art as fetish is issued 
as a way of revoking engrossing sorrow. The artist consumed by melancholia is also the most 
relentless in his determination to repel the symbolic abdication which anaesthetizes him. 
(Kristeva, 1989, 18) 
 
                                                 
30 Nikolchina writes (2004) that, ―Strangeness to language does entail the forlornness of the melancholic 
who is fused in the maternal Thing because of an unaccomplished separation from the mother. Asymbolia 
is the insufficiently lost maternal continent, the invisible centre of gravity, the hidden image of Narcissus, 
whose silent call threatens with dissolution.‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 26 emphasis mine) 
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Australian scholar Catriona Mackenzie manages in her work to develop the 
theories of selfhood, autonomy, self-conception and imagination. Theories of otherness 
are of great importance in the process of gaining autonomy where the subject strives to 
gain a greater knowledge of itself or achieve pleasure in various situations stretching 
from imagining, decision-making, etc. Through the concepts of intersectional identity, 
freedom of expression, constructing a social self, the philosophical concept of autonomy 
surfaces and it takes on a new meaning when applied to femininity. Throughout the 
centuries autonomy has been constructed in philosophy as relying on four tenets – self-
understanding, self-realization, authenticity and self-governance. As Diana Tietjens 
Meyers writes in her ―Intersectional Autonomy and the Social Self‖: 
 
 Self-understanding has been taken to presuppose a transparent self; congruence of self and 
action has been taken to presuppose a unitary, homogenous self; self-governance has been 
taken to presuppose unfettered independence from other individuals, as well as from the 
larger society. (Meyers in Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 152) 
 
It follows that autonomy has been encumbered with masculine definitions and 
became an ‗andro-centric phantasm‘ (Meyer in Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 152). As 
seeing, autonomy should now be understood through the re-conceptualisation of female 
body – the distencio of the body into eternity or timeless time. Feminists have long been 
divided in their either favourable or unfavourable treatment of autonomy, voices 
ranging from discrediting the concept as inhospitable and ―antithetical to the project of 
revaluing interpersonal capacities‖ (Meyer in Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 152), Teresa 
de Lauretis being a strong example to feminists procuring to re-evaluate autonomy as a 
concept capable of bringing social change. In this analysis autonomy poses some 
interesting doubts on the construction and enactment of identity. More specifically, 
criticism of autonomy can be divided into five groups, of which the first one refers to 
autonomy as a symbol of Western civilization that gave rise to the myth of self-
sufficient man. The second group focuses on metaphysical entrenchment of the problem 
since to say that someone is autonomous signifies to see them as atomistic and isolated 
in the universe, which completely contradicts the dialogical understanding of the world. 
The third group of criticism centres on the care criticism and is straightforwardly 
connected to ideas such as female kinship systems, problematic of sisterhood as well as 
female affiliation complex. It postulates that autonomy contradicts traditional 
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conceptions of womanhood such as nurturing, loving and caring. Postmodern critique as 
the fourth group draws on psychoanalysis and has in focus the ―complex and shifting 
configurations of power‖ (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 10-11). Diversity critique 
centres on the idea that an individual identity is intersectional and thus cannot be 
autonomous.  
Even though the link between autonomy and men seems to be univocal, ―the 
gender paradigms of autonomy‖ are not stagnant. Moreover, the masculine attributes of 
autonomy have always been exaggerated in a way that independence and self-
sufficiency became discursive stereotypes ascribed to masculinity. Marylin Friendman 
writes that ―some feminists worry that (…) autonomy has been (…) contaminated by 
this atomistic approach, which neglects the social relationships‖ (Friedman, 1993, 39). 
Autonomy does not implicate self-conception ex nihilo – on the contrary it is a theory of 
agency where the other comes to play a founding role in the construction of the self. 
That said, the idea of relational autonomy has been put forward assenting on the 
problems of intersectional identity and undeniable social context in which a subject is 
inserted. Mackenzie writes that,  
 
The term ‗relational autonomy‘, as we understand it, does not refer to a single minded 
conception of autonomy but is rather an umbrella term, designating a range of related 
perspectives. These perspectives are premised on a shared conviction, the conviction that 
persons are socially embedded and that agents‘ identities are formed within the context of 
social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as 
race, class, gender, and ethnicity. Thus the focus of relational approaches is to analyze the 
implications of the intersubjective and social dimensions of selfhood and identity for 
conceptions of individual autonomy and moral and political agency. (Mackenzie, Stoljar, 
2005, 4) 
 
 
Relational autonomy requires a contextual construction of the subject, which 
on its part implicate a temporal analysis. The temporal element does not only refer to 
the subject but also to its other as well as the dynamic relationship it has been fostering 
with the outside. As long as the autonomy is relational the subject is understood not as 
opposing interdependence and obligation but as embracing and transforming it. The 
problematics of autonomy – individual or relational overlap with the concepts of 
motherhood and womanhood. Relational autonomy implicates favourable evaluation of 
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centre-discursive feminine attributes such as nurturance and care. The ‗philosophical 
anthropology‘ of being and time  
 
is organized on the basic of a thematic concept, Care (Sorge), that (…) allows (…) to 
overthrow the primacy of knowledge of objects and (…) uncover[s] the structure of being-
in-the-world that is more fundamental than any relation of a subject to an object. (Ricoeur, 
1984, 61)  
 
Feminine care contributes to the understanding and construction of temporality 
as in St. Augustine‘s distentio animi that is synonymous with dispersal, multiplicity and 
consequently dialogism. Since distentio animi originally refers to the soul‘s capacity to 
experience eternity it undoubtedly gains a quality of perfection, trying to grasp the 
nature of God‘s invention of time. Distentio animi refers in St Augustine to temporality 
but, in my opinion, it can be translated into women‘s experience of pregnancy, 
maternity, and within this the experience of selfhood and otherness.  One may well 
reach back to the symbolic of the Virgin Mary as the Western-Latin signifier for 
femininity which was so overtly used by Julia Kristeva in a series of her writing on 
maternity as in Kristeva‘s ―Stabat Mater‖. In becoming pregnant through the Holy 
Spirit, Virgin Mary experiences a somewhat similar event to that of the beginning of the 
world in Christian tradition – a miracle that has no beginning, simply an extension of 
God‘s out-of-temporal existence. In pregnancy, human experience of time distends from 
the past, present and future it is consciously aware of in the present of the whole 
pregnancy. It is not only that distentio animi refers to temporality in pregnancy – it may 
also refer to the more complex and in-depth understanding of selfhood and otherness, 
where the self is distended literally and metaphorically from one to being two. 
Analysing femininity through the aporia of temporality, and within this temporality 
studying the aporia of selfhood and otherness is for this study of crucial importance and, 
as has been noted earlier, is rendered to be a form of narrativization of the personal in 
order to recover the public. 
Consciousness of different time frames takes the subject from exercising 
autonomy to exercising agency. This implies a conscious relationship towards being in 
time, and being in place. In ‗consciously‘ being a subject uses its right to autonomy by 
maintaining a ―close kinship between motivation and the ability to mobilize in the 
present experience inherited from the past‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 60). Ricoueur admits that ―I 
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can‘, ‗I do,‘ and ‗I suffer‘ manifestly contribute to the sense we spontaneously give to 
the present‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 60). In ―Stabat Mater‖ Kristeva corroborates the idea of 
describing maternity as suffering: ―My body is no longer mine, it doubles up, suffers, 
bleeds‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 167). In reaching towards the other, Ricoeur specifies two 
instances of suffering that need to be worked upon, namely the wounds that one 
associates with the ‗terror of history‘, that he calls evil as suffering and the suffering one 
inflicts on others, that he calls evil as wrongdoing. The first category finds its discursive 
response in lament, the second one in blame. What is more ―the two categories are 
almost always intertwined‖ (Kearney, 2004, 91). In general, the memory of suffering 
needs to be exchanged in the third model, not according to the contractual rules of 
reciprocal obligations, but according to an economy of the gift that exceeds reciprocity 
so that one would ―proceed from the suffering of others (…) before imagining one‘s 
own‖ (Kearney, 1996, 9), which then is expressed as empathy towards the other without 
which there is no communication. It is clear that a spiritual economy is invoked in 
Ricoeur‘s discussion, involving a non-forgetful forgiveness that does not confuse 
forgiveness with forgetting, for one must keep the memory of the debt owed to those 
who have suffered. This means that ―… the work of forgiveness must be grafted on to 
the work of memory in the language of narration‖ (Kearney, 1996, 10). ―It follows that 
the effort of telling differently involved in refiguring identities requires the work of 
anamnesis, thus of mourning (in relation to loss and suffering) and of the revision of the 
past as narrated in ‗traditionality‘ (for instance, in relation to the recovery of the traces 
that onto-theology and monotheism erase, and in relation to a justice called for by a 
suffering caused)‖ (Venn, 2005, 285). In Ricoeur‘s deeply Christian treatise on identity 
that responds to the ethical summons of embracing the other, the concept of forgiveness 
blends with St Augustine‘s concept of Care. 
The autonomous ‗I‘ constructs a three-fold temporal dimension of its own 
present, since it commits to doing something – ‗doing that tomorrow‘ -the present of the 
future‘. It commits itself to doing something because it ‗just realised that‘ - the present 
of the past and it ventures on doing something ―because now (…) [it] can do it‖ 
(Ricoeur, 1984, 60).  – the present of the present. The spatial and temporal frame of the 
subject‘s being is ―constituted through (…) [the subject‘s] (…) capacity of posing the 
question of Being or the meaning of Being‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 60-61) and is tantamount to 
what has been called in philosophy ‗within-time-ness‘ (Innerzeitigkeit). In this dialectic 
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―time is entirely desubstantialized‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 61) receding from the emphasis on 
the words ‗future‘, ‗past‘, ‗present‘ to the emphasis on agency or temporality of action. 
Interestingly enough, Ricoeur notices that such ―philosophical anthropology‖ is similar 
to that of the concept of Care (as in Heidegger) and its capacities of ‗making-present‘, 
‗awaiting‘ and ‗retaining‘. That said the concept of Care has been associated and 
embraced by feminism. In the feminist ethics of care relationality and responsibility are 
the privileged adjectives. The concepts of Care and ‗within-time-ness‘ are directly 
associated with being-in-the-world through Heideggerian Dasein. Being-in-the-world 
according to narrativity is a being-in-the-world already marked by the linguistic 
(langagiére) practice, as much as the concepts of femininity are already marked by the 
phallocentric practice. For this reason feminine autonomy has been considered best 
enacted if relational. Much of the feminist discourse has encountered in relational 
autonomy a tool for better understanding of the relationships women engage or are 
traditionally expected to engage in. As an example, citing again from Adrienne Rich‘s 
Of Woman Born: ―We are, none of us, ‗either‘ mothers or daughters; to our amazement, 
confusion, and greater complexity, we are both‖ (Rich, 1995, 253). And it should be of 
our autonomous decision to what extent we choose to engage with these roles and in 
what way we choose to enact and live them. The decision, on its part, is a consequence 
of our intersectional construction of identity, contextualized by the place (Dasein) and 
the temporal frames (within-time-ness). As far as the element of contextualization is 
included – any social practice only becomes a discourse if contextualized. And yet it 
becomes an autonomous discourse if we are able to exercise some kind of agency in its 
production. It follows that discursive autonomy and agency are necessary tools for a 
better impersonation of ipseity and idem-identity. Idem gives the self spatio-temporal 
sameness and ipse is responsible for its individuality – its haecceity. What is more, it is 
through our autonomy and agency that we can shape our attitudes towards sameness and 
selfhood, as well as sameness and otherness. 
Bearing the above in mind, relational accounts of autonomy need to recognize 
the importance of female individuality should they make claim to validity. Above all, it 
is vital that femininity conquers its right to agency and autonomy but it needs to be 
highlighted that traditionally the lives of women have been devoted to the care of 
others. Relative to this context, the concepts of agency and autonomy need to be 
rethought and remade. What is more, a greater focus needs to be given to personal 
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relations with the other in general. Linda Barclay writes in her essay ―Autonomy and 
the Social Self‖ that ―what emerges (…) is the need to acknowledge that our autonomy 
competency is a debt we owe to others (…) (particular others (…) fictional or historic 
interlocutors)‖ (Barclay in Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 58). Similarly, Annette Baier 
writes that being a person signifies being  
 
seen as one who was long enough dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential 
parts of personhood. Persons essentially are second persons, who grow up with other 
persons. The fact that a person has a life history, and that a people collectively have a 
history, depends upon the humbler fact that each person has a childhood in which a cultural 
heritage is transmitted, ready for adolescent rejection and adult discrimination selection and 
contribution. Persons come after and before other persons. (Baier in Mackenzie and Stoljar, 
2005, 58) 
 
Linda Barclay extends the argument of reciprocal heritage writing that apart 
from being aware of the personal influences of the past we ―must live (…) with other 
persons‖ (Barclay, Barclay in Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2005, 58). In short, the concepts 
of autonomy should not be conflated to substantive independence as Marilyn Friedman 
has postulated in ―Autonomy and Social Relationships‖ but rather distended to 
relational interdependence and intertextuality whose important elements are those of 
ongoing creativity underlying identification in order to fill in the overwhelming sense of 
vacancy – ―the vacancy, more than negative (...) [that] made the natural claims of a life 
(...).‖ (Bowen, 1942/1976, 161) 
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5. The Bowenesque Turn. 
 
Elizabeth Bowen defies the relentless manifestations of intra-subjective 
realities within very immanent and constraining spatial and temporal realities. In her 
dialogical and teleological manifestations of corporeal subjective time she strives to 
explore the overwhelming and maze-like geographies of the self to which the maps lie 
behind the idea of hermeneutical becoming rather than sediment being. Central to this is 
both subjects‘ constant awareness of the body‘s excavation by temporality that serves as 
metaphor of the overwhelming incapacity to live alone and an impending necessity to 
recover agency. Everyday struggle to become oneself in Bowen - ―the daily attitude is 
what puts the before and after into the body, time into the body‖, and that this ―attitude 
of the body relates thought to time (...).‖ (Deleuze, 2004b, 189) Within twentieth 
century modernism‘s general crisis of forms, the idea of external and internal 
temporality as perhaps the only omnipresent form (one that has heterogeneous, non-
teleological modes and affects) may cause troubled reactions ultimately because it 
positions the subject itself as both epistemologically and ontologically vertiginous. As a 
result, the tiredness of the affected body forces the brain to a new and difficult thought, 
reminding the subject of its own ―embodied‖ time within that of the world. As Bowen 
writes in her ―Notes on Writing a Novel‖ at the end of each narrative a character that 
pre-exists in ―the mass of matter‖ (Bowen, 1945/1976, 37) becomes ―like the silk worm 
at work on the cocoon‖ (Bowen, 1945/1976, 46) and spins itself out. The time-image of 
the world is ―no longer a motor extension which is established‖ (Deleuze, 2004b, 4) 
between subject and real world ―but rather a dreamlike connection through the 
intermediary of the liberated sense organs. It is as if action floats in the situation, rather 
than bringing it to a conclusion or strengthening it‖ (Deleuze, 2004b, 4). Since, as we 
have said, narrativity is cyclical the assertive performance of becoming elevates the 
subject to the position of being able to constantly question and filter actively the pre-
established discourses on the body and its actions. 
Time becomes space. Movement does not lead towards a conclusion but 
multiplication within the bodily space, an almost Italian neorealist technique to which I 
relate myself in the chapter devoted to Bowen‘s last novel Eva Trout, or Changing 
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Scenes. It should be emphasized that not so much the political content of Italian neo-
realism is of great importance here but rather a new time-image contradicting dominant, 
in cinema and thinking, action-image where the part and the whole of both movement 
and perception were intricately conjoined into an organic unity.  In time image the part 
and the whole become dispersive but more productive where the character must labour 
to comprehend the image, and this very event of labour becomes the embedding time 
space.  What is more in time-image the character cannot absorb the situation or 
synthesize total understanding but rather expel laborious continuity of being without 
reaching climax or conclusion but rather constant becoming. As Deleuze admits the 
relationship between the part and the whole (object and subject) in time image is serial. 
In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes does Eva not relate more to space? Does she not 
laboriously struggle towards a better comprehension of reality through her own 
participation in time? However, is her world not a series of disjoined events that amount 
to becoming rather than final being – defining rather than final definition? Time image 
implies the philosophy of becoming. 
Here a question of Eva‘s body enveloping time should be raised – this is a new 
way of showing perception and becoming and thus the authority/autonomy dyad, 
through one‘s bodily time – the female body for the purpose of this thesis - as the 
omnipresent time. Eva is her own enclosing space. Eva embodies a specific weight of 
time operating inside and excavating identity from within. The fact that Eva‘s body is 
hermaphrodite dismantles, like the Italian neorealism, the traditional gendered 
protagonist and opens up Bowen‘s discourse to a different type of politics. Of much 
importance is also the introduction of the male-child to replace and represent the 
humiliated males (both in The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes) and 
refigure the traditional masculine action image as well as femininity as less than 
subjectivity in general.  
It may be argued that the musings on the agency of the gaze and the exchange 
from the doer to seer are futile for the feminist discourse. After all both seer and doer 
are properties of masculine subject according to the phallocentric discourse. Little 
changes if the centre remains in hands of the male subject, where the female ceases to 
constitute the source of desire. This floating action is often in the form of characters 
being forced into simply looking and thinking, the evolution of the subject Deleuze saw 
in Italian neorealism from doer to seer. Deleuze discusses how this epistemologically 
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impoverished but very open gaze is both directed outwards upon the world, and 
internalized as characters attempt to reconcile the difficult thought which this new 
seeing generates with the tired emotional investments of lived bodies. As a result both 
the seen and the unseen gaze seek the lost ―self‖ rather than the maternal or erotic 
―other‖. It has been suggested that the deserted space from which the characters have 
been emptied ―refers back again to the lost gaze of the being who is absent from the 
world as much as from himself‖ (Deleuze, 2004b, 9). The gaze searches for the modus 
operandi imprinted on the body rather than the completing other. So even though the 
action remains traditionally masculine, as gaze has always been the masculine preserve, 
the element of autonomy and self-discovery remains unsexed. For what one discovers 
can be either male or female, and situates oneself rather on the unsexed threshold of the 
subject  especially if we believe that sexualization or rather engenderment happens in 
reiteration outside. The discovery of the self happens through the external other, when 
the other becomes allocated within the self. I become estranged from the world and 
from my body. What happens when woman ceases to represent the source of desire? 
She is no more the complementing element, the marginalized other and lack but rather 
another assemblage. 
External time destabilizes the subject‘s ability to master space, both in the way 
he or she looks at the world outside and in the way he or she interacts with the strange 
diagetic home Alienated, the subject is lost to its own gaze. Since the cultivation of 
subjectivity is indebted to the operations of otherness only a detailed analysis of this 
detour from selfhood to otherness should take into consideration its spatio-temporal 
fluctuating reality. There is a particular temporality in the gaze of the other and at the 
other which inevitably must coincide with the subject‘s lines of flight that is lines of 
creation. We watch the people in their desperate acting out of the erotic impulse, 
seeking to avert their eyes and minds from both the abyss of their presumed essence and 
the grasping of their brains‘ difficult future potentiality, while the temporal and spatial 
de-centeredness they seem to experience also induces vertigo in the viewer.   
Yet how is Eva gazing? Her gaze is not tantalizingly external for she is dumb 
and commits many mistakes – her gaze can only be cast inwards, seeking the lost self. 
When it is, in fact, cast outwards in the National Portrait Gallery, it penetrates the gaze 
of the other from the portrait and finds nothing. Eva‘s gaze is prompted by the floating 
space propelled by her moving and travelling. Yet it must remained centred within the 
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body spreading sheet of boundary-less time – the three-fold present. It may be a new 
concept of feminine since women are not connected to the gaze, but rather these are the 
man who are thought to exercise the culture of an oppressive male gaze. But if the male 
gaze seems to be external hence excitable by the external world, the female gaze may be 
internal, and outwardly static. 
Since external time destabilizes the subject‘s ability to master space it becomes 
crucial to elevate one‘s body into the status of ‗space‘. The time of the subject becomes 
the personal bodily time as in three-fold present, and the space of the subject becomes 
the body of the subject and the relation of the subject to the external world through the 
body. The body fills in the deserted space from which the subject is emptied, being 
absent from the world as much as from herself/himself. Such internalized gaze marks 
the shift from the subject as doer to the subject as seer. As such however it is not a male 
gaze at other but rather a female gaze arising as a consequence of the mirror stage – a 
female gaze at oneself or the other within oneself. This leads us towards a 
comprehension of personal fantasies as signs of internal life, lived externally and 
marked on the body. 
The basic theoretical argument here is that identities are fantasized in the 
recesses of the mind. In order to express these fantasies, and thus flesh out our social 
identity, we cite, to a certain extent, from others‘ narratives. After all even Elizabeth 
Bowen made her own way of life a fantasy. What she saw and was made to believe in 
was a lie immediately after her mother‘s onset of cancer. As a child she sensed that the 
endless plans and musings about the future made by her parents were false. Instead of 
hope she felt betrayal and guilt along with a growing sense of security. If her childhood 
life was a lie she set on making her adulthood thanks to a lie - she decided to establish 
her grown-up identity by writing  
However based on the idea of cyclicality of narrativity we may argue that the 
narratives of others are made available to us in external contexts that seem to be already 
internalized. Hence, the narratives we reproduce are never exact copies of the narratives 
of the others. Rather they are a sum total of fantasies we have about others, generative 
responses whose meaning changes inevitably with the passing of the clock‘s hand. In 
this way, on the theoretical ground, we move from the external iterability that is that of 
the subject crossing the boundary of the self towards the external. We hence arrive at 
the internal iterability that is the iterability of the subject crossing the boundaries 
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of/within its own body. The common denominator of the two theories is the dynamic 
character of subjectification and the emphasis on its agency. 
The body has always been associated with the feminine and the mind with the 
masculine- while one should not defend erasing these phallocentric alignments since 
they will be substituted by other similar dichotomies, one should challenge their logic 
making the body and mind interconnected and equal. Bodies are engenderment of 
fantasies – bodies are multiple and different. The body must be preconceived ―not in 
opposition to the culture but as its preeminent object‖ (Grosz, 1995b, 33) – one should 
try to erase difference into variation.  This way the theory arrives at what can be called 
the inscriptive body, which  
 
is more concerned with the processes by which the subject is marked, scarred, transformed, 
and written upon or constructed by the various regimes of institutional, discursive, and non-
discursive power as a particular kind of body. (Grosz, 1995b, 33)  
 
Elizabeth Bowen presents the inscriptive body – inscriptive subjectivity that 
focuses more on the external process that becomes later internalized. Judith Butler uses 
in her Gender Trouble a citation from Roy Schaffer‘s ―A New Language of 
Psychoanalysis‖ ―when identifications are understood as internalizations they imply a 
trope of inner psychic space that is ontologically insupportable‖ (Butler, 1990, 333). 
Internalization is not a real process but a fantasy where rather than identifying oneself as 
an individual with certain attributes one fantasizes that one is that individual. Agency is 
not born in constructing a solid self but rather out of interpolating others, while always 
having an intention of influencing the other in some way. This also stands as the 
definition of the deitic, iterable model – if narrative influences the other it is iterable – 
deitic and based on exercising some sort of agency, even if by the female subject. As 
Bowen writes in ―Notes on Writing the Novel‖ thanks to the combustion of  a character 
it moves on from magnetizing the reader as it has magnetized the author, where 
―through out the novel the character is expending potentiality‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 47) to  
safeguard freshness ―by means of ever-differing presentation‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 47). And 
here I refer myself to the other outside and within the subject. The ideas of both the 
deitic and iterable models are corroborated in Butler‘s writing. The former is confirmed 
by inversion when Butler admits that one of the basic qualities of the body is its 
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vulnerability to the influence of the other – ―through our bodies we always remain 
exposed to others‖ (Butler, 2004, 22) thus body escaping ontological foundation still 
serves as matter. The latter idea partially results from the body‘s vulnerability and 
flexibility and is also supported in Butler‘s argument of materialization of the body 
through discourse – that is the body‘s dynamic character. Speaking about the 
contemporary theories of identity, Linda McDowell argues that,  
 
Identities are a fluid amalgam of memories and places of origin, constructed by and through 
fragments and nuances, journeys and rests, of movements in between. Thus, the ‗in-
between‘ is itself a process or dynamic, not just a stage on the way to a more final identity. 
(McDowell, 215, 1999) 
 
As in Nietzsche, civilization does not educate and enlighten peoples but rather 
―ensures cohesion through coercion and cruelty‖ (Grosz, 1995b, 34). The body reworks 
the very norms that constrain it through discourse. If sex is a product of gender, so is the 
body a product of discourse – as such one should not concentrate on the symbols that 
themselves are material but on the dynamic processes which change them. Matter is not 
created but materialized through discourse; moreover it is the effect of dynamic powers. 
Bowen writes in her ―Notes on Writing the Novel‖ that characters must ―materialize – 
i.e., must have a palpable physical reality‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 38). In patriarchal order the 
outside of the symbolic conceived as the locus of subversion is in fact ―a construction 
within the terms of that constructive discourse (Butler, 1990, 77). Grosz writes that ―As 
a receptive surface, the body‘s boundaries and zones are constituted in conjunctions and 
through linkages with other surfaces and planes‖ (Grosz, 1995b, 34-36). The character 
of Eva Trout is such a product and she continues to produce herself. The unthinkable is 
thus fully within culture as much as the carnivalized fantasies of the others‘ discourses 
are imprinted on bodies. That said, reiteration of the iterable model leads to its re-
contextualization and carnivalization – carnivalization of the other‘s discourse – the 
paternal discourse in female narratives.  
Carnivalization does not only refer to the other but to myriads of ways in which 
one worships the image or the fantasy of one‘s body rather than the body itself. 
Carnivalization is the dynamic change of a fantasy. Bodies are textualised through 
fantasies and deciphered as mirror images of the subject‘s psychic – yet they should be 
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read as cultural affects. Grosz writes that ―Knowledge is the consequence of bodies, and 
in turn enables bodies to act or prevents bodies from acting, expanding themselves, 
overcoming-themselves, becoming‖ (Grosz, 1995b, 214). Carnivalization in itself is a 
fluid process – its outcome cannot be predicted since its force lies in its unexpectedness 
and concealment of the known. Subjects, as Bowen writes, are an ―assemblage of traits‖ 
of many bodies, where no one body could ―supply everything (physical) necessary for 
the character (…)‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 39). As in Deleuze, Bowenesque characters 
multiply and ‗magnetize‘ ―perceptions, sense-impressions, desires‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 39). 
It has been written that Bowen‘s female characters evolve into ―Kristevan subjects-in-
process‖ (Ingman, 2007, 37) whose future is made of many possibilities and the idea of 
unified self questionable. As we have said earlier Bowen writes in The Last September 
that the novel‘s main character Lois sees a blurring crack at the bottom of her washbasin 
every time she washes. Undoubtedly, it is conventionally accepted that what one sees in 
the reflection of water is the exact image of oneself as visible to others. What Lois sees 
is the true nature of identity – always divided between the idea of selfhood and 
otherness. Bowen writes again in The Last September,  
 
But when Mrs Monmorency came to: ‗Lois is very‘ – she was afraid suddenly. She had a 
panic. She didn‘t want to know what she was, she couldn‘t bear to: knowledge of this 
would stop, seal, finish one.  Was she now to be clapped down under an adjective, to crawl 
around lifelong inside some quality like a fly in a tumbler? Mrs Montmorency should not! 
(Bowen, 1929/1998c, 60)   
 
Only those who accept the hegemonic discourse on identity ―allow [themselves] to be 
moulded‖ (Bowen, 1929/1998c, 129) by the society‘s idea of them. There is, however, a 
great difference between fluidity and sedimentation both resulting from the other‘s 
cracking of the self. Fluidity has long been considered the female paradigm partially 
because of the female connotations with the water principle and partly because of the 
female obligatory flexibility of the translator from the dominant discourse to the 
marginal one. Above all, fluidity signifies retention and multiplication of desire. Desire 
should urgently be rescued from the rhetoric of lack since it has its origins in surplus. 
Female bodies are the rallying points against marginalization of desire and inevitably 
pleasure. In Bowen the female body serves as a circuit breaker and a desiring machine 
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that consequently produces a flow of its own desire. Desire is a condition that allows 
Bowen to postulate a de-essentialized female subjectivity that can be considered extra-
centric or ‗e[x]ccentric‘, as in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. Such femininity, seen in 
Bowen‘s writing, is capable of difference through multiplication rather than dualism. It 
is capable of producing lines of flight that can be considered progression – a flight from 
– rather than regression to the essential self that according to phallic discourse solely 
conceals lack and gap. Bowen writes that finding a subject of desire is similar to 
obsession that originates a ―search for language‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 63). Desire is 
childlike – ―The childishness is necessary, fundamental – it involves a perpetual, errant 
state of desire, wonder and unexpected reflex‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 63). Furthermore, desire 
is understood as multiplication when ―the writer find[s] the subject – his subject, (...) 
[then it] germinates into play or story, poem or novel‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 63) – a new 
narrative. 
Luce Irigaray uses the idea of fluidity in her treatment of the feminine and 
doing so she deconstructs the phallocentric solidity of philosophy and theory. Not only 
does Luce Irigaray argue for fluid forms of feminine subjectivity, but she also 
articulates that this sex, the feminine, which is not one, has not become, yet. To 
Irigaray, bringing into play new and fluid forms means inviting ‗her/me‘ for a journey 
of opening up new textual territories and rethinking ‗our‘ practices. As such there is no 
longer stable me/other dyad but a fluid parallel flow of elements. As in Irigaray, 
Bowen‘s way of constructing femininity is that of penetrating and careful irony directed 
at strategic essentialism. Bowen shows that mimesis, as postulated by the dominant 
discourse is never faithful and always illogical. As in Irigaray, Bowen speaks logically 
about the apparent lack of logic in women using masculine economy that values identity 
and unity. And yet, such Bowenesque wit transcribed onto the narrative ground does not 
resign from drawing on the carnivalesque and the ironic. The conflict between mimesis 
and femininity takes Bowen to consider the idea of natural in her texts too.  
The idea of the ruins of representation is one of the straightforward results of 
the failure of mimesis. Theorists have offered some valuable critique of the structure of 
representation to produce the idea of the ruin of representation – the ruin of 
hierarchically ordered time and space. As well known, the two obvious elements of 
representation are self explicatory. It follows that, in the first place, representation can 
only happen dynamically in change, and that changeability is its own picture. Static 
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structures of time and space have come to be considered dissembled.  It goes against the 
oppression of women, as well as oppression and dominance as ontologically viable. 
Instead a search has begun for abstract and fluid ontology of this and now, and this very 
woman. In the ―Preface‖ to The Demon Lover collection Bowen writes about the 
particular:  
 
This is how I am, how I feel, whether in war or in peacetime; and only as I am and feel can 
I write. As I said at the start, though I criticize these stories now, afterwards, intellectually, I 
cannot criticize their content. They are the particular. But through the particular, in 
wartime, I felt the high-voltage current of the general pass. (Bowen, 1999k, 99) 
 
In Space, Time and Perversion Elizabeth Grosz writes that the body becomes a 
threshold between one‘s fantasized identity and socio-political demands. The body, 
 
is placed between a psychic or lived interiority and a more socio-political exteriority that 
produces interiority through the inscription of the body‘s outer surface. Where 
psychoanalysis and phenomenology focus on the body as it is experienced and rendered 
meaningful, the inscriptive model is more concerned with the process by which the subject 
is marked, scared, transformed and written upon or constructed by the various regimes of 
institutional, discursive, and non-discursive power as particular kind of body. (Grosz, 
1995b, 33) 
 
Bearing this in mind, one sees how the body becomes the only viable site and 
temporal frame of identification – it cannot be represented by any other image than 
itself and, at the same time, it draws from the examples of the other. Fantasies are too 
inscribed on the body‘s surface. Temporality of the self draws on the body‘s 
development from infantile to adult.  
When psychoanalysis shows that a fantasy is constituted on the basis of at least 
two stages, one infantile and pre-genital, the other genital and post pubescent, it is clear 
that the series succeed one another in time from the point of view of the solipsistic 
unconscious of the subject in question. Precisely the body has all the temporal tools to 
mark the subject‘s change and it becomes its spatial and temporal canvas. 
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What is of great curiosity here is the issue of delay concerning the influence the 
infantile stage exercises over the adult stage. Deleuze claims that the crucial part of this 
explanation lies in the distance that separates the infantile stage from the adult one and 
that, in fact, they ―are not distributed within the same subject‖ (Deleuze, 2004d, 151). 
The childhood event – the fantasy – does not belong to the infantile series but rather 
constitutes a link between the stages of ―adults we knew as a child‖ and that of ―the 
adult we are among other adults and other children‖ (Deleuze, 2004d, 152). In 
psychoanalysis this has been called deferred action, where in analyzing the subject‘s 
discourse we do not know whether we are confronted with a case of childhood 
influencing adulthood or adulthood giving sense to childhood trauma. Not surprisingly, 
the theme of deferred action has already been used in the criticism of Elizabeth Bowen. 
Doryjane A. Birrer develops this argument in her essay entitled ―Time, Memory, and 
the Uncertain I: Transtemporal Subjectivity in Elizabeth Bowen‘s Fiction‖. Birrer 
believes that crucial to understanding Bowen‘s short fiction is the idea of ‗transtemporal 
subjectivity‘ assimilating itself to a destabilized I that exists in ―a fluid realm comprised 
simultaneously of past (memory), present (experience) and future (expectation).‖ 
(Birrer, 2008) The simultaneous existence I choose to call the three-fold present 
imprinted on the body to render possible a resolution of the problem of temporality as 
already described in Henry James in ―The Art of Fiction‖ as being ―the measure of 
reality (...) very difficult to fix‖ (Hoffman, 2005, 15). Birrer argues that ―Bowen‘s 
psychological realism and representations of transtemporal subjectivity comprise a 
vision of the human subject that, though not necessarily comfortable, offers increased 
scope for human agency in a radically  destabilised social world‖ (Birrer, 2008). Again 
in her Preface to The Demon Lover collection Bowen writes that ―The past, in all these 
cases, discharges its load of feeling into the anaesthetized and bewildered present‖ 
(Bowen, 1999k, 98). The present seemingly being a body anesthetized by the 
dislocation of reality is an imprint of what memories and expectations. From there, like 
from a manuscript the I can be read – ―It is the ‗I‘ that is sought—and retrieved at the 
cost of no little pain‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 98). Bowen‘s narrative stretches between, what 
Birrer describes as ―physical/somatic/lived experience and the vicissitudes of the mind 
as it moves both consciously and unconsciously through time‖ (Birrer, 2008). Contrary 
to what Birrer writes the I is not lost in Bowen‘s fiction, and the ―I-saving strategies‖ 
(Bowen, 1999k, 98) are imprinted on the material, germinating into ―received 
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impressions of happening things; impressions that stored themselves up and acquired 
force without being analyzed and considered‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 99). One of the greatest 
wounds to the self that dissipation of reality brings with the Second World War is the 
―claustrophobia of not being able to move about freely‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 98) resulting in 
a levelled-down time of a corpse-only the ―impulsive movements of fantasy‖ (Bowen, 
1999k, 98) remain. To Bowen feeling and suffering is carnal for how she feels is 
through ―spot-light faces or cutting out gestures‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 99). 
On the whole the theory of fantasy puts a considerable emphasis on our 
dialogical existence as a child and as an adult, making us open to transference from the 
outside. The fantasy becomes the ultimate reality and a manifestation of a child as a 
dark precursor. Since it is impossible to establish the primacy of any stage, we should 
see the series as overlapping and seek the meaning in the difference between the stages. 
However childhood should not be understood as imaginary or unreal as much as the 
body one possesses is neither imaginary nor unreal. 
The emphasis on the negative paradigm in identification is the fruit of the post 
structural emphasis on the subject as discursive effect and an act of constraint both 
visible in Foucault and Lacan. For the purpose of this thesis I prefer to venture a new 
understanding of subjectification not as subjection but as multiplication, as liberation of 
various selves and the body.  
In such definition and time space dyad as kaleidoscopic, the idea of female 
multiplicity and plenty takes on a new meaning. Women in their plurality can strive 
towards a more complete construction of identity.  According to Bowen, the novelist 
must alot his or her characters ―psychological space‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 38). Otherwise 
the character becomes passive and so called flat - ―What E.M. Forster has called the flat 
character has no alternatives at all‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 38). Subject is entitled to 
multiplicity and as such ―for the portrayal of their alternatives, to time and space‖ 
(Bowen, 1999k, 38). It is a new female gaze through the omnipresent temporality of the 
body.  
Kaleidoscopic definition comes to argue against what can be perceived as 
negative understanding of subject formation. Lois McNay writes in her Gender and 
Agency that  
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The process of subjectification is understood as dialectic of freedom and constraint (...) then 
it is the negative moment of subjection that has been accorded the theoretical privilege in 
much work on identity construction. (McNay, 2000, 2) 
 
The conclusions that we arrive at are that women fantasise thus creating and 
recreating their subjectivities, women consciously make their bodies assemblages of 
power and connection with others.  
Bowen offers us a feminist theory of time, the bodily/dynamic time. Elizabeth 
Grosz elucidates on this idea. She explores the Darwinian account of natural selection as 
a dynamic principle with random chance operating as a central force in the evolution of 
a species. As such, evolution must also be understood as being a force toward the 
future. It can be said that the forces of evolution can encompass both the biological and 
the cultural. Culture is not separate from nature, nor is it the end of evolution; rather, it 
is also the product of species survival.  Any viable feminist discourse must examine the 
potential for feminist theorizing of this. As such feminism can argue that politics can be 
seen as cultural evolution that has practical and theoretical consequences. According to 
this statement, even the concept of feminist struggle itself—a struggle for survival under 
oppression—is the force that produces self-transformation. Like the survival of the 
species, this feminist self-transformation is directed toward an unknowable, multiple 
possible future of political change. Bowen offers us expansion of future conceptual 
possibilities since she is unable to pin down identity but rather see it in a reciprocal 
operation of sameness and otherness in oneself.  
To understand better the post-modern feminist claim, Grosz argues for a 
discussion of sexual difference as the organization of materiality and what she calls 
messy biology, even though these concepts have been seen with hostility, or even as 
counterproductive.  Grosz argues that even the concept of sexual difference is a form of 
an unknowable future. Time must be recognized as a force, rather than conceptualized 
as the passive result of the causal effects of the present. Time is, in a sense, within 
objects and is the force that directs their becoming towards more satisfactory self-
denomination.  
In general Elizabeth Grosz offers an alternative to the socially constructed 
identity and sexualities of the subject by calling for an examination of how inhuman 
forces constitute these concepts. For Grosz, the feminist goal of the removal of the 
oppression of women must involve a necessary re-conceptualization of women as 
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subjects: as evolving multiple subjects that are produced by these forces. This way we 
must capture the body in change and relation with a affirmation that, to a certain degree, 
they can be autonomous.  
In her last novel entitled Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes Bowen approximates 
herself to the central claim for a new feminist discourse in fiction at the expense of the 
law of the father. Bowen writes about Eva‘s self-transformation from a perspective of 
corporeal feminism where the focus falls on the body as the propeller and sum total of 
subjectivity. Eva Trout is an active force in Nietzschean division between active and 
reactive forces – she ―moves in its directions without regard for anything other than its 
own free expansion, mindless of others‖ (Grosz, 1995b, 215).  Not only is she 
affirmative but she is ―guileless, open, perhaps even naïve in its openness to what 
befalls it‖ (Grosz, 1995b, 215). In the patriarchal discourse one submits ―one‘s 
pleasures and desires to enumeration and definitive articulation‖ (Grosz, 1995b, 223). 
This however results in yielding the  
 
processes and becomings to entities, locations, and boundaries, to become welded to (…) 
control, and the tying of the new to models of what is already known, the production of 
endless repetition, endless variations of the same. (Grosz, 1995b, 223) 
 
 It is for this reason that Eva cannot stop or still herself and mould her 
discourse to the abiding rules of the society; this is why Karen flees away.  
Only the revolutionary subject can progress in a discourse. Only those subjects 
that are able to sustain their ―epic rages‖ (Bowen, 1929/1998c, 107) within the accepted 
cultural context, and who can chaff against social restrictions are able to support 
alternative dialectical ways of belonging together. Kristeva says that ―rebellion is a 
condition necessary for the life of the mind and society‖ (Kristeva, 2002 in Ingman, 
2007, 31). In her ―The Sense and the Non-sense of Revolt‖, Kristeva acknowledges that  
 
permanent revolution is vital both in the life of an individual and in the life of a nation for, 
without it, values become frozen and humans are in danger of resembling automata 
(Kristeva, 2000 in Ingman, 2007, 31)  
 
Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes is Bowen‘s exercise in freedom, for it is in this 
novel that she allows her revolutionary character to linger and live accordingly to her 
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affirmative discourse. As such eponymous Eva Trout becomes a non-secretive rebel 
who has a living presence with other characters as well as a power of influencing 
memories out of which the characters try to constitute their identities. Eva is a rebel 
against the gendered role she is expected to perform. It is not the consciousness of 
restrictions that induces on her a feeling of being an outsider – her disregard of norms 
makes her a symbol of rebellion. She has little inner uncertainty. The vacancy Eva 
perceives in herself is similar to the vacancy she sees in the outside world. Bowen wrote 
about the Big House that it imposed a performance of routinized life. The common 
Anglo-Irish belief was that it ―ought to be lived in a certain way‖ (Bowen, 1999b, 32). 
In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes Bowen shows that life should not be lived in a 
standardized way but be embraced as full of differences and open-ended possibilities. 
Eponymous Eva Trout cannot be contained within a form or a pattern of norms, so she 
remains the outside and un-theorisable by the centre. She herself becomes the centre 
since she centres everybody‘s attention on her. Her last words before she dies after 
being shot by her adoptive son Jeremy are a question about what is concatenation? 
Concatenation  means things linked together in a series or chains – Eva herself links all 
the narratives, but since her death leaves all the possibilities open she says ―There is 
invariably more, nothing is final I suppose‖ (ET, 296). There is no stronger message that 
the one spoken out at the moment of death in a way that laughs at order, nothingness 
and meaning. What then opens up Bowen‘s fiction to diversity of discourses is her idea 
of humour. Bowen uses her sense of humour to ridicule, to deconstruct, and to rebuild. 
Eva Trout is a giant literally and figuratively – she is herself a satire on what is usually 
considered feminine and gracious. Regina Barreca writes in her Untamed and 
Unabashed: Essays on Women and Humor in British Literature that ―Bowen‘s prose is 
emblematic of the way women‘s humour questions, mocks and demystifies the world of 
inherited and institutionalized power.‖ (Barreca, 2004, 109) She continues to say that  
 
Satire created by Bowen does not have a corrective action; indeed, her work remains 
fascinatingly problematic because while she mimics the accents of the ruling class, she 
mirrors power only to ridicule it (…) she mocks the certainties of the authoritative 
discourse. (Barreca, 2004, 111) 
 
 Humour in Bowen proves the point that we all, we women live under artificial 
boundaries that in the end prove meaningless in the cafe of death. As a matter for 
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conclusion it should seem right to shift the analysis of Bowenesque sense of humour 
and her sensibility for irony to the post-modern theory of consumerism. The theory as 
such was described in Michel de Certeau‘s The Practice of Everyday Life, which 
appeared in the 1984 in its English translation, but was influenced by the nineteenth 
century Neo-liberal and Marxist ages of social and cultural revolutions. What Cartau 
postulates in his book is an acquisition of cleverness and irony on the part of the subject, 
which he calls strategy, in entering the new territory of the high-tech capitalism. The 
clever subject is then a materialisation of the affirmative way of being of the modern 
subject and not merely non-producing user. However, the roots of the active and ironic 
subject grow even deeper. As Certeau promptly adds, the ironic subject has already 
been postulated in the writings of Friedrich Schlegel, as well as has been the propeller 
of the Marxist theory of historical forces. Its central function was to fill the gap between 
philistine everyday life and the insatiable longing for spiritual infinity.  
As a result, ironic consumption of the ironic subject has maintained the interest 
of scholars until present times, and most importantly for us has become to be known in 
the 1960‘s as – ‗camp‘, of which Susan Sontag wrote in her ―Notes on Camp‖: ―It‘s 
good, because it‘s awful‖ (Sontag 1964, §58). Camp, which stands for turning around of 
attitudes, may be well used in the analysis of Bowen‘s character Eva Trout who marks a 
turn in Bowen‘s interests from the natural in her earlier novels, towards the unnatural, 
artifice and exaggeration, as will be defended in ―Eva Trout – a Journey towards new 
Discourse‖. Irony in Bowen helps the subject to move around between the countless 
countermeasures and counter-morals, where there,  
 
are no guarantees. (. ...) Here figures cast unknown shadows; passion knows no crime, only 
its own movement; steel and the cord go with the kiss. Innocence walks with violence; 
violence is innocent, cold as fate; between the mistress's kiss and the blade's is a hair's 
breadth only, and no disparity... but who is to say that this is not so? (Bowen, 1999k, 193) 
 
 
Bowen‘s evolution of irony starts with her constatation in The Death of the 
Heart as expressed by ‗lunatic‘ Eddie in his conversation with Lois – ―You know I‘m 
not a cad, and I know you‘re not batty. But, my God, we‘ve got to live in the world 
(Bowen, 1998a, 302). With The Last September the irony-in- subject moves towards 
Lois‘ statement - ―I feel it‘s time something happened. (...) I should like it to happen in 
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spite of me‖ (Bowen, 1929/1998c, 82). It evolves into a deconstructing irony of illusion 
as the only real power, where Eva Trout ponders the idea of ‗real life‘ – ―there was no 
‗real life‘; no life was more real than this. This she had long suspected. She now was 
certain.‖ (Bowen, 1929/1998c, 216) 
Bowen strives consistently to deploy humour as her strategy of subversion, 
writing in her Collected Impressions of her wish to use irony ―which is seldom gentle, 
and is in the long run deadly to what it attacks‖ (Bowen, 1950, in Lee, 1999, 124). 
Bowen‘s irony shows experience as arbitrary and subjective. Barreca writes in her 
Untamed and Unabashed that Bowen‘s female characters are  
 
the Laughing Medusas described by Cixous; they are the women described by Judith Wilt 
as (...) ‗Laughing at the edge, withholding fertility, humility, community‘. (Barreca, 2004, 
120) 
 
Irony becomes the only tool to tackle the moral dispossession depicted as 
normal, as simple ―what is there is there‖ (Bowen, 1963/1991, 166). Irony and hope 
merge in a subversive and heretical laughter of women in Bowen‘s fiction whose 
belief in revolution is taunted by the belief in the exclusion of change – ―people must 
hope so much when they tear streets up and fight its barricades‖ (HP, 150), writes 
Bowen in The House in Paris. However, there still rests some hope in the subject as 
Dasein and as the ever-changing subject-in-process.  
 
But, whoever wins, the streets are laid again and the trams start running again. One hopes 
too much of destroying things. If revolutions do not fail, they fail you. (HP, 151) 
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6. At the Crossroads of the Dialogue and the Difference. 
 
While writing about narrativity, remembering, suffering and forgiving seem 
to be recurring motives. As has been noted earlier in this chapter, in his ―The Repetition 
of Violence: Dialogue, the Exchange of Memory, and the Question of Convivial 
Socialities.‖ Couze Venn goes back to Ricoeur‘s idea of suffering in discussing the 
conditions for the kind of dialogue and exchanges that would reduce or eliminate 
antagonisms by altering the relation to the ‗other‘ regarded as stranger or alien. He 
writes that  
 
It follows that the effort of telling differently involved in refiguring identities requires the 
work of anamnesis, thus of mourning (in relation to loss and suffering) and of the revision 
of the past as narrated in ‗traditionality‘ (for instance, in relation to the recovery of the 
traces that onto-theology and monotheism erase, and in relation to a justice called for by a 
suffering caused). (Venn, 2005, 291)  
 
In Benedict Anderson‘s phrase each society, each political identity is an 
‗imagined community‘ (in Kearney, 2000, 104). Each individual identity is ―qua 
narrative construction (…) reinvented and reconstructed‖ (Kearney, 2000, 194). It also 
means that it is open ended and indeterminate, so that the self and other are bound to go 
on exchanging narrative memories. An ability to live in a dignified way means showing 
willingness to exchange stories with the other, the stories from the past and the stories 
of the present and future. For feminism, this means re-encountering the multiple stories 
of its past. In his On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva, Kearney writes that memory in 
Ricoeur‘s Memory, History, Forgetting (2000) constitutes the only successful way of 
―releas(ing) into a different, freer future‖ (Kearney, 2000, 105). Following Ricoeur, 
Kearney argues that  
 
For genuine amnesty does not and cannot come from blind forgetfulness (amnesia), but 
only from a remembering which is prepared to forgive the past by emancipating it from the 
deterministic stranglehold of violent obsession and revenge. Genuine pardon, as Ricoeur 
observes, involves not a forgetting of the events themselves but a different way of 
signifying the debt to the dead which paralyses memory – and, by implication, our capacity 
to recreate ourselves in a new future. (Kearney, 2000, 105) 
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Narrativity is not bound to literature – every identity, every self is made up of 
different stories and histories that ―exercise a formative influence on our modes of 
action and behavior‖ (Kearney, 2000, 57). If used as an analytical tool it evokes a series 
of themes such as memory and reenactment, the self and its other, the female/male 
binary opposition, the mother and child, childhood and trauma, as well as forgiveness. 
The ideas of suffering, forgiving and confronting the other are underlying 
Bowen‘s two novels that will be discussed in this thesis as primary bibliography, and 
her fiction in general. The concepts are always implicit to Bowen‘s text and I argue that 
they need to be re-examined in order to uncover Bowen‘s innovative discourse on 
feminist rhetoric. It is within this rhetoric that I wish to give greater deliberation to 
Bowen‘s construction of the mother/child dyad – giving special attention to the 
mother/daughter dyad. I suggest that the focus of analysis needs to fall on the 
construction of temporality (as in Eva Trout‘s travelling or changing locations implicit 
for Dasein and her being-in-the-world), autonomy and agency of both male and female 
subjects. Therefore, this work traces Elizabeth Bowen‘s use of different temporal 
frames tantamount to one feminist present and looks at the ways Bowen posits her 
characters in relation to different events.  
Topics to consider in this thesis include contextualization of action and 
characters‘ awareness of social systems, as not merely constraining but allowing inter-
subjectivity and dialogical construction. The work ventures to analyse autonomy (as in 
autonomy to act within social sphere or Karen‘s decision of abandoning her son) as 
problematic in phallocentric social context. It ventures to analyze dialectics of selfhood 
and otherness as being undeniably the most important operation of identity formation. It 
has been widely claimed that to autonomy, otherness is essential in a similar way that 
constituting one‘s ‗identity‘ requires a process of abjection. Therefore, I would like to 
remain diligent towards notions such as motherhood (as in Karen‘s denial of 
motherhood or Eva Trout‘s decision to ‗mother‘ by adoption), daughterhood, abjection, 
matricide, abandonment and orphanhood (as the founding plot of all three novels 
analysed here). What is more this work focuses on the re-definition of Bowen‘s literary 
aesthetics, which I would call the aesthetics of attestation and dialogical contestation. 
Henceforth, since Elizabeth Bowen gives so much attention to social interdependence 
and relational interconnections between people in the private and public sphere I argue 
that awareness and sensitivity of the social context in Elizabeth Bowen‘s writing, that 
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can be described as the personal topography of selfhood, have a more important 
meaning than sole complying with formal literary norms. The immediate and long-term 
implications of gender/class matrix and economic background constitute Bowen‘s 
hermeneutic of identity.  
Above all, this thesis has as its goal an analysis of identification, 
subjectification and engenderment in what I consider Bowen‘s innovative counter-
discourses of femininity enveloped in both traditionality and change and at the 
crossroads of the dialogue and the difference. In doing so many philosophical and 
theoretical texts are implicit and prerequisite for this study so that it becomes a ‗longer 
route‘ in many hermeneutical detours (Kearney, 2000) towards the truth. This, I hope, 
contributes to the philosophical depth of my study and attests to my interest in 
dialogism, since the thesis itself relies on a dialogue between many theoretical giants 
and the greatness and profoundness of Elizabeth Bowen‘s work.   
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PART II 
 
 
The Counter-Discourses of Femininity: 
 
The House in Paris. (M)Other and Child’s Boundary Crossing. 
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1. Time and Narrativity. 
 
Narrativity as presented here stands for the journey towards the unknown 
home or enhancement and enrichment of selfhood through inter-subjectivity and finding 
otherness within and outside. Within this narrative framework the mind temporarily 
produces unstable syntheses between immediate sense data and reason: thus, reason is 
in the image. Movement is related to the time which conditions it, and consequently it is 
hinged upon the subject.  
In his Time and Narrative (1984, 1984, 1985) Paul Ricoeur labours through 
the ideas of time and narrativity. He analyses St Augustine‘s Confessions and his 
development of time as three-fold presence that does not strive to encapsulate 
movement but the constant presence of God and eternity. Ricoeur writes about 
Augustine‘s lamentation on the distension between eternity and time. Against the 
backdrop of the stillness of eternity, the lamentation unashamedly displays the author‘s 
feelings:  
 
What is that light whose gentle beams (percutit) to my heart, causing me to shudder in awe 
yet firing me with their warmth (et inhorresco et inardesco)? I shudder to feel how 
different I am from it: yet in so far as I am like it, I am aglow with its fire‖ (9:11). 31 (in 
Ricoeur, 1984, 27) 
 
In Elizabeth Bowen‘s The House in Paris this time-imagery is deployed to 
understand better all the sense data that percolate the mind of the narrator of St 
Augustine‘s Confessions. The lamentation apart from the similarity to the temporal 
aspect of the scene, is revisited in the night scene when Karen experiences a series of 
epiphanies on the notion of life and time. Karen too witnesses a flickering light whose 
fluorescent signals speak to her heart. She sees the lights outside the window ―the street 
lamp‖ that ―still lit up the chestnut tree.‖ (HP, 151) She sees the hours on the 
                                                 
31 The fragment bears some similarity to what Paul Ricoeur later described in his Oneself as Another 
(1992) as his ideas on selfhood and sameness – idem and ipse; the idea of being different from and yet 
similar to the other. 
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frightening ‗luminous watch‘ because ―the eye of time never stops watching you‖ (HP, 
151). In this transient experience she comes to understand how different and yet how 
similar she will be to the other she encounters in the future idea of her yet unborn son 
Leopold. It is her lamentation on the distension between the miracle of life and the 
moral imprisonment imposed by the society. It should also be understood as an 
extension and distension of selfhood into and through otherness, which will be 
developed later in this chapter. She sees the distension between herself and her lover 
Max, and she laments the distension between the celebration of her selfhood in her 
brave decision to love and give herself to Max and the immanent emulation of her 
selfhood by becoming a mother. St. Augustine‘s lamentation ends strikingly, ―And I 
discovered that I was far from you in the region of dissimilarity (in regione 
dissimilitudinis)‖ (in Ricoeur, 1984, 27).  
It must be mentioned that originally, the idea of falling into the region of 
dissimilarity had been taken from Plato and then was ―transported into the Christian 
milieu through the intermediary of Plotinus‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 27). However, it no longer 
refers to the human fall into Godless dark, deprived of any mimetic qualities, but to the 
experience of journey through darkness (distentio animi) in which the human soul 
discovers the mightiness of God, ―returning to its source and by its very effort to know 
its origin‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 27) in St Augustine cited by Ricoeur.  
Transposed on subjectification, the moment of darkness becomes synonymous 
with intentio (fusion) of the child with the mother, and of the mother with the archaic 
mother within her. The narrative frame as presented in The House in Paris merges the 
two myths of living as travelling – hence travelling to and from Paris – namely that of 
Plato‘s myth of travelling towards the known home/paradise and that of St Augustine of 
travelling towards an unknown home. According to various philosophers, the rub of 
human existence lies in its everlasting travelling – it actually is travelling, be it literal, as 
in Albert Camus or imaginary as in Dante, Aristotle and Herman Cohen. What should 
then remain within the cognitive capacities of recognition in a subject – i. e. concepts of 
home or the mother is a great unknown in Bowen‘s The House in Paris – it remains as 
in St Augustine, a journey towards strangeness and otherness. And yet it turns out to be 
a journey of self discovery through the recognition of binary differences of here and 
now, you and me, selfhood and otherness. Whereas in many of Bowen‘s texts we are 
carried away thanks to the unloving things to which Bowen imputes action more 
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willingly, here the plot takes us on a quest towards self-perception. When we are carried 
away by the three separate chapters of The House in Paris that disrupt the temporal 
sequence of yesterday, today and tomorrow, we learn the importance of desire and 
iterability. We travel towards something that remains unchangeable, just like being 
somebody‘s child or parent. We travel through a constant temporal frame best described 
by the concept of the afore-mentioned three-fold present, whose constancy is 
maintained by the iterability of the subject, its nature of homo viator as written in 1951 
by Gabriel Marcel in his Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope (1985). In 
travelling through life we are prompted by the two concepts of desire and need as Pascal 
rightly describes to explain the difference between Odyssey‘s and Abraham‘s journeys. 
To be precise a need can be fulfilled and it is as Odyssey coming back home. Desire, on 
the other hand, can never be quenched and is as Abraham‘s dissatisfaction with 
anything he saw and encountered on his way. The more we try to satisfy desire the 
larger it grows. And if we try to transpose this onto the question of subjectivity, we may 
say that there are certain needs such as a need for home, food, shelter, mother-figure, 
whose fulfilment leads to a growing desire for something entirely ungraspable – the 
integrity of the self. We travel in the darkness of our desire punctuated by separate 
beams of light just like the Paris characters of Bowen‘s novel come to find unhelpful 
and unrevealing. 
In the darkness, Karen suddenly has the idea of a son which will be begotten 
with Max. ―This made her lean over, trying to see Max‘s face.‖ (HP, 152) For a 
moment darkness bares presence of any other human. ―But there was not enough light 
and his face was turned away from her in the cleft of the pillow.‖ (HP, 152)  Karen 
finds herself alone- she finds herself entrenched by the stillness of the present, the 
barred cold and dull light which extend into nothingnes-  
 
They had both came a long way, without consulting each other, to sleep under the ceiling 
with this barred light. Between the tamarisks passing the rainy window and this lamp-
invaded darkness, nothing remained (HP, 152).  
 
Stanislas Boros wrote in an important essay on St Augustine, ―Les Categories 
de la temporalité chez saint Augustine‖, about four synthetic images that correlate with 
Ricoeur‘s ‗sorrow of the finite with the celebration of the absolute‘ (Boros, 1958, 
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Ricoeur, 1984, 29). These images refer to temporality as malleable mass, plurality and 
multiplicity as in female paradigm and symbolism. 
 The first image of temporality represents dissolution symbolised by ―ages of 
devastation, of swooning, of gradually sinking, of unfulfilled aim, of dispersal, of 
alteration, and of extreme indigence;‖ (Boros, 1958, in Ricoeur, 1984, 28).  The second 
image is that of ―temporality as agony‖ (Boros, 1958, in Ricoeur, 1984, 28); the  third 
image stands for ―temporality as banishment (…) exile, vulnerability, wandering, 
nostalgia‖ (Boros, 1958, in Ricoeur, 1984, 28), the fourth image correlates with ―images 
of (…) darkness and opacity‖ (Boros, 1958, in Ricoeur, 1984, 28). If the above four 
images underline the dialectic of the finite and absolute or the time and eternity, they 
may too shed some light on the textual weather of distentio animi in dialogism between 
the I and the other, the child and the mother, which extends the subject from now to the 
past and from now to eternity.  On finding herself banished from ‗home‘ and entrenched 
in darkness, Karen experiences distentio animi of her identity in an epiphanic reverie. 
Her distentio animi is embedded in the images of swooning, alteration, banishment, 
exile, nostalgia for home, as well as darkness and opacity.  As such subjectivity 
revolves in hermeneutical circles rather than as absolute intuition of self-consciousness.  
 
Hermeneutics debunks the claims of the transcendental ego; it demonstrates that 
understanding always labours within the historical horizon of an intersubjective 
communication (with) meanings (…) distantiated from subjective consciousness (Kearney, 
2006, 31).  
 
Distantiation as in being away from ‗home‘ is the dialectical opposition of 
belonging and they both form the two major tenets of the hermeneutic bridge. As such, 
subjectivity remains split and in darkness between the unknown home it both travels 
towards and belongs to. 
Furthermore, time analysis parallels that found in St Augustine‘s writing on 
psalms. Whatever may happen this morning, it will be part of afterwards may be 
explained in the passage from St Augustine.  
 
What is true of the whole psalm is also true of all its parts and each syllable. It is true of any 
longer action (in action longiore) in which I may be engaged and of which the recitation of 
the psalm may only be a small part. It is true of a man‘s whole life, of which all his actions 
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(actions) are parts. It is true of the whole history of mankind, of which each man‘s life is a 
part (in Ricoeur, 1984, 229).  
 
Presenting her ideas on temporality, Bowen writes in The House in Paris,  
 
While it is still Before, Afterwards has no power, but afterwards it is the kingdom, the 
power and the glory. You do not ask yourself, what am I doing? You know. What you do 
ask yourself, what have I done? you will never know (. …) What they never know will 
soon never have been. They will never know. (. ...)This seemed to have to be, when nothing 
had ever had to be, so I thought it would be all. It looked like the end. I did not see it would 
have an end. These hours are only hours (HP, 152-153). 
 
Karen‘s mind ―performs three functions, those of expectation (expectat), attention 
(adtendid: this verb recalls the intention presens), and memory ‗meminit‘.‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984, 18) Temporality hinges upon Karen but remains out of joint in terms of its 
relation to the cosmic time. The result is that ―the future which it expects passes through 
‗transeat‘ the present, to which attends, into the past, which it remembers.‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984, 18) 
Perception of time is a recurring trope in The House in Paris. Time seems a 
controllable thing in the narrative, so that Leopold‘s mother is to arrive ―at half-past 
two‖ (HP, 60) exactly when Henrietta is ―going out‖ (HP, 60), hence Leopold looks ―at 
the clock with masterful confidence, as though its hands moved faster the more he 
looked‖ (HP, 61). ―Grown ups‖ like to control time since they ―seem to be busy by 
clockwork: even if someone is not ill, when there has been no telegram, they run their 
unswerving course from object to object, directed by some mysterious inner needle that 
points all the time to what they must do next‖ (HP, 198). To control time in Bowen 
means to control reality, just like the schedule of trains arriving to Gare du Nord and 
leaving from Gare de Lyon. However, Bowen‘s conception of time as three-fold present 
goes against the idea of time control. According to the two contradictory ideas of time, 
that of ancient mythology and that of Judaeo-Christian tradition, controlling time is an 
illusion. We are either unable to tie the end with the beginning of it, as in Alkmeon and 
ancient Greek thinking or we are never to see it end, as in Abraham‘s journey home. 
Bowen‘s conception of time as three-fold presence not only disrupts the 
temporality of Karen‘s dream in the hotel with Max – it finds its parallel in the 
temporality of the whole book, divided into three parts of equal importance. During 
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Karen‘s reverie, ―The present of past things is memory [Naomi also sitting on Karen‘s 
bed that night].‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 11) Consequently along with this temporal model ―the 
present of present things is direct perception (contuitus; later the term will be attention, 
which better denotes the contrast with distentio).‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 11) And in the end 
―(...) the present of future things is expectation [Karen already speaking to her child 
Leopold]‖. (Ricoeur, 1984, 11) The novel The House in Paris is itself divided into the 
present, the past, the present changing into future. Both the first and final parts are 
hinged dialogically in the middle part- the past. Temporality dissolves, so that a 
question arises, ―how can time exist if the past is no longer, if the future is not yet, and 
if the present is not always?‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, 7) What is the role of perfect tenses then, 
where death ―would not have been for nothing‖ (HP, 154) and Leopold ―would have 
been then and then and then‖ (HP, 154)? 
We may take it, as the original presupposition, that the realist plot has already 
been marked as male32 since it procreates in a linear male manner – from an event to an 
event. Elizabeth Bowen devotes her essay entitled ―Notes on Writing a Novel‖ to the 
process of ‗designing‘ a good novel. She starts with pointing out the essential and non-
essential predicates of a satisfactory plot- ―something the novelist is driven to.‖ (Bowen, 
1999k, 35) Plot stands for ―knowing of destination. (. ...) Action of language, language 
of action. (… .)  story. (. …) = lie.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 35) It must ―(...) further the novel 
towards its object. (. …) The non-poetic statement of the poetic truth.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 
36) Bowen writes that ―Novelists must always have one foot, sheer circumstantiality, to 
stand on, whatever the other foot may be doing.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 36) However, the role 
of the novelist is also to recognize the character that ―(...) exists outside the action being 
contributed to the plot‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 37), and not to create them. Therefore, the role 
of the novelist, or else the author of a narrative, is not to resort to simple mimesis but 
                                                 
32 For the relationship of feminism, masculinism and narratology, see Marianne Hirsh, The 
Mother/Daughter Plot: Narrative, Psychoanalysis, Feminism. (1989), or further, Susan Snaider Lanser, 
―Towards a Feminist Narratology,‖ Style 20, 3(Fall 1986); The argument develops the notion that there is 
a metaleptic nature in masculine textuality, where ―the first scene‖ is always followed by a sequential 
―second scene‖, and so on. Furthermore, realism, as a text, belongs in the realm of the symbolic order, 
and Lacanian phallic economy. It may, then, be argued that it offers a stable positioning of the ‗I‘, a fixed 
meaning and a move towards closure. 
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rather to multiplication in favour of the new: enrichment and direct transposition of 
different voices into the narrative. 
If characters pre-exist the plot and if they are the object of its narrative quest, 
the novel itself comes to resemble, according to Gilles Deleuze, a Body – without - 
Organs, whose continuous desire pre-exists the object of the desire where action is the 
simplification (for story-purposes) of complexity. The plot does not procreate new 
events, it moves in a circular manner from the already existing ideas. For each one act, 
there are an x number of rejected alternatives. And yet Bowen does defend certain 
Cartesian purposefulness. It is worth saying that Cartesian clarity and mimesis in art is 
representative of the empirically grounded unity of abstraction: it is imbued with a pure 
disinterestedness, a promise of autonomy, an absolute purposefulness. Still, Bowen 
rejects simple binary oppositions and normative essentialism in favour of multiplicity, 
―It is in being seen to be capable of alternatives that the character becomes, for the 
reader, valid‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 38). She does highlight the necessity of dialogism, which 
on one hand furthers the plot and on the other one expresses the characters. Bowen 
writes, ―Dialogue provides means for the psychological materialization of characters‖ 
(Bowen, 1999k, 41). Dialogue is performance too as ―each piece of dialogue must be 
‗something happening‘‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 42), since it is a means of doing ―things with 
words‖ (this idea of J. L. Austin33 is recurring in the thesis and I make a more extended 
reference to it in the ―Discussion: The Dialogue and the Difference‖) to the other – 
speech being ―what the characters do to each other‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 41). It is also in 
agreement with J. L. Austin that there are no true and untrue statements in Bowen‘s 
fiction – they are only happy or unhappy in relation to their validity to the truth the 
novel tries to present. Truth is ―virtuous‖ by the ruling of ―the inherent truth that the 
novel states‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 44).  
What can be seen as an example of disruption in the linear narrativity in The 
House in Paris is above all the division of the novel into three even parts of present, 
past and again present. Such construction proves what Bowen advises as a good 
novelistic practice – a dialogue between unpredictability and being inevitable.  
 
                                                 
33 J. L. Austin‘s ideas on the generative nature of language and dialogism are collected in his How to Do 
Things with Words. (1975). 
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Roughly, the action of a character should be unpredictable (the first part of The House in 
Paris) before it has been shown, inevitable (the second part of The House in Paris) when 
it has been shown. In the first half of the novel, the unpredictability should be the more 
striking. In the second half, the inevitability should be the more striking (Bowen, 1999k, 
38).  
 
 
The idea of past that Bowen gives us is significant of two predicaments that 
what passes away is the present and what we measure is not the present but the past and 
the future - hence hours ticking away from what is ―tomorrow night – no, tonight. Her 
sleep of an hour had let tomorrow in‖ (HP, 152). Pregnancy is also the measurement of 
the months that remain and that which have past, and the present that, although still, 
remains fleetingly imperceptible. 
 
Tonight would be more then than hours and the lamp. It would have been the hour of my 
death. I should have to do what I dread, see them know. There would still be something to 
dread. I should see the hour in the child. I should not have rushed on to nothing. He would 
be the mark our hands did not leave on the grass, he would be the tamarisks we only half 
saw. (HP, 153) 
 
The teachings of St. Augustine of Hippo introduce us to the motives of the 
miraculously immaculate conception of Jesus Christ, of Virgin Mary as Christ‘s mother 
and of the idea of Virgin Mary being the second Eve purifying femininity of its original 
sin. St Augustine says in his Sermons, ―the parents who generated us to death are Adam 
and Eve: The parents who generated us to life are Christ and the Church.‖ (Augustine, 
1991, 22:10 PL XXXVIII, 54) Furthermore, in The Christian Combat he announces 
―There is a great mystery here: that just as death comes to us through a woman, so Life 
is born to us through a woman‖. (Agustine, 1998, §22:24) 
Motherhood34 as in begetting is a metaphor and embodiment of the relational 
character of subjectivity, where the I encounters with the other. Motherhood appears to 
be closest to what the Franco-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas stated to be the 
                                                 
34 The idea of motherhood as well as the relationship between the daughter and the mother as originary of 
female subjective will be further developed in the fourth (―Motherhood‖)  and fifth (―Motherhood and 
Masks – Fantasy and Sacrificial Mothering‖) section of this chapter. 
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only guideline for those who survived or lived after the atrocities of Auschwitz. For 
Levinas the rub of moral love is the experience of the encounter with the other through 
the phenomenon of proximity and distance it exercises. Levinas‘s idea of ethical duty to 
the other finds a strong parallel in motherly love towards the child that is believed to be 
capable of emulating itself for the child. As in Levinas grade of proximity, first a 
mother offers tenderness and care to the child, then it also gives her time, and finally the 
mother is ready to make any sacrifice, even the sacrifice of death. And even if not all 
mothers can climb this ladder of Levinas‘s ethics, they certainly embody the most exact 
picture of the encounter of the I with the other – the stranger.  
If the time is breachable through hermeneutics and intersubjective 
construction of the self, or different – through the relationship of the self with the 
other/the stranger, Bowen rightly notices that characters may substitute one another. In 
her letter to A. E. C., dating 31
st
 August 1935, Bowen wrote that she had tried to 
reinforce the idea that Leopold is the double of Max. In the letter Bowen explains, 
 
It‘s funny about people being hard to visualize – I find I visualize the people I‘m writing 
about in the same terms, with the same blanks and qualifications, as I remember people 
who have impressed me but that I cannot always see in entirety. I can see all Henrietta 
except her features; Karen‘s figure, movements and ways but I don‘t know what kind of 
nose she had. Max is a portrait of someone I knew quite passingly and superficially once, 
so of course I do see him; Max (read Leopold) is the same man as a little boy. But if I can‘t 
get this across there‘s something wrong. (Bowen, 1999k, 199) 
 
If Leopold is Max and Max is Leopold, according to Bowen‘s authorial election, then 
we can read into the narratives of both of the characters as constructed within the 
economy of narcissism. As should be noted, both characters betray porous selfhood, and 
they both fail to find an external totalized object of desire. Apparently, they are unable 
to forego their want of a strong mother figure and a desire for maternal love. In The 
House in Paris Bowen links the development of narcissism with childhood as well as 
with emotional bereavement of estrangement and otherness. Narcissism has been 
considered in psychology a result of a childhood trauma, a loss of a love-object, loss of 
maternal love and affect or parental rejection. It originates excess of self-hatred which 
the subject masks with exaggerated self-love. What happens is that these destructive 
drives are misdirected at the subject‘s own ego, whereas in a normal situation the 
subject directs or should direct its abjectable drives against the maternal. Narcissism is a 
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scream against rejection but it also constitutes a form of self-defence. In her In the 
Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith Julia Kristeva says that narcissism is a 
―defence against the emptiness of separation‖ (Kristeva, 1988, 42). She admits that ―in 
being narcissistic one has already throttled the suffering of emptiness‖ (Kristeva, 1988, 
42-43). We clearly see narcissistic traits in Leopold and we have proof of their existence 
in Max‘s behaviour as well. Miglena Nikolchina writes in her Matricide in Language. 
Writing Theory in Kristeva and Woolf (2004) that,  
 
Strangeness to language does entail the forlornness of the melancholic who is fused in the 
maternal Thing because of an unaccomplished separation from the mother. Asymbolia is 
the insufficiently lost maternal continent, the invisible centre of gravity, the hidden image 
of Narcissus, whose silent call threatens with dissolution. (Kristeva, 1987, 26) [Emphasis 
mine]  
 
If we turn towards Max‘s narrative in The House in Paris, we see that what 
consecutively follows from his narcissistic subjectivity heightened by his relationship to 
Mme Fisher is his silent suicide – ―His attack on himself had been, however, so quiet 
that when it happened she did not understand‖ (HP, 184). What is more, the suicide, 
when Max ―struck myself (Mme Fisher), himself and my knowledge of him‖ (HP, 184), 
is also a matricide and dissolution of the maternal from which as Narcissus he cannot 
free himself.  
In fact, one might say that Elizabeth Bowen herself has devoted much of her 
attention to narcissism, as one of the frequent topoi of her writing. Bowen wrote about 
narcissism, as an almost social problem, in her descriptions of boarding schools and 
dormitories for girls. Her essay entitled ―The Mulberry Tree‖ gives a fine example of 
emotional emptiness similar to the feelings of loneliness at the school she attended 
during the years of the First World War. Self-loathing for emotional desiccation was 
magnified in excessive fetishism and self-adoration. The American Psychiatric 
Association (2000) has described narcissism as a malignant grandiose sense of self-
importance, preoccupation with unrealistic fantasies, exhibitionism, cool indifference or 
feelings of rage, inferiority, shame, humiliation, or emptiness in response to criticism. A 
subject who succumbs to this personality disorder shows at least two of the following 
interpersonal disturbances: entitlement, exploitativeness, alternation between over-
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idealization and devaluation, lack of empathy. (American Psychiatric Association APA: 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – DSM-IV-TR). 
Another facet of intrasubjectivity can be seen in the concept of boundary 
crossing as described by Jurij Lotman. In Aristotle, ―nature is a source or cause of being 
moved and being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of a concomitant 
attribute.‖ (Ricoeur, 1994, 91) The internal tendency to change distinguishes nature 
from art. If we look at characters in The House in Paris, we are able to divide them into 
the static/passive characters and the active ones. As an example, Karen‘s travelling to 
and from England, as well as her ―escape into the world of dream, crossing the 
impenetrable border between two different realities‖ (Kardela, 2002, 178), are examples 
of boundary crossing only applicable to exceptional characters. Karen is not a static 
subject. According to Jurij Lotman, boundary-crossing is the characters‘ ―movement 
which takes place across the basic topographical border in the spatial structure of a 
cultural text‖ (Kardela, 2002, 179), which is ―the most abstract model of reality from 
the position of a given culture‖ (Kardela, 2002, 178). Anna Kedra-Kardela writes in her 
―Boundary-Crossing in Elizabeth Bowen‘s Short Story ‗The Happy Autumn Fields‘‖ 
that Lotman‘s division of cultural texts into stative and dynamic, a division that  
 
parallels [his] division of characters into mobile and immobile ones. In contrast to the 
immobile characters, the mobile characters can cross the topographical boundary in the 
internal structure of texts; they can cross change the environment or move from one 
environment to another. (Kardela, 2002, 179)  
 
As has been mentioned, the exceptional characters, most often main characters, are 
mobile, which takes us back to the exceptionality of homo viator. Similarly, exceptional 
characters in Bowen are usually exceptionally mobile as the eponymous Eva Trout, or 
as Portia in The Death of the Heart. The characters that fix themselves to one place are 
usually ‗bad‘ characters, as in Mme Fisher confined to her bed in the upstairs of the 
house in Paris – who has ―not been alive for nearly ten years‖ (HP, 203), as well as 
Karen‘s mother and aunt, fixing themselves with ―unconscious things – the doors, the 
curtains‖ (HP, 173). Opposed to that are the boundary-crossing characters: Karen, Max, 
who however makes a mistake of fixing himself to the house in Paris, to Naomi, who is 
―like furniture‖ (HP, 155). Since, however, the plot of The House in Paris takes place 
mostly in one household, how can the characters involved be considered mobile? In my 
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opinion, Bowen‘s boundary crossing is not merely of a spatial kind – first it is temporal, 
as in crossing from present to past and back to present again, also analysed by Kardela 
in her text on two realities in ―The Happy Autumn Fields‖. Temporal boundary crossing 
is executed by the reader and by the dialogical construction of the characters – that is 
the I fixed within the other, the child fixed within the parent. In this sense we can read 
Max as Leopold, as Bowen wished in her design, and Henrietta as Karen. What is more, 
the boundary crossing involves crossing the gender binary oppositions, so that the 
characters can be yoked in various oppositions. Temporal boundary crossing does 
trigger identity boundary crossing as just noted. Bowen‘s writing is therefore an event – 
an event of creating a counter-discourse on femininity.  
Austin‘s speech acts in discourse – perlocutionary and illocutionary acts are a 
form of boundary crossing – crossing the boundary of the other. Karen‘s speech act of 
addressing the other in her monologue, leads her to construction of the other within 
herself and parallely the night she spends with Max leads to her pregnancy with 
Leopold. As has been noted earlier, speech acts consists of ―doing things with words‖ as 
in J. L. Austin‘s work on the generative discourse. Both perlocutionary and 
illocutionary acts require the other – the other that listens and understands.  
According to Ricoeur and J. L. Austin, personal identity can only be 
understood in temporal terms. When one speaks of oneself, they immediately have 
available two modes of permanence in time: the first mode is described as character and 
the other mode is referred to as keeping‘s one‘s word. Both modes are descriptive and 
emblematic. Both are also referred to as dialogical modes of being. Hence, Karen‘s 
reverie about the other is transposed onto three temporal frames: that of her past, 
present and future. These are yoked into one unified temporal frame through the 
iterability of Karen‘s character and ―keeping the word‖, which again points to a certain 
faithfulness to a unified image of oneself. 
Utterance of such character evokes interlocution, speech not only creates and 
confirms the self but it also unveils the other.  
 
Facing the speaker in the first person is the listener in the second person to whom the 
former addresses himself or herself – this fact belongs to the situation of interlocution. So, 
there is not illocution without allocution and, by implication, without someone to whom the 
message is addressed.‖ (Ricoeur, 1994, 43)  
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It is a double phenomenon that signals the ―I‖ that speaks and the ―you‖ to 
which the speech is addressed. It should be signalled here that the aporia of discursive 
dialogism in The House in Paris does not only highlight the importance of the other, but 
it also develops the aporia of consequential strangeness. That said, dialogues are 
―solitary experiences in another solitary experiences‖. (Ricoeur, 1985, 83) Constructing 
a strong character means that this character is not only capable of co-existence with the 
other, it is also capable of being faithful to oneself, which may disrupt the engendered 
notions of strong masculine and weak feminine. The greatest battles for integrity are 
fought between the evanescent idea of self-knowledge and persistent shadow of 
strangeness, as well as the unknown within oneself – Kristevan porousness of the self.  
Personal identity develops from mundane practices in which people find a 
reference in actions and performances or reiteration of the subject. This concept is 
closely linked to iterability of subjectivity – a term drawing from Judith Butler‘s and 
Jacques Derrida‘s writing. In the development of identity there is a process of reiteration 
of subjectivity in performances. Life is seen as performance emplotted into temporality 
– a work in progress of an uncompleted subject. Reading along this line, a subject 
appears as a being-in-time, dispersed between the remembered past, the experienced 
present and the anticipation of the future. As has been written at the beginning of this 
chapter, temporality of past and future is grasped in the temporality of present, so that a 
three-layered present unfolds in a narrative of a subject. Past, present and future mingle 
in one, undividable whole that can only be understood transcribed into an emplotted 
narrative. In narrativity that gives the title to this part of the chapter, emplotment is 
essentially a link to the separate histories and events in which the subject is involved 
voluntarily or involuntarily. Narrative identity, which develops in relation to the 
assumptions of narrativity, is closely linked to action/performance and suffering of a 
subject. Different from the cosmic time and phenomenological time, it permits a better 
understanding of the so-called ‗human time‘ of emplotment. The process of narrative of 
identity asks the question of ‗who‘ is acting and suffering – who is doing and enduring. 
Each narrative is a story of somebody who is ‗enduring‘ one‘s commitments, character 
and practices. The identity of the ‗who‘ unfolds as the story unfolds. This takes on new 
light in the writing of Elizabeth Bowen concerned with the devaluation, desiccation of 
reality during the Second World War. It corroborates her interest in memory and past as 
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constantly unfolding over the present. Randall Stevenson notes in his Modernist 
Fiction: An Introduction,  
 
the war‘s enormous violence not only swept away a style of life, a sense of integration in 
the flow of time. (…) A sense of security within history, and a belief in the attractive 
qualities of the future to which it probably led, had sustained a good deal of thinking – and 
fiction – at least since the latter part of the Victorian period. (Stevenson, 1992, 140) 
 
Since temporality is so strongly anchored in suffering, which prompts a character to 
develop and tell his/her story, this may find its parallel in what Simon Critchley calls in 
one of his interviews for The Believer the philosophy that begins with experiences of 
disappointment,  
 
Political disappointment flows from the fact that there is injustice—that we live in a world 
that is radically unjust and violent, where might seems to equal right, where the poor are 
exploited by the rich, etc. So for me philosophy begins with these experiences of 
disappointment: a disappointment at the level of what I would think of as ―meaning,‖ 
namely that, given that there is no God, what is the meaning of life? ... But if there is a 
feature that dominates the present, I would say there‘s the fact of war and the horror and 
cruelty of war. (Critchley, 200335) 
 
In my opinion, unsurprisingly bearing in mind the plot of the novel, a similar 
feeling of disenchantment with reality prevails in Bowen‘s The House in Paris. The 
novel is divided in three parts; its plot is supported by three crucial moments, which are 
the conversation scene between Leopold and Henrietta, the night that Karen spends with 
Max, and the revelation of bad news to Leopold that his mother would not be coming. 
The three moments are embedded in the overwhelming feeling of disappointment that 
the characters experience. From these three points a number of less significant moments 
of revelation spreads, forming what Slavoj Zizek called a network of resistant points 
within the demagogical dominant discourses – here one can undoubtedly call it the plot. 
Critchley argues for a cultivation of the low, the common and the near—the everyday—
as that in relationship to which we can make a meaning out of the meaninglessness of 
                                                 
35 Retrieved August, 13, 2008 from website: 
http://www.believermag.com/issues/200308/?read=interview_critchley 
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our existence, Bowen chooses to write about cultivation of the material – the house, the 
furniture. From the experience of profound disappointment with having one‘s childhood 
kept ―sunny and beautiful‖ (HP, 41) and then finding oneself looking back at ―(…) 
humiliations, ridiculousness and self-deceptions, and dread[ing] others‖ (HP, 161), from 
this moral nihilism Bowen threads her work on the self and other, where the dyad find 
themselves set against the necessity of self-creation and self-definition. Her ‗luminous 
spaces‘ emerge from the vulgar, from the hypothetical motherlesness and strangeness, 
similar to what Julia Kristeva describes in her  text ―Motherhood According to Giovanni 
Bellini‖ (1980). 
From these resistant points the narrative races forward – taxis swerve, trains 
run from north to south, ships sail from a country to another country. In Bowen, we are 
literally moved from one event to another one within the emplotment of narrated time. 
And yet, the highly strung emotional moments are equally oppressive and haunting as 
the dynamics of movement itself. Even though the resistant points seem to be frozen in 
oppressive stillness, there is a dynamic quality in them – the feeling of the monumental 
time and the internal time closing in on the character. In this sense, the narrated time 
undergoes significant changes thanks to those emotive moments of stillness. The 
narrated temporality is delayed or thrust forward, amplifying the stillness – the non-
existence of now, demeaning its hegemony and at the same time amplifying the internal 
conflicts of characters – the internal time, the internal life merges with what Nietzsche 
would call the monumental history. 
The entanglement of the narrated past, present and future gives the character 
not only a psychological depth, but shows the spuriousness of the dominant ideology. 
Thanks to the moments of great intensity, Bowen creates an experience of dejà-vu – we 
seem to be seeing the same character in different situations, whereas in fact we see 
different characters undergoing deep internal changes and conflicts. The narrator guides 
us through various consciousnesses, so that we gain a sense of participating in a 
dramatic representation. We witness the performance of characters and become their 
other. The textual time merges with monumental time; the internal time of the 
characters is emplotted into our own time of experience. Complying with the literary 
118 
 
weather of her times, Bowen gives us her own idea of Auerbach‘s multi-personal 
representation of consciousness.36 
During the night Karen spends with Max, the chronological time is quite 
clearly represented by the luminous watch and the passing hours. In Bowen‘s play with 
prolepses and analepses, the present is oppressive – it has barely any quality in itself let 
alone that of passing. It is burdensome, lacking – similarly it is not sufficient to do 
certain things – just like visiting Paris in the case of Henrietta. What happens now, gains 
quality only if it is converted to either memories or expectations. The present is less 
palpable than the past or the future. In this sense Bowen tries to answer the question of 
whether time is irrevocable. And following Marcel Proust whom she cites on various 
occasions, she presents time not as irrevocable but rather to be regained in memory and 
expectation. Hers is the idea of consciousness similar to Auerbach and his symbolic 
omni temporality of the remembering consciousness. To Auerbach, omni-temporality 
means coexistence within single subject‘s experience of different time frames equal to 
multiplicity in voices. By merging past and future into present Bowen gives in to the 
idea, also shared by Virginia Woolf that consciousness has no absolute linear existence. 
In her often quoted essay Woolf writes,  
 
Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-
transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end. Is it 
not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, 
whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and 
external as possible? (Woolf, 1986, vol II, 106-107) 
 
Bowen tries to find the answer to what Woolf deemed as impossible – realist fiction 
representing human experience and consciousness. Woolf believed that realist writers 
fail to represent human consciousness convincingly because they ignore the fact that as 
in the ―Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown‖: ―in or about December, 1910, human character 
changed‖ (Woolf, 1986, vol I, 320). So even though Bowen strives not to dispense with 
                                                 
36 Eric Auerbach spoke about the idea of multipersonal voices in his commentary to Virginia Woolf‘s To 
the Lighthouse in one of his most influential essays ―The Brown Stocking‖ (1946). In the text Auerbach 
analyzed the internal monologue of Mrs Ramsay. His idea of multi-personal representation of 
consciousness referred to a consciousness containing many voices that is a mirror image of author‘s 
attitude toward the reality of the world. 
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the idea of time and chronology, she disrupts the linearity of past, present and future – 
as well as the hegemony of the present. The time presented by Bowen in the present 
moment is complex and multi-layered and it is her effort to present the characters‘ 
internal struggle with the outer frame of time and events. The idea of movement that 
Bowen deploys refers not so much to the measurement of cosmological time, but rather 
deconstructs the internal and external time of every subject‘s consciousness. As such 
Bowen complicates Deleuze idea of the time image constructed within Kantian thinking 
of Adorno‘s post Second World War thinking, who remarked that writing poetry after 
Auschwitz was obscene (1949)37. The subject in Bowen may not be motionless and 
restrained and yet it seems to be surprisingly passive and reluctant towards action, an 
idea, which is signalled by Bowen in her deployment of passive syntax.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Theodor Adorno wrote in 1949 that ―To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric‖ (Adorno, 1949, 
Guyer, 2007) 
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2. The Self and the Other 
 
He would be the mark our hands did not leave on the grass, he would 
be the tamarisks we only half saw. And he would be the I whose bed 
Naomi sat on, the Max whose sleeve I brushed rain: tender and 
guardable. He would be the Max I heard talking when I stood outside 
the salon, the I Max rang up: that other we were both looking for. I 
could bear us both lying tire and cast-off if it were for him, if we were 
his purpose… these would not have been for nothing: He would have 
been there then and then and then. (HP, 155) 
 
The approach to subjectification and the development of identity is notoriously 
divided in two ‗schools‘. The first one takes into account the sex of the subject and 
consequently its sexual practices. This approach very often refers itself to different 
erogenous practices or zones of our political, social and economic lives. The second 
approach chooses to focus on different aspects of being as independent of sexual 
practices. In such light a subject can become gendered in this or that way not necessarily 
having engaged in sexual practices typical of that gender. Still from another angle a 
subject may acquire the attributes of a given sexual orientation without engaging in 
sexual practices of the given group. The most salient argument is that our daily lives or 
the category of being is more a verb, a practice rather than a predefined noun. Bowen 
writes in one of her essays that speech is a ―physical act‖, just like ―a fight, murder, love 
making – dialogue is the most vigorous and visible inter-action of which characters in a 
novel are capable‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 41). This idea has been widely used in modern 
research on the construction of feminism, patriarchy and hierarchy producing dominant 
discourses, hate speech, gate-keeping policies as well as all dichotomist thinking on 
gender and sex. Erzsebet Barat says,  
 
In other words, signifiers come to be meaningful ‗within the available frames of 
intelligibility‘i that are effects of particular relations of hegemonic power. These frames of 
intelligibility can be captured then through the practices of categorization and the 
assumptions about ―ordinary‖ that can go without explicit explanation simply assumed to be 
known by a given collective of speakers. (Barat, 200738) 
                                                 
38 Retrieved March 13, 2009 from website: http://americanaejournal.hu/vol3no1/barat 
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Barat admits that inter-textuality, emerging at the boundary of text/context, needs  
 
to acknowledge above all the materiality of discourse and define it as an ideological social 
practice where categorizes or concepts ‗never assert their meaningfulness in and of 
themselves‘ but function ‗as a particular way of making sense of (the signified)‘ and thereby 
bring about or ‗define a particular set of social arrangements. (Barat, 2007) 
 
The practices of intelligibility of a discourse are best exemplified in operations 
of categorization, as well as admitting ordinariness of a given concept in a collective 
understanding of speakers. And it is questions of categorization and supposed 
ordinariness that Bowen resolves to exhaust. Her world view hinges on the exploration 
of the ideological investments of the sense making practices in a given cultural and 
historic moment. 
As follows, what is of utmost importance is to analyze why 
individuals/characters choose to use a particular discourse or take a particular action, 
which they do on a regular basis thus enacting the process of reiteration. One should try 
and understand the ideological investments that parallel one way of behaving rather than 
another. And by doing this, we may try to sketch at least two conclusions. The first one 
will refer itself to the construction of the dominant discourse with the discourse‘s 
presuppositions that go without verbalizations but without which no statement can be 
enunciated. The other conclusion will explore the potential consequences, the direction 
where the dominant logic that informs a particular statement should pull the trajectory 
of the propositions; these propositions that make for an essential element of Bowen‘s 
longer fiction.  
Since this work chooses to problematize subjectification as strongly enframed 
in gender operations, we shall give a great emphasis to the categories of woman and 
man. Here, we should work under the premise that the categories of woman or man are 
not enclosed in a predefined set of qualities but become themselves a work in progress, 
a Deleuzian becoming, just as much as the Deleuzian Body - without - Organs. A verb 
rather than a noun gender categorization allows construction of verbs such as to man 
and to woman. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the sole practice of being a 
woman, a man, a mother or a father does not become a social discourse until it receives 
a reaction, thus before it gains dynamic momentum of being exchanged between the 
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addresser and addressee. Whatever the social practice of a subject becomes a discourse 
only when it is contextualized. The approach of contextualization can be divided into 
two separate approaches, one being more radical than the other one. The more radical 
approach would only have a given practice as a discourse juxtaposed against an external 
other. Whatever one says or does needs to be performed in front of an audience, which 
on its part needs to react to that given statement.  
As has been mentioned in the previous part of this chapter, this approach finds 
its parallel in J. L. Austin‘s idea of language as a set of speech acts and performative 
utterances. In an intellectually intriguing way Bowen‘s ideas precede that of J. L. 
Austin‘s so that in her ―Notes on Writing a Novel‖ she writes that ―speech is what the 
characters do to each other‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 41). Discourse has a deeply productive and 
generative power, of which interpellation and verbal violence are just few facets. What 
is more, language has plausibly physical consequences. 
Contextualization can also be seen from a different angle – that which escapes 
the existence of external other, so that acts have their meaning even if no one receives 
them, especially in the case of perlocutionary acts, performed/enlivened by saying 
something. Thus, the human mind continues to invest into rituals. It can be argued 
therefore that, for example, Karen‘s night reverie is a perlocutionary act, that by sole 
linguistic performance ‗begets‘ Leopold and inserts Karen within the maternal 
dichotomy of the child and the mother – the self and the other. The imagery of holding 
hands, leaving marks on the grass, endless coming and going of two lovers with their 
attempts at making the relationship as normative as possible, are among other reasons 
(to be taken up later in this study) an example of the importance of ritualization and 
contextualization. The effect of a symbol is far more important than the realistic image 
itself, even though it requires being performed. And, what is more important, it does not 
function within the true/false binary opposition but within the premise whether the 
utterance is happy or felicitous, which takes away the repressive and impeding ethics, as 
has been mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis. 
However, this doing away with the hegemony of the other points to the 
spuriousness in the construction of this very other as well as to the fact of the other 
being a partially external and internal construct. The other makes part of both ‗myself‘ 
and ‗yourself‘, so that it needs to be taken into account within the temporal frame of the 
subject‘s existence. ―One cannot simply act‖ (HP, 152) says Max to Karen when they 
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are in Boulogne – one is not a solitary agent but a dialogical construct. This reading of 
the concept of selfhood is worked on in Paul Ricoeur‘s idea of individual as both myself 
and another based on the division between sameness and selfhood. 
In her introduction to The House in Paris A. S. Byatt elects three sentences 
that she believes best describe the ‗emotional weather‘ of the novel. The fragments are 
typical of a certain Bowenesque intellectual ubiquitousness and, irritating for many 
readers as they are, they highlight very important tropes in The House of Paris – 
emphasis on dialogism between selfhood and sameness as well as selfhood and 
otherness respectively. However, it often strikes one that Bowen can be too prompt to 
use categorization and then, within this taxonomy - hierachization. To give an example, 
the three fragments from Bowen‘s novelelected by A.S. Byatt need to be quoted. The 
first quote refers to innocence: ―Years before sex had power to touch his feeling it had 
forced itself into view as an awkward tangle of motives‖. (HP, 34)  
The second quote is about the plasticity of a child‘s mind: ―The mystery about 
sex comes from confusion and terror: to a mind on which these have not yet settled 
there is nothing you cannot tell.‖ (HP, 78) Similarly, Kristeva believes the time of 
childhood and early adolescence to be that of total belief in oneself; a time blatanly 
called a syndrome of ideality. This again conjugates with a certain polymorphous 
perversity of a small child whose spectre of interests is broad and diverse. 
The third quote sees the adult world peeking through the child‘s voice: ―There 
is no end to the violations committed by children on children, quietly talking alone.‖ 
(HP, 31) Theoretically, it may refer to the idea that there is a child within every adult 
subject that needs to be re-discovered and returned to as in Gilles Deleuze. This child, 
as the other or the foreigner, dwells deep within the structures of every individual 
psyche, so that his or her existence does not solely threaten the borders of the self from 
the outside, as one would imagine, but rather it destabilizes the subject from the inside. 
Categorization in Bowen is a deliberate technique revealing the dominant 
divide into exclusionary dichotomies. This is followed by the illusion of giving certain 
social practices the status of ‗ordinary‘. The second technique reveals itself in Bowen as 
a typical Bowenesque style of writing in style of aphorisms and general truths that are 
supposedly to resonate deep with the reader‘s understanding of reality and his/her 
experience of life. A. S. Byatt comments on the trickiness of such style –  
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I began the book, a compulsive reader, having already worked my way through most of 
Scott and much of Dickens, expecting to find a powerful plot, another world to inhabit, love, 
danger. I found instead my first experience of a ‗wrought‘, formalized ‗modern‘ novel, a 
novel which played tricks with time and point of view. (Byatt, 1976, 7) 
 
That said, however, Byatt seems to be unable to see through this clichéd Bowenesque 
style as she goes on to admit  
 
A novel, also (and this I remember clearly as being supremely important), which clarified, 
or would have clarified if I had been clever enough to focus it, the obscure, complex and 
alarming relationships between children, sex and love. There were powerful phrases which 
lodged in my mind and stayed there. (Byatt, 1976, 7) 
 
 
Socratic dialogue is characterised by opposing itself to any monological 
ontology ‗claiming to possess a readymade truth‘ (Kristeva, 1980, 81). Socratic truth is 
a by-product of ‗dialogical relations between speakers‘ (Kristeva, 1980, 81) and it 
verges on the category of a noun and a verb at the same time. Its craft can be seen in 
articulation of fantasy, correlation of signs – it also means a questioning of truth by 
discourse and by the very effect this discourse will have once it has been produced. 
Narrative threaded as in Socratic dialogue is externalized and ‗dialogized‘. Emphasis is 
given to the other and his or her truth. Meaning is a dialogical product between the self 
and other. And if we decide to treat the other as an equally important subject we must 
take into consideration the sum total of his or her existence – their narrative, origins, 
social sphere. Bowen constructs her own discourse using these textual land marks. And 
yet even though we encounter a plethora of social contexts in Bowen, her ―subjects of 
discourse are nonpersons, anonyms, hidden by the discourse constituting them‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 81). Narrative in Bowen continually makes use of the social detail so 
that one can easily fall into the trap of denying Bowen any originality and genuine 
talent. However, her exaggerated use of the social detail is somehow pessimistic, there 
is an undercutting sense of grotesque and Bowen‘s use of the leading motives of failed 
maternity and difficult childhood sets the atmosphere against an apparent simplicity of 
plot. What is more, if using the social detail may seem common and cliché, introducing 
themes of orphanhood and failed motherhood opposes the apparent plainness. To read 
better into the uniqueness of such choice, let us remember Kristeva‘s words from her 
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Desire in Language. ―The exclusive situation liberates the word from any univocal 
objectivity, from any representative function, opening up to the symbolic sphere‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 81), so that by definition the ideas of maternity, adolescence and 
childhood in Bowen need to be singled out from the dominant definition for the 
discourse be able to shift it outside the dominant ideology. And if these themes, stripped 
of any sentimentalism in The House in Paris, are deeply tragic and moving in their 
stagnant cruelty, Bowen‘s last novel Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes introduces a 
Dionysian ‗Bowen-ism‘ that is defiant and carnivalesque, as will eventually be shown in 
the next chapter.  
To gain a better view of how deep the discursive cracks of the dominant 
discourse are, Bowen plays with stable signifiers and signified widening the sphere of 
their interconnectedness. She moves a step further liberating the self and other from 
their dichotomised relationships, so that a character does not have an obvious opposition 
but in an overview of the plot we may see his/her oppositional relationships with 
different others. What differentiates Bowen from the traditional construction of Socratic 
truth is her denial of relativisms triggered by the observers‘ autonomous point of view. 
And since subjects are not autonomous but coherent in reiterating certain discourses, we 
read about mothers who choose to mother well or badly. The play of signifiers and 
signified, that is various characters, is not free and uncontrolled to give them greater 
freedom of being, but it is deliberate. As such in constructing an unhappy mother 
without a child, Bowen does not give us a happy one with a child, but a happy one 
without her child. In Bowen there is Menippean, blatant and open exploration of ‗body, 
dreams and language‘ (Kristeva, 1980, 83) that answer to the unattainable object of 
ultimate desire. Narrative in Bowen is carnivalesque for it is like ―the residue of a 
cosmogony that ignored substance, causality, or identity outside of its link to the whole, 
which exists only in or through relationship‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 78). What surfaces in this 
particular interest in dialogism, is Bowen‘s emphasis on multiplicity and relationality of 
dependence as an ongoing process the self and the other maintain. Multiplicity and 
relationality are inseparable elements of autonomy feminism strives to achieve through 
its particular enactment of agency.  
In a Menippean gesture Bowen laughs at the concept of family though a happy 
marriage – those relationships, which fit into the society‘s discourse on matrimony 
usually are the most fraught with problems. Apparently, The House in Paris plot lacks 
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in stable, fulfilling unions let alone the curious and problematic marriage of Karen‘s 
aunt, who dies before Karen gets married. It is during the visit to the aunt‘s house in 
Ireland, now installed on a mount after the Troubles, that Karen realizes the futility and 
shallowness of her possible union with Ray. Yet the concept of family that Bowen 
laughs at is the one presented by Foucault in The History of Sexuality as the family cell, 
as opposed to the eighteenth century concept of family as alliance. It is what Nancy 
Armstrong reads in Desire and Domestic Fiction39 as evaporation into discourse – 
women giving up their corporeality for the introduction into discourse, so that they no 
longer are corporeal but textual constructs easily manipulated by men. Armstrong had 
written much in her book about the idea of desire as inseparable from its representation. 
She followed Foucault in saying that repression is a rhetorical figure and a means of 
producing desire in the middle class, bourgeois logic. Its repressive hypothesis ensures 
that we always think about freedom in terms of repression and the myth of progressive 
enlightenment, whereas  desire should be liberated from these encumbering notions so 
that we should ―abandon the practice of putting knowledge in a domain of nature 
outside of and prior to representation‖ (Armstrong, 1999, 13). Only by doing so ―we 
stand a chance of avoiding the tautology inherent in the notion of repression‖. 
(Armstrong, 1999, 13) As such we may be able to understand desire as part of political 
history and different hegemonies as well as contest the reigning systems of 
phallocentrism manipulating both corporeality and textuality of women.  
Paul Ricoeur writes in his Oneself as Another that the self floats between the 
preserve physicality and intentionality, which posits the aporia of self against the strict 
deployment of the Cartesian cogito and the extreme anti Cartesian-ism. Instead, Ricoeur 
presents the self as a product of an impersonal system. The aporia of the self, as he then 
endeavours to prove, is an epistemological construct, occupying an ontological place 
between the cogito and its extreme anti-cogito. To be precise, Ricoeur writes about the 
                                                 
39 Nancy Armstrong focuses in her book Desire and Domestic Fiction on the causal relationships 
between the rise of the domestic fiction and the domestic woman along with the ascent of the middle-
class in 18
th
 and 19
th
 century England. She writes extensively on the introduction of the new political 
power through disentanglement of sexuality from the discourse of politics. Armstrong, using the writings 
of Foucault, Gilbert and Gubar, and Watt, ventures on a redefinition of desire, the feminine and the 
domestic, processes that had been occurring in England since eighteenth century and that led to the 
contestation of the reigning kinship systems, a notion crucial in the understanding of both Anglo-Irish and 
Irish literature and history. 
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situation of ―Exalted subject and humiliated subject‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 16), so that to 
him ―it seems that this is always through complete reversal of this sort that one 
approaches subject‖. One of its grammatical categories is pinpointed in the division of 
identity between selfhood and sameness – Latin Ipseity and Idem-identity (Ipse/Idem). 
Idem gives the self spatio-temporal sameness and ipse is responsible for its individuality 
– its haecceity. On the other hand, the self is constructed by three hermeneutical 
categories. The first one is achieved by a detour of reflection by analysis. The second 
category refers itself to the dialectics of selfhood and sameness, and the third category is 
that of dialectics between selfhood and otherness. Ricoeur‘s theories are that of 
preoccupation with the binary oppositions, which results in positing of the ‗I‘ as atopos 
without any fixed place in the discourse. As such it is easily manipulated by different 
discourse practices.  
Two very important ways of individualization are identifying reference and 
self-designation, yet they are only possible in a situation of interlocution, which 
highlights the importance of the other as an addressee. Paul Ricoeur says that as such 
the idea of identity generates itself within the idea of sameness, what matters is that the 
interlocutors agree on the same discourse and find themselves within the same 
language. Consequently, we may read more into Bowen‘s analysis of common language 
in The House in Paris. Since Karen and Max lack a common parole they are obliged to 
talk about the history of the place where they meet, so that Bowen ironically is able to 
demystify the couple‘s belief in neutrality of history. After all, it is Henrietta who 
contradicts this naïve belief, when she considers the amount of blood shed in Paris. It is 
also Bowen‘s statement on how much our public discourses merge with our private 
discourses or that after all there exists only one discourse altogether and it is public. 
(Ricoeur, 1994a, 31) 
According to Ricoeur (1994a) it is better to use the term individualization 
rather than individual since ―language contains specific connecting units that allow us to 
designate individuals‖ dynamically (Ricoeur, 1994a, 27) and ―the ascription of 
individualities can be based, depending on the various lexical resources of natural 
languages, on widely varying degrees of specification‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 27) – thus the 
process of individualization can vary from subject to subject. In other words, one should 
focus on concrete practices of individualization, contextualization of gender practices in 
a pragmatic way. Individualization theory also attracts attention to the problem of 
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discourse working specifically towards designation of which individuals one wants to 
speak. As such discursive operations of designation are examples of state apparatuses 
that assign gender attributes and denote cultural behaviour. The relationship between the 
self and other becomes the relationship between language use and ideology, in the 
ideological investments of any sign to acquire meaning. Individualization through 
discourse becomes a dominant practice of meaning making and political practice of 
wide repercussions, its extreme form being hate speech. By denominating the other one 
not only exercises influence over oneself and one‘s discourses but also creates the 
other‘s discourse. The consequences for feminist scholarship are far reaching from the 
dominant practice of categorization in exclusionary dichotomies towards the privilege 
of assuming the status of ‗ordinary‘ – ordinary motherhood, womanhood or childhood.  
One short fragment of The House in Paris takes us to the narrator‘s statement 
that Karen ―had outgrown years ago any girlish naturalness, without having learnt how 
even to imitate any other‖ (HP, 98). Now, Karen recognizes learnt discourses operating 
through her friend Naomi, whom ―she could feel (…) setting in a smile like her 
mother‘s – a too kind, controlled smile‖ (HP, 99). As has been said, normative gender 
and sexuality problematizes motherhood/parenthood and femininity/masculinity into 
political and social practices, little dependent on any simplistic generative approach to 
discourse dividing humankind into binary oppositions of plus and minus. The first 
group is known to have the penis the second one is known to lack the penis. Bearing in 
mind the above, the importance of Bowen‘s emphasis on the social and class issues 
takes on a different light, drastically differing from that of extreme criticism of her 
preoccupation with social and class detail.  
The central thesis of Ricoeur‘s theories of selfhood is that the I and other cease 
to be understood as an inseparable binary opposition with a relationship of meaning 
operating merely internally within the binary.  It is now a triad whose meaning operates 
both internally and externally. It should be perceived through the interdependence 
between the I, the other within the I and the third person that ―acquires its complete 
signification of person only if the attribution of mental predicates is accompanied (…) 
by the capacity for self-designation, transferred from the first to the third person‖ 
(Ricoeur, 1994a, 52). The third person is the other and pronounces any given statement 
in the first person: ―I affirm that‖, ―I promise that‖, etc, ―The I is extracted from the 
prefix of an action verb and posited for itself as a person, that is as a basic particular 
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amid all off the things of which one speaks‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 52). In the case of a lack 
of action verbs the dynamics of the discourse are supplemented by the narrativity of the 
discourse that takes on a temporal frame into attention. Ricoeur goes on to write about 
the triad of selfhood: ―This assimilation between the ‗I‘ who is speaking to ‗you‘ and 
the ‗him/her‘ of whom one is speaking functions in an opposite direction to the 
assigning of the power of self-designation to ‗him‘ or ‗her‖ (Ricoeur, 1994a, 52). This is 
a process of assimilation between the subject of the utterance and the irreducible basic 
particular – the person producing the utterance. 
The ‗I‘ of the utterance has its designating power on being performed in front 
of the ‗you‘, as an utterance about him or her (the you being either external or internal, 
as in an performative practice). In such manner, what Karen says about Leopold, in 
Max‘s presence, is both self designating for Leopold and Karen. The ‗I‘ of Karen‘s 
utterance is the ‗I‘ that Leopold takes up in the first and third part of The House in 
Paris. The fact of Max being asleep points to the irrelevance of active participation of 
the other. The ‗I‘ fluctuates between the three subjects – the ‗political‘ statement Karen 
makes when talking to Leopold can also belong to Max or Leopold, as Karen‘s 
statement is the expression of the dominant discourse. It is extremely difficult to break 
away from the dominant discourse and it may only be possible by making oneself 
misunderstood, by stepping outside of the language – Karen gives up the opportunity to 
escape entrenchment in the dominant discourse – she stops painting,  she rejects 
maternity and other, and consequently leaves Leopold40, who to her ―was the enemy‖ 
(HP, 215). As such, she remains ‗passive‘, barren and sexless, which according to 
Kristeva is the way of controlling the motherly jouissance making her a desirable 
object. ―It was understood that their childlessness, though an infinite pity, kept their 
companionship uninterrupted and close‖ (HP, 218). Being ―right to make any sacrifice‖, 
Karen becomes entangled by the myth of the sacrificial Madonnas, virginal in her 
barrenness, who devoted their life to ―the plain man‖ (HP, 219), who gave up a son for 
a greater good. The imagery of Madonna is recalled in the description of Karen 
shuddering in ―the Versailles bed, with the gloves she had put on to go to Paris, then 
pulled off, dropped on the floor, and the violets she had pinned on for Leopold pressed 
dead between her breast and the bed‖ (HP, 215). The symbolism of the nurturing breast, 
                                                 
40 I strongly believe that a certain hostility and consequent abandoning of children is visible in twentieth 
century fiction by Irish women writers, as in Mary Morissy and Mary Rose Callaghan.  
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the bed as on the night of Leopold‘s conception heighten the symbolism of the violets 
that in Christian imagery are the sign of the Virgin Mary‘s humility and her son‘s future 
sacrifice. Violets can be seen in Leonardo da Vinci‘s paintings of Madonna Litta (1490) 
and Madonna and Child with Flowers/The Benois Madonna (1478). Irreversibly, the 
past hunts Karen with the burden of being a whore and a mother too. Violet is also the 
name of Karen‘s terminally ill aunt living the final moments of her Anglo-Irish fantasy 
in Mount Iris in County Cork. Aunt Violet is told to die ―wondering what else there 
was‖ (HP, 152), sometimes ―wishing one had done more‖ (HP, 83) out of love 
―Couldn‘t love be a reason?‖ (HP, 85) to give more meaning to life 
Ricoeur says in his work that we are subjects in ‗the other‘s‘ stories, ‗the 
others‘ are subjects in our stories and consequently we are authors of ‗the other‘s‘ 
stories and ‗the others‘ are authors of our stories. This may explain why human subjects 
are easily manipulated by various ideological apparatuses as noted by Althusser and 
Zizek. The triad of selfhood corresponds to three modes of exchange in which the self 
participates. These are: exchange as translation of the other into our discourse as an 
example of ‗linguistic hospitality‘, which makes possible a common participation in the 
present. In exchange as translation the self makes a charitable attempt at including the 
mystery of the other into the self‘s consciousness. Translation defends the idea that 
there is no unconditioned free speech as such, which would inevitably be regulated by 
those who voice the status quo. The condition is that speech needs translation from one 
individual to another through the third person acquiring complete signification of person 
by the capacity of self-designation and not violation into hostile discourse.  
The second mode translates itself into exchange of memories by sharing 
stories crucial to our self-recognition, but of which we have been unaware – as in 
childhood stories told to adults. Here, I situate my understanding of dialogical relations 
between the characters in The House in Paris. They include the dialogical/reciprocal 
relationship Leopold and Henrietta have, which corroborates the process of their self-
recognition and self-understanding. The situations of dialogue between characters are 
also included in the mode of linguistic hospitality. 
The third mode of exchange is that of forgiveness, since evoking memories 
could mean recalling guilt and debt. The mode of forgiveness does not free the present 
from the effects of the past but from its debt and guilt, and as such it makes the future 
possible. Therefore, the third mode translates itself in The House in Paris into the 
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central conflict of the self and other, the self and society, the self and discourse. It builds 
on the dialogical dependence between Leopold and Karen, Karen and Naomi, Henrietta 
and her guardians. It underpins one of the central relationships of the narrative – that of 
the parent and the child.  
The problematic of guilt recalls the Kristevan concept of transferencial 
plasticity that describes transference of guilt from one individual to another as a means 
of self defence and preservation. In Intimate Revolt, Kristeva reveals that the analytical 
experience of transference and counter-transference are processes that the subject uses 
to vindicate freedom. It is not freedom in Sartre's sense of condemnation to choice and 
responsibility but freedom from the guilt of being as such (Heidegger) and from the 
vicissitudes of consciousness whose attraction to interiorizing the collective realism of 
sin in individual responsibility is unquenchable as in Freud. Here Kristeva‘s interpretive 
elaboration of the concept of forgiveness as rebirth, as suspension of judgment, and 
generally as ―the unconscious coming to consciousness in transference‖ (Kristeva, 
2003, 19) might prove helpful. However, it may contradict, to a certain degree, 
Levinas‘s concept of forgiveness, used here in the thesis, referring to forgiveness in 
order to remember. While the idea of being is linked to time, the idea of drive – the 
death drive in particular - is linked to timelessness. It is in ―The Scandal of the 
Timeless,‖ chapter three of Intimate Revolt, that Kristeva delivers a sustained and 
compelling philosophical argument on the concept of the timeless (l‘hors-
temps/Zeitlos), on its role and importance vis-à-vis the transferential experience of 
analysis.  
In The House in Paris, Karen and Leopold occupy the central place in the 
discourse on motherhood and infanthood, highlighting the overt tension, insight and 
self-recognition they provoke in the subject. We may recall the aforementioned passage 
from Karen‘s reverie about Leopold.  
 
I should see the hour in the child. I should not have rushed onto nothing. He would be the 
mark our hands did not leave on the grass, he would be the tamarisks we only half saw. 
And he would be the I whose bed Naomi sat on, the Max whose sleeve I brushed rain off: 
tender and guardable. He would be (…) that other we were both looking for. (HP, 153) 
 
The central question is whether Leopold as the embodied consequence of the past, 
embodied past, the tangible other, will be able to escape the operations of guilt 
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persecuting Karen. What would be the central role of motherhood, and whether will its 
practices be sustained? Will the verdict of the other voice in Karen‘s reverie be 
confirmed – so that Leopold ―(...) would be disaster‖ (HP, 154) 
The final pages of The House in Paris blatantly speak out against Leopold, 
―this little brittle Jewish boy with the thin neck, putting a hand at once wherever you 
looked‖ (HP, 215). Leopold, ―who is more than a little boy‖ and of whom only Karen 
knows ―what he is‖ shadows everyone‘s present reaching after people like the shadow 
of the past. Leopold‘s imaginary self ―had used [Ray‘s] his inner energy, without 
letting, all these years, any picture form‖ (HP, 215). That very moment when Karen‘s 
husband Ray begins to fear Leopold he comes into the room announcing that Mme 
Fisher will not be seeing any guests and after that he adds promptly – ―She dreads the 
past‖ (HP, 215). As much as Mme Fisher dreads the past, Karen dreads Leopold who is 
the past. ―While he is a dread of yours, he is everywhere‖ says Ray to Karen in their 
―unspoken dialogue‖ (HP, 217) whose mode is circular and not plain or linear, just like 
the unspoken discourse of Montaigne or Virginia Woolf. 
 
No one could be less merely impish than Leopold. Behind the childish méchanceté Ray 
saw grown-up avengingness pick up what arms it could… Karen‘s unalarmed smile 
appeared in Leopold‘s lips when he had said this, but his deliberate look was from 
someone else‘s eyes. Ray saw for the moment what he was up against: the force of a 
foreign cold personality (HP, 220-221).  
 
The statement that can be read from The House in Paris is that the past needs to be 
faced, lived with because one ―is never alone‖ (HP, 217) and apart from the other; 
otherwise Karen and Ray are ―never alone, while you‘re dreading him (Leopold). It is 
you who remembers. If he were here with us, he‘d be simply a child, either in or out of 
the room‖ (HP, 217). 
The above passage from The House in Paris, not only pictures the circularity or 
iterability of identity that is propelled from the mother towards the father, it too makes 
visible the conflicting operations of the symbolic and semiotic within the developing 
subject. As Nancy Chodorow writes in her Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory, the 
Oedipal processes in girls and boys, the process towards the father‘s masculinity 
becomes and remains problematic for boys in the sense that the boy has to differentiate 
himself from the (M)other. Identification with the father does not usually develop in the 
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context of an affective relationship, because it results from internalizing and learning 
components of immediately apprehensible role of the father. As such the body defines 
masculinity in negative terms, as ―the force of foreign cold personality‖ (HP, 201) – the 
phallus, which in case of developed narcissism will be abjected as normatively the 
(M)Other should be rejected, as is revealed in Max‘s case. The development of a girl‘s 
identity is different from that of a boy‘s, since ―the femininity and female role activities 
are the immediately apprehensible in the world of her daily life‖ (Chodorow, 1989, 52). 
The female Oedipal crisis is not resolved in the same way. A girl cannot completely 
reject her mother in favor of her father, but keeps her close relationship with her mother. 
However, a girl too ―wavers in a bisexual triangle‖ (Chodorow, 1989, 53).  
It is true that The House in Paris describes, to a larger extent, the trauma of 
what is parentlessness and childlessness. However, on a more general plane, it is a story 
of the self (re)encountering the other through the continuous feeling of lack it 
experiences in constructing its narrative. This lack means that the subject is filled in by 
the operations of otherness, but it also refers to the subject‘s autonomy and agency in its 
relationship with the other – a concept that will underlie the feminist claim to subjective 
agency through dialogism. As Neil Corcoran writes in his Elizabeth Bowen: The 
Enforced Return (2004), the novel offers a moral extension on reciprocity towards the 
other. In the story Henrietta, the eleven year old who is on the passage to her 
grandmother in Mentone, learns the implications and meaning of the word empathy and 
discovers ―a self previously unknown to her‖ (Corcoran, 2004, 83). Still a child she is 
cast into performing an act of selfless emotional charity towards a boy called Leopold 
who happens to stay in the same house in Paris. The children‘s meeting marks 
Henrietta‘s entrance into the dominant discourse casting her into the role of a guardian 
angel. Corcoran writes that ―the Gospel ‗Except ye… become as little children, ye shall 
not enter into the kingdom of heaven‘ (Matthew, 18:3, in Corcoran, 2004)41 may lie 
behind this astonishing narrative‖ (Corcoran, 2004, 87) referring to the plot, and most 
particularly the dialogue between Leopold and his mother Karen set in the imaginary 
heaven before the boy has been born. As in the fragment of the gospel, Henrietta and 
Leopold the only children in the book, are capable of compassion and direct emotional 
communion – they are capable of the touch that leaves a visible mark on the other.  In 
                                                 
41 Other Biblical reference takes the reader to the idea of grass in The House in Paris. 
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the Kristevan language Henrietta learns to become ‗disembodied‘ so that she is able to 
feel the pain and despair of other thanks to her momentary emulation. To paraphrase 
Kristeva Henrietta‘s body becomes no longer hers42, it doubles up and suffers. In the 
following fragment Henrietta joins Leopold in his mourning, shedding tears for him so 
that his exasperated breathing can steady up, 
 
Leopold‘s solitary despair made Henrietta no more than the walls or table. This was not 
contempt for her presence: no one was there. Being not there disembodied her, so she 
fearlessly crossed the parquet to stand beside him. She watched his head, the back of his 
thin neck, the square blue collar shaken between his shoulders, wondering without 
diffidence where to put her hand. Finally, she leant her body against his, pressing her ribs 
to his elbows so that his sobs began to go through her too. (HP, 197) 
 
What is surprising in this fragment is the importance Bowen gives to the sense of 
embodiment in one‘s relation to the other. Henrietta feels disembodied when ignored, 
feels an urgent need to mark her bodily presence in the room to avoid experiencing the 
feeling of contempt. And yet, to become present or embodied for the other invites a 
further disembodiment that happens during the act of selfless charity. To be there for the 
other means not to be there for oneself. Henrietta becomes disembodied for Leopold; 
she becomes a refuge for him so that his cry penetrates her and becomes audible thanks 
to her presence. In no time Leopold‘s look drifts away but his body remains with 
Henrietta: 
 
Leopold rolled his face further away from her, so that one cheek and temple now pressed 
the marble, but did not withdraw his body from her touch. After a minute like this, his 
elbow undoubled itself against her and his left arm went round her with unfeeling 
tightness, as though he were gripping the bole of a tree. Held close like this to the 
mantelpiece he leant on, Henrietta let her forehead rest on the marble too: her face bent 
forward, so that the tears she began shedding fell on the front of her dress. (HP, 196) 
 
                                                 
42 Similar ideas can be found in Kristeva‘s ―The Maternal Body‖ (295-6, 303) which constitutes part of 
Desire in Language, especially when we are told that Henrietta‘s body no longer belonged to her when 
consoling Leopold. We are shown that this kind of embrace can be stronger than any embrace that may 
unite lovers. Kristeva writes that no one is present within this - within the maternal body - simultaneously 
dual and alien space. 
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Consequently, it is not surprising that Bowen turns to the Victorian image of an angel, a 
symbol of feminine care and guard. And while Leopold becomes more placid his look 
shifts into the focalizing position at the end of the fragment. It is not only that Leopld‘s 
and Henrietta‘s bodies become united in this fleeting moment of despair – it is also the 
masculine predicament that is empowered thanks to feminine sacrifice, moving away 
from the look of the mother to the look of the father. Now Henrietta‘s eyes cover with 
tears of her previously unknown self, 
 
An angel stood up inside her with its hands to its lips, and Henrietta did not attempt to 
speak.  
Now that she cried, he could rest. His cheek no longer hurt itself on the marble. 
Reposing between two friends, the mantelpiece and her body, Leopold, she could feel, 
was looking out of the window, seeing the courtyard and the one bare tree swim into view 
again and patiently stand. His breathing steadied itself; each breath came sooner and was 
less painfully deep. Henrietta, meanwhile, felt tears, from her own eyes but not from the 
self she knew of, rain on to the serge dress, each side of the buttons that were pulled a 
little crooked by Leopold‘s hand. They stayed like this some time.  (HP, 197) 
 
At a first glance and rightly so the above fragment is a fragment describing 
transformation within the self, but it is also a fragment of transformation within the 
feminine. It illustrates a shift within the categories of the Whore, the Virgin and the 
Mother clustered now to the dominant understanding of the category of woman. It 
unveils a passage into adulthood embedded in the discourse of ‗normative femininity‘ 
as seen from the ‗father‘s‘ perspective, thus ―like a grown-up hand coming between 
their bodies, something outside‖ (HP, 198). The entrance into the symbolic puts 
Leopold and Henrietta apart, so it is also in this very moment that Leopold learns to 
keep life ―outside himself, more happy in having intellect‖ (HP, 198). It is now Leopold 
who possesses the faculty of seeing outside, as men are centre-ocular in dominant 
discourse. Henrietta‘s eyes now solely serve as instruments through which emotions are 
expressed.  
In ―Stabat Mater‖ Kristeva writes that the only language the silent Virgin Mary 
is allowed are the tears she sheds over her son‘s death – tears which are ―metaphors of 
non-speech, of a ‗semiotics‘ which ordinary linguistic communication cannot account 
for‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 312). Here, Bowen too highlights what becomes the book‘s 
recurring motif: the Virgin and her sacrifice. For Bowen, Henrietta comes to resemble 
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the figure of the Virgin holding to Christ‘s body after he has been taken off the cross, 
since the tears shed by Mary on Christ‘s death are the only language given to women in 
the dominant discourse.  
The ritual passage from semiotic to symbolic for Henrietta and Leopold takes 
place at the marble mantelpiece. The marble is like a sacrificial altar, identity and 
selfhood are both at stake. Not surprisingly enough, the very same mantelpiece has 
served as the place of a ritual sacrifice/suicide of Leopold‘s father, Max who cuts his 
wrists there, while talking to Mme Fisher. In her writing, Kristeva says that a subject 
crosses the border of the symbolic and reaches the semiotic chora in a ritual of 
abjection, whose ultimate version is a ritual of death. In so doing Max and Leopold 
reach the maternal space, the semiotic, retrieving from the symbolic. For Leopold it is 
the last glimpse of the maternal he awaits and yet does not know, for Max it is the 
glimpse of what he too lacks and what he chooses over life. Again a ritual, according to 
Kristeva, makes it possible to access the trans-symbolic jouissance connected with the 
maternal- the maternal of phallic mother. It is a means of overwhelming what‘s 
maternal without abjecting it. Max reaches Mme Fisher who witnesses his suicide, 
Leopold gains access to Henrietta‘s tears. A ritual triggers the eruption of the semiotic 
motility threatening the unity of the social realm and the subject, as in Max‘s ‗breaking 
free‘ from under Mme Fisher‘s control, her ―commendation he could not bear‖ (HP, 
184) because ―he needed so much to escape‖ (HP, 184), and as in Leopold‘s forcing 
Henrietta into the role of angelic virgin. As such it is doomed to momentariness and 
inevitable death of the subject. The only salvation for the subject lies in its acceptance 
of the symbolic order and abjection of the mother – a process that has led it to this very 
symbolic order. 
In the scene, which could be called a scene of trans-symbolic exchange, Bowen 
compares Henrietta to an angel. Neil Corcoran writes in his book on Bowen about the 
strength of the passage: ―Part of the tremendous force of this derives from its merging 
of two elements: intense physical specificity; and large moral generalization‖ 
(Corcoran, 2004, 83), generalization which stretches onto the categories of selfhood and 
otherness. However, the tremendous force here owes its strength to the transformation 
within the feminine, too. As much as Henrietta ―is being morally extended‖ (Corcoran, 
2004, 83), her femininity is being extended too and the change is mediated through the 
body. Henrietta, Leopold and the external world are yoked together in reciprocity 
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between the subject and object, between the I-for-myself and I-for-others. It is now 
femininity of ‗blood and tears‘ as described by Kristeva. Henrietta becomes a 
participant in the world and her participation is more than one of mere anguish or 
overprotectiveness, she becomes the secular version of the ‗Mater dolorosa‘. Henrietta‘s 
becoming Leopold‘s looking-glass, her knowing that ―I‘m [Leopold] there‖ (HP, 202), 
gives Leopold access to exercising ―a vulgar power, simply‖ (HP, 202), as Mme Fisher 
points out to Leopold at the end of the book.  
Looking at this event from the cognitive perspective, we remember that Mark 
Johnson and George Lakoff in Metaphors We Live By part from the premise that reason 
is dependent on the soma. The book purports to be about our awareness and interaction 
with other bodies as the source of knowledge about the world. It purports to be about 
human mind having its roots in the experience of embodiment. Metaphors We Live By 
presents the pattern of how we reason about our environment and understand the reality 
we live in. This is supported by various examples from our daily life and more blatantly 
by the language codes of metaphors we use. And to use cognitive science in analysing 
literature means to decode the cultural parole from which any given literature draws, 
and which remains imprinted on our bodies. For it is true that cognitive sciences place 
understanding of the mind in a historical context so that one can analyze how the mind 
shapes every literary act and how in turn literature shapes cognition. Cognitive science 
can support claims to understanding perception, metaphor, concept formation, and 
categorization – it can offer support in understanding gender division and construction 
within any cultural framework.  
Embodiment of cognitive science leads one to the questions of maternity, 
agency, objectification and subjectification to name just a few. Simone de Beauvoir 
says that ―He is the Subject, he is the Absolute — she is the other‖43, to be the other is 
to be the non-subject, the non-person, the non-agent, to be solely: the body. In Kantian 
definition of the ethical subject44 as free, rational chooser, this subject is further 
                                                 
43 Simone de Beauvoir develops this idea of the woman as other in her The Second Sex (1989); 
(Originally published in 1949). 
44 The problem of disembodied subjectivity finds its logical development in the post war conception of 
time, as expressed in Deleuzian notion of time-image, the time out of joint, and its further in Italian 
neorealism. There, the active part of embodied subjectivity is returned to the construction of identity since 
it now controls time movement and change that become subordinate to the bodily perceptive horizons. 
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presented as an autonomous agent. As such, these above conceptions of the self isolate 
the individual from personal relationships and larger social forces; they isolate the 
subject from its bodily experience; in a disembodied mind, the body is peripheral. This 
leads to creating de-contextualized individualism. Dependency on corporeality is 
considered a defective form of selfhood. For Kristeva too, the self is a subject of 
enunciation — a speaker who can use the pronoun ‗I‘. But speakers are not unitary, nor 
are they fully in control of what they say because their discourse is bifurcated. The 
symbolic dimension of language, which is characterized by referential signs and linear 
logic, corresponds to consciousness and control. The clear, dry prose of scientific 
research reports epitomizes symbolic discourse. The semiotic dimension of language, 
which is characterized by figurative language, cadences, and intonations, corresponds to 
the unruly, passion-fueled unconscious. Since discourse is made of both registers, the 
masculine symbolic and the feminine semiotic are equally indispensable to the speaking 
subject. Whereas Kristeva understands the self as a dynamic interplay between the 
feminine semiotic and the masculine symbolic, other critics like Nancy Chodorow 
understand the self as fundamentally relational and thus linked to cultural norms of 
feminine interpersonal responsiveness. Subjectivity is neither homogenous nor 
autonomous, but, more so, remains opaque to itself, remaining dependent on the 
emotional and bodily relation to the other. However, any corporeality is already 
emplotted into the reality as we read from Merleau-Ponty‘s insight that any corporeality 
is always and already a ‗body-in-the-world‘ that differentiates the body‘s becomings. 
We may say that ultimately every performance of a subject is accompanied by its other, 
which is constructed on the subject‘s primary relation with the other as lived in the 
archaic mother (parent)/child dyad. That said, we may ask who is this archaic mother, 
who becomes an essential part of the archaic ‗parent‘ possessing both female and male 
attributes. Kristeva writes in Tales of Love (1987), 
 
But what is this primal mother, inexhaustible source of excitement at the same time as an 
impossible object, unnamable secret, absolute taboo? One will again keep in mind primary 
identification, dawn of identity and idealization, where the future speaking being grasps his 
own image only on the basis of the ideal apperception of a form that is external to his needs 
                                                                                                                                               
The ideas of time imagery and new temporality are developed further in the chapter of Elizabeth Bowen‘s 
novel Eva Trout.  
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and desires, one that is not libidinally cathected but has the qualities of both parents. If 
Freud called this first ideality a ‗father of individual prehistory,‘ this should not make us 
forget that it possesses characteristics of both parents. (...) ―ideal‖ should be understood 
here in the sense of impossible, other, inaccessible through libidinal cathexis. (Kristeva, 
1987, 202) 
 
Freud‘s famous ―What does a woman want‖45 (Jones, 1981, Vol. 2, Pt. 3, Ch. 
16)46  is perhaps only the echo of the more fundamental ―What does a mother want?‖ It 
runs up against the same impossibility, bordered on one side by the imaginary father, on 
the other by a ‗not I‘. And it is out of this ‗not I‘ that an Ego painfully attempts to come 
into being. 
 In narcissism what remains at play is less the relationship towards the archaic 
mother than the idealization of the relationship itself47. The subject not only imagines 
motherhood as the lost territory but it also idealizes the way towards it. The sublimation 
of this fantasy is what allows artistic accomplishment; the denial of it assures the 
entrance into the language of the father. This process can be traced early in the meeting 
between Henrietta and Leopold. In the body of Henrietta Leopold sees a promise to help 
him assuage the lack he experiences as an orphan by reencountering the body of the 
mother – Karen‘s body. As Freud says in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
―There are thus good reasons why a child sucking at its mother‘s breast has become a 
prototype of every relation of love. The finding of an object is in fact a re-finding of 
it.‖48 (Freud, in Horner and Keane, 2000, 111)  
                                                 
45 This is a question that in the light of aforementioned theories on desire presented by Foucault and later 
elaborated by Nancy Armstrong would be an example of bourgeois oppressive discourse on sexuality that 
led the female subject to justify why she believes she is repressed in desiring. 
46 Freud‘s writing on the split female subject, as well as other fundamental texts are collected in Ernest 
Jones‘s anthology Sigmund Freud: Life and Work.  
47 In the first chapter of this thesis I have mentioned that women have been originally thought to be 
capable of solely faulty desire based on lack of and gap from the complementing masculine principle. 
Now, in the light of the philosophy of maternal femininity women are now a category based on surplus 
since they carry within them the possibilities and generative powers of the archaic mother. 
48 Elizabeth Bowen might have clearly been influenced by the psychology of Quislingism as studied by 
Ernest Jones in the post second world war period, which Jones gathered in his text ―The Psychology of 
Quislingism‖ (1941). Jones was well known to relate adult psychology to infantile sexuality as its primary 
source of patterns and adult traumas. Bowen, as postulated in this chapter, relates adult behaviour to 
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Looking at this problem from a different angle, in recognition of displacement, 
when the fantasmatic mise-en-scène becomes unfamiliar, it is also the maternal body as 
the point of reference that becomes lost. The notion of the obligatory other leads us 
towards the notion of emptiness, which is at the root of the human psyche. In this 
respect, the arbitrariness of the Saussurian sign of the structural object/subject dyad has 
placed us in front of a bar, or even an emptiness, that constitutes the 
referent/signified/signifier relationship developed in the gaping hole of the mirror stage. 
Saussure‘s arbitrariness of the sign and Lacan‘s gaping hole both readily point to what 
might be understood from the standpoint of representation the uneasy uncertainty, 
ubiquity, and inconsistency of narcissism.  Narcissism protects the subject from an Ego 
and what is not yet an object, giving predominance/eroticising to the mother-child bond 
since a narcissus, as Kristeva writes in her Tales of Love (1987), remains fascinated 
with the mother‘s phallus. Such thinking translates itself into the relationship lived by 
Max with Mme Fisher as his protector and probable lover, as well as his faulty 
relationship with Naomi Fisher and Karen, whom he failed to sexualize as objects. 
Narcissism is the defence against the emptiness of transference from the law of the 
father to the mother as abjected.  
 
Psychotic persons, however, remind us, in case we had forgotten, that the representational 
contrivances that cause us to speak, elaborate, or believe rest upon emptiness. Possibly the 
most radical atheists are those who, not knowing what the ability to represent owes to a 
Third Party, remain prisoners of the archaic mother, for whom they mourn in the suffering 
of emptiness. (Kristeva, 1987, 42) 
 
In a close relationship to the archaic other, we may expect a subject to re-live 
the life of his or her parent, trying to re-discover them in the quest for confirmation of 
their own subjectivity. In The House in Paris, we find out that Leopold and Henrietta 
are re-living the emotionally devastating relationships of their parents. Leopold is 
believed to resemble his father and mother in attitude,  
 
                                                                                                                                               
childhood trauma and abandonment, making the infantile stage the most crucial stage in a subject‘s 
development.  
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We feel, that apart from the circumstances of his birth, Leopold‘s heredity (instability on 
the father‘s side, lack of control on the mother‘s) may make conduct difficult for him (…) 
(HP, 41),  
 
Mrs Grant Moody writes to Naomi Fisher. In short we also learn that it was Leopold‘s 
father – Max - who believed he needed Naomi for a wife since she resembled a Virgin 
Mary. A stranger, Max is an orphan, who seeks a mother-figure and female object, and 
so he becomes split between the urge for the archaic mother (Mme Fisher) and a female 
object of desire - Naomi Fisher, who becomes for him the symbolic Virgin Mary. As 
such he becomes the psychotic figure in the book, ultimately committing suicide in 
front of Mme Fisher, 
 
Narcissus is not located in the objectal or sexual dimension. He does not love youths of 
either sex, he loves neither men nor women. He Loves, he loves Himself–active and passive, 
subject and object. The object of Narcissus is psychic space; it is representation itself, 
fantasy. But he does not know it, and he dies. (Kristeva, 1987, 116) 
 
As we read from Kristeva, all strangers are motherless according to what she 
writes in her Strangers to Ourselves. In a short explanation given to Karen, Max says ―I 
am not English; you know I am nervous the whole time‖ (HP, 146). Since ―I am at 
home with her, she reposes me and I need her. (…) Naomi is like furniture or the dark‖ 
(HP, 146) - Naomi‘s femininity is that of traditional unchanginess/ static/ passivity. ―I 
should pity myself if I did not marry her.‖ (HP, 146), says Max in his momentary 
recognition that he needs a reference that he would be able to displace into the periphery 
and as a narcissistic subject that loves only itself. ―I could not endure being always 
conscious of anyone‖ (HP, 146), says Max as a subject who‘s longing is self 
gratification but also as a masculine subject who‘s work it is to displace the woman to 
its symbolic place of female belonging: the dark, just like a piece of furniture. A second 
later, the symbolic discourse is established when Karen admits, ―That‘s what my mother 
said‖ (HP, 146) What is more important, however, it is restored in a statement uttered 
by a woman, since the symbolic discourse requires it to be uttered by a female subject. 
The language of the father needs a confirmation from the mother, as well as its 
subsequent ‗motherly‘ translation for the child. The child, on its part, requires drawing 
from the mother‘s discourse, namely from the mother‘s desire for the father‘s penis – 
the discourse of his authority. As such, Bowen‘s text is intensely a mother/child 
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narrative, for the One the subject identifies with its both masculine and feminine ‗father 
of individual prehistory‘. At the stage where the consequences of the narrative are cast, 
there is no differentiation of the sexual.  
Transposing this problem onto the dialogical context, a subject constructs his 
or her identity from the constant readjustments to the ‗heteroglossia‘ of its embedding 
reality. In psychoanalysis again the subject should try to readjust to its new Ego Ideal. 
Self awareness that the subject gains means realizing one‘s incompleteness and hence 
avoiding the misconception that it does not need the Ego Ideal since it is already ideal. 
The only way to bridge the gap between the incomplete consciousness and the world is 
what Mikhail Bakhtin calls ‗answerability‘, that is, giving meaning to the empty reality 
by the means of meaningful deeds. Answerability, as in Bakhtin or Levinas, means that 
the subject can retain agency in its actions. Answerability means embracing and 
translating the other, as in Miss Fisher‘s ―Often when she spoke she seemed to be 
translating (...). (HP, 19) 
Dialogism is an essential process in the development of characters‘ narratives 
in The House in Paris and it ―provides means for the psychological materialization of 
the character‖ (Lee, 1986, 41). The subject‘s self is represented through the other since 
Elizabeth Bowen intertwines the I-for-others with the I-for-myself, problematizing it 
into what may be called the I-in-others and the I-in-myself. That said Leopold learns 
about his mother/child relationship from others, which Bowen exposes in his 
questioning of Henrietta. ―What did Miss Fisher say about my mother and me?‖ (HP, 
30) he asks the little girl in an off-hand manner since a woman‘s narrative should be 
informal and spurious. Julia Kristeva writes in her work that the only discourse able to 
contradict the father‘s parole is, in fact, the poetic language based on off-hand 
connotations and interplay of signifiers with signified. Kristeva claims that poetic 
language—the semiotic —is a surfacing of the maternal body in writing, uncontrolled 
by the paternal logos. Poetic language is a dialogue, a patchwork of various texts, 
loosely appropriated by the new author. Here, Bowen‘s use of letters in the text gains 
the quality of poetic language in use, so far as they tell and re-tell stories building new 
identities. 
What is more, at some point Bowen prompts us to see Leopold in the rackety 
monkey Charles Henrietta carries around. It should also not be inappropriate here to 
mention that the monkey Charles can be understood as the third mediating term in 
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Deleuzian becoming, as exemplified in concepts of becoming-animal and becoming-
woman. In The House in Paris Henrietta is advised by Miss Fisher to play with Leopold 
just as she were to play with her toy. In the early morning conversation between 
Leopold and Henrietta, Leopold inspects the monkey just as he is analyzing his own 
emotions to recognize the feelings he bears towards the imaginary mother. The mother 
holds the key to Leopold‘s identity as well as to who he is and what made him be. Still, 
later Leopold explores Henrietta‘s unrealised grief for having lost her mother and finds 
out much about his own emotions.  
 
I don‘t see what you mean,‖ said Henrietta, distracted – in fact in quite a new kind of pain. 
She saw only too well that this inquisition had no bearing on Henrietta at all, that Leopold 
was not even interested in hurting, and was only tweaking her petals of or her wings off 
with the intention of exploring himself. (Bowen 1935 31) 
 
Bowen writes in the novel, ―The disengaged Henrietta had been his [Leopold‘s] first 
looking-glass‖ (HP, 35). Virginia Woolf notices in A Room of One‟s Own, ―Women 
have served all these centuries as the looking-glasses possessing the magic and 
delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size‖ (Woolf, 2005a, 
585). Whether being a woman stands for a lack according to Simone de Beauvoir or a 
masquerade according to Joan Riviere - women‘s sole role is to reflect the masculine I. 
This leads us to the idea of construction of masculinity solely within the ―female 
paradigm that exists to authenticate the male subject in his identity. A woman sees a 
man in order for the man to be capable of seeing himself.‖ (Hoogland, 1994, 174) When 
Karen talks to Naomi in an aloof manner about Max‘s possible fear of women she 
rebukes Naomi, ―You mustn‘t encourage him to be touchy, Naomi; you make him 
sound like a man who cannot pass a looking glass‖ (HP, 100). If one considers using the 
concepts of looking-glass and its reflection of the other, one may see them as dialogical 
tools. In dialogical construction of the Self its identity depends on its difference from 
the other with a premise that there is no originary category of self and other, but, 
instead, an ever-changing flux of performative differences. In the feminine/masculine 
opposition, the male subject has been traditionally displacing the female subject to the 
margins in order to install its order. It may be for this reason that while writing about 
the beginning of identity construction in that first part of The House in Paris, Bowen 
has Leopold underline his difference from Henrietta: ―You see, you and I are just 
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opposites (…). He watched Henrietta closely, to see, as though on himself, the effect of 
this. (HP, 32) Leopold is, in Teresa de Laureatis words, ―cross(ing) the boundary (of the 
closed space) and penetrate(ing) the other space‖ (in Hoogland, 1994, 148). He is 
constructing himself as the centre. As A. S. Byatt notices there is much importance 
given to the idea of language and intelligence as the attributes of the symbolic: 
―Leopold, and still more Henrietta, are children equipped with the language of the secret 
thoughts of intelligent children‖ (Lee, 1981, 95). Hermione Lee points out that The 
House in Paris ―explores the behaviour of children with a social ‗place‘ and children 
without one‖ (Lee, 1981, 95).  We may extend her thinking onto the premise that it 
explores the lives of children deprived of the place within the language of the father.  
What these children are equipped with is the fantasy of the language of the 
archaic mother. It is not the language of the maternal that propels the child towards 
creating the Ego Ideal, it is the language given by the substitute mothers, as created in 
the symbolic discourse. It is not the language of the maternal, it is the language given by 
the substitute guardians. The children are violent – ―Intelligent children are not kind‖ 
(Lee, 1986, 95) – but could they have become somebody else if they were raised by 
their mothers? Leopold and Henrietta are in fact estranged from a child‘s language, the 
language of the semiotic of impressions, colours and pulsions, as writes Kristeva.  So 
that when Leopold finds out he has no pre-learned discourse to decipher the content of 
The Strand Magazine, its ―trafficky cover and glazed smell‖ turns out to be ―richer than 
its contents‖. (HP, 38) That said, the children are forcefully raised in the language of 
adults. They speak the violent language of their guardians, and they speak the language 
of the Father – a language at its best in the content part of The Strand Magazine that 
Leopold finds so puzzling.  
 
His passionate lack of humour was native and untutored; no one had taught him that 
curates, chars, duchesses, spinsters are enough, in England, to make anyone smile. The 
magazine perplexed Leopold with its rigid symbolism, Martian ideology. A veil of foreign 
sentiment hung over every image, making it unclear. Once, at a figure of an admiral 
saluting, something went up in him like a firework. But he did not know what the magazine 
was about. Hoping for something concrete, he went through the advertisements. (HP, 39)  
 
What is more, the fragment is exemplary of the processes of cultural interpellation 
working over any subject of the English society of Bowen‘s times, where ―almost all 
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English humour shows social (sometimes now, backed by political) pre-assumptions. 
(Extreme cases- that the lower, or employed classes are quaint or funny – that 
aristocrats, served by butlers, are absurd)‖ (Lee, 1986, 45). People‘s values, desires and 
cultural habits are inculcated in them by ideological practices. Here, the central idea of 
sense of humour is a product of ideological apparatuses, to borrow from Marxist 
vocabulary. Interestingly, the ideology here is that of dominant phallic discourse – with 
an exception of a curate, who was a representative of lower clergy responsible for the 
parish, all other names: char, duchess and spinster refer to women. Even the curate‘s job 
was that of a female kind – he was responsible for the pettiest tasks involved in 
attending to the vicar – he was a male version of a female char working in a household. 
It is only when looking at the photograph of an admiral saluting – a masculine symbol – 
that something fires up in Leopold - a phallic symbol – but he still lack the discourse to 
decipher the message behind the visual sign. However, Bowen argues, a subject does 
not posses an ability to be a self-conscious agent, awareness of selfhood is not innate 
but acquired within a structure of established social rituals and practices.  
The concept of operating ideology is also taken up in the conversation Karen 
has with the Irish girl – The Yellow Hat – on the ship taking her home after a visit to 
Aunt Violet‘s house in County Cork, Ireland.  
 
Over here for a bit of fun?‖ says the Yellow Hat – ―I guess you think we‘re all mad?‖ ―Well 
we are,‘ she said. ‗Mad as hares. Reckless and mad and bad – that‘s what they say, you 
know: there‘s no harm in us. There‘s no holding us once we‘re off, though… You ought to 
see the way all of us go on at home‖ (HP, 91). 
 
Foucault wrote about these material rituals as used by disciplinary institutions 
in his Discipline and Punish (1975), which may refer us to Bowen‘s underlying 
criticism of the Anglo-Irish myth of colonial power and plenty perpetuated against all 
odds by the impoverished Anglo-Irish gentry. Foucault‘s twin concept of ‗family cell‘, 
as the source from which the subject draws on material ideologies, can shift our 
attention to the problematic of family, parenthood and motherhood discussed later in 
this chapter. We may also compare the rituals to Bourdieu‘s concept of habitus that is a 
set of patterns of thought, behaviour and dispositions acquired both voluntarily and 
involuntarily. Habitus refers us to Leopold‘s foreignness – his literal foreignness as 
non-Englishness and his foreignness to the dominant discourse as in his not speaking 
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French – ―They have clipped your wings for you nicely‖ (HP, 203). The foreigner, 
according to Kristeva speaks another language and that is why he differs from someone 
he is not, especially because Leopold speaks the language of ―childish children‖ (HP, 
34). He may speak the language of the host but he inevitably is recognized as foreigner 
– a foreigner who ―is, in fact, full of the bastard‘s pride‖ (HP, 34).  During the luncheon 
on the grass Max tells Karen: ―But we are a couple of foreigners‖, to which Karen, 
trying to make space for the foreign within herself, responds ―Foreigners though belong 
somewhere else, and you and Naomi don‘t‖. (HP, 109-110)  And yet, in her reverie on 
being pregnant with Leopold/the other Karen not only gains insight into herself but 
recognizes the negative economy of otherness-within,  
 
He [Leopold] would be a disaster. They would not know where to turn to save me for 
themselves. They would have to see me as someone poisoned49. Only poisons act on you. 
If a thing does act on you, it can only be poison, some foreign thing. (HP, 154)  
 
In the end, we are all foreigners to ourselves, just as Max and Leopold through their 
Jewishness, as well as the Fishers in their undecipherable language – ―peculiar idiom‖ 
(HP, 19) - of a mixture of French and English – ―No phrase she [Karen] used was what 
anyone could quite mean; they were doubtful, as though she hoped they would do: Her 
state of mind seemed to be foreign also.‖ (HP, 19) 
Karen, becoming pregnant, experiences a state of bearing the other of oneself 
and another. In her pregnancy with Max‘s son – Max who as French/English Jew is a 
foreigner and outsider, Karen becomes the foreigner, the poison, the sinner- just like 
Naomi ―Fisher‖/the poison/the sinner. Again, Bowen writes in ―Notes on Writing a 
Novel‖ that ―national pre-assumptions show in treatment of foreigners‖ (Bowen, 1950, 
Lee, 1999, 45) so that the narrative of Max‘s foreignness shifts from his literal 
immigrant outsiderness to outsiderness towards the dominant discourse of gender and 
identity construction.  
                                                 
49 Here Bowen plays with words disclosing yet again the negative influence of Mme Fisher and her 
daughter Miss Fisher on all Max, Karen and Leopold – the word fisher, bearing in mind the Fishers 
French origins, relates us to the idea of French language pécheur as in ‗sinner‘ and pêcheur as in 
‗fisherman‘. 
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The House in Paris therefore may be read as a treatise on foreignness and 
otherness – otherness as in the non-normative narratives of Max, Leopold and Naomi, 
which penetrate apparently stable and normative discourses, i.e., Karen. After all while 
studying art in Paris, Karen was herself a stranger in the Fisher household ―In Paris she 
had been subject to Mme Fisher and her own tongue-tied silence‖ (HP, 101). In fact, 
otherness does not mean outsiderness since there always dwells an other within oneself, 
who prompts us to solitude, absence, pride and feelings of oddness. Strangeness 
signifies inner strangeness in Kristevan theory, where the other is embedded in our 
subjectivity. So there is some hope in the category of strangeness. ―Kristeva insists on 
the necessity for us to become strangers to language‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 26) and situate 
ourselves within the maternal language, she insists on our addressing the orphaned 
strangers, even though they are always in motion and changing places.   
The important question is whether it is sufficient, to recognize the stranger 
within oneself as postulated by Kristeva? After all, her theories have already been found 
politically unsatisfactory and repetitive. Elizabeth Grosz has written that Kristeva‘s 
transgressive subjectivity fails to escape phallocentrism by presenting a myth of men 
taking up women‘s discourse women cannot speak. The discourse is that of men 
penetrating the space of women to mimic women who reproduce men. It is for this 
reason that the stranger one dialogues with needs to be the stranger as child/the little 
girl. In the process of mothering it is not the dialogue with the archaic mother that 
should be addressed but rather the event of finding the little child within oneself. 
During their meeting at Miss Fisher‘s house, Leopold attempts at penetrating 
Henrietta‘s space, it being an example of male symbolism of desire and action. Their 
conversation starts when Henrietta is still lying on the sofa, Leopold is standing next to 
her having spent some time watching her sleep defencelessly. During their epiphanic 
moment at the mantelpiece, Leopold succeeds in transmitting Henrietta his feelings of 
despair and grief so that she awakens in her role of a serving angel – Virgin Mother. 
The imagery of the first sin is brought back when Leopold commits the crime of 
stealing and reading letters from his guardians and his mother – he snatches the letters 
from Miss Fisher‘s bag that stands near to one of the apples that had fallen from 
Henrietta‘s travelling box. Again he learns about himself from others, tempted into this 
discourse by the other. Not surprisingly he finds the envelope addressed by his mother 
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empty – the lack of real mother, replaced by a fetishist imaginary mother, enliven in his 
own imaginary discourse on her.  
However, it is also Henrietta who manages to cross the boundary to sample the 
unknown feeling of dialoguing with the maternal. She stands near the marble 
mantelpiece just to ―feel as nearly as possible how he felt (…) She looked at his ear, 
unconvinced, touched her own. But Leopold‘s mother swept brilliantly through one‘ 
fancy (…) leaving Henrietta forgotten, luckless, cold.‖ (HP, 61) And when Naomi 
Fisher announces to Leopold that his mother would not be coming Henrietta ―waiting 
breathed on the table and absorbedly wrote an H in the mist‖ (HP, 66) – she seems to be 
fitting herself into the dominant discourse.  
That said, if the real mother is replaced by the imaginary mother, the real home 
which, mother stands for becomes nothing more than imaginary. The H, Henrietta 
writes, may therefore stand for the idea of home or hope for home that Karen had long 
conveyed for Leopold and that disappeared like mist on finding out that Karen was not 
coming. After all, it is Karen who dreams about home in her reverie –  
 
Today is showing; I shall be home tonight. (. …) ‗Home? was always downstairs (and it 
is downstairs in Miss Fisher‘s house that this scene takes place). Upstairs is crazy with 
dreams or love (so if you do not dream or love you are safe home, idea that casts shadows 
of critique on the idea of maternal love). Once ‗home‘ you are safe; (HP, 155) 
 
Home is the semiotic chora ‗in‘ which one can hide, encapsulated as inside the 
mother‘s womb – language can only be like the symbolic furniture in the dark ‗behind‘ 
which one can stay, but only momentarily. 
Kristeva believes that introduction into language equals loss of the motherland 
and a loss of home. ―It is emptiness that produces signification and subjectivity.‖ 
(Nikolchina, 2004, 48) It is only as orphans that we live ―creators, creators but 
forsaken‖ (Kristeva, 1989, 181). Nikolchina writes that ―Exile is the eternal destiny of 
the speaking being. S/he can‘t go back home. The initial expulsion that constituted the 
leap into language and subjectivity can only be repeated, never undone, if we are to 
continue to speak‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 48). It is on being exiled from home, being an 
orphan, that Leopold and Henrietta are introduced into the ‗house‘ in Paris – the world 
of the father, where they are ushered into the father‘s language. 
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3. Aesthetics of Dialogism. 
 
Jane Goldman in The Feminist Aesthetics50 of Virginia Woolf writes about 
―Woolf‘s handling of the basic vocabulary (…) of subjectivity – light, shade and 
colour.‖ (Goldman, 2002, 10) In her book Goldman says:  
 
I identify two interrelated spheres of colourism informing Woolf‘s aesthetics: suffrage art 
and English post-Impressionism. (…) Darkness it seems is not to be celebrated – except as 
a foil against which to revel in the re-emergence of light and colour. Re-inscribed here is a 
traditional hierarchical binary opposition: light/dark (where light is positive, dark negative) 
(Goldman, 2002, 10, 14).  
 
This Goldman reinforces with Jacques Derrida‘s statement in Writing and 
Difference of light and darkness being the founding binary opposition of the Western 
philosophy and the metaphor for ―self-revelation and self-concealment‖ (Goldman, 
2002, 14).  
 
Light, and particularly its first source, the sun, is traditionally the province of the 
masculine, never the feminine. Freud held the view that the sun is a symbol of the father, so 
much so that ‗symbolism overrides the grammatical gender – at least as far as German 
goes, for in most other languages the sun is masculine. (Goldman, 2002, 15)  
 
Elizabeth Bowen ascribes darkness to Karen in the miracle of begetting 
Leopold. Still another modernist text states that ―It is not in the illuminated zone that the 
darkest plots are woven‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 98). The sentence is uttered by Colette making 
an obvious reference to Freud‘s images of femininity that of weaving and archaeology. 
51 Hermione Lee writes in her Elizabeth Bowen ― At Folkstone, and then in the hotel in 
                                                 
50 Bowen‘s Celtic imagination was above all surrealist, influenced by the concept of a dialogue of writing 
and art through a mutual use of the marvelous, the gothic and the sublime and expressed though psychic 
automatism verbally in writing or in any other form of expression, here art.  
51 In 1920 Freud revises his ideas on the development of female sexuality giving greater importance to 
the pre-oedipal bond between the mother and daughter (Hirsh, 1989, 98). According to Freud the 
mother/daughter relationship needs to be deleted and replaced by subsequent adoration of the father, then 
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Hythe where Leopold is conceived, the dank sombre Kentish scene (described with the 
passionate exactness of childhood recollection) puts their emotions at risk in a different 
way: they feel abandoned by the sun‖ (Lee, 1991, 91). The metaphor of light and 
darkness is played out surprisingly. It is not Max who overcomes Karen, as the light of 
the masculine I would overcome feminine subjectivity. It is not the darkness of Karen‘s 
femininity that embeds Max. For that night when Leopold is begotten the binary 
oppositions take on their different interplay, as if of equality. And when the night ends 
Karen wakes up to see Max as light again standing at the window so luminous that she 
is momentarily blinded again by his masculine presence. There is a play of colours, 
light penetrating the dark and dark overcoming the light. Here Bowen‘s desire to cast 
away the dichotomy of light and dark is visible. The envisaging of the lighthouse – to 
the lighthouse marks a special moment is the couple‘s walk. Goldman writes that  
 
In order fully to appreciate the ‗comfort… of plenty of light and colour‘ Woolf suggests we 
need to experience its contrary – the darkness. Here the world ‗relief‘ takes on its special 
meaning of ‗distinctness by contrast‘ as well as its more usual one of a ‗removal of burden‘. 
Against darkness ‗all that was in one‘s mind‘ might be examined. (Goldman, 2002, 38)  
 
Similar to the enunciation of truth, as well as living on the margins of 
knowledge, darkness interplays with light in the second part of The House in Paris.  
 
Mind, m‘m,‘ said the maid, ahead in a dark arch. This unlit floor was all steps, two dull 
square glass panes only in one door. ‗Mind m‘m; it‘s dark here when you don‘t know.‘ ‗I 
can see that.‘ It had to be dark, built in between the hill and the tight street. The maid said: 
‗Number nine‘, ahead, opening a door. Karen saw the chestnut over the white blind. She 
looked round and put her hat on the bed. (…) 
Rain made the day dark for the day, but till late the light did not change. Saturday 
stayed late, reflected on wet roofs and straight wet paths uphill. The west broke, the grey 
went white, lightening across the rain that did not stop but still veiled the darkening houses 
and trees. (HP, 150) 
                                                                                                                                               
the male partner and finally the male child. One of the advocates of matriarchy underlying patriarchy 
―positing matriarchal prehistory to patriarchy‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 98) was Jane Ellen Harrison, whom Virginia 
Woolf immortalized in a quick reference in her ―A Room of One‘s Own‖ (1927), as ―a bent figure, 
formidable yet humble, with her great forehead and her shabby dress – could it be the famous scholar, 
could it be the great J---------H--------- herself?‖ (Woolf, 1927/2005, 17) 
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Even if there is light, it is cold and unwelcoming. It is the light of Gare du Nord, the 
train station in Paris towards which all characters seem to be going; the light of the 
north: cold, weak and pale. Jane Goldman‘s analysis of colour and feminist aesthetics 
devotes much of its attention to Virginia Woolf‘s Orlando. Goldman writes that ―when 
blackness is reached instead of nothingness or amorphous obscurity, a trumpet call 
heralds a new landscape, in which is discerned a ‗dark spot‘; and as eyes adjust, 
darkness becomes ‗pierced with lights‘ (Goldman, 2002, 110). The male figure who 
later becomes a woman puts in the limelight a vision of ―liberated femininity‖ 
(Goldman, 2002, 110). The passage from overwhelming darkness to a fanfare of colours 
‗in shades of red‘, pierced with light – an illuminated darkness is a ―celebration of 
feminine pleasure culminating, after the attentions of various servile men have been 
noted, in a coded and playful attention of orgasm‖ (Ibid., 110) and yet it is still darkness 
that permits the engendered illumination. Bowen too emphasises the importance of 
darkness and light in her passage on Karen‘s reverie. This emphasis is reinforced many 
times by references to ―lamp-invaded darkness‖ (HP, 152), ―a room with a lamp and a 
tree outside, with tomorrow eating into them‖ (HP, 153), ―a barred light on a ceiling, a 
lamp, a tree outside‖ (HP,  153), tomorrow ―more than the hours and that lamp‖ (HP, 
153), Naomi as ―barred light‖ (HP, 155), putting lamps out, paler sky, lighthouse, and 
the question uttered by Karen– ―Did I dream the sky was lighter or is it lighter‖ (HP, 
155), as well as ―Max standing in daylight by the window‖ so that Karen puts ―her hand 
to her forehead to shield her eyes‖ (HP, 155).  Bowen envisages the trajectory through 
darkness to light, so that Karen experiences a journey. Darkness can be read as 
symbolizing the semiotic of maternity, brought upon the narrative by Karen‘s imminent 
pregnancy with Leopold. But it is also associated with the occult side of femininity 
represented in the figure of Naomi,  
 
who is like the furniture or the dark. (. ...) [who is the daughter of] (...) a woman who sells 
girls; [daughter of a woman who] is a witch. She is here; she is that barred light, (HP, 155)  
 
that serves as the necessary other for masculinity originally associated with light – Max 
―was hers [Naomi‘s] tonight when we saw the lighthouse,‖ (HP, 155) In The House in 
Paris, having a child is described as ―being caught‖ (HP, 154) as if in ―playing hide and 
seek‖, where ―the seekers go by just the other side of the curtain or. (. …) come into the 
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room where‖ (HP, 154) one hides. ―The curtain would fall, the light would discover her 
[Karen] before she could slip out to bolt for ‗home‘‖ (HP, 154). And yet darkness does 
offer some refuge and a meeting point with the other/the child – it is in darkness where 
one discovers the child. Light can be terrifying, blinding and even though ―the sky is 
paler; (…) [when] Today is showing;‖ (HP, 155) Karen needs to ―put her hand to her 
forehead to shield her eyes‖ (HP, 155) – since it is the ‗home‘ of the ‗father‘. 
The meeting later on perpetuated in Leopold‘s imagination takes place in 
Heaven – the maternal place of plenitude, the Semiotic – ―where to speak would have 
been impossible‖ (HP, 69) (since the Semiotic is outside of language, where the 
arbitrariness of senses is random, as during Karen‘s reverie – ―I cannot see him only 
touch him [Max]. ( ...) At Boulogne, to touch was to see, to see was to touch‖ (HP, 
153), or art, where the light and shades are combined harmoniously to create an image 
of illumination and plenty; this having been described as a different, better place by 
Virginia Woolf - see Jane Goldman52, 
 
Actually, the meeting he had projected could take place only in Heaven – call it Heaven; on 
the plane of potential not merely likely behaviour. Or call it art, with truth and imagination 
informing every word. Only there - in heaven or art, in that nowhere, on that plane – could 
Karen have told Leopold what had really been (HP, 67).  
 
Not surprisingly, the final question Leopold asks Ray, when they have left the house of 
the Fisher family in they journey to ‗possibly‘ meet Karen, is ―Is it illuminated?‖ (HP, 
239) 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 For the concept of aesthetics and writing see, Jane Goldman, The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia 
Woolf: Modernism, Post-Impressionism, and the Politics of the Visual (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). and Modernism , 1910-1945: Image to Apocalypse ( Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2004). 
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3. Motherhood.  
 
 
April is the cruellest month breeding  
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain. 
(T. S. Eliot, ―The Waste Land‖  
Part I: The Burial of the Dead) 
 
                                                                                                  
                                                                                                  ―(. . .) a girl has got to be a daughter            
                                                                                       first. She have to learn  that. And  
                                                                                       if she never learns how to be a  
                                                                                        daughter she can't learn how to  
                                                                                         be a woman."                                     
                                                                                            (Toni Morrison, Tar Baby, 281) 
 
 
When a curious reader sets on a time stopping journey of reading The House in 
Paris one of the few guarantees he or she takes along with them is that its reading will 
be ―continuous and shifting‖ (Byatt, 1976, 7). A. S. Byatt has called The House in Paris 
―a very elegant and a very melodramatic novel‖ (Byatt, 1976, 15), since all ―Characters, 
Scene, Dialogue‖ are relevant to the Plot, there is no nuance that could be omitted, no 
detail that could be discarded. What is more, Byatt admits that there is a trap of 
struggling with a feeling of claustrophobia and narrowing, ―detracting from our sense of 
reality and importance‖ (Byatt, 1976, 15). Even though the abundance of elegant 
discourse is undeniable in the book, I do believe that the key word to reading of The 
House in Paris or any of Bowen‘s novels is not the elegance of plot but rather 
continuity/ (recurrence) shifting towards the new and unpredictable. Simple reading for 
plot is not sufficient - preoccupation with the poetic truth should be diminishing, as 
Bowen neatly weaves her original discourse.  
In my opinion, reading of any of Bowen‘s texts needs to be dialogical, 
responsive and multiple – there are different levels of narratives to be deciphered and 
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the doing of it requires a truly ―roving eye‖. Reading of Bowen is like taking away the 
subsequent layers if ―cracked crust over the surface of life‖. In reading Bowen, one 
should be (but may choose not to) equipped with many tools that will drill through the 
text and then shift it away from its ―elegantly‖ woven plot. In the first place, I wish to 
refer myself to three elected critics who will form the critical corpus for this chapter. 
Many textual references that have already appeared in the thesis belong to Marianne 
Hirsh, Elaine Hansen and Ellen Moers – all three scholars who have been contributing 
to the feminist studies for some time now.  All three scholars develop their theories 
based on the assumption that any female subject is propelled ―back-to-the-
wombishness‖, in which the danger, despair and passion expressed on the more visible 
level of identity confirm a daughterly desire to both abject and engulf the mother figure. 
Bearing this in mind we may infer that Bowen‘s idea of identification develops from the 
either/or situation – either a mother or not – towards the hermaphrodite dual mode of 
both – both a mother and a daughter, as in her last novel Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes.  
In her Mother/Daughter Plot, Marianne Hirsh, who has written extensively on 
motherhood and femininity, says that,  
 
The multiplicity of ―women‖ is nowhere more obvious than for the figure of the mother, 
who is always both mother and daughter. Her representation is controlled by her object 
status, but her discourse, when it is voiced, moves her from object to subject. But as long as 
she speaks as mother, she must always remain the object in her child‘s process of subject-
formation; she is never fully a subject. (Hirsh, 1989, 12)  
 
It should be added that, in the post-modern world the dyad mother-child seems to be the 
only non-cyborg dyad of dialogue between the self and the other. There is nothing about 
being female that naturally binds women together into a unified category, least it should 
be maternity, which, on its own, binds women not solely into femininity but humanity 
and identity. To go further, according to Donna Haraway, there is not even such a state 
as being female, itself a highly complex category constructed in contested sexual 
scientific discourses and other social practices. A cyborg does not require a stable, 
essentialist identity, argues Haraway, and feminists should consider creating coalitions 
based on ―affinity‖ instead of identity. Fundamental contradictions in feminist theory 
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and identity should be conjoined, rather than resolved, similar to the fusion of machine 
and organism in cyborgs according to Haraway.  
The figure of the mother herself is a figure of cyborg femininity, constructed 
by the maternity narratives that all have origins in the hegemonic discourse and 
women‘s very often contradictory personal experience of them. Motherhood, as such, 
ceases to be solely an essentialist and natural concept, there no longer is one way of 
mothering, but rather a myriad of subjective responses based on the concepts of care, 
nurturance and translation.  
Furthermore, the strength and weakness of female relationships to her mother 
and father points to the fact that the girl ―wavers in a bisexual triangle‖ (Chodorow, 
1989, 53) throughout her childhood so that the ―thoroughness with which female realist 
writers eliminate mothers from their fictions‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 14) may, to a certain extant 
be an aftermath of  ―hostility, resentment and disappointment on the part of these 
writers themselves, as well as with their total self-identification as daughters‖ (Hirsh, 
1989, 50).  
Elizabeth Bowen devotes the greater part of her fiction to adolescent girls 
growing up orphaned, coming of age through the painful experience of disillusionment 
with society. Just as for Elizabeth Bowen, disillusionment ―was a condition of the 
[their] life, in which reality revisited continually corrected memory, limiting the power 
of illusion, even as illusion was often necessary to prevent the overwhelming impact of 
reality.‖53 (Egleson, 1983) In Bowenesque fiction, even though the daughters persist as 
subjects and objects of her narrative, mothers on their part are either done away in 
unfortunate accidents or dead of illnesses. If they do linger on, they are described as 
inhibiting, dominant and perverse in their manipulation of others. Maternity in Bowen is 
subject to society‘s whims and judgements, and so is womanhood in general. Rightly 
so, Bowen writes in The House in Paris that ― (…) in Mrs Michaelis‘s view a woman‘s 
real life only began with marriage, that girlhood amounts to no more than a privileged 
looking on‖ (HP, 69) which echoes Hoogland‘s aforementioned comment ―female 
                                                 
53 This insightful article written by Janet Egleson Dunleavy and entitled ―The Subtle Satire of Elizabeth 
Bowen and Mary Lavin‖ reiterates the idea that humour, satire, irony and pun – all very Bakhtinian 
concepts – have all been of utmost importance in Irish literature. According to Egleson Dunleavy whereas 
Samuel Beckett practiced reduction ad absurdum, Elizabeth Bowen ―mock[ed] with mirrors and 
metaphors‖ (Egleson, 1983, 69). 
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paradigm that exists to authenticate the male subject in his identity. A woman sees a 
man in order for the man to be capable of seeing himself.‖ (Hoogland, 1994, 174) 
Elaine Hansen, another critic I wish to evoke here, gives a compilation of 
different analyses of the maternity theme in her Mother Without Child, where she 
decides to search for a pattern that underlies mother/daughter literary relationships and 
plots. As an example, Hansen postulates that ―nineteenth-century plots, (…) are 
controlled by the family romance and depend on the heroine‘s dis-identification from 
the fate of other women, especially mother.‖ (Hansen, 1997, 7) At the same time, 
Hansen highlights the absenteeism of women, and mothers in fiction of such important 
writers as Jane Austen, Mary Shelley, George Sand, the Brontë sisters, George Eliot, 
and Kate Chopin. In modern fiction the lack of women in the narratives is substituted 
gradually with the seduction by a female character, very often of mother-like type.  
Similar to that, in her Literary Women, Ellen Moers defines an important shift 
of emphasis in modern fiction from the heterosexual plot of courtship, marriage, and 
adultery to the story of what she calls ‗maternal seduction‘. For Moers, this movement 
of the novel ―beyond the courtship to a fictional world where boy never meets girl‖ 
(Moers, 1977, in Hirsh, 1989, 98) is confirmed by the literary and narrative interests of 
the women writers in the 1920‘s. Hirsh develops this argument further, writing that ―all 
modern narratives recount the female artist‘s story in relation not to a father or male-
lover, but to a powerful, seductive, traditionally female mother-goddess‖54 (Hirsh, 1989, 
96). This shift is the shift towards female Kunstlerromane featuring a young woman in 
the process of responding to the challenge of artistic calling and who, then, renounces 
the calling to endorse a possible female affiliation. It is a narrative of a need of 
connection and disconnection at the same time, abjection and embracement of the other 
– the female other. As a result, the literary reference for a female subject evolves from 
her dis-identification with the mother, towards the total abjection of her and in the end 
infatuation with the archaic mother-goddess. In general, all three of these psychological 
                                                 
54 The concept of female artist is developed in DuPlessis, Writing Beyond the Ending; Susan Gubar, ―The 
Birth of the Artist as Heroine: (Re)production,  the Kunstlerroman Tradition, and the Fiction of Katherine 
Mansfield,‖ in The Representation of Women  in Fiction, ed. Carolyn G. Heilbrun and Margaret R. 
Higonnet (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), and Jane Goldman, The Feminist Aesthetics 
of Virginia Woolf: Modernism, Post-Impressionism and the Politics of the Visual (Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
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trends inform Bowen‘s narrative that also assents on the total self-identification with the 
daughter - the child. The strong maternal types abide in Bowenesque fiction, both in her 
short stories and novels. 
That said, in The House in Paris, Karen goes back to painting after having 
given Leopold away. Even though we do not see Karen turn to be a fully-acknowledged 
artist, she elects to lead the sterile life of an aspiring artist and barren wife, instead of 
becoming a mother. And yet, in frantic attempts to erase Leopold from her memory, 
instead of devoting herself to artistic life, Karen fails the challenge of balancing the 
personal experience or history and the identification with a newly elected discourse. The 
experience of birth places Karen both inside and outside of the dominant discourse.  It 
tears Karen away from the child and still makes her vulnerable identity grow through 
personal enrichment and subsequent loss. Karen enters the dominant discourse and 
consequently rejects the symbolic role it ascribes.  
A controversial black feminist and author, Alice Walker rightly writes in her 
In Search of Our Mother‟s Garden (1983) that the negative experience of her mother‘s 
maternity prompted her towards her own independence and fastened her self-growth. 
What a daughter owes the mother, in Walker‘s opinion, is to regain the freedom the 
mother lost on giving birth – such is the daughter‘s almost sacred duty. Similarly to 
Virginia Woolf, Walker gives importance to all the lost creative and artistic potential in 
women, which in her opinion, finds vent in various unconventional forms such as 
storytelling, singing, cooking or even gardening and sewing that would normally be 
ascribed as chores of a woman‘s daily life. Walker admits in her later essay ―One Child 
of One‘s Own: A Meaningful Digression within the Work(s)‖ that ―I began to see that 
her birth and the difficulties it provided us joined me to a body of experience and a 
depth of commitment to my own life hard to comprehend otherwise‖ (Walker in Hirsh, 
1989, 194). The experience of motherhood lays the ground for autonomous attempts at 
authoring and agency drawing from a broadly defined female heritage. Agency is 
important because, as numerous feminists have pointed out, the mother in Western 
culture has traditionally been conceived as passive and mute. Even though relational the 
struggles of authoring the mother/child dyad empower the child and the mother in equal 
ways. This puts forward an idea of maternal performativity. The House in Paris is one 
of the novels where Bowen develops her project of maternal performativity. As such, it 
undergoes three stages – in the first place, mothers are depicted as utterly abject; in the 
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second place, the idea of maternal agency is approached but ultimately jettisoned in 
favour of a resigned kind of essentialism; in the third place, the mother is active and 
performative, but is still shown as hampered by traditional structures. Sociologist 
Christine Everingham‘s Motherhood and Modernity: An Investigation into the Rational 
Dimension of Mothering (1994) rejects the idea that in constructing the mother/child 
relationship both mother and the child are powerless. More, they seem to be active 
agents of the construction of the identities of the self and other within the mother/child 
dyad. Even further Everingham claims in her ―Lacan‘s Gap: Sexual Identity and the 
Problem of ‗Connectedness‖ (1996)55 that in setting and later following the patterns of 
subjectification one needs to be capable of locating the agency of the (m)other and the 
significance of her potentially critical and reflective efforts to ‗read‘ the discourse of the 
child. 
Elizabeth Bowen started writing at the apex of modernism and yet her eclectic 
literary technique had been informed by various literary traditions. She was deeply 
immersed in realism but also drew from modernist aesthetics. She was growing up 
harvesting from the cultural achievements of Gaelic Revival (An tAthbheochan 
Gaelach) and of the Irish Literary Renaissance. To understand better the multiplicity of 
such literary heritage, some enlightening criticism comes from Marianne Hirsch in her 
Mother/Daughter Plot: Narrative, Psychoanalysis, Feminism (1989), who ventures to 
capture the spirit of the different traditions. Hirsh writes that ―The conventions of 
realism, resting on structures of consent and containment, shut out various forms of 
indeterminacy, instability, and social fragmentation‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 14). Bowen follows 
this trend to a certain extent with her eye for mannerism and ear for nuance of 
expression since realism as Egleson (1983) claims constituted the condition of Bowen‘s 
life. It has been noted that priority and temporality ―are constitutive of the relationship 
between familial and narrative structure‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 51) in nineteenth century realist 
fiction. Recent narrative theories have also focused on the psychological origins of plot 
constructions, yet as Marianne Hirsh notes in the Mother/Daughter Plot ―they obscure 
the relation of plot and gender.‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 51) Patricia Drechsel Tobin, inspired by 
Roland Barthes‘s The Pleasure of the Text, structures her argument around the linear 
                                                 
55 ―Jigs – the Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies.‖ The University of Newcastle, Australia, Vol 1, 
nº 2. The journal publishes texts on topics across a wide range of academic disciplines that raise gender 
issues in historical and contemporary contexts 
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development of a realist plot, where the causality of events is based on their cause/result 
relationship – the causality has a deeply genealogical character. The genealogy, the idea 
of linear begetting and subordinates causes Drechsel Tobin to state in her Time and the 
Novel. The Genealogical Imperative that the realist plots have a paternal structure where 
even the smallest sentence fathers ―a progeny of words sustains them throughout in 
orderly descent and filial obedience‖ (Drechsel Tobin, 1978, 18). In this sense plots, 
argues Drechsel Tobin, are gendered into masculine discourse leaving little space for 
feminine presence. In his Beginnings: Intention and Method, Edward Said writes that 
the novel ―makes, procreates, a certain secondary and alternative life possible for heroes 
who are otherwise lost in society‖ (Said, 1975, in Hirsh, 1989, 51). To Said the very 
potential of narrativity to unfold and sustains itself lies in its ability to relate itself to 
paternality. Surprisingly enough Said states that,  
 
The narrative represents the generative process – literally in its mimetic representation of 
men and women in time, metaphorically in that by itself it generates succession and 
multiplication of events after the manner of human procreation. (Said, 1975, in Hirsh, 1989, 
52) 
 
In The House in Paris, however, on the level of chapters, this paternal sequence is 
disrupted into a maternal cyclical pattern. Every chapter of Bowen‘s novel prompts us 
back towards the beginning, having the allegorical chapter of pregnancy with Leopold 
at the very centre.  
On a general plane, the situation changes to some extent with the appearance of 
proto- and modernist plots, which are ‗supplemented‘, according to Hirsch, by the 
heroine's artistic ambitions and desire for affiliation with other women, so that ―for 
women writers contradiction and oscillation, rather than repetition, bind the modernist 
plot‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 15). Bowen‘s heroines show too an ambition for a better repetition 
of models as well as want of ‗oscillation‘. Finally, in what Hirsch calls ―postmodern‖ 
plots, ―more multiple relational identities emerge.‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 10) That said the 
mother remains the one ―who did succumb to convention‖ - a negative model from 
which the daughter must detach herself (Hirsh, 1989, 10). In the texts Hirsh analyzes we 
find works by Margaret Atwood, Marguerite Duras, and Christa Wolf. Although the 
mothers are prominent in those narratives, the perspective, as explained earlier, remains 
―daughterly‖. Only in recent fiction—especially, in Hirsch‘s view, in Toni Morrison's 
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Beloved (2007) - do ―mothers begin to appear as subjects‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 11). Other 
recent critics consider the impact of dominant myths of phallogocentrism on later 
women writers support Hirsh‘s view. In her study of H.D. and Jean Rhys entitled The 
Unspeakable Mother, Deborah Kelly Kloepfer supports the view that earlier in the 
twentieth century established women writers tended to assume the role of daughters, not 
mothers since the mother function was merely operational, in the sense to carry the 
female subject through the necessary change from the fragile and spurious semitoc to 
fully literate and phallocentric symbolic – the mother figure was considered both a 
vehicle and an obstacle. 
What for some critics is strength in motherhood for others endangers the 
development of the child. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar postulate in their The 
Madwoman in the Attic (1984), that motherlessness is equalled with powerlessness in 
nineteenth century fiction. As has been mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, 
according to Gilbert and Gubar orphaned heroines lack the discursive power to adapt to 
the phallocentric order. Still, Adrienne Rich sees motherlessness as the condition 
necessary for full and free development of feminine subject. She supports her theories 
with her analyses of Jane Eyre56. Even Marianne Hirsh goes as far to quote in her 
Mother/Daugher Plot Margaret Homans (1986) arguing in favour of orphanhood. What 
Homnas does in her Bearing the Word. Language and Female Experience in 
Nineteenth- Century Women‟s Writing is to explain to us the conjunction of the 
maternal with silence by invoking what she calls a ‗myth of language‘ prevalent during 
the Victorian period. The myth of language was theorised by Freud and Lacan who 
postulated, as Marianne Hirsh reminds us, that ―language and culture depend on the 
death or absence of the mother and on the quest for substitutes for her. (. ...) Women are 
identified with the literal, the absent referent.‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 45)  
Whatever the empowering or castrating powers of maternity we still see it 
from the perspective of the child perpetuating the myth or a prerequisite of sacrificial 
                                                 
56 Adrienne Rich‘s criticism of Jane Eyre entitled ―The Temptations of a Motherless Woman‖ appeared 
in On Lies, Secrets and Silence: Selected Prose, 1966- 1978, (1979). The core argument of it lies in the 
young heroine‘s quest for a substitute mother in order to avoid the traditional female discourse of self-
emulation, sacrifice and enslavement to the masculine. The young heroine is therefore to find ―the image 
of a nurturing or spirited woman on whom she can model herself, or to whom she can look for support‖. 
(in Hirsh,1989, 46) 
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mother, who makes herself the object of the phaloccentric discourse and the object of 
her child‘s discourse. What if the mother decides she cannot exist in the same narrative 
with the child? 
In Elizabeth Bowen and the Dissolution of the Novel Andrew Bennett and Nicholas 
Royle undertake a deconstructive reading of Bowen‘s longer oeuvre and even though 
their preoccupation is that of presenting a modern analysis of Bowen‘s text, they do not 
seem to be able to escape the dichotomised divide between the male centre and the 
female periphery. Writing about the symbolism of marks left on the grass by Karen and 
Max holding hands, Bennett and Royle shift their attention to event-making and 
narrativity. They write,  
 
The invisible trace, the unknowable consequence of the vent of holding hands, traverses 
The House in Paris (…). The invisible trace on the grass can only become visible in a 
displaced representation of the vent. An event – holding hands – can only become known 
by the consequences of another event. (…) An event can produce consequences – traces – 
through other events. (Bennetr and Royle, 2005, 59) 
 
In this sense Bennett and Royle defend a linear progression of knowledge-making and 
event-plotting. By insisting on the motif of ‗leaving a mark‘ they engage in a male 
economy of discourse, which is endangered by vocabulary of destruction, a vocabulary 
unfit to be read. ―Indeed, to ‗slave‘ or ‗redeem‘ itself, language would have to be ‗read‘. 
But ‗read‘ is itself figured within dread, contained by the gashed logic of ‗dead‘ and 
‗dread‖ (Bennett and Royle, 2005, 61), conclude Bennett and Royle, when writing 
about the leitmotif of words such as dread, read and dead in The House in Paris. Bennett 
and Royle associate these words with femininity and by doing so highlight their 
irreducible excess and ability to destroy as comprehended by the masculinist hegemony. 
The politics of making the feminine the monstrous other of which the male logic needs 
to be afraid appears to be summed up in the following statement.  
 
Dread may be conceived as at once immobilizing and displacing every traditional notion 
of the event, even or especially when that event is figured as a cut or gush - a momentary, 
violent, destructive and irreversible cut in time (…) Dread adumbrates the very 
temporality of the event. (Bennett and Royle, 2005, 61) 
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Dread is stagnant – makes the past, present and future ―pregnant with fear‖ to borrow 
the expression from Hans Gumbrecht – therefore, dread is feminine. Dread, according 
to the authors of Elizabeth Bowen and the Dissolution of the Novel is linked by ‗a near 
homophony‘ to the word dead – ‗dread‘ resonates and results in ‗dead‘. To this problem 
a solution ‗resonating‘ with the male economy of knowledge making is produced: one 
can still procreate. ―This dread knowledge would be a kind of death, the time of Karen‘s 
death, but the gash of knowledge – Leopold – would also be a future, a posthumous 
other life for Karen living on in Leopold‖ (Bennett and Royle, 2005, 59). The politics of 
procreation, begetting, linear progression in distribution of power, as well as necessary 
matricide corroborate the idea of the secondary role of women within the dominant 
discourse. 
If one goes back to Said‘s thinking of paternal/filial dependence between 
characters, events and plots, the woman presents herself as the only element left out 
from this dichotomy. She is ascribed a less than secondary role of redistribution of 
power between the male protagonists. In Said‘s understanding the internal conflicts 
within plots can be reduced to exploration of origin and narrative by an exaggerated 
emphasis on paternity and an oedipal scenario of conflict between father and son. The 
conflict between authority and molestation does not lead us to the conflict between the 
masculine and the feminine but between the father and the son. Nineteenth century plots 
offers its society a means of covering up and justifying its disorders within stories 
structured about itself. The stories however do not cease to refer themselves to the 
dissatisfaction and unfulfillment at the heart of which lies the very fact of absence of the 
mother. According to Lacan, language springs from the intersection of linguistic ability 
and the absence of the maternal. The ability to sustain and enact any narrative is 
surprisingly spurred not by the paternal/filial conflict but the desire for the mother57. 
Peter Brooks says in Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative that a plot 
is a form of desire but also a move from passivity to mastery in which the subject 
―learns how to cope with lack, namely the lack of the mother‖ (Brooks, 1984, in Hirsh, 
1989, 53). Since Brooks studies do not offer any examples of female authors his 
paternalistic language is easily adapted to his exclusively male dynamic of narrative. 
                                                 
57 This maternal presence will also be a source of language complications if met with opposition from the 
buried mother that works upon the narcissistic inclinations of the subject – an idea that will be worked 
upon in the later section of this chapter. 
165 
 
With the language of male sexuality, illness and death, Brooks focuses on the conflict 
between the father and the son leaving the experiences of the mother and the daughter 
out of his agenda. Here however looms a problem with Brooks‘ dialectics. The narrative 
accommodating the struggles of male characters, the immanence of death brings the 
female plot closer as seen by the blind spot in the economy of male desire where the 
woman must be the other but never the different. And if apparently narrative relies on 
repetition ―based on the fort/da game in which the subject learns to cope with lack, 
namely the lack of the mother‖ (Brooks, 1984, in Hirsh, 1989, 53), the repetition refers 
itself to a circular mode originally associated with femininity and orality. In this sense 
even if there is no mother according to Brooks and, consequently for the purpose of the 
thesis, if there is no non-dominant discursive mother in most of Bowen‘s fiction, the 
very lack creates a necessity and an expectation for a maternal discourse into we which 
one needs to read. The very lack constructs a gap that inevitably is filled in by maternal 
language. Marianne Hirsh writes that,  
 
If the ultimate goal of narrative is the act of transmission, the process of reading and 
understanding, the moment of contact without which no narrative can exist, that act 
depends on death. (Hirsh, 1989, 53)  
 
This death may well refer itself to the father/son dyad so that the act of transmission and 
the act of redistributing life depends on the woman – the mother. However, it can also 
refer to the death of the subject in the face of embracing the other, and in this case, the 
death of the daughter paradigm in the face of the mother as well as the death of the 
mother paradigm in the face of the daughter – a truly cyclical and hermeneutical 
process. 
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5.  Motherhood and Masks – Fantasy and Sacrificial Mothering. 
 
Gilles Deleuze devotes much of his writing in Difference and Repetition 
(2004d) to the idea of a mask. To him beyond the mask there is no space for 
subjecthood and truth but only the existence of further masks. Deleuze writes that 
masks behind which we hide in our lives are the proof of repetition, ―which constitutes 
itself by disguising itself‖ (Deleuze, 2004d, 19). The information is not behind the mask 
but constructs itself from one mask to another. There is nothing primary behind the 
mask, and even the fantasies of our relationships with the mother repeat and multiply 
our adult relationships. At the same time, psychoanalysis owes much of his debt in the 
development of theories of repetition to Freud. It was Freud who first concluded that 
repetition cannot be eradicated by simple reliving of an event in the abstract, or forming 
a ―concept in general, not even to represent the repressed event in all its particularity.‖ 
(Deleuze, 2004d, 21) rather it should be embraced as a primary process in identification. 
Motherhood as a mask has been a frequent theme in recent feminist writing 
interested in the construction of the term as artificial. As Judith Butler reminds us 
mimicry and masquerade are the core of identity structure. Susan Maushart, nationally 
syndicated columnist in Australia and the mother of three children, has written a 
compelling book on attitudes towards motherhood fostered by both men and women 
over the last thirty years. The book, entitled The Mask of Motherhood: How Becoming a 
Mother Changes Our Lives and Why We Never Talk About It (2000), talks about many 
masks mothers and mothers-to-be are compelled to wear by the dominant culture. In 
fact, according to Maushart, mothering has been changed into a series of masks that 
hide the discourse that is not in accordance with the masculine myths of achievement, 
control, and autonomy. Motherhood/mothering is a dynamic process, according to 
Maushart, it is rather ‗doing it‘ than ‗having it‘. It is described as the invisible transition. 
Mothering is multiple, constructed by both men and women – therefore can be ascribed 
to both men and women, and either disruptive or complacent with the hegemonic 
discourses. The way it is presented in the dominant culture requires it being repeated – 
the repetition forms its essence. It is for this reason that there has been a shift in modern 
criticism to talk of mothering rather than simply of motherhood. The discourse becomes 
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politicised as available for other subjects than only biological mothers. There is no base 
or origin but a signification of repetition. Deleuze writes about repetition in his 
Difference and Repetition, ―I do not repeat because I repress. I repress because I repeat, 
I forget because I repeat‖ (Deleuze, 2004d, 20). Therefore, according to Deleuze, there 
are two major challenges that repetition and here mothering pose– the first one is being 
aware of mothering‘s fluid character and deconstructiveness, the second one is engaging 
in repetition, by simply ‗doing it‘ as Susan Maushart writes in her book. Here, ‗doing it‘ 
means actively participating in the discourse of mothering as a unique opportunity for 
disrupting hegemonies. The House in Paris, in this sense, deconstructs mothering as a 
product of society‘s parole, and by doing so shows it spuriousness.   
The only viable solution to trauma is in the process of transference that is a 
process of careful choosing the masks and the roles, so that the process achieves 
stability, linking the consciousness to the death instinct. Julia Kristeva finds an archaic 
process of repetition in identity formation in the mother/daughter dyad. Kristeva 
describes motherhood as the process when a daughter rejoins her mother‘s body in the 
act of becoming a mother herself. In a similar manner, Maushart talks about becoming a 
mother and having a child as a re-birth rather than birth. Such discourse on mothering 
becomes both deconstructive of stories told and tales heard, as well as constructive of 
the new subject. In a circular manner it leads the subject from the Semiotic through the 
symbolic and back to the semiotic. It is dynamic and represents becoming rather than 
being. And here too the theories agree - above all Gilles Deleuze insists on the vitality 
of the idea of becoming in constructing a subject: becoming an animal, becoming a 
woman or becoming a child, becoming a mother. Deleuze writes in his Difference and 
Repetition about our ‗subject-hood‘ and the idea of transformation or becoming: 
 
The paternal characters are not the ultimate terms of individual subject-hood but the middle 
terms of an intersubjectivity, forms of communication and disguise from one series to 
another for different subjects, to the extent that this forms are determined by the 
displacement of the virtual subject. (Deleuze, 2004d, 130) 
 
Becoming an animal, a woman or a child are cornerstones in the process of 
doing away with Platonic hegemony of being over becoming – they are our means of 
disposing of subjectivism, allowing us to think ―without models, axioms or grounds‖ 
(Colebrook, 2002, 126), without prejudice. This does not necessarily mean that we 
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should turn into one of these categories, but we should try and experiment the effects 
that either living – ―the flow of becoming life‖ (Colebrook, 2002, 125) or the other have 
on them. To better explain his idea Deleuze gives us the metaphor of a swimmer who in 
learning to swim does not need to repeat exactly all the moves of his swimming 
instructor. He should however try to experience what it feels like, how the water feels 
like if moving one‘s arms just like the swimming instructor does. Fruitful repetition is a 
creative response and not a self-contained action. Experience therefore is something 
extremely personal and surprisingly so is repetition, since ―to repeat something is to 
begin again, to renew, to question, and to refuse remaining the same‖ (Colebrook, 2002, 
8). Becoming an agent in the language of the father is to experiment with an ―exercise 
of a vulgar power, simply‖ (HP, 202).  To repeat means to create new lines of flight of 
temporality and live life as drama not as destiny.  
Such thinking means also that motherhood is a process and not a stagnant 
state. It means that one becomes a mother rather than is a mother. This idea is taken up 
in The House in Paris in its presentation of motherhood as an ongoing process and 
transformation of the subject – from rejection to possible reunification. Motherhood 
here should rather be replaced by the term mothering retaining the character of 
transferential plasticity. And if in particular mothering in The House in Paris (that of 
Karen‘s and Mme Fisher‘s) is a process, mothering as discourse in general is fluid too. 
This idea is rendered in Bowen through the development of the internal conflict from a 
mother to the child. We recognize the same conflict of the private and public sphere, the 
displacement caused by the desiccation of the private realm, the thread of actual and 
emotional orphan-hood and bereavement. Yet we recognize that each character takes the 
problem a step further or rather experiments with it a step further. Motherhood and 
orphan-hood seem to occupy a special place. The problem presents itself from different 
angles but it essentially remains the same – motherhood/maternal paradigm is a ―fantasy 
of a lost territory‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 234). The House in Paris analyzes the mask of 
mothering as the sacrificial mother/ the virgin/the whore, who abandons the child. It 
creates a narrative of fantasy of subjectification compulsively embedded into the fantasy 
of family, mother and mothering. 
The idea of the family romance theme as a psychoanalytical tool used as 
theorization of narrative structures finds its origins in an essay written by Freud in 1908 
entitled ―Family Romances‖. ―Family Romances‖ is a founding text describing a 
170 
 
subject‘s identity development based on his rather than hers fantasy of escaping from 
the paternal authority. Many novels in which the family romance theme is used also 
include literal fantastic elements and supernatural forms in either the plot or theme, and 
these include vampires and ghosts. Other novels that revolve around this theme use 
fantasy in a more psychoanalytical context. The theme of family romance is based on a 
fantasy constructed in the process of subjectification within the father‘s parole and 
undergoes double modification. The version of family romance offers a fantasy of being 
a step child as a consequence of realising the faultiness of the parents and living 
strenuous sibling conflicts. A child confronted with the desire to free itself from the 
progenitors replaces the biological parents with other nobler ones.  What is important to 
note here is that it is the male child who is the protagonist of the family romance as a 
result of his ability to feel hostile towards the progenitors, more likely the father than 
the mother. The second variation of the family romance theme introduces the element of 
desire. The mother is understood to be inalterable. This second version of family 
romance has been given the name of a bastard plot founded on two elements – the 
erotic element and the ambition element. The male child would ―place the father alone 
into the realm of fantasy, while the mother remains firmly and certainly planted in 
reality‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 54), banned from fictionalization58. ―While imagination can alter 
her status and explore her sexuality, it cannot replace her identity‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 55) – 
the mother is always pictured as passive. Strangely enough, the mother‘s sexuality is 
estranged from her identity or else her sexuality as her discourse has no bearing on her 
fixed identity within the father‘s parole – the identity of a mother/virgin. Consequently, 
the replaced fantasy father can be elevated to the highest positions of the society, while 
the mother remains incompatibly low in status. Her sole role is to remain lower on the 
social scale so that the male son has the space to move upwards and redeem himself 
from her, equalling the status of the father. The woman moves only in an enclosed 
circular model between the category of the whore, the fantasy angelic wife and the 
silent biological mother. 
                                                 
58 Marthe Robert devotes her Origins of the Novel (1972) to the problem of Family Romance classifying 
various narratives as representative of this genre. On her list there can be found writers such as Balzac, 
Dostoyevsky, Tolstoi, Proust, Faulkner, Dickens, Melville and Kafka (the two last names consequently 
belonging to the first stage of family Romance, while the former names come to occupy the place in the 
second stage bastard plots). 
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My argument here is that Elizabeth Bowen‘s fiction struggles to reverse the 
fantasy of family romance and uses it as a means to analyze the mother‘s subjectivity. 
She introduces us to the idea of non-normative motherhood and the concept of 
mothering fostering the link between the maternal and the socio cultural. Doing so 
Bowen does owe much to the element of fantasy – many of her mothers are absent thus 
imaginary, she does write much about dreams, unknown countries, motif of 
estrangement, travelling to unknown destinations and visiting unknown houses. In 
Bowen the mother either dies when her child, most often a female child is still very 
young or the mother gives up the child, both as in The House in Paris. The family 
romance explores the tropes of fantasy and very often uses gothic elements such as 
―forbidden liaison or secret pacts that subvert the normative social values‖ (Backus, 
1999, 1). Most of all it uses the trope of the return of the repressed, which not only 
refers to the threat of retributive violence within the nuclear family, but also depicts the 
trope of the (archaic) mother as the abjectable and yet lingering figure. Through the 
interplay with this trope depicted as both fantasy and a lost territory, ―the theme of 
family romance helps explore the systems of appropriation of children and women into 
patterns of loyalty and animosity‖ (Backus, 1999, 2). The paradigm ―that emphasises 
the transmission of misleading and destructive narratives‖ (Backus, 1999, 3) is broken 
by the reappearance of the mother theme.  
Another interesting version of the family romance motif is the female family 
romance described by Marianne Hirsh in her Mother/Daughter Plot. In the book Hirsh 
writes extensively on the idea of matricide committed by the female child. Hirsh 
believes this an implication of the female child being confronted with the static 
narrative of the mother. Since the mother is in Freud‘s words always certissima, she 
stands on the way for a young girl‘s individuation and needs to be done away with. 
Hirsh writes that ―The Freudian family romance pattern clearly implies that women 
need to kill or eliminate their mothers from their lives, if they are not to resign 
themselves to a weak imagination‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 56). It is also of great interest if not 
subject for another study to note, following Hirsh, that the predicate of certissima is 
only applicable to certain cultures, in this case Germanic and Anglo-Saxon cultures. It 
has been proven that for example, ―Slave mothers were separated from their children 
and often unknown to them‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 56) and some further insight into this 
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problem may be found in Toni Morrison‘s Beloved in the introduction and chapter five 
of the novel.  
However if we focus on the cultures where the certissima model does function 
we should note that as opposition the father presents himself as semper incertus, thus 
opening an easy path for his elimination at the hand of his son and gaining a certain 
flexibility in his identity. This very concept does no more than victimize women on 
various levels. First, women are likely victims of matricide. Second, their discursive 
position is weakened so that they become mere tools in the plot‘s development. Third, 
they fall prey to gender asymmetry, which replaces the supposedly binary opposition 
between the masculine and the feminine.59 And forth, women are victims in an unequal 
treatment of what they do and how they conduct their lives, so that the man, being the 
incertus one and thus more given to incest, always escapes the deserved punishment. To 
a certain extent femininity is again given responsibility of providing meaning and power 
to masculinity, since once in the centre of discourse women‘s subjectivity is once more 
allocated in the margins. 
As a result, the punishment circumvented by the male subject is usually 
ascribed to women so that a discourse of original female guilt is perpetuated. Whenever 
and however a man falls it is because of the female mistake - because of the female sin 
– the first sin committed by Eve that resulted in the banishment of mankind from 
Paradise. On the whole female family romance plot represents a narrative trap for 
women, that is, their imprisonment in the dominant male discourse. On killing the 
mother a woman can only find safe harbour within the male economics of power. She 
can associate herself with the father or the brother. This will either originate in an 
incestuous relationship within the nuclear family or usher the woman to find a male 
substitute for the mother, which will offer nothing more than mere ―alternative to 
patriarchal power and dominance‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 57) within the male hegemony. 
                                                 
59 This seems to be the core argument of feminism not interested in perpetuating a sexually grounded 
dichotomy between the feminine and the masculine. According to women who reject psychoanalysis, 
originally founded on human sexual development, the dichotomy is always of unequal distribution, giving 
the masculine a more central role over the female part. A similar ontological move can be found in Queer 
theory which refuses to be seen as solely oppositional to normative sexuality, and strives to be something 
outside of the binary definition. 
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Adrienne Rich calls this process the fantasy of ‗the-man-who-would-understand‘ whose 
origins can be found as early as the classical heroic tradition of Electra and Antigone. 
The House in Paris finds its apparent similitude with the female family romance 
on three levels and then quickly diverges from its discourse on femininity. First, The 
House in Paris is also a story of adopted children whose mothers remain distant or die 
when the child is still very young. Second, The House in Paris is a fantasy on 
motherhood, on parent/child relations. Third, the novel is a quest for the man-who-
would-understand. Above all, the three levels function thanks to a certain tension 
between desire, repression and conflict – tension which was advocated by Nancy Locke 
in her study on Manet60‘s painting, and which constitutes one of the key concepts of 
female family romance. However, this tension is a disruptive force operating through 
the subject that can hardly attain stability or ―certitude‖. Since in classic female family 
romance the father is semper incertus, the mother in Bowen‘s female family romance – 
here mother family romance – is semper incertus (Karen) as well. The threat of 
retributive violence is connected with the relationship the subject bears with the 
reappearing mother. The relationship based on the reciprocal tension is one of: 
incestuous character (Max and Mme Fisher), return of the repressed (Karen, Naomi 
Fisher Max), appropriation of children (Henrietta and Leopold). It also underlines the 
quest of the female subject to gain identity through the process of mothering that 
reconnects her with her own semiotic co-existence with the mother – the female subject 
becomes a little girl again in a Deleuzian search for identity. 
                                                 
60 Edouard Manet was the key figure in the transition from Realism to Impressionism. In his work he was 
inspired by Raphael, Giorgione, Titian and Velazquez. He is the author of many famous paintings among 
which are The Luncheon on the Grass and Olympia. Manet was posthumously chosen to be one of the 
key artists for the ―Manet and the Post-Impressionists‖ exhibition organized by Roger Fry in London, 
1910. The exhibition was a total fiasco and caused a public outrage within the London society. In her 
essay ―Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown‖, Virginia Woolf wrote ―On or about December 1910 human 
character changed‖, remembering the public reacting with rage and laughter. Apart from Manet, the 
exhibition was presenting Seurat, Van Gogh, Gaugin and Cézanne. Even though Fry was wrong in his 
belief in the one hundred paintings to be the work that could infuse British art and culture with new and 
potent ideas, and give it new direction – there were many artists who saw Impressionism as deeply 
influential. It is in my belief that Karen‘s, Max‘s and Naomi‘s scene of tea-drinking on the grass bears 
much resemblance on the scene presented in Manet‘s The Luncheon on the Grass. 
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Margot Gayle Backus‘ The Gothic Family Romance is a fairly detailed study 
of ‗paranoid‘ Anglo-Irish gothic that the author sees as ―a hybrid mixture of Anglo-Irish 
antiquarianism and English anti-Catholic Gothicism‖ (Backus, 1999, 109). According to 
Backus, Anglo-Irish gothic with all its subversive conventions aims at deconstructing 
the ―autophagus dynamics of settler colonial reproduction‖ (Backus, 1999, 109). It 
serves as a tool to ―reincorporate denied feelings, perceptions, and experiences‖ 
(Backus, 1999, 109) into narratives that ―simultaneously rationalize[s] them and 
categorically denie[s] their relationship to the family‖ (Backus, 1999, 109).  
The autophagous nature of British and Anglo-Irish social and governmental 
systems, writes Backus, was an empowering factor in the English speaking rule. It 
empowered those hegemonies to secure the power by interpolating every generation of 
children. The destructive control of children runs on many different levels61 and 
reached Ireland‘s social, political and economic systems, on which the Anglo-Irish 
relied. The motif of child control, according to Backus, is well represented in both 
literature and culture and it is visible in many different literary and cultural motives. As 
an example, Backus sees the Anglo-Irish hegemonic discursive model in an overt use of 
irony by Anglo-Irish authors – something Bowen is much known for and appreciated. 
However, the two most overt elements fostered by the Anglo-Irish dominion Backus 
identifies as  the foregrounding of heterosexuality as the social norm along with 
lessening of kinship ties, which gave the parents the means to control their children‘s 
sexuality and allowed commodification of children in social relationships. For an 
additional factor shaping the Anglo-Irish discourse Backus elects the emergence of ‗the 
capitalist family cell‘ based on Marx‘s identification of the social contract underlying 
capitalism and Foucault‘s theories of the enclosed, nuclear family. As Bowen notes in 
her Seven Winters: Memories of a Dublin Childhood disorientation was the founding 
stone in the development of identity of the young Anglo-Irish, whose ―dispossession at 
the level of group identity‖ (Backus, 1999, 75) paralleled the confusion of their sexual 
identity. To put in blankly, social interaction of the Anglo-Irish was, as Bowen writes, 
                                                 
61 Margot Backus comes two identify two earlier stages in Irish economic, social and political 
development. The first one refers itself to the rise of a narrow Protestant English nationalism which 
subsequently cast the Catholic Irish as the denigrated, vilified other against which the Anglo-Irish social 
order emerged. The second thread exemplifies a shift within Irish society away from matriarchal, 
communal social relationships toward patriarchal, restrictive, atomized structures. 
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―a mixture of showing-off and suspicion, worse than sex‖ (Bowen, 1942, in Foster, 
1993, 31). 
On the aesthetic level, The House in Paris uses some gothic conventions, 
something that Bowen did more openly in many of her short stories. However, this time 
the eeriness of the ‗emotional weather‘ draws well from the gothic. There is still space 
for an almost ritualistic blood shed and the idea of a foreign, vampire-like visitor who 
feeds on the emulating women. In The House in Paris, the night Karen spends with Max 
at the murky hotel serves as a petit attempt at recreating the gothic family romance 
atmosphere. With its ―labyrinthine interior space‖ (Backus, 1999, 1), claustrophobic 
atmosphere, overcoming darkness, as well as a witch-like maid who tells Karen the 
future fortune, all corroborate the aesthetic of the genre. Indeed, the house in Paris, 
where the plots of the first and the third chapters develop is of gothic kind. And if we 
choose to re-read the mellow scene of tea drinking outside of Naomi‘s late aunt‘s house, 
we are confronted with the eerie feeling of having to face the spectre of the aunt 
stepping outside of the house on any minute and interrupting the merry encounter. We 
can hardly reconcile this overcast emotional weather with the sexual tension of the 
scene between the two future lovers: Karen and Max.  
Margot Backus refers herself to Elizabeth Bowen on a number of different 
occasions. In her in The Gothic Family Romance. Heterosexuality, Child Sacrifice and 
the Anglo-Irish Colonial Order she takes Bowen‘s short story ―The Demon Lover‖ as 
an example of gothic family romance narrative accompanying social changes in the 
narratives of the First World War in Ireland62. Backus analyzes the gothic tropes such as 
the demon lover character, and the motives of the devil‘s bargain as well as the living 
dead. Then she deconstructs the marks of a shift towards realism in Anglo-Irish fiction 
similar to that exemplified in Oscar Wilde‘s The Picture of Dorian Gray with its Gothic 
realism. What Gothic realism does, according to Backus, is render the typically secret 
machination explicit. Later on, Backus devotes space to other texts such as Yeats‘ ―A 
                                                 
62 It is also important to see the Celtic imagination that influenced Bowen‘s fiction with its surrealist 
content. That said, Bowen was not the only writer in Ireland to be under some influence of the Celtic 
modernism, this having affected W.B. Yeats and his experiments with automatic writing and Celtic 
mythology, as well as James Joyce‘s exploration of the hallucinatory nighttime in ―Circe‖ section of 
Ulysses and later in Finnegan‟s Wake. Celtic imagination appealed to many writers through its concepts 
of collective magic imaginary, the marvelous, and above all the new and modernized Gothic. 
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Rose of Shadow‖, McGuinness‘s Observe the Sons of Ulster Marching toward the 
Somme, and Johnston's How Many Miles to Babylon? These texts serve to prove 
Backus‘ theory on parallels between the contested social spaces for British male 
homosexual and Anglo-Irish identities. In the following chapters of Gothic Family 
Romance Anglo-Irish gothic realism is examined with the basis of McGuinness‘ 
Baglady and Johnston‘s The Invisible Worm. The motif of incest survivor develops the 
idea of Anglo-Irish femininity intertwined with the social and cultural systems and 
perpetuating them by producing children. Baglady and Laura, the novels‘ heroines, 
openly reject the previously desired familial relationships on suffering incest on their 
behalf and put an end to the discursive economies of the gothic family romance. Backus 
recalls the imagery of Virgin Mary and Yeats‘ sick rose. On a more general level 
Bowen too sees children as involved in perpetuating the hegemonic systems. She too 
ventures to write an alternative narrative to the hegemony oppressing women and 
children, mainly in her treatment of femininity as autonomously relational, and 
mothering as iterable and political.  
Yet one more time does Backus go back to Bowen in an entire chapter 
analyzing the Big House narratives. Backus finds an obvious reference to the Anglo-
Irish Big House in Bowen‘s Bowen‟s Court63 and The Seven Winters as well as its 
recurring motif in many other novels by Bowen, among them The House in Paris. 
According to Backus, the burning of the Big Houses ―represents the only possible end to 
integrational cycles of exploitation and abuse, perpetuated by the integrational denial of 
colonial appropriation within the settler colonialist order‖ (Backus, 1999, 213). Backus 
finds consoling hope in Bowen‘s big house narrative since destroying of the Big House 
                                                 
63 Bowen‟s Court and Seven Winters is an autobiographical history of the Bowen family – Protestant Irish 
gentry - in Ireland from the Cromwellian settlement until 1959. It describes ―the spasms of folie de 
grandeur‖ (Bowens Court, 1999, 458), ―the life of fanatical commitment to property, lawsuits over land, 
formidable matriarchs, violent conflicts between fathers and sons, hunting, drinking and breeding, self-
destructive and self-sustaining fantasies‖ (V. S. Pritchett in Bowens Court). Not merely an account of the 
existence of the Bowen house, the book is a testimony of and Elizabeth Bowen‘s tractatus philosophicus 
on livingness, tradition and self-deceiving nature of any dominant discourse. ―Knowing as you now do, 
that the house is no longer there, you may wonder why I have left the opening chapter, the room-to-room 
description of Bowen‘s Court, in the present tense. I can only say that I saw no reason to transpose it into 
the past. There is a sort of perpetuity about livingness, and it is part of the character of Bowen‟s Court to 
be, in sometimes its silent way, very much alive.‖ (Bowen, 1999, 459) 
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and its Anglo-Irish domestic space may result in producing alternative and liberating 
possibilities to women. If that be the case, the secondary plot of Karen‘s aunt living in 
Ireland takes on a more problematic meaning. 
The ongoing dialogue between The House in Paris and female family romance 
is illustrated on many other levels above those of emotional weather and interpolation of 
children.  It can be seen in the ‗brotherly‘ relationship Karen continues with Ray after 
she has given up Leopold for ‗adoption‘ in Italy. In such relationships, Backus writes, 
the male object of desire takes the form of brother-object as a result of an incestuous 
subplot. Here the subplot is that of Karen‘s former relationship with Max and her 
motherhood of Leopold. The narrative of brotherly object of desire is exemplified in 
Karen‘s platonic marriage to Ray. As such Karen lives the most sterile and friend-like 
life with Ray, accompanying him on business, traveling with him but choosing not to 
have any more children. From the grief after Leopold Karen turns emotionally unstable 
passing most of her days in bed – she becomes an Undine-like creature whose survival 
is perpetuated by imaginary visits of a male stranger into the couple‘s household – the 
idea of Leopold.  
It is worth remembering here that there is a constant exchange between the 
forms that the objects of desire take on in family romance. (Examples of the female 
family romances are many in nineteenth and twentieth century women‘s fiction such as 
Jane Austen‘s Emma and Mansfield Park to name just two.)  They can be as different as 
desire for the penis, for a male child or sterile brotherly love. In his treatment of 
‗mature‘ femininity Freud asserts that there not only happens an exchange of the object 
of desire from the mother to the father, but the replacement of ―the wish for the penis 
with a wish for a child‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 58). In the female family romance the wish for the 
child is very often replaced by the wish for a brotherly object of desire because this 
represents a shift from the oppressor to the-man-who-would-understand in Adrienne 
Rich‘s words. As much as the differentiation in object of desire changes the focus of the 
narrative, the plot of female dependency and subservience to the male order is 
perpetuated. However, on reading Bowen one realizes that irrelevant of the closure 
marriage or motherhood entail there still remains space for a new discourse. The 
construction of adolescent and orphan narratives as well as non-normative motherhood 
has a certain purpose, namely that of keeping the child away from the father‘s discourse 
and the hegemony of the father‘s parole. Bowen‘s writing represents vestiges of the 
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Anglo-Irish child ambivalent quest for identification. At the same time, Bowen believes 
‗her children‘ to be in an advantageous position of being still submerged into the 
mother‘s semiotic but already exposed to the father‘s law.  Family romance convention 
used in Bowen collapses the mother-child narrative into an autonomous female subject 
narrative. It presents mothering not so much as a biological kinship but rather an 
intellectual one. Mothering in Bowen not only depends on the convention of social 
recognition but it is shifted towards a private understanding that a child is a spectator of 
the mother. And as such the concept of devouring mother, also present in The House in 
Paris, develops into the concept of devouring child – a somewhat inversion of the 
Anglo-Irish colonial order that privileged male over female, parent over child, and state 
order over individual desire. Even though Bowen pictures the children as sexually and 
ideologically appropriated, she does hint at the sexual and ideological appropriation of 
mothers too. Usually, in Bowen‘s texts children grow up away from the dominion of the 
father since the father is either absent (Leopold‘s father) or incapable of any discursive 
action (Henrietta‘s father). Through the ideological promise and the instability of the 
mother‘s body, the spuriousness of childhood is shown. In general in Bowen, devouring 
children, denying children‘s childishness disrupts the traditional Big House order and 
the concept of traditional family. However as opposed to the narrative operations of 
female/gothic family romance, it is the child who comes to embody a monster – it is the 
child who is the site of uncanny and the other – ―the child commands, I have acted on 
his scale‖ (HP, 239) says Ray in panic when traveling with Leopold to meet Karen. In 
Bowen, the child consumes the adult and this pattern is exacerbated in much of 
Bowen‘s longer fiction (and deserves a due attention in Bowen‘s shorter fiction). It is 
the child who becomes the subject and mothering - the way towards its subjectification. 
Especially when we recall Kristeva writing ―I feel like vomiting the mother‖ (Kristeva, 
1982, 47), we begin to wonder whether this is the mother one consumed as a child. The 
monstrous child or the abject implies a category that devours adults from the inside of 
discourse in their quest for the little girl/the other, and from the outside of discourse on 
encountering the other in both Leopold and Henrietta, in the case of The House in Paris. 
As such, to state that the child or the other is my proper unconscious is to rightly 
paraphrase Kristeva here. The monstrosity and otherness of the child shifts our attention 
to the principal argument in Elizabeth Bowen‘s fiction – that of incapacity to embrace 
the other and perpetuate the dominant discourses rotten inside. Most obviously the adult 
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is unable to embrace the child, the self is unable to embrace the other since it has been 
propelled into discourse/adulthood from the position of an orphan or a stranger, as the 
narratives of Naomi, Max and Karen imply. The body of the buried child is the source 
of terror in Bowenesque fiction – it is the child who does not extol the innocence of 
becoming as in Nietzsche‘s ―Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks‖, who ―builds 
towers of sand (...) at the seashore, piles them up and tramples them down (...) in 
innocent caprice‖ (Nietzsche, in Pearson, 2006, 111) – the child is the transcendental 
signified of the incapacity of the dominant discourse to accommodate the hermeneutics 
of the self and other split between the totality and essence of this very discourse. 
The emphasis on including the theme of family romance into The House in 
Paris is of Foucauldian nature. The formation of self is closely related to social 
structures operating through discourses leading to a paradoxical position of women of 
inequality or total exclusion. The House in Paris, similarly to the female family 
romance embeds what Louis Althusser called ‗the ideology of the family‘. In the term 
Althusser envisaged the impossibility of psychological factors in the construction of a 
family to exist without historical materialism. The House in Paris represents Bowen‘s 
attempt at moving from a fantasy/distortion of female discourse towards reality through 
emphasis on materialism – materialisation of women‘s discourses. Materialism in 
feminism has been used to highlight the key role of production, including domestic 
production. Bowen shows mothering as a means of production, politicising it into a all 
women‘s discourse. On examining the conditions and narratives of mothering Bowen 
avoids seeing this as an effect of singular patriarchy – and instead ―traces a network of 
social and psychic relations that make up a material, historical moment‖ (Wicke, 1994, 
751)  as writes Jennifer Wicke in her ―Celebrety Material: Materialist Feminism and the 
Culture of Celebrity.‖ In general materialism as a trend in feminism argues that material 
conditions of a different kind play a major role in the social production of gender and 
Bowen ―assays the different ways in which women collaborate and participate in these 
productions.‖ (Wicke, 1994, 758-759) We could chose, here, to paraphrase Marx‘s 
quotation on social conditions – ―It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence but their social existence that determines their consciousness‖. Bearing 
this in mind if mothering be a mode of production in our social existence, both literal 
and political, it does certainly have a determining role in shaping our consciousness, 
both individual and general. Bowen wrote in ―On Writing a Novel‖ that ―characters 
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must materialize- i.e., must have a palpable physical reality (…) the unmaterialized 
character represents an enemy pocket in the area that has been otherwise cleared‖ 
(Bowen, 1999k, 38-39). Perhaps the palpable physical reality not only refers to the 
social conditions but also to the dialogue with mothering discourses that have shaped 
one‘s consciousness. It is mothers who materialise us into the discourse.  
In The House in Paris Bowen extends an argument of materialist feminism into 
other situations where hegemonic discourses are created. In the case of marriage, which 
Bowen sees as an expression of urgent need for a form of protection and legitimacy, the 
reader is presented with the fragility of this institution affecting both the male and the 
female parties. From the failed engagement between Max and Naomi we can read a 
critique of any legitimate union of which the sole purpose is to accommodate the 
weaker party in the dominant discourse. After all, we are told, Max seeks in Naomi a 
protector, a stable point of reference, a symbolic signified – ―the furniture in the dark‖ 
(HP, 155), bearing in mind his unsyable signifier quality that Mrs Fisher links to his 
Jewish origins and effeminate character. It is also an argument for Bowen that women 
should seek their identity not in possible unions with men but in their regress to 
mothering – in their dealing with the discourse of mothering.  
The fact that Max admits not having a family, which according to the narrative 
of the novel is disastrous in Paris, reinforces his position of an orphan seeking help from 
powerful women. It has been suggested that Max is himself an orphan, ―Like Leopold, 
he is illegitimate, and has been abandoned by a mother.‖ (Corcoran, 2004, 93) This 
initially prompts him to continue an affair with Mme Fisher, Naomi‘s mother. We can 
only be aware of the fact of how disadvantaged his original position would be if he is of 
less value than women in social hierarchy. Bowen makes us aware too of how the 
dominant order perpetuates itself outside of male hegemony, a historical fact of the 
internal politics within households and colonies, where women were as much eager 
implementers of Western/Capitalist/Dominant civilizations. What is more, Max seems 
to be the character identified by Margot Gayle Backus as ―the man that enters my 
sister‘s bedroom at night‖ and who ―cannot be my father, because that man is 
Transylvanian, homosexual, and a vampire64‖ (Backus, 1999, 109) as opposed to the 
                                                 
64 Vampirism and circulation of children is noted in The House in Paris on several occasions, among 
which there is Karen‘s belief that Mme Fisher sells girls. It is signaled in the novel‘s motif of the Fisher‘s 
drawing blood (and money) from Max, Karen and other inhabitants of the house. The money drawn to an 
181 
 
man who must be my father because he is ―rich, handsome, and powerful‖ (Backus, 
1999, 109). The rich and handsome man could apparently be Ray in The House in 
Paris, but Bowen clearly exposes his fragility in the final pages of the novel when Ray 
is to deliver Leopold to his mother Karen. ―The obverse of this, however, is Leopold‘s 
radical refusal to accept his lot; and in The House in Paris the subjected or subjugated 
child insists on his release.‖ (Corcoran, 2004, 94) The final manifesto remains – go and 
search for the mother.  
The situation of having the female characters fail to act outside the dominant 
plot can be understood on different levels. They have already been signalled earlier and 
span from the necessity of matricide, impossibility to function within the male plot, as 
well as women‘s ‗dependency and subservience‘ as the plot-controlling factor. In this 
sense the death of those who are situated on the margins and sometimes bleak and 
predictable turns within the plot signal the hegemony of the dominant order over the 
plot. 
In the middle part of the novel Max and Karen meet and beget a son - 
Leopold, whose new life will both be empty of and filled by the narratives of his 
parents. However, when the child is born Max and Karen are already absent from its 
discourse: Max slits his wrists after a conversation with Mme Fisher so that his blood is 
metaphorically spilt in a ritual on the marble mantelpiece at Mme Fisher‘s house. 
Indeed, it is, as we have seen, the very same mantelpiece on which Leopold hurts his 
head learning that his mother ―is not coming.‖ (HP, 66) Karen gives Leopold away to a 
couple of adoptive American parents, the Grant-Moodies. In Kristevan terms Karen  is 
trapped between the two paths a woman may elect in face of the phallic discourse, the 
first path being that of asymbolic singularity (Karen‘s strongest position within the plot 
is signalled in the second part of the novel, before she becomes a mother). The second 
path is that of life in disguise, when the female subject pretends to observe the paternal 
law that neither sees nor signifies her (this happens in the third part of the book with 
Karen‘s continuous withdrawal from the narrative). 
 Kristeva‘s ―My body is no longer mine, it doubles up, suffers, bleeds‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 167) is a prophecy behind Karen‘s imaginary conversation with 
                                                                                                                                               
end and used up leaves Mme Fisher in the state of dying. When at her death bed she is described more as 
a skin-dried skull whose final days are accompanied by her daughter‘s stabbing of knitting needles when 
drawing confession/words from Henrietta on her visit to Paris. 
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Leopold during the sleepless night of his conception65. Similar to Kristeva‘s striking 
image, Karen‘s body too doubles up and suffers bringing to mind the idea of pregnancy 
and bearing a child. As such Leopold continues to insist that he remains an integral part 
of his mother‘s being – a flesh from flesh,  
 
When he said: ‗We shall understand each other‘, he had not boasted. He and she had shared 
experience once: to his pre-adolescent66 mind his having been born of her did not shut a 
gate between them. (HP, 67) 
 
The relationship one has with one‘s mother is one of the most constructive relationships 
ever to be had. Maternity, being a complex process, is not merely a biological fact 
occupying the realm of the private sphere but a project, a work in progress, in theory 
and in practice, stretching over the public and the private spheres. It is the space where 
our selfhood is created on encountering with the other and the place where we create 
notions of the other that remains dwelling within and outside of ourselves.  
Julia Kristeva‘s idea of maternity is described in her Desire in Language, 
although her interest in the subject surfaces in more of her studies, among them The 
New Maladies of the Soul and The Powers of Horror. Kristeva advocates a new 
discourse on maternity that acknowledges the importance of maternal function in the 
development of subjectivity and culture. To her we are subjects in process. But most of 
all she makes an attempt at analyzing the idea of maternity itself posing a question of 
―what is there (…) that reduces social anguish and gratifies a male being; what is there 
                                                 
65 However, if we understand Kristevan parenting as open to both the masculine and the feminine, we 
will too understand Max‘s death as gruesome yet symbolic and necessary sacrifice in favour of Leopold‘s 
life. In the first place, Kristeva sees the post-partum love for the child as originating in the so-called 
father-mother conglomerate with which the infant identifies. In the second place, in Kristeva‘s opinion, 
the concept of herethics (self/other relationship based on the idea of maternity) is an open concept for 
both men and women since it relies more on the idea of Agape – ―(...) a sort of gift, it comes to you from 
outside, you don‘t need to merit it, it‘s a sort of profusion, it‘s the love of parents for their children (...).‖ 
(Kristeva, 1984, 342) Ray‘s meeting with Leopold in the house in Paris perpetuates the male subject‘s 
development from love as Eros – an ascendant movement ―(...) compared to erection‖ (Kristeva, 1984, 
342) that aspires to power – towards love as Agape as love for the other that now reveals itself as an 
instance of the self. 
66 It is important to notice that Kristeva considers pre-adolescence as still the preserve of the semiotic, 
that is the space operating with the maternal rhythms, flows and energies; a space close to the maternal. 
183 
 
that also satisfies a woman so that a commonality of the sexes is set up (…)?‖ (Kristeva, 
1980, 236) Kristeva understands motherhood as the experience of split subjectivity. 
This connects to the myth of the Madonna – her fluidity in assuming various roles of the 
mother, the wife and the Virgin. A woman, going through the experience of 
motherhood, is ―like a strange fold in the human fabric that tightly pulls on the 
connections between nature and culture, inside and outside, the semiotic and the 
symbolic, the self and other‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 182). When a woman becomes a mother, 
she identifies with many elements at the same time that ultimately lead her back to 
herself – she identifies with her own mother‘s love, the love for the child‘s father and a 
growing self-love. Elizabeth Bowen describes in her fiction women split between the 
challenges of culture and nature, the public and the private scenes. She describes a split 
within subjectivity between narcissism and idealization, otherness as an instance of the 
self and the space of alterity. She problematizes the stereotype of a woman as either 
virgin or whore. In her novel The House in Paris67, Karen who to us is directly present 
only in the second middle part of the book, gives birth to Leopold, a fruit of her affair 
with a French Jew – Max. She later on gives Leopold up to be raised by an American 
couple the Grant –Moodies. Leopold goes on to live in Italy until the age of nine when 
Karen finally makes an attempt to get the boy back and plans to meet him in Paris. This, 
however, does turn out to be an idea forced by Karen‘s husband Ray. The place of their 
arranged encounter is the house inhabited by the mother and daughter Fisher, who both 
live a tremulous relationship of enslavement and destruction. Naomi Fisher, the 
daughter, remains steadfast in her servitude to her mother, who happened to have 
destroyed her life by manipulating her former and long dead fiancé and a father of 
Leopold. Karen, who as it turns out still rejects Leopold, fails to appear on the agreed 
day sending an apologetic telegram. In the end Leopold is picked up by Karen‘s 
husband, Ray Forrestier, and they leave to begin a new life for Leopold. In picking 
Leopold, Ray believes he can compensate for his own childlessness - motherhood 
becomes a neutral function which both men and women are capable of and procure for 
their own fulfilment. This, on its part, correlates with Kristeva‘s theory of heretics, at 
                                                 
67 The house that stands at Rue Sylvestre Bonnard is named after the eponymous hero of a novel written 
by Anatole France and entitled Le Crime de Sylvestre Bonnard (1890). Le Crime de Sylvestre Bonnard‟s 
eponymous character - scholar Sylvestre Bonnard, who was involved with a young girl living in a 
boarding school, was based on the life of Anatole France. 
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the conclusion of ―Stabat Mater‖ (Tales of Love), that constitute a promise for a new 
beginning for both men and women through a new kind of ethics and morality, which is 
to be derived from the (un)engendered experience of motherhood/parenthood. 
Motherhood is to provide the basis for the new ethics from their experience of split 
subjectivity. This means that if motherhood serves as a model for a subject-in-process, 
this very subject is always an ethical subject. Rather than utopian68, her vision is of 
possibility and love. She writes: ―Herethics, is perhaps no more than that which in life 
makes bonds, thoughts, and therefore the thought of death, bearable: herethics is 
undeath (a-mort), love‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 185). ―Stabat Mater‖ is a study of the cult of 
the Virgin Mary and so it combines the religious dogmas and study with Kristeva‘s own 
experience of maternity. The text reads divided into two parts that ‗coexist‘ on the same 
page. The personal recollections are written in bold and penetrate the text always 
beginning with the word ‗FLASH‘ as a reminiscent of birth. There is not a neat 
dichotomy between the theoretical part and the personal part. As one reads into the text, 
the separate parts form a unified whole – practice needs tradition and rightful discourse. 
The underlying message of this strange textual union is, as Toril Moi states, a concern 
that today, due to the demise of the cult of the Virgin, and of religion in general, we are 
left without a satisfactory discourse on motherhood. ―(...) There is, then, an urgent need 
for a ―post-virginal‖ discourse on maternity one which ultimately would provide both 
women and men with a new ethics: a ―(her)ethics.‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 160-61) Here the 
word ―her/ethics‖ stands for a strange cluster between femininity and masculinity. 
Femininity, as represented by the idea of child- bearing and maternity, is combined with 
masculinity, as the basis and origin for law and ethics – the dominant discourse on 
morality and conduct. They would form a new non religious union69 of semiotic and 
symbolic – the bodily maternal flow with the rule of the language. In ―Stabat Mater‖ 
both the autobiographical and historical parts, along with the making of new ethics, 
overstep constantly the imaginary boundaries and merge like the columns of textual 
paragraphs – the idea of what should be the ideal future be like is never clear and it is 
blurred. Kristeva‘s attempts at dealing with the challenges that motherhood represents, 
for her, are no more conclusive than, for example, Adrienne Rich‘s text - Of Woman 
                                                 
68 For further development of utopian mothering see, Adrienne Rich (1995). 
69 Non-religious since Julia Kristeva considers the religious idea of motherhood as connected to blood 
and tears, obliterating women as the subject. 
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Born - on the same subject. There surfaces a problematic ambivalence in both texts. 
Kristeva voices this feeling in one of the passages: ―My body is no longer mine, it 
doubles up, suffers, bleeds‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 167); ―(T)he dark area (aut) that 
motherhood constitutes for a woman‖ (Kristeva, 1987,179); 
  
Let us call ‗maternal‘ the ambivalent principle (aut) that is bound to the species, on the one hand, 
and on the other stems from an identity catastrophe that causes the Name to topple over into the 
unnameable that one imagines as femininity, nonlanguage, or body. (Kristeva, 1987, 234-235)  
 
This very passage seems to be an exact description of the mood found in the second part 
of Bowen‘s The House in Paris. In that very part Karen dialogues with her yet unborn 
child Leopold on the reasons for his conception. ―FLASH – instant of time or of dream 
without time (…) Epiphanies‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 234) goes the text written by Kristeva, 
which seems to be the exact background for Karen‘s epiphany about her unborn son. 
And FLASH may have its parallel in the lighthouse which Karen and Max see flashing 
its lights towards darkness – they both turn away from it. At the same time the textual 
weather of the setting corresponds to the occasion of the clandestine meeting. The 
darkness of rooms, confinement, rain and sleepless night mirror the difficult situation in 
which the two lovers – Karen and Max- encounter themselves. They are both engaged 
to other people and in their short, emotionally unsatisfying affair they break the 
constraints society imposes on them. Karen and Max both know that their relationship is 
impossible to continue, yet they are unable to escape the way it develops into a 
stereotypical/unpondered night of almost painful passion. Their encounter freezes in 
timelessness70 of which there is no NOW and only the certainty of future – new life. To 
                                                 
70 It is interesting to see the different pace of action which Bowen attributes to certain events. We find 
that fast events such as taxi driving, train travel are presented with an emphasis on their fastness. Taxis 
‗dart‘, ‗pump‘, ‗crash‘ and ‗swerve‘, trains ‗impale‘ and ‗crash‘. In Pictures and Conversations, Bowen 
comments on her characters, ―Bowen characters are in transit consciously. Sensationalists (…) when they 
extend their environment (…) what goes on in them is magnified and enhanced: impacts are sharper, there 
is more objectivity (…) Speed is exciting to have grown up with. It alerts vision (…) By contrast, it 
accentuates the absoluteness of stillness. Permanence (…) stands out the more strongly in an otherwise 
ephemeral world. Permanence is an attribute of recalled places.‖ (Bowen, 1999g, 286) Travelling, moving 
are some of a few tenets one has in life, since life according to Bowen is made up of ambivalence. Life is 
made of change since even writers ―seldom prey to regret (…) seldom look back, for they are usually 
engaged upon something else.‖ (Bowen, 1999g, 287) 
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Leopold Karen remains ―his contemporary, a past as plain as the present, simply a 
present elsewhere‖ (HP, 67). Similarly to Giovanni Bellini‘s paintings, described in 
detail by Kristeva in her Desire in Language, what in life ―remains multihued and 
compact figuration inevitably floats in empty space‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 262) – everything 
floats in timelessness.  
Casting a glimpse at Irish writing of the seventies in the twentieth century, one 
is stricken by a curious statement made by Edna O‘Brien‘s in her ―A Scandalous 
Woman‖ (1972)71, which says that Ireland is ―a land of strange, sacrificial women‖ 
(O‘Brien, 1972, 33). By the statement, O‘Brien points towards the two-fold meaning 
that womanhood implies. On one hand it stands for complying with the dominant order, 
perpetuating the constraining myth of Virgin Mary. On the other hand, it highlights the 
otherness and difference that women embody in their strangeness. In Strangers to 
Ourselves Kristeva describes the foreigner as the ‗cold orphan‘, motherless, a ‗devotee 
of solitude‘, a ‗fanatic of absence‘, alone even in a crowd, arrogant, rejected, yet oddly 
happy (Kristeva, 1991, 4-5). The stranger is always in motion, doesn‘t belong 
anywhere, to ‗any time, any love‘ (Kristeva, 1991, 7). 
 
The foreigner, thus, has lost his mother. Camus understood it well: his Stranger reveals 
himself at the time of his mother's death. One has not much noticed that this cold orphan, 
whose indifference can become criminal, is a fanatic of absence. He is a devotee of 
solitude, even in the midst of a crowd, because he is faithful to a shadow: bewitching 
secret, paternal ideal, inaccessible ambition. (Kristeva, 1991, 5) 
 
A foreigner, according to Kristeva, understands that being sentenced to death after years 
of wandering, is the only meaningful state within the symbolic discourse – the death of 
a child in becoming an adult, the death of the semiotic on entering the symbolic, the 
                                                 
71 Surprisingly enough 1969 is the year of publication Bowen‘s last novel Eva Trout, her most curious 
and difficult piece of fiction, which juxtaposes itself against the ideas presented in Bowen‘s earlier 
novels. Not only does it seem to be marking a turning point in Bowen‘s beliefs about society, but it 
reveals itself as contradicting all supposedly stable and patriarchal tenets of the mid twentieth century 
society and its discourse on women, motherhood, love and difference. It seems then that Bowen‘s ideas 
correlate with what was, at that very time, growing to be the core of Irish fiction by women writers – the 
problem of a motherless child, as well as childless mother, the motif of single motherhood, as well as the 
conflicting concepts of female agency, maternity and femininity itself. 
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death of the I in favour of the other – processes that do not only take place in The House 
in Paris, but, as we will see, in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes too. 
 
Foreigner: a choked up rage deep down in my throat, a black angel clouding transparency, 
opaque, unfathomable spur. The image of hatred and of the other, a foreigner is neither the 
romantic victim of our clannish indolence nor the intruder responsible for all the ills of the 
polis. Neither the apocalypse on the move nor the instant adversary to be eliminated for the 
sake of appeasing the group. Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face 
of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and 
affinity founder. By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in 
himself. (Kristeva, 1991, 5) 
 
A hidden wound makes the orphan wonder, an occult wound accounts for their 
excessive mobility. An orphan is not a static character; they may feel an unexplainable 
interior inquietude. The inquietude translates itself directly into dislocation - a key word 
in Elizabeth Bowen‘s fiction. By dislocation I do not only refer to ‗stative‘ or ‗dynamic‘ 
texts that embrace a certain textual quality based on episodes and with a ‗what-
happened–next‘ structure. By dislocation I wish to address the problems of 
internal/emotional mobility or immobility of characters. I would like to analyze their 
implications on what, in relation to the spatial structure of a text, Jurij Lotman calls 
‗boundary crossing‘.  
 
For Lotman the division into mobile vs. immobile characters (in spatial terms) underlines 
another opposition: namely that between texts with a plot and texts without a plot. 
According to Lotman, plotless texts (…) affirm a particular world and its ordering. They are 
organized according to the principle of binary oppositions which establish fixed frontiers. 
Texts with a plot, on the other hand, involve what has already been referred to as boundary 
crossing, i.e. movement across the forbidden border which has been established by the 
plotless structure. (…) Movement within the character‘s own space is not considered an 
event. Kardela, 2002, 178-179) 
 
If we apply this theory to psychoanalysis it opens up a series of implications 
on characters‘ internal evolution. Above all it reveals the ingenuity of Bowen‘s fiction 
since, as Lotman admits: ―(…) only exceptional characters can go across the 
impenetrable boundary of their environment, others are confined to one environment 
and thus remain immobile‖ (in Kardela, 2002, 179). The female characters in Bowen‘s 
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fiction do transgress the centre/periphery boundaries and what seems to be the engine of 
their mobility has originally been described as the leitmotif of Bowen‘s fiction – the 
motif of orphanhood. And the concept of orphanhood seems to be reversible in Bowen – 
it is either orphaned children or childless mothers – solitude perpetuates our social 
relations. The assemblage of orphanhood ―has neither base nor superstructure… it 
flattens all of its dimensions onto a single place of consistency upon which reciprocal 
presuppositions and mutual insertions play themselves out‖ (Grosz, 1994, 167). 
Jeanette Shumaker72 explains the sacrificial position of women in long and 
short fiction by evoking the religious myth of the Virgin Mary. She writes that the 
distressing martyrdoms of the fictional heroines result from the overspread Catholic 
notions of the Madonna. As Shumaker points out, scholars such as Julia Kristeva in 
―Stabat Mater‖ (1977) and Marina Warner in ―Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and 
Cult of the Virgin Mary‖ (1976) in part, help scrutinize the impact of the Madonna 
myth on western European women. Their feminist scholarship illuminates short stories 
such as Mary Lavin‘s ―A Nun‘s Mother‖ (1944) and ―Sarah‖ (1943), as well as 
O‘Brien‘s ―Sister Imelda‖ (1981) and ―A Scandalous Woman.‖ According to Shumaker 
many short stories by both Lavin and O‘Brien work the concept of female martyrdom 
(en)gendered by the Madonna myth. As such the myth can be found hidden in various 
motives, from becoming a nun to becoming a wife, a mother, or a ‗fallen woman‘.  
Julia Kristeva, as already pointed out in Jeanette Shumaker‘s writing, talks 
about a certain fluidity of the Madonna role as well as her plasticity and 
heterogeneousness. As such the Madonna role encompasses diverse female roles and 
takes on different masks – as in Riviere‘s femininity as masquerade73. In this sense what 
is important about the Madonna myth is that it overlaps with many public and private 
roles ascribed to women, which are all consequently cast into the periphery. By setting 
up an impossible ideal, the cult of the Virgin does drive the adherent into a position of 
                                                 
72 Jeanette Shumaker has worked extensively on Edna O‘Brien and Mary Lavin, publishing articles such 
as ―Mother-Daughter Rivalries in Short Stories by Edna O‘Brien, Helen Lucy Burke, Mary Beckett, and 
Elizabeth Bowen‖ (2001), or ―The Madonna Ideal in Mary Lavin‘s Short Stories: A Kristevan 
Perspective,‖ (1993), 
73 The notion of femininity as masquerade is explicated in Joan Riviere‘s now well-known 
psychoanalytic essay, ―Womanliness as a Masquerade‖ (1929). Furthermore, Riviere‘s notion of 
masquerade along with Kristevan fluid asymbolia contribute to the desirable ideal cut out for women in 
the postcolonial texts. 
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acknowledged and hopeless yearning and inferiority that is refigured both in the centre 
and on the margins.  
The Madonna myth is drawn upon in The House in Paris many times both 
directly and indirectly. Max compares Mme Fisher to a stone Madonna in his 
understanding a Madonna that cannot give birth. Naomi Fisher‘s devotion to her mother 
is too selfless like that of the Virgin Mary‘s. The role of Naomi Fisher as sacrificing her 
right to maternity and identity - Kristeva might call this ―A suffering lined with 
jubilation‖ (Kristeva, 1987) is characteristic of the woman who lives suffused by the 
image of the sacrificial Madonna. ―Uniqueness is attained only through an exacerbated 
masochism‖. (Kristeva, 1987, 258) The idea of Naomi Fisher as virginal and pure is 
obliterated in her very last name also reinforced by Mrs Arbuthnot, Henrietta‘s 
grandmother. By calling her Kingfisher, she repeats the play on words in French, since 
the word fisher, pronounced ‗pêcheur‘ is almost indistinguishable in pronunciation from 
the word signifying sinner that is ‗pécheur‘. Since we do not know the character of the 
relationship between Mrs Arbuthnot and Naomi Fisher, we may only infer that she 
follows the steps of Mrs Arbuthnot, one of the many examples of dominant and 
manipulative women in Bowen‘s fiction. ‗Pécheur‘ directs our attention to what Bowen 
thought about the myth of the Madonna, suggesting that it could be as sinful a life as the 
one against the myth. After all, one may believe Karen to be an anti Madonna, who 
chooses a different path than that of emulating motherhood.  
Bowen‘s often recurring piece of criticism on society, with its stress on 
omnipresent negative influence on young people, is that it changes anyone irreversibly 
when he or she enters its dominant discourse. In ―Out of a Book‖, her essay on literary 
influences, Bowen writes that once we grow up we cannot feast in the Garden of Eden, 
we are banished from the place of plenty, and ―The young person is then thrown out of 
Eden. (. ...) Appreciation of literature is the end of magic.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 51) - the 
paradise is lost forever. It is interesting to look at the origins of the word paradise that 
has its roots in two Persian words: ‗pairi‘, which means around and ‗diz‘, which means 
to shape or mould. According to Bowen as we gain our access to society we become 
resistant to change and set in our characters - we loose our virginity and ingenuity. This 
idea goes parallel with Julia Kristeva‘s notion of transferential plasticity, which she 
describes in her Powers of Horror and which, according to her, characterizes the youth 
period and is lost on entering into the symbolic. Surprisingly enough if we go back to 
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the context of Bowen‘s citation that is our loss of innocence in our treatment of literary 
fiction, we may as well remember the origins of the word fiction. The word fiction has 
its roots in the Latin word ‗fingere‘, which means to form or to mould thus to create 
narraives, just as the word paradise. The question here concerns the role the obligatory, 
Madonna-like virginity may play in women‘s lives – whether it may compensate female 
loss of plasticity with its surprising fluidity of roles. It may be here that we could find 
the reasons for the obsession with the Madonna like function that is commonly ascribed 
to women. 
Furthermore Neil Corcoran clearly highlights Elizabeth Bowen‘s fascination 
and obsession with the Roman Catholic image of the Mother and Child. And it is the 
very Mother and Child analyzed by Julia Kristeva in her ―Motherhood According to 
Giovanni Bellini‖, which makes part of Desire in Language. About sacrificial 
motherhood Neil Corcoran writes that,  
 
The feelings of selfless compassion and resigning from one‘s own body for the sake of the 
other can only find their resemblance in the feeling a mother has towards her child. (Corcoran, 
2004, 84) 
 
And the intensity of reciprocity, ―the buttons pulled a little crooked‖, as in the scene 
between Leopold and Henrietta - the expression of emotional exchange with the other 
can only come from a child being comforted by the mother. In there, Henrietta‘s ability 
to understand Leopold comes from her own traumatic experience of orphanhood. 
However, the novel has Henrietta overcome these feelings of reciprocity in placing her 
in the dominant discourse, making the reader wonder whether she will follow into the 
footsteps of her manipulative female ancestors. After all she carries with her a bagful of 
symbolically-charged apples – she may be the tempting Eve taking the meaning away 
from Paradise thanks to her carnal sin. And if the reader does wander what ‗comes of 
the children‘ Neil Corcoran offers little consolation to the blatant truth writing that ―in 
various ways we are encouraged to read Leopold as a second Max‖ (Corcoran, 2004, 
95). The reader should not be reluctant to believe that Leopold will suffer from the same 
weakness of nature as his father. Again, an apple does not fall far from the tree. There, 
however, remains hope in his rebirth into a new family life promised by Karen‘s 
husband, who is willing to exercise a maternal/paternal role for Leopold. As we find out 
in Kristeva maternity should not be solely ascribed to femininity and it can also be a 
191 
 
male function, especially if we bear in mind the concept of the imaginary father – ―the 
phantasm of a father who can love like a mother‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 3).  
 
The imaginary – maternal – father thus (…) is the guarantee of a ludic entry into the oedipal 
triangle and provides a theatrical setting for the becoming of the subject: of the subject as a 
game of I-s (jeu de jes), as a gambling of the I-s. (Nikolchina, 2004, 64) 
 
However when reading from Kristeva‘ study of the revolutionary ―herethics‖, 
we are reminded that the development of subjectivity is ascribed mainly to the 
mother/child (daughter) dyad, and to a greater extent it resembles the Demeter- 
Persephone myth. It is too only through exploration of the maternal presence in the first 
place that the concept of the imaginary, loving father arises. Kristeva begins her treatise 
on motherhood by analyzing Bellini‘s paintings of Madonna and Child in an essay 
entitled ―Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini‖ written after the birth of her son 
in 1976. According to Kristeva Bellini‘s Madonnas are governed by interplay between 
feelings of distance from and anguish to poses(ing) as experienced within the mother 
and the child dyad. Similar exchange can be found in The House in Paris, especially in 
Karen‘s attitude towards Leopold, as well as in Henrietta‘s meeting with Leopold. It is 
an interplay of abjection and possessiveness. It is ―the theorizing of the mother both in 
terms of losing her (exile), and of surrogating her, acquiring her in sublime joy where 
she is not.‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 58) The House in Paris is speaking ―of darkness through 
luminosity, of silence through polyglotism, and of hidden face through mask‖ 
(Nikolchina, 2004, 61), and of exile, strangeness and geography through creating 
spaces, places and movement. 
The maternal body is the subject that splits and where ―nature confronts 
culture‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 238). It is also embedded with a fantasy of so called Phallic 
Mother since we are made to believe in her power steaming from some religious 
mystification of the paternal function. Motherhood helps a woman to reunite with her 
own mother ―By giving birth, the woman enters into contact with her mother; she 
becomes, she is her own mother; they are the same continuity differentiating itself‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 239). Pregnancy and childbirth can be experienced as a reunion with 
one‘s own mother – in a primal regression the woman –mother reunites with the body of 
her mother. The reunion, however, needs not be peaceful. The woman reacquires what 
she has been deprived of or castrated of by her phallic mother.  
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The language of art, too, follows (but differently and more closely) the other aspect of maternal 
jouissance, the sublimation taking place at the very moment of primal repression within the 
mother‘s body, arising perhaps unwittingly out of her marginal position. At the intersection of sign 
and rhythm, of representation and light, of the symbolic and the semiotic, the artist speaks from a 
place where she is not, where she knows not. (Kristeva, 1980, 242) 
 
According to Kristeva attitudes towards the maternal body can be divided into 
two groups. The first group sees the maternal body as fetish. It develops into worship of 
the figurable and representable person. The speaker sees the meaning only in the 
fetishist representation of the mother/child relationship. The second group perceives the 
maternal body as its predominance of luminous, chromatic differences beyond and 
despite corporeal representation – the body is the image of the represent-able. The 
speaker sees the meaning beyond the imagery of motherhood, projecting the discovery 
of his own jouissance onto the image. I do believe that we may find a transcription of 
these theories in the characters of Leopold and Max in The House in Paris. Information 
about Max‘s life is scarce. We do know, however, that he had befriended Mme Fisher as 
a young man, and immediately fell prey to her seductive and castrating powers – ―He 
[Max] could do nothing that she had not expected; my mother was at the root of him‖ 
(HP, 183) This then constituted for him a turning point in his emotional development – 
a prisoner to Mme Fisher‘s whims, he felt lost in the world when attempting to free 
himself. The ‗friendship‘ represented to Max a precocious seduction74 suffered at the 
hands of his ‗substitute/adoptive‘ mother.  
 
Persuaded by precocious seduction and double motherhood of the existence of a maternal 
phallus, (he) never stopped looking for fetish equivalents in the bodies, (…) objects and 
money. (Kristeva, 1980, 245)  
 
                                                 
74 Max explains the incestuous nature of his relationship with Mme Fisher and says: ―She was ready for 
me when I was not ready for her. She had waited years for what I had not had time to miss. We met in her 
house, in all senses. Women I knew were as she made me see them: they were not much. Any loves I 
enjoyed stayed inside her scope; she knew of them all. She mocked and played upon my sensuality. She 
always had time to see me;‖ (HP, 139) 
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The bodies were those of girls that Mme Fisher put up in her house in Paris, 
though the desire for them was nothing more than platonic, since the house had its strict 
rules and Max was forbidden from talking to the girls. Furthermore, Max‘s 
performances as a subject were strictly controlled by and embedded into Mme Fisher‘s 
discourse. The objects and money that Max never possessed enough, were there to curb 
his amorous adventures, yet it was a given that if he married a girl it would also be for 
her material goods. If we see Max‘s live structured around the trauma of maternal 
castration, we may better understand his narcissistic exploration of fantasies for a better 
life – the fantasies he pursues in vain until he falls in love with Karen, and unable to 
stand up to the ‗reality‘ of love, he commits suicide. The fantasies that the sheltered and 
dominated Narcissus explores ―incite pleasure, but (…) dramatically affect(s) desire that 
is impossible to satisfy by an abundance of objects, bodies, or behaviours, which 
ceaselessly excite and disappoint.‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 245) Max himself says that what 
goes on in his mind is ―Only images and desire.‖ (HP, 140)75 It was Freud who first 
―noticed in the subject the failure of a desire for the signifier to achieve objective value‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 117) and when the objective value comes to be represented in love for 
the other  - when the desire ceased to be solely that of a subject, it became unbearable 
causing the subject to disintegrate. ―First, there is a fetishism of the body and an 
extreme refinement of the technique of representation by resemblance. Next comes the 
staging of psychological episodes centred in the desire for a body – his, a child‘s, or 
another‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 245) writes Kristeva on the development of the narcissistic 
quest for fulfilment. I believe Max‘s fetishism finds its vent in the imagery of the stone 
Madonna, that he first sees in Mme Fisher and then finds in Naomi Fisher. The desire to 
subordinate Naomi makes itself visible in the image of Naomi silently pricking her 
finger with a needle while sowing that Max witnesses.  
 
Though I saw her, I only felt her there when her mother had gone out and all the energy 
went out of the room. Seeing how gently Naomi picked up her scissors from the floor, I 
remembered she was a woman. I said something, and she started and pricked her finger. I 
saw from the pitying way she sucked the bead of blood from her finger how much she 
                                                 
75 As has been mentioned, the other, once in the world, becomes an instance of the self and one‘s own 
mother feelings towards whom are sustained through desire that seeks the lost part of the self. The love 
for the other becomes expressed by the love for the self, of which narcissism and idealization are 
inseparable elements.  
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pitied me, and saw at the same time that hers was the only pity I did not resent. (. ...) 
When I see how the stony lines of her dress and her entirely unsurprised face moved me, I 
see now that it was the Madonna trick – my nerves tricking my senses with the idea of 
peace, making someone to make for me an unattackable safe place. (HP, 162)  
 
Max invests his fantasises in the gratifying image of stone Madonna that Naomi comes 
to represent and which Kristeva traces in the religious understanding of maternity as 
that of blood and tears, as well as resigning from one‘s own I for the sake of the other.  
Similar images of Madonna lamenting are given when Naomi Fisher is to share the 
news of Karen‘s decision not to come with Leopold. She breaks on her knees- she ―held 
her arms out to him, dropped on her knees, and advanced on her knees arms out‖ (HP, 
66). This then stirs in Leopold feelings of disdain as Naomi Fisher persists ―dumb 
again, knelt there in the patch of weak sun‖ (HP, 66).  Leopold ―haughtily, touched the 
tie of his blouse. His small dark figure, one arm up in the act, flattened against the 
mantle piece like a specimen‖ (HP, 66). At the very mantelpiece where Max had 
committed suicide, primal narcissism is awakening in Leopold, which pushes him into 
the centre, as accordingly with the dominant discourse, he abjects Naomi Fisher in her 
servitude-like position. Max‘s narcissism develops itself into his overt womanish-ness, 
which Mrs Michaelis traces to his Jewish origins. ―He looks sensitive, and might easily 
be touchy. (…) And there is always that touch – Jewish perhaps – of womanish-ness 
about him that a woman would have to ignore and yet deal with the whole time‖ (HP, 
117).     
That said, to a certain degree a character‘s failure in moral development may 
stem from his or her emotional lag in the attitudes towards the mother; there remains a 
niche that has been filled either by a possessive or hostile mother. This then pushes the 
character away from the experience of jouissance, which may be the case of psychotic 
characters with suicidal tendencies. Suicide in The House in Paris is the fate Leopold‘s 
father chooses for himself. We also may try to find parallels for suicide in the 
description of blood/tears virginity that characterises the textual stone Madonnas who 
resign from their private for the public‘s sake, who give up their selves, as is the case of 
Naomi Fisher.  
If we look closely at Leopold, we find that he stands in contrast to Max in his 
attitudes to the maternal. For him the mother has been lost, she remains absent since he 
was abandoned by her shortly after being born. We do know that his adoptive mother or 
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mothers, since there are two women involved: Mrs Grant-Moodie and her sister, tried to 
replace the ‗real‘ but absent mother in an insensitive and rough manner, as we learn 
from Mrs Grant-Moodie‘s letter to Miss Fisher about Leopold‘s education. To Leopold 
―maternal space is there, nevertheless – fascinating, attracting, and puzzling. But we 
have no direct access to it.‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 247) 
 
As if there were a maternal function that, unlike the mother‘s solicitude in Leonardo‘s [da 
Vinci] paintings toward the baby-object of all desire, was merely ineffable jouissance, 
beyond discourse, beyond narrative, beyond psychology, beyond lived experience and 
biography – in short, beyond figuration. (Kristeva, 1980, 247) 
 
―The faces (…) are turned away , intent on something else that draws their gaze to the 
side, up above, or nowhere in particular, (…)‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 247) – the way 
Leopold‘s face is turned away during his embrace with Henrietta.  
 
Leopold rolled his face further away from her, so that one cheek and temple now pressed 
the marble, but did not withdraw his body from her touch. (…)Reposing between two 
friends, the mantelpiece and her body, Leopold, she could feel, was looking out of the 
window, seeing the courtyard and the one bare tree swim into view again and patiently 
stand. (HP, 196-197)  
 
And even though Leopold learns that his mother would not be visiting him after all, he 
experiences jubilation where ―she is not‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 247) and her absence 
produces a serene joy - Leopold is reclaimed by Karen‘s husband, ―So the mother who 
did not come to meet Leopold that afternoon remained his creature, able to speak the 
truth‖ (HP, 67). Like in Colette‘s modernist text ―Sido‖ – the mother- is absent (she 
says in her letters that she will not come and later she dies) but she is also perpetually 
present via the texts of letters Leopold steals from Miss Fisher‘s bag, as well as the one 
he invents as possible content of the allegorical empty yet addressed envelope. In the 
first and second parts of The House in Paris Karen is absent at one and present thanks to 
the narratives of others of her and the letter she sends even though it is also hidden from 
Leopold since he only finds an empty envelope. Here, Karen‘s absence/presence is yet 
more highlighted. What constructs the narrative is the ―simultaneity of loss and gain, 
separation and closeness, difference and similarity‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 106). The empty 
envelope contains no narrative directed at Leopold but an image he must transcribe into 
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his own life – he must become both the ―receiver and the sender‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 106) he 
―must project himself into the very text/nontext of the letter‖ (Hirsh, 1989, 106) - the 
child fills in the mother, impregnates its signifier with her signifying. Leopold‘s 
fascination with the mother function (the mother beyond the law) splits itself between 
the primary and obvious need for a mother that any child possesses and a desire or 
curiosity not so much for a woman ‗body‘/woman ‗subject‘ but the ―very function of 
jouissance‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 248). The maternal function becomes the luminous 
background in the quest for understanding of one‘s origins, ―evoking an ‗inner 
experience‘ rather than a referential ‗object‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 249). As I have written 
earlier in this chapter, ―(…) the meeting he had projected could take place only in 
Heaven – call it Heaven; (…) or call it art‖ (HP, 67) so Leopold projected his mother 
onto reality just like Giovanni Bellini, whom Kristeva describes in her ―Motherhood 
according to Giovanni Bellini‖, projected his idea of motherhood onto his painted 
‗Madonnas‘ embedded in the illuminated background. ―Is it illuminated?‖ (HP, 239) 
asks Leopold, when he is to meet his mother – when he is to return to his Garden of 
Eden of which Bowen, herself orphaned early, wrote so extensively in her essays. The 
indirect study of human psyche and the character as subject in discourse leads both 
Kristeva and Bowen to enhance their interest in art, echoed in Theodor Adorno‘s 
‗aesthetic mode of existence‘76. This corroborates the use of the painting motif in the 
fictional creation of Karen, who intermittently tries her luck as a painter and whose 
activity as such is breached by society‘s pressure. As such art prefigures and releases a 
perspective on the subject. The thin line between art and life is ―a double movement in 
which the oeuvre is analytically destabilised into artistic practice and the subject‘s 
coming into being is delivered as an aesthetic occurrence‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 65) – art 
is not a symptom but it ―sets the subject up in the first place‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 65). 
And if the interest in art lead Kristeva to the analysis of the ludic I – the je de jeu, it too 
took Bowen to treating the I as work in progress, especially the feminine I (for both of 
the writers) that thanks to its ―as if‖ condition in the phallic order became a universal, 
unsexed necessity.  Hence, the potential for developing feminine subjectivity became a 
―potential infinity of masks‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 66). Art, like in Adorno‘s giving form 
                                                 
76 For the elucidation of this concept, see Theodor Adorno‘s Aesthetic Theory (1970). 
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to contingent material, made Bowen see the subject as dialogical and fluid subject-in-
process77. 
I wish to devote an entire section to the body of the buried mother in the next 
paragraphs, since I do believe that The House in Paris yields some labouring through 
this concept. As much as one finds the idea of motherhood the principal theme of The 
House in Paris there is no denying that a greater part of Bowen‘s fiction seems to be 
discarding the mother in many but obvious ways. The House in Paris has the mother 
abandon her child. It seems it cannot support the existence of the child and the mother 
in the same narrative. Mothers are at once absent in Bowen‘s fiction but, in my opinion, 
remain very present. This can be compared to the parallel absence and presence in a 
modernist text by Michel Beaujour‘s Break of Day, where the story of love between 
mother and daughter revises the concept of what is narratable and what is not. The 
narrative of mother and daughter will always remain a narrative of renunciation. 
Julia Kristeva has emphasized not mere matricide as place for mothers after and 
in order to initiate us into language. She describes the mother‘s seductive 
psychosomatic intrusion into her infant being incorporated by the child to form the inner 
world. To better analyse this we need to go back to Kristeva‘s writing on Giovanni 
Bellini‘s stone Madonnas contrasted with some painting by Leonardo da Vinci. Kristeva 
starts with her analysis of Giovanni Bellini‘s style claiming that it is a ―synthesis of 
Flemish landscape painting, iconography, and Mediterranean architectural manner‖ 
(Kristeva 1980, 243). She highlights Bellini‘s introduction of luminous density of 
colour that ―introduced volume into the body and into the painting‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 
244). To that there is an argument of luminosity emerging from the concept of loss – 
loss of a country, territory, the mother, the theme of exile and stranger, which are 
notorious not only in Bellini‘s vision but also in Dante‘s writing, whose doubling in 
Kristeva ―has remained unnoticed‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 58). As such, Dante, who was 
notorious for descriptions of mother-son incest, was an exile in the times when many 
writers and scholars sought travelling as mind-enriching. Max too remains an exile 
entrapped in his incestuous relationship with Mrs Fisher – the archaic mother to his 
                                                 
77 Bowen admitted in one of her interviews that she perceived her literary work in terms of forms that 
were primary to the invention of characters and plot. Bowen confessed that ―The idea for a book comes to 
me in the shape of an abstract pattern‖ (Bowen, 1942, in Ellmann, 2001, 67), all else is secondary and 
depends on the aesthetics of the pattern. 
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unhealed orphanhood. All this falls far away from the day light and luminosity of Paris, 
and remains enclosed in Mrs Fisher dark and sombre house. Nikolchina writes in her 
Matricide in Language, that  
 
the luminosity itself is related in Kristeva (1980), among other things, to the pagan-
matriarchal Orientalism and the  revealing Orthodox conception of the Virgin as privileged 
space: ergasterion. (Nikolchina, 2004, 58)  
 
The House in Paris is a surrogating of the other‘s story, the story about the 
mother and the daughter, the mother and the child, the I and the other – oneself and the 
stranger. After all, to Bowen herself, fiction was a means of surrogating her mother‘s 
unfinished story due to her mother precocious death of cancer. What also seems of 
crucial importance is Bellini‘s overt discretion resulting in a lack of biographical 
information and writing, in contrast to ―the profusion of information and biographical 
notes left behind by his younger contemporary, Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519)‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 244) who supposedly experienced ―maternal seduction‖, along with 
―double motherhood‖, as well as ―the impressive authority of an office holding father‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 244). His, according to Kristeva, is the typical narrative of a 
homosexual structure. The story is representative of a painter who finally triumphs over 
the phallic mother and turns towards excessive fetishism of the masculine body along 
with a total denial of the feminine body. To prove her point, Kristeva gives us an 
analysis of da Vinci‘s Madonna with the Carnation and Virgin and Child with St. Anne, 
highlighting the furtively masculine features of the Madonnas‘ physique, as well as the 
total absorption into the masculine body of her baby Jesus. Leonardo‘s fetishism is 
supported by the phallic scientific discourse and a humanist realism, so that certain 
fundamental traits of Renaissance emerge, ―supported by the story of Leonardo‘s life 
that was brought out by Freud‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 245). In contrast to Leonardo da 
Vinci‘s work Kristeva places that of Giovanni Bellini‘s. It is the imaginary mother the 
painter who is presented as the site of jouissance and mediated by the language of the 
present, ever-loving father. Similarly in The House in Paris, Leopold is to be introduced 
into the dominant discourse thanks to Ray‘s access to it,  
 
You will notice, we talk where I can talk. You will not quote Mme Fisher, you will not kick 
me in taxis, you will not shout in houses where they are ill. You will wear a civilian cap, not 
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snub little girls and not get under my feet. There will be many things that you will not like. 
There are many things that I do not like about you. (HP, 238)  
 
According to Kristeva, Bellini positions himself in the place of the mother and 
while depriving her of the right to any real existence, he gives her a certain symbolic 
status, so that the experience of motherhood becomes an inner experience ―rather than a 
referential object‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 249). The category of mother is thus shifted onto the 
category of the child. Bearing this in mind, Kristeva writes that ―The point is to reach 
the threshold of repression by means of the identification with motherhood (…), to 
reach this threshold where maternal jouissance, alone impassable, is arrayed‖ (Kristeva, 
1980, 249). The subject depends on the mother in the process of identification, even 
though the mother is symbolised via the language of the father. The converse, in my 
opinion, holds true, so that motherhood can be rendered ―passable‖/‖translatable‖, 
thanks to the child‘s investments into the maternal. Even though it is thanks to the 
eclipsing (operations of the father‘s discourse) that the colour of the figures produces 
volume, it still awards some primacy to the maternal figure. Later in the text, Kristeva 
gives an account of changing imagery of Madonna‘s hands. Bellini‘s Madonnas from 
between 1450 to 1460 are portrayed as distant and impassive. Yet when the motif of 
Madonna enters back into Bellini‘s work in early 1455, the focus shifts towards the 
maternal hands whose caress is already ―more threatening than comforting‖ (Kristeva, 
1980, 254). From 1460 onwards the hands shift towards ―the child‘s buttocks‖ and then 
―prod the stomach and penis of the frightened baby‖. And yet, Madonna‘s 
―characterless gaze fleeting under her downcast eyelids, her nonetheless definite 
pleasure, unshakable in its intimacy, and her cheeks radiating peace, all constitute a 
strange modesty‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 254). Here we can see the beginning of what would 
become the imagery of stone Madonna –distant, servile and yet taking pleasure in her 
maternal role. With Madonna with Two Trees (1487), the possessive mother changes 
into the hostile mother, distance-pleasure changes into distance-anguish and yet ―the 
myth of the maternal figure is nothing but a screen, a foreground, or an obstruction to be 
broken through‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 260) as in Madonna and Child (1487). It is ―a mother 
who is projected from the painting, but does not dominate‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 262). It is a 
mother as module functioning according to the language of the father ―capable of 
capturing her specific imaginary jouissance, the jouissance on the border of primal 
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repression, beyond, although always coexistent with, the imagery of full, mimetic, and 
true signs‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 263). 
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6.  Corporeality - The Body of the Buried Madonna. 
 
I have written in one of my published papers entitled ―Mark Johnson and the 
Body Metaphor‖ that ―the somatic manifestations can be viewed as body metaphors, 
which are very often impossible to be expressed verbally‖ (Sanches, 2006, 285). The 
idea of a buried mother brings us back to the notion of multiplicity of womanhood, 
which translates itself into Auerbach‘s multipersonal subjectivity, as in mother/child 
dyad, and certain androgyny (in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes it will be extended to 
the concept of hermaphroditism), The body of the buried mother belongs to the phallic 
discourse, that is, the phallic discourse is constructed upon the fear of its generative and 
castrating power that can only be done away by strengthening the mother/child dyad. As 
much as a mother becomes pregnant and carries her child inside her body, in 
psychoanalysis drawing on the concept of the buried mother, she also becomes pregnant 
with her own mother as the experience of motherhood brings her back to the body of 
her own mother. After the period of pregnancy, what remains as an unhealed wound is 
the body of the buried mother. And yet the body of the buried mother can be found not 
only in women but in men too. It may be so since a necessary stage in identity‘s 
development, as according to Deleuze, includes the stage of becoming-woman for both 
the feminine and the masculine. The buried mother exercises power within the realm of 
languages, the verbal one and the non-verbal/bodily one. ―There was nothing he 
[Leopold] could say: he stood there unmeaningly‖ (HP, 35). The unmeaning language 
of the body is yet another discourse tarrying with the negative body of the buried 
mother. 
As may be concluded, ―bodily movement is responsible for the distribution of 
knowledge we posses.‖ (Sanches, 2006, 288) Similarly, in The House in Paris 
characters lie and sit during their conversations and this spatial frame perpetuates the 
binary systematic and structural distribution of knowledge in either vertical or 
horizontal manner. Dead, living, moving or carried forward in a taxi characters in The 
House in Paris gain new space for knowing oneself and the other, so that we read in the 
novel: ―But sense of space is emotional, this taxi, bursting, seemed to groan on it 
springs. What was inconvenient could, now, only be said‖ (HP, 234). 
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Among many somatic representations of traumas and unsuccessful 
relationships with mothers are so-called ‗obsessive neurotic disturbances‘ mostly visible 
in language complications, as well as violent behaviour. Bowen in her description of 
Naomi Fisher from The House in Paris writes,  
 
Miss Fisher‘s mother was French (…): this accounted perhaps, for Miss Fisher‘s peculiar 
idiom, which made Henrietta giddy. Often when she spoke she seemed to be translating, and 
translating rustily. No phrase she used was what anyone could quite mean; they were 
doubtful, as though she hoped they would do. Her state of mind seemed to be foreign also, 
not able to be explained however much English you had (...). (HP, 19) 
 
Language difficulties characterize the unsatisfactory social relationships 
Max fosters in Paris, being a ‗social orphan‘ and having no family and no connections. 
His strangeness is perpetrated by his ambiguous relationship to his surrogate mother, 
Mme Fisher.  The motif of incomprehensible language is situated in the context of 
Leopold trying to understand the content of The Strand Magazine. His inability to 
comprehend the hidden discursive messages owes itself to the fact of Leopold not 
having been introduced to the intricacies of English society of the twentieth century. It 
is Karen, who being English, should have equipped Leopold with necessary tools for 
discursive and cultural proficiency, but on giving Leopold for adoption, she fails to do 
so. The narratives of Max and Leopold share, therefore, a common assumption of 
motherhood being directly connected with language proficiency, which comes to 
contradict the dominant theory of language being the preserve of the phallic discourse, 
the domain of the father. The language of the father belongs to the obsolete world that 
Mme Fisher occupies, so that on finding that Leopold does not speak French, she 
exclaims, ―They have clipped your wings for you nicely, then‖ (HP, 203). And the idea 
of language as the maternal domain does not only centre on the Semiotic language of 
harmony and plenty originally associated with the mother, it defends all linguistic 
capacity being of the mother‘s responsibility. After all it is The Strand Magazine that 
Henrietta uses as her guidebook or dictionary into the world of adults and which she 
eventually forgets enriched, now, with a new kind of knowledge, so that the old 
―Henrietta is gone, importantly silent, for ever‖ (HP, 237). 
To shed more light on the question of language let us focus on Bowen‘s war 
novel and one of her most famous pieces of writing - The Heat of the Day. The novel 
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The Heat of the Day dates back to 1949 but it had been written and re-written over five 
consecutive years starting in 1936. One of its secondary characters is manipulative Mrs. 
Kelway, mother to the traitor Robert Kelway. Mrs Kelway spreads her iron rule within 
the domain of the middle-class housewife. Her negative influence on her children is so 
devastating that they themselves undergo a series of internal conflicts. Mrs Kelway 
―venting her frustration on the system by which her subjective authority is categorically 
curbed, she nurtures a contempt for language and reigns through silence, repression and 
concealment‖ (Hoogland, 1994, 145). Mrs Kelway and her children are told to 
―communicate with great difficulty‖ (Bowen, 1998b, 258). 
The fiction of dominance is preserved by Mr Kelway‘s widow and his 
daughters. Mrs Kelway is the buried mother that Robert carries inside him and whose 
silent violence translates itself into the treason of his home country. Obsessive 
neuroticism rarely leads the subject to analysis of their infantile relationship with the 
mother so that the tensions are vented in other ways.  
 
However they (subjects) do not escape willingly from talking about their experiences with 
other women (…) – least to say - a veritable ‗buried mother‘ resides at the core of their 
psyche. (Kristeva, 1995, 53)  
 
‗A buried mother‘ provokes in child violence, and later in adult life violent 
libido, which escapes all symbolization, and which is either tactile or visual and 
speechless. A buried mother stands for the fear of the generative power of femininity 
that men carry with them which ―acts like acid on a plate‖ (HP, 138). An obsessive 
neurotic possesses two languages of which the first one:  
 
is secretive and nonverbal ‗speech‘, a tomb or a screen of the satisfaction that he had 
received following a precocious demand that he directed toward his mother, who was all 
the more accommodating because her feminine desires have been left unsatisfied. The other 
language appears to be a neutralized language and thought that are dead, freed from the 
chains of this voracious demand, thought consequently divested, superfluous, reversible, 
unconvincing, and uncreative. (Kristeva, 1995, 53)  
 
That is to say a child grows up embedded in the mother‘s emotional output and 
eventually the lack of maternal response for infantile needs engraves itself on the 
nonverbal language the child possesses. The ‗buried mother‘ which has never been there 
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results in emotional weakness, scarring, self infliction of wounds, as if the child on 
entering the language order/the symbolic tried to abject the mothers body and in the face 
of its absence it abjects its own body instead. Hence the scarring Henrietta notices on 
Leopold‘s body. ―We notice, among other things, that separating oneself from the 
mother, rejecting her, and abjecting her, to define oneself according to her, and to 
rebuild her, constitutes an essential movement‖ (Kristeva, 1995, 118). The extreme 
example of an absence of language surfaces in the character of Jeremy from Bowen‘s 
Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. Soon after Eva ‗acquires‘ Jeremy we learn that he is 
deaf and dumb. 
 
The buried mother is often a woman who is simply depressive, sometimes depressed, but 
who masks her malady in an exaggerated activity level (…) she has broken off two bonds: 
the erotic bond with the father and the bond with language. (Kristeva, 1995, 53) 
 
Eva, herself, an orphan, suffers from bouts of depression, yet she remains abnormally 
active in the novel. She moves from hotel to hotel, as if fleeing away from the 
recognition of her own emotional displacement. She moves from country to country. 
Her language problems are common; she has difficulty entering into verbal relationships 
with people, and often seems rude as in her buying a house or not being able to decipher 
other people‘s langauge. On the whole, she has never had a relationship with Jeremy‘s 
father and her new marriage seems to be entirely platonic – hence Jeremy‘s variation in 
his mother/child relationship and probably the gesture of his final abjection in shooting 
Eva. There seems to exist a violent breech between what is called meaning and 
signification. We may say that Bowenesque characters suffer from a lack of recognition 
of what is meaning and then what it signifies/implies in the society. As we find out in 
Kristeva, the maternal function makes possible the child‘s entrance into signification, or 
a passage from meaning into signification. We may say that ―Mothers give us meaning 
(…) so that the signifier of everyday communication can cease to be a lifeless and 
foreign membrane for the child‖ (Kristeva, 1995, 109). 
In the letter written to Naomi Fisher, Mrs Arbuthnot calls her Kingfisher. It 
may be an allusion to the myth of Fisher King who wounded in the legs or groin lost his 
fertile abilities and endangered his kingdom. The fact of Naomi being castrated leads us 
to the role of castrating mother – the phallic mother. This motif of a slightly different 
female castration leads one to believe that the castrated daughter, the victim of her own 
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mother, needs to make up for her wound, not only having a male child but also entering 
into the role of mother/guardian to a man. ―The Virgin especially agrees with the 
repudiation of the other woman (which doubtless amounts basically to a repudiation of 
the woman‘s mother (…)‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 258)  
Elizabeth Bowen has been criticised for giving too much attention to the 
superficial detail.  At first glance her novels invest too much time into describing failed 
relationships, petty intrigue and romance. However, as much as there is a need for a 
rejection of shallow writing on love there is a need for acknowledgment that love and 
relationships play an utmost important role in the development of the mind. 
Relationships, especially those of a sexual nature, can open up a well of anxiety issues 
or castration fears as postulated by Freud. All those sources of feminine depression can 
lead to consequent frigidity since they are directly linked with female sexual organs, 
metaphorically responsible for receiving and storing of the negative emotions. We may 
refer to Helen Deutsch78 who became intrigued by this particularity of female 
physiology, while studying depression79 as an undercurrent of many neuroses. Deutsch 
devoted much of her investigation to the study of female anatomy and physiology, 
while studying female suffering and melancholy as sources of pleasure or its lack. She 
concluded her study associating female depression with frigidity stemming from the fact 
of female reproductive/sexual organs being the receivers of death anxiety (vagina) and 
castration fears (clitoris).  
Whatever the viability of this theory, it seems reasonable to state that female 
sexuality is more engaged with her life experience, and that her reproductive organs 
bear a direct connection with the other, mainly through the experience of maternity. 
                                                 
78 Further development of crossroads of eighteenth-century studies and disability studies, with particular 
emphases on questions of authorship, originality, and embodiment across a variety of genres can be found 
in Helen Deutsch co-ed with Felicity Nussbaum, “Defects”: Engendering the Modern Body (2000). 
79 Melancholy and depression were studied by Kristeva in her Black Sun (1989) with an emphasis on the 
imagery of light and darkness, taken up in this chapter as part of Bowen‘s projection of femininity and 
masculinity. In Black Sun Kristeva analyses melancholia in the context of art, literature, philosophy, 
history of religion, culture and psychoanalysis. She explains that the love of a lost identity of attachment 
is the main problem of melancholia as expressed in the failure to acquire the language of the father. Black 
Sun takes as its main focus Hans Holbein‘s controversial painting The Body of the Dead Christ in the 
Tomb (1552). (see Mme Fisher‘s comparison of identification and triumph of the language of the father to 
a tree breaking from inside a tomb) 
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What has also been postulated by Julia Kristeva is that in her anatomy and via maternity 
a woman is directly attached to the ghost of her own mother, as if her sexual organs 
were storage for the negative or positive memories of her. Kristeva postulates that 
frigidity results from storing up a ‗bad mother‘.  
 
I would say that regardless of the anatomical bases for this process (frigidity and death 
anxiety), a woman uses fantasy to enclose an inaccessible object inside her body. In a 
phantasmatic sense, this interior ends up being the vagina or, as Lou Salomé would say, the 
‗vagina is rented to the anus‘. The object in question is the ‗bad mother‘ whom the woman 
imprisons to prevent losing her, to dominate her, to put her to death, or even kill herself 
inside this melancholic embrace between two women. This phantasmatic of the frigid 
woman with a bad mother espouses the dynamics of depression, in which the depression 
subject incorporates the man or woman she hates in order to keep from loosing him (or her). 
And by killing him (or her), she kills herself. (Kristeva, 1995, 198) 
 
In other words there exists transference from the need of rejection towards 
compulsory attraction and forward interioriorized abjection. If we look closely at 
Bowenesque female characters we may notice a pattern of a compulsory 
heterosexuality, an unaccountable attraction towards the destructive relationship, as a 
result of deep wound from the unsatisfactory relationship mother/child – unsatisfactory 
in its duration. However, what Bowen seems to be ingenuous at is the way she makes 
use of the society that, in her opinion, plays a crucial role in this process. The imaginary 
‗bad mother‘ is not, or rather, was not a bad mother at all. It is the society that requires 
of her to present herself as unstable emotionally and unfitting for the redemption and 
continuation of the dominant order. It is the centre that requires the existence of the 
periphery to continue to be periphery so that the centre may continue to exist. There is a 
hint; however, at the fact that such a ‗bad mother‘ may have had a ‗bad mother‘ herself 
and that there is a history of conflict within the mother/child relationship. We see that 
Karen, Leopold‘s mother from The House in Paris lives a frustrating relationship with 
her own mother. We see Portia in The Death of the Heart accused of having an 
emotionally weak and unstable mother, but we also see Anna, who is the source of this 
insensitive judgement, to have been orphaned very early. We read about Lois in The 
Last September as the daughter of the depressive mother. 
As a result we see that the imprisonment of the ‗bad mother‘ leads to various 
problems when dealing with relationships, especially love relationships. Yet it is of 
207 
 
utmost importance to add that the ‗bad mother‘ problem draws women towards other 
woman which introduces a trope of a feminine trinity. Feminine trinity, as in the da 
Vinci paintings, in The House in Paris, Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes, Friends and 
Relations, Last September, The Death of the Heart, To the North. The life of the heroine 
and her lover or child always involves a third party, and that third party is understood to 
be a violent and manipulative woman, chaperone etc. Why do we always encounter 
triangles in Bowen‘s fiction? 
Still, ‗bad mother‘ bears its mark on the sexual relationship a woman has and 
makes possible the two forms of Kristevan jouissance. 
 
On the one hand, phallic jouissance – competition or identification with her partner‘s 
symbolic partner – mobilizes the clitoris. On the other hand, there is another jouissance that 
the fantasy imagines and puts into action by focusing on the core of psychic and corporeal 
space. This other jouissance requires that someone literally ‗dissolve‘ the melancholic object 
that blocks psychic and corporeal interiority. Who might be able to do this? A partner who 
is believed to be capable of being a more-than-mother, who could dissolve the mother 
imprisoned inside me, by giving me what she was or was not able to give me. (Kristeva, 
1995, 198) 
 
Such partner is believed to give a new life by deleting the bad mother without being a 
phallic mother but by inflicting a phallic violence on a woman – sexual act. Hence, such 
union can easily reiterate the position of female subjection to the other. It is as if the 
relationship a woman lives with her bad mother and the relationship a woman lives with 
her sexual partner were a reproduction, an illusion of the image of the Virgin/Mother - 
hence the subsequent imagery of the woman as the Madonna and/or the Madonna and 
the Child (and the quasi sacred value given to the jouissance produced in the 
male/female union). Much of this has its roots in adolescence and its open structure 
character. 
There is then an attempt at explaining the character of relationships women 
have with men in Elizabeth Bowen‘s fiction. Why do women remain or pursue so called 
‗toxic‘ relationships with men? A closer look at the relationships in The Last September, 
The Death of the Heart, Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes, Friends and Relationships, The 
House in Paris, To the North sheds more light on this problem. In To the North Cecilia 
is described not to have a passionate bond with Henry Summers at first nor is she told to 
like Markie, yet she is drawn to them and ends up in a relationship. In The Last 
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September Lois is disinterested in boys yet she is obliged to invest herself into the 
relationship with Gerald. Other relationships are similar. In the end in The House in 
Paris Karen looses herself in the relationship with Max and then is reinserted into the 
symbolic in the relationship with Ray. 
The body of the buried mother becomes a metaphor through which women 
may re-connect with their dislocated semiotic identity. If phallic mothers who abide by 
the phallic order are discarded there is an urgent need for discovering the buried mother 
anew. Aunt Violet, who has long lived in neutral Ireland, may be considered a prototype 
of Karen‘s new mother, whom she is able to cry over. In fact, now dead and buried, 
Aunt Violet remains Karen‘s textual reference whose reminiscence she finds in the 
violet pinned into the lapel of her dress on the day when she imagines to meet Leopold. 
In the body of the buried mother, Bowen re-discovers female murky past and 
the spaces of alterity women inhabit, so that she digs for the meaning of maternity deep 
into the characters of The House in Paris. She then makes her own these places in the 
last novel Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. As we will see in the next chapter Eva Trout, 
or Changing Scenes becomes a manifesto for the new woman – the new mother.  
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7.  Mapping out the New Paths. 
  
 
To better clarify the concepts of motherhood and childhood according to 
Bowen we must turn towards Julia Kristeva again. In her work, Kristeva speaks about 
adolescence as an open structure80 whose polymorphism is a metaphor for the subject‘s 
existence as the subject-in-process. This means to Kristeva that adolescence stands for 
trying on different roles when an adolescent is able to transgress many boundaries 
without incurring punishment. Adolescence, being an open structure, finds its parallel in 
writing, which is an open structured form of expression as well, and may be said to be 
closely related to adolescence through the same phase it starts – the budding of the 
symbolic order. Adolescence to Kristeva is an ideal model for writing because through 
the practice of writing one is able to explore the possibilities of identity without 
encountering judgment, so that she writes ―adolescent drive is structured not only as a 
language but as an ideality‖ (Kristeva, 2007, 719). Even if art of the word stands for 
conscious sublimation on the part of the author, and for what otherwise would be 
considered transgressive, art of the word easily escapes judgement. Similarly, a young 
person is81 able to transgress discourse boundaries without any apparent punishment and 
to experiment different identities. Adolescence is a period when approaching the atopos 
of subjectivity as work in progress is socially acceptable. Writing too, especially if we 
bear in mind Cixous‘ manifesto for l‟ecriture feminine, draws on multiplicity, 
amorphousness and dissolution. However disrupting and problematic, plasticity is not 
alien to Gilles Deleuze in whose theoretical oeuvre it finds its parallel in the idea of 
                                                 
80 For further elucidation of the concept of adolescence as an open structure, see Julia Kristeva‘s The New 
Maladies of the Soul (1995). 
81 It is of great interest here to mention that Bowen‘s last novel Eva Trout not only refers itself to Eva‘s 
troubled adolescent period (a period which Henrietta in The House in Paris is about to enter) but it too 
makes a direct reference to it in Henry‘s vision of a trapped bird during his father‘s sermon in the church, 
where ―A thrush had got into the church. It was adolescent;‖ (ET, 295). Henry, Eva, as well as Leopold 
and Henrietta are such trapped birds for whom ―they have clipped your wings for you nicely, then‖ (HP, 
203). 
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becoming over being – changing instead of sedimenting. As such Gilles Deleuze bases 
his analysis of subjectivity formation on the notion of the plasticity of becoming – 
plasticity that is not solely progressive but regressive too.  
While becoming-animal is a major theme of identity construction to Deleuze, 
becoming-woman is clearly a privileged mode of constructing a fulfilling identity as 
well. According to Deleuze, all subjects pass through the stage of becoming-woman – to 
him a universal notion- on their journey towards becoming a Body - without - Organs, 
the ideal and ultimate stage in a human development – a multifaceted network of 
production and desire. Further on, Deleuze is interested in other forms of becoming: in 
becoming-child or becoming-little girl one gains the capacity just like that of Leopold‘s 
to ―commandeer, to make her [Karen], every desire, not only his own. He was a person 
whose passion makes its object exist.‖ (HP, 62) 
Requiring a third term82 and therefore not being a literal process, becoming-
woman is similar to becoming-animal. Becoming-animal involves a third term, which 
would not be ―based on mimesis of or resemblance to the animal or, conversely, on the 
animal‘s ability to symbolically represent and act as a vehicle for the subject‘s fantasies 
and psychical investments‖ (Grosz, 1994, 173). We have already mentioned that most 
of Bowen‘s love investments require a third party, and we should highlight again, after 
Maud Ellmann in her The Shadow Across the Page - Bowen is clearly not interested in 
what her characters do in the privacy of their sex life, rather she is focused on numbers, 
that is, how many people the love affair involves and affects. Hers is the search for the 
third party, meaning that every dialogical relationship is only propelled forward if it 
includes the third party. All life affairs to Bowen are triangles rather than binary dyads; 
all identities assents on the triangle of three signifiers rather than simple I/other 
division. 
Going back to the question of becoming-animal, in his writings Deleuze 
provides a detailed description of how to become-animal: 
                                                 
82 Emmanuel Levinas, whom this thesis uses to argue for the mutual responsibility between the self and 
the other, develops his own theory of the third term. The third term, according to Levinas, is the force that 
separates the self from the other selves. The third term, being nothing but the self‘s double, makes 
possible the differentiation of the other from the self. Levinas writes ―I do not exist solely with my 
neigbouring other, but with a multiplicity of others‖ (Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous/On thinking-of-the-
other. (2006), trans. Michael Bradley Smith and Barbara Harshav, London: Athlone Press. 1998, p. 202) 
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An example:  Do not imitate a dog, but make sure your organism enters into composition 
with something else in such a way, that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus 
composed will be canine as a function of the relations of movement and rest, or of 
molecular proximity, into which they enter. Clearly this something else can be quite varied, 
and be more or less directly related to the animal in question: it can be the animal‘s natural 
food (dirt and worm), or its exterior relations with other animals (you can become-dog with 
cats, or become-monkey with a horse), or an apparatus or prosthesis to which a person 
subjects the animal (muzzle or reindeer, etc.), or something that does not have a localizable 
relation to the animal in question (…) we have seen how Slepian bases his attempts to 
become dog on the idea of tying shoes to his hands using his mouth muzzle. (Grosz, 1994, 
174) 
 
Since becoming-woman functions in a similar way to becoming-animal it 
functions, as we have concluded, thanks to incorporating the third term which encloses 
in itself the haecceity of the object and subject. This haecceity translates itself into an 
arrangement or ensemble of bodies produced by the movement of desire on the plane of 
immanence and it is described by Deleuze in A Thousand Plateauxs co-written with 
Felix Guatarri 
 
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing or 
substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a 
date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is 
different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they 
consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, 
capacities to affect and be affected. A degree of heat can combine with an intensity of 
white, as in certain white skies of a hot summer. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b, 261) 
 
So while using the above description we may try to understand a subject‘s 
imaginable itinerary in becoming-woman. Following the advice Deleuze leaves us in 
the form of a recipe for becoming, it is necessary to understand the nature of the middle 
term of becoming-woman – the third term. The third term, this very ‗figure of 
resistance‘ Deleuze proposes, is the idea of little girl. For Deleuze and Guattari, the girl 
is a privileged figure, linked with openness, possibility and ‗becoming‘. They write that 
the girl is ―defined by a relation of movement and rest, (…) haecceity. She never ceases 
to roam upon a body without organs. She is an abstract line, or a line of flight‖ 
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(Deleuze, Guattari, 2004b, 276). Elizabeth Grosz, who has found Deleuze inspiring for 
her Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism, explains to what extent the little 
girl is a metaphor, 
 
Not the little girl as vehicle for (pederastic) fantasy or the little girl as pure innocence, or 
indeed the girl as a romantic or representative figure, but rather the girl as the site of a 
culture‘s most intensified disinvestments and recasting of the body. (Grosz, 1994, 175) 
  
The little girl can appear at any stage of life, producing activity that Deleuze associates 
with becoming. She represents the molecular energy that refers to the dispersed libidinal 
energies and opposes molar energies - those which strive to aggregate into totalities, 
standing for the ‗majoritarian‘ consciousness. Of crucial importance to Deleuze is Lewis 
Caroll‘s Alice‟s Adventures in Wonderland (1998).  
 
The question is fundamentally that of the body – the body they steal from us in order to 
fabricate opposable organisms. The body is stolen first from the girl: Stop behaving like 
that, you‘re not a little girl anymore; you‘re not a tomboy, etc. The girl‘s becoming is 
stolen first, in order to impose a history, or prehistory upon her. The boy‘s turn comes 
next, but it is by using the girl as an example, by pointing to the girl as the object of his 
desire, that an opposed organism, a dominant history is fabricated for him too. The girl is 
the first victim, but she must also serve as an example and a trap. That is why, conversely, 
the reconstruction of the body as a Body without organs, the anorganism of the body, is 
inseparable from becoming-woman, or the production of a molecular woman. (Deleuze, 
1990, in Grosz, 1994, 175) 
 
 
In so far as Deleuze tries to do away with the notion of the binary opposition 
and the centre, he does shift the category of the little girl as the focus of his discourse on 
becoming. He shifts the centre of the dominant discourse from the masculine to the 
feminine, trying to disperse it into subsequent and more secondary categories that of a 
child and an adult. The little girl in the limelight becomes the reference point to the 
process of identity formation, being a continuous reference from which subjects part 
and to which subjects return in a necessary process of becoming a Body- without - 
Organs. 
Elizabeth Bowen‘s fiction is an example of how ideological practices start to 
mould femininity into its dominant frame where girls are inserted into dominant 
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discourse very early. In the narratives of Henrietta, of Karen and of Naomi we see the 
discourses of femininity being developed and bent into their standardized form – the 
discourse of femininity as subjugated to masculinity. As postulated earlier in this text, 
narratives of motherhood take shape in infanthood, so that for Bowen in order to 
become-woman it is necessary to analyze one‘s becoming-little girl. Becoming-woman 
happens in becoming a little girl. And by saying that, I not only advocate the idea of 
early development of certain modes of behaviour in infanthood later perpetuated into 
adulthood. By saying that motherhood begins in infanthood, I want to highlight the 
appearance of surface and deep structures operating within the dialectic of the I and 
other, which later serve as a reference point to which the self goes back in becoming a 
Body - without - Organs. In this sense what Bowen does is disrupt the hegemonic 
relationship of adulthood and infanthood, making the world of children the signifier and 
the world of adults the signified. Becoming-woman means embracing one‘s other – the 
little girl captured within the three modes of expectation towards the other – the present 
with the other, the future and the past. It seems to me that in her fiction Bowen finds 
herself searching for the little girl in her characters, while trying to make more 
understandable their passage into adulthood and their subsequent existence within the 
dominant discourse. Again, Bowen works through the above-mentioned triangles: 
Freud‘s Oedipal triangles83, be it in love life, be it in parenting or identitarian quest. 
Truly, even a momentary feeling of affection towards a man may be mistaken for the 
love received from the mother, as demonstrated in the plot of The Last September84, 
which brings back the motif of a little girl that readily dwells within each of us. In The 
House in Paris, Henrietta/Alice, sitting on stairs just like Karen‘s son, shows Leopold 
what is there ‗on the other side of the mirror‘, so that he too is able to ask the same 
questions of who he is. The motif of Alice‟s Adventures in Wonderland is of as great 
importance to Bowen as to Deleuze since she writes  
                                                 
83 Oedipal triangles are mother/child relationships inevitably disrupted by the third party of the father. 
84 Lois Farquar in The Last September experiences ―a quiet beyond experience, as though for many nights 
he had been sleeping beside her‖ (Bowen, 1929/1989c, 89) when kissed by fiancé Gerald Lesworth. This, 
however, does not stand for her passion towards the man but her yearning for the long-deceased mother 
with whom, as a child, she spent many similar nights banished in foreign hotel rooms. This, again, signals 
Bowen‘s interest in ‗the little girl‘ whose primal want is to go ‗back-to-the-wombishness‘, as worked 
further in this and the following chapters. Similarly, in The House in Paris, Karen claims that ―To be with 
Ray will be like being with mother;‖ (HP, 153) 
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But now she [Henrietta] woke, her manner at once took on a touch of clear-sighted, over-
ridding good sense, like Alice‘s throughout Wonderland. She might marvel, but nothing, 
thought Leopold, would ever really happen to her. (HP, 26)  
 
In The House in Paris, Henrietta is presented as having Alice-like qualities, as 
the one who can tamper with other people‘s lives – just the way she plays with her 
monkey Charles – and leave untouched, ―with her face up to be kissed‖ (HP, 231)85. 
This leaves the critic wondering about the importance of Henrietta, in the sense of to 
what extent she is a theoretical tool, a narrative spectre for Bowen to disrupt the 
identitarian binaries and dyads – to what extent is Henrietta Bowen‘s manifesto for ‗the 
little girl‘ inside – someone who will be capable to ask questions ―Who am I? Who is 
Henrietta? as in: ―Today was to do much to disintegrate Henrietta‘s character, which, 
built up by herself, for herself, out of admonitions and axioms (under the growing stress 
of: If I am Henrietta, then what is Henrietta?)‖ (HP, 25) What is more, Henrietta may be 
Bowen‘s budding idea of a hermaphrodite self – both a girl and a boy in one self – 
further explored in her last novel Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes and analysed here in 
the thesis.  
Deleuze writes about (de)corporalized becoming-a-girl as becoming a 
universal movement. 
 
The girl is certainly not defined by virginity [but] (…) haecceity. (. …) Thus girls do not 
belong to an age, group, sex, order or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, 
acts, ages, sexes: they produce n molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the 
dualism machines they cross right through. The only way to get outside the dualisms is to 
be-between, to pass between, the intermezzo. (. ...) The girl is like the block of becoming 
that remains contemporaneous to each opposable term, man, woman, child, adult. It is not 
the girl who becomes woman; it is becoming-woman that produces universal girl. (Deleuze, 
1990 in Grosz, 1994, 175) 
 
                                                 
85 However, Henrietta undergoes an almost religious transformation during her encounter with Leopold 
and his incident of crying in the living room of Mme Fisher‘s house. In a Deleuzian sense a subject is 
only capable of bodily reaction when prompted towards becoming though another body – Henrietta 
crying over Leopold‘s misery, and furthermore in Eva Trout, Eva crying after Henry has accepted her 
marriage proposal. 
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We have already said that the woman is defined by the concept of becoming 
the Madonna, by the role of virginal selfhood she needs to embrace as expressed in her 
servitude to the other. And yet instead of the Madonna, it is the little girl, as yet unspoilt 
by the dominant discourse and close to the maternal semiotic that women need to take 
as their signifier. The little girl becomes the other of the woman- the haecceity of 
becoming and the haecceity of femininity. Many Bowenesque female characters such as 
Karen, Henrietta, Portia or Maud rove restlessly among the other characters, hold to no 
gender identity, ‗knock other people about‘ and yet have ‗a high look of candour‘. The 
plot tries to bend them into sedimented ‗molar‘ femininity, into ―women as defined by 
her form, endowed with organs and functions and assigned as a subject‖ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b, 275) as written by Deleuze.  
The last pages of The House in Paris are devoted to the unspoken dialogue 
Karen has with Ray, a similar one to that which she had with Leopold in the novel‘s 
Part II. In the dialogue Karen accuses Ray of an unexplainable and egoistic desire for 
Leopold as a son (in his becoming ‗husband-turned-mother‘ – Kristeva‘s archaic object 
of the child‘s affection), rather than wanting a child of their own. She accuses him of 
wanting a child, wanting to devour the child‘s narrative in order to translate it into his 
own narrative of being. As such the existence of the abjectable other in Leopold makes 
him a desirable object for Ray‘s becoming – becoming-animal in preying on Leopold‘s 
imagery, becoming-woman in parenting Leopold, becoming-patriarch are both instances 
of subjugating the other in Leopold and Karen. Echoing Karen‘s flight away from 
motherhood to escape masculine subjugation, Luce Irigaray‘s concern for the absence of 
mother‘s discourse in our society leads her to state that it is men‘s desire to give birth to 
themselves, depriving women of the only empowering discourse – the mother as the site 
of origin. According to Grosz in her Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists Luce 
Irigaray writes that,  
 
in order to become men, they continue to consume (…) [the mother], draw on her resources 
and, at the same time, they deny her or disclaim her in their identification with and their 
belonging to the masculine world. They owed their existence, their body, their life and they 
forget or misrecognise this debt in order to set themselves up as powerful men, adults 
busying themselves with public affairs. (Irigaray in Grosz, 1991, 121)  
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Similarly, Backus, whom we have quoted on cyclical vampirism and 
devouring of children in Bowen‘s fiction, writes in her Gothic Family Romance that in 
order to become male subjects, men devour children. Within the discourse between the 
phallic mother who satisfies all desires and the castrated mother who immulates herself 
(thus autophagy), Bowen finds her own narrative mother, a being of spurious identity 
and an eternal orphan – the mother who becomes her own daughter and who struggles 
against her own child, who is too much aware of the child‘s lack of autonomy – ―The 
mother knows better than to think of the Other as autonomous‖ (Baraitser, 91, 2009), 
and thus hers, as well as his or her future fate in the symbolic order. Such mother, as 
Karen in The House in Paris, chooses to abject the child. The conflicts within the 
category of woman are artificial discourses of the phallic mother or the castrated mother 
women do not find compatible with their semiotic femininity. Becoming-woman being 
a universal practice and a stage in masculine development means that men too cast their 
development against a wrongly perceived other, a wrongly perceived femininity. In 
Bowen too, the distorted image of femininity does not permit a construction of viable 
selfhood. The problem becomes visible in three dialectical situations: first, the unspoken 
dialogue and at the same time an unsatisfactory relationship to the other (Karen either 
dialoguing with unborn Leopold or denying a verbally expressed conversation with 
Ray); second, women‘s rejection of motherhood; third, women‘s distorted motherhood 
and femininity in practice, that is the narratives of phallic and servile mothers. And 
especially in conferring the maternal status to a woman, the most tangible dialectics 
between the I and other, means installing her within the dominant discourse. In Bowen‘s 
fiction, becoming-woman as mother is not presented by the love of children but by a 
conflict with the children and many a times the I and other – the mother and the child 
are unable to exist in the same narrative. It is Bowen‘s conscious choice to get rid of the 
mothers since by doing this she eliminates the necessary link within the mother/child 
dyad – the adult/little girl opposition – and disables the hegemonic operations of the 
dominant discourse. 
The primacy of the gratifying mother/child dyad is momentary in The House in 
Paris and takes place during Karen‘s reverie. That very night the phallic domain of the 
father, the symbolic, is spurned, so that we see Max sound asleep while Karen‘s fantasy 
is unveiling. The domain of the archaic mother, the semiotic, and the pre-Oedipal (or as 
Kristeva calls it Oedipus One), are conceptualized. This is visually enhanced through 
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the use of water imagery (rain), the invigoration of the maternal as in Karen‘s memories 
of going back to the safe retreat of home ―the cavernous receptivity of Oedipus One‖ 
(Nikolchina, 2004, 33), and the primacy given to the mother-child bond as in the 
creation of Leopold in an object-subject relation to Karen. Nikolchina writes in her 
Matricide in Language that,  
 
If the Freudian child springs from the death of the father‘s father ‗the father is dead, long 
live the father that I am‘ and if this child, born into the world with ‗compound drives, 
erogenous zones, and even genital desires‘, acquires its form within the oedipal triangle, the 
Kristevan infant emerges in the recovery of the body of the mother‘s mother. (Nikolchina, 
2004, 33)  
 
―It is in this atopia [the triangle of mother-child-archaic mother] (…) that the earliest 
dramas of the future speaking being take place‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 33); it is where ―the 
idea of you, Leopold, began to be present with her [Karen]‖ (HP, 152). Therefore, 
motherhood is not a simple exchange of the object of desire from that of the father to 
that of the child – it is rather ―amplification‖ of the mother and of her archaic generative 
power, where she ―attains the infinite body of her death-proof mother. The mother lives, 
long live the mother that I am‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 33). It is not an escape from 
dependence on archaic mother to subjecthood – ―Had this not been escape?‖ (HP, 152) 
Karen asks herself after she had slept with Max: ―She was washed back ashore again. 
Further out than you dare go, where she had been is the outgoing current not strong 
enough not to let you back.‖ (HP, 152) – The waters (female symbolism) of archaic 
motherhood entrench one‘s identity even when there is a child, especially if there is a 
child.  
The process of Einfuhlung, that is the process of identification in the child/parent 
dyad are mobilized by the female libido anchored in the Oedipal, and more precisely in 
Oedipus One. And yet, since the female libido is ―an amorous space approachable from 
any gender position‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 32), penetrating ―to a typology of loves and not 
to a typology of bodies‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 32) the parent/child dyad is extended to a 
parent-child-archaic mother triangle, that is parenthood problematizes the relationship 
of the male subject to the archaic mother too. 
But just as Karen‘ s clothes are to get wet – just as she is immersed in her 
discourse – Max wakes up to move the things away from near the window. ―I thought 
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your things would get wet; I got up to move them‖ says Max to which Karen responds 
―Are they wet?‖ To this Max answers: ―No the rain did not come so far. The things on 
the table are wet, though‖. The discourse of the father is awaken to wail its power over 
the feminine.  And since the rain did not come as far to wet all, that is not all have been 
marked by the discourse of the other, Karen can comfortably go back to sleep – she 
needs not to wake up. It is only The Salvation Army Band‘s martial tune that ―will get 
wet86‖ (HP, 156) if the band is out of doors. 
On being reclaimed by Ray Forrestier Leopold becomes a subject. He gains a 
father figure to introduce him into the discourse, so that he can ―cross the sea‖ (HP, 64) 
conquer the feminine. His existence is extended dialogically – the other knows now - 
since before that no one knew of his having been born- ―Because no one knows I am 
born‖ (HP, 59) Leopold tells Henrietta. Mme Fisher, the archaic mother ―the restless 
water‖ (HP, 202) explains to Leopold that ―in one thing you have the advantage of him, 
Leopold: you know it is necessary to have a father, he did not know it was necessary to 
have a son‖ (HP, 201).  
In Jacques Lacan: A feminist introduction Grosz writes that the ―child 
becomes a subject only with reference to the name-of-the-father and the sacrificed, 
absent body of the mother.‖ (Grosz, 1990, 71) Grosz adds that the burial of women 
under the phallocentric reduction to maternity is crippling for both mother and daughter, 
so that a woman becomes obscured by maternity and an ‗object of desire‘. The House in 
Paris certainly endeavours to escape this process, even though some female characters 
are consciously constructed within the desire economy suffice to say, characters such as 
Naomi Fisher87 are there to be desired into the hegemonic and phallocentric system of 
power. However, The House in Paris makes a claim that the process of women 
becoming mothers within the dominant discourse is not an advantageous situation for 
the dominant discourse itself. It may be postulated that Bowen‘s fiction can be read as 
the discourse of mother-as-woman rather than idealised woman-as-mother. 
                                                 
86 However, one can also ‗get wet‘ or hurt indoors where, in the novel, obvious disasters of unwanted 
pregnancy and an affair with Max await Karen. 
87 Max speaks about Naomi Fisher: ―She has thought of our coming marriage for weeks; she is more than 
stone; she desires to be desired.‖ (HP, 163) As a result, what ‗goes on‘ in Max‘s head is ―only images, 
and desire‖ (HP, 141) 
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According to Luce Irigaray, to subvert the traditional Lacanian and Freudian 
psychoanalytical theory, which have entrenched the woman in the maternal for decades, 
is to give up the mother, despite the painful sacrifice of nurturing, to allow her validity 
as woman. The daughter in return is able to ‗speak to, rather than at her mother‘ (Grosz, 
1990, 183). This new relationship would be able to disrupt the ‗socio-sexual exchange‘ 
demanded of patriarchy, whereby the daughter could replace the mother – the daughters 
therefore must make their own ―sexual, political, and economic exchange‖ outside the 
maternal order (Grosz, 1990, 183). 
Giving up the mother is a multifaceted process in Bowen, based on the theory 
of abjection of that which threatens the borders. It is not castrating (see reproductive 
abilities of a child88) but endangers the subject‘s stability. Mme Fisher talks about the 
responsibility Leopold has to assert himself as a subject, ―To find oneself like a young 
tree inside a tomb is to discover the power to crack the tomb and grow up to a height‖ 
(HP, 203) – tombs, death being the ultimate images of the abject triggering a response 
in Kristeva.  
The child needs to give up the mother to enter the discourse, the narrative must 
give up the mother to make space for the adolescent narrative and the mother must 
become a little girl again to give up maternity. 
 
It is certain the molecular politics proceeds via the girl and the child. But it is also certain 
that girls and children (they must mean boys) draw their strength (…) from the becoming-
molecular they cause to pass between sexes and ages, the becoming-child of the adult as 
well as the child, the becoming-woman of the man as well as the woman. The girl and the 
child do not become; it is becoming itself that is a child or a girls.  The child does not 
become an adult anymore than the girl becomes a woman; the girl is the becoming-woman 
                                                 
88 Kristeva has called this notion the polymorpous perversity of the child capable of acquiring new skills 
and satisfying many drives. Kristeva writes in ―Adolescence, a Syndrome of Ideality‖ that                    
―Polymorphous perversity is dominated by instinctual drives that are inevitably polymorphous hence 
dependent on the satisfaction of erotogenic zones, on the primary incestuous relationship (maternal 
seduction or the mère-version) and on the ultra-precocious oedipal challenge (père-version). The drives‘ 
agitation is satisfied and perlaborated by denial-Verneinung (« I don‘t want mother » = « I want mother ») 
type fantasies. (. …) In short, polymorphism is at the crossroads of the auto-erotic drive and the quest for 
an object relation – the object of desire becomes an object of language and thought; the polymorphous 
perverse child is a subject of epistemophilic curiosity; the polymorphous perverse child is a seeker of 
knowledge, a little researcher, we could say.‖ (Kristeva, 2007, 715-725) 
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of each sex, just as the child is the becoming young of every age. (Deleuze, Guattari, 2004b, 
305) 
 
Claire Hanson writes in her ―Little Girls and Large Women: Representations of 
the Female Body in Elizabeth Bowen‘s Later Fiction‖ that in her literary oeuvre Bowen 
floats between the concepts of a little girl and a grown woman. As for Deleuze and 
Guattari, as well as Kristeva, the little girl is about becoming, polymorphousness and 
openness. The little girl is molecular89 and the grown-up woman is molar, each one is 
the result of the other. Inside every molar woman sediment in time and desire there is 
the little girl whose role is not to ―make sense‖ (Bowen, 1963/1991, 33) but to be ―a 
child at heart‖ (ET, 249). 
 
Knowing how to age does not mean remaining young, it means extracting from one‘s age 
the particles, the speeds and slownesses, the flows that constitutes the young of that age. 
Knowing how to love does not mean remaining a man or a woman; it means extracting from 
one‘s sex the particles, the speeds and slowness, the flows, the n sexes that constitute the 
girl of that sexuality. It is Age itself that is a becoming-child, just as Sexuality, any 
sexuality, is a becoming woman, in other worlds, a girl. (Grosz, 1994, 176) 
 
Grosz comments in her Volatile Bodies ―Not only must men become-woman 
(…) but so too must women‖ (Grosz, 1994, 176). This thought seems to be the 
reworking of Simone de Beauvoir‘s idea of transcendence and immanence which she 
took from Sartre. In her The Second Sex, Beauvoir postulates that transcendence is the 
natural preserve of men; it is what distinguishes human from animal and culture from 
nature and stands for activity, creativity and production. Opposed to transcendence 
Simone de Beauvoir situates female immanence which translates itself into passivity, 
darkness, imprisonment and stagnation, for which she is ardently criticised by Judith 
Butler in her Gender Trouble,  
 
It appears that Beauvoir maintains the mind/body dualism, even as she proposes a 
synthesis of those terms. The preservation of that very distinction can be read as 
symptomatic of the very phallogocentrism that Beauvoir underestimates. In the 
                                                 
89 Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus that youthood are connected to the concept of 
dispersed and libidinal energies, whereas adulthood is understood to be about energies aggregating into 
totalities. 
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philosophical tradition that begins with Plato and continues through Descartes, Husserl 
and Sartre, the ontological distinction between soul (consciousness, mind) and body 
invariably supports relations of political and psychic subordination and hierarchy.  (…) 
The cultural associations of mind with masculinity and body with femininity are well 
documented within the field of philosophy and feminism. (Butler, 1990, 17) 
 
The immanence of becoming-woman or becoming little girl runs parallel with 
the immanence of femininity. The notion of becoming-woman or re-discovering the 
little girl is a meeting point of transcendence and immanence of femininity; women 
must be like the sea and like ―lava flowing as fast as it can‖ (HP, 65). 
Paraphrasing Grosz from her Volatile Bodies, physical and textual 
embodiment are achieved in the long process of becoming the other. According to 
Bowen, becoming-woman is constituted in a process of embracing the other, embracing 
the little girl and the process of transmission of motherhood from subject to object, from 
the mother to the child. It means coming to terms with the imagery of two separate 
mothers that arise in the child‘s unconscious according to Melanie Klein that is the 
imagery of a nurturing mother and the phallic/archaic mother. This process involves 
abjection – a necessary matricide on the part of the child, narrative matricide and the 
abjection of the child by the mother. 
For Julia Kristeva the mother/child dyad is best characterized by the process of 
abjection. The woman and mother are implicated in abjection as the entities against 
which the child must develop subjectively. But, thanks to the transferential plasticity, 
the mother too must develop against the child, re-find her own childhood though the 
love towards (or lack of it) her own mother. In this way, Karen must define herself 
against Leopold as well as against Henrietta who plays an important role in Leopold‘s 
self-discovery. Dialogism in Bowen is therefore not based on binary oppositions but on 
the endless connections and disconnection between the self and the other, when the self 
and the other fluctuate from subject to object positions. Grosz believes that the 
boundaries of the self are blurred in the mother/child dyad/dynamic – the relationship 
incurs transferential plasticity of object/subject relation. Grosz admits that the abject 
being a space of resistance against the mother also signals an attempt to do away with 
the identity boundaries between the child and the mother.  
In Bowen, the mother becomes her own child, the autophagous dialectic 
between the archaic mother and the sacrificial Madonna where the self merges with the 
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other in the process of bargaining over identity. The discourses of the child and the 
adult are blurred. At once, Leopold becomes the messenger of the past, as well as its 
embodiment (and according to Ricoeur‘s three-fold conception of present the past 
happens in the present), a sage. He is all that Karen was and was not – the tamarisks, the 
eternal mark of hands on the grass, as in ―Max put his hand on Karen‘s, pressing it into 
the grass‖ (HP, 120)90, Naomi who sat on her bed, and Max whose sleeve she dried of 
rain.  
If the world of children could ever be called a world of adults in miniature, the 
world of adults is a mirror reflection of the world of children, ―like doll‘s house (...) 
magnified‖ (HP, 26). Henrietta, too, in becoming-woman, becomes the little girl of the 
narrative, the little girl of all the characters‘ becoming.  
Contemporary Toni Morrison writes in her Tar Baby ―(…) a girl has got to be 
a daughter first. She has to learn that. And if she never learns how to be a daughter, she 
can't learn how to be a woman‖ (Morrison, 1987, 281). In Bowen, the characters usually 
do not have a chance to live their childhood fully first and this cripples them as adults. 
Innocent childhood is a fallacy created by the dominant discourse of which main 
purpose is to hide dominant discourses in order to perpetuate them91 as in Foucault‘s 
The History of Sexuality. The concept of motherhood in Bowen does not strengthen the 
structures of privilege of the adult over the child but rather dissolves them. 
Elaine Hansen writes about the concept of synthetic maternity in her Mother 
Without Child as first used in Queer fiction in Jane Rule‘s Desert of the Heart. First, 
                                                 
90 One is prompted to remember Biblical reference to the ephemeral quality of grass. Also, we may see in 
this part of The House in Paris, the way Karen is somehow drawn towards grass and drowned in the 
grass, first with ―her hand with Ray‘s  ring into the grass‖ (HP, 114), then ―digging the heel of one shoe 
into the grass‖ (HP, 115). This may be reminiscent of Karen‘s Aunt Violet‘s death and her ―dug-up daises 
on the lawn (...) [where] the death had been then‖ (HP, 127) – meaning Karen, too, is steadily dying on 
entering into the realm of the paternal law and love life so that she admits ―I still am, left to die like Aunt 
Violet after mother has died like her‖ (HP, 153). 
91 Foucault maintained in The History of Sexuality (1977) that the innocent child is a myth of the modern 
era created to better police individual lives. Modern sexuality is a construct articulated within relations of 
power. As such individuals can be defined through their sexuality rather than by any other aspect of their 
lives. As such the idea of innocence in childhood clears away all the problematic disruptions of identity 
this concept implies. This, again, may parallel Bowen‘s interest in the infantile stage of the subject‘s 
development similar to what Ernest Jones postulated in his psychology of Quislingism, which has been 
noted earlier in this chapter. 
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synthetic maternity does not include procreative relations ―traditionally assumed to be 
normal, right, and natural for women‖ (Hansen, 1997, 48). Second, it does not mean 
that women can only be defined by their maternal function, as would be understood in a 
cause-effect/general-particular thinking. Third, synthetic maternity goes against the 
belief that  
 
Whole woman‘s identity or subjectivity (should such thing exist) can be constructed out of 
her maternal parts, nor are her maternal feelings necessarily unifying, unitary and 
constructive. Elizabeth Bowen shares a similar understanding of maternity as synthetic, 
which to Hansen translates itself into ―characterized by a combination of simple words or 
elements into compound or complex words; expressing a complex notion by a single 
compounded or complex word instead of by a number of distinct words. (Hansen, 1997, 49) 
 
To Bowen, synthetic maternity implies a complex structure of public and 
private relations – relations between the I and the other, the mother and the child, as 
well as a complex dialogue of sameness and selfhood within the bounding I. What the 
synthetic nature of maternity incurs to Bowen and Hansen, is that ―perceived as 
unifying rubrics (it) may dangerously suppress distinctions and reduce a variety of 
stories to a single prescribed narrative.‖ (Hansen, 1997, 49) Rule‘s Desert of the Heart 
frames a narrative of a complex lesbian affair that develops between two main 
characters, Evelyn and Ann, whose love is based on a mother/daughter relationship. The 
relationship marks Evelyn and Ann‘s passage into developing a ‗genuine‘ enjoyment of 
female selfhood, 
 
Oh, at moments Ann sleeping was a child, her child. And sometimes, when she saw the 
thin, vicious scars on Ann‘s wrists, she had to fight down an animal rage which was 
protective. But these emotions were occasional. Now (…) Evelyn wanted to be charming, 
provocative, desirable, attributes she had never aspired to before out of pride, perhaps, or 
fear of failure. Now they seemed almost instinctive. She was finding, in the miracle of her 
particular fall, that she was by nature a woman. And what a lovely thing it was to be, a 
woman. (Rule, Hansen, 1997, 160) 
 
At the centre of Desert of the Heart lies a metaphor of non-procreative 
motherhood, symbolized in the making of a cartoon Ann attempts to sketch, ―Childbirth 
without pain, Motherhood without guilt, Mother without child.‘ (. …) ‗I wonder if I 
could get that: ‗Mother without Child.‘ If I got it, I couldn‘t sell it.‖ (Hansen, 1997, 
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1997) The reader never finds out if the cartoon is finished, but it exemplifies a discourse 
where ―women (…) resist either conscription into reproduction or exile out of 
womanhood‖ (Hansen, 1997, 51). If compared to Grosz criticism of Kristevan ‗men 
mimicking women who reproduce men‘, Desert of the Heart postulates a different kind 
of mimesis. It is mimesis of women not reproducing men and this way reproducing 
themselves.  
If Bowen were to draw a similar cartoon of such motherhood, this would 
certainly be an image of every woman, since motherhood becomes one even without a 
child, since there always dwells a child within us and since this should be a universal 
state. Motherhood as such would represent a state of blissful coexistence and 
communion with the other, surrogated as both the child and the mother. Deleuze argued 
that while psychoanalysis privileged the subject whose desire was founded on lack, 
desire in fact did not lack anything: it is rather the subject which is missing in desire—
the illusion of a fixed subject only comes about through the repressive law of Oedipus. 
Deleuze suggested, accordingly, that we should dismantle the whole cultural edifice of 
Oedipus, focusing instead on the impersonal but generative and productive force of 
(positive) desire. In a similar manner we should try and dismantle the concept of 
motherhood into a more generative and productive force both for the subject and the 
object.  
 In Desert of the Heart ―it is the missing child, not the missing mother that 
seems to structure female desire; what unites women may be, as Evelyn says, the (often 
frustrated) wanting of the child, not the having of one‖ (Hansen, 1997, 52). Not 
necessarily should the child be ‗found‘ according to Desert of the Heart, which makes it 
resonate with Deleuzian ever-existing desire, preceding its object and escaping its 
fulfillment, since if fulfilled, the desire dwindles. Therefore, when Ray meets Leopold – 
his object of desire – ―He was here, that was all. The world had come to an end‖ (HP, 
211). 
In Bowen what unites not only women but men too is not only a missing 
mother or the missing child but rather the missing relationship to the child within, to 
Deleuzian little girl, the third party in becoming. It may be for this reason that Bowen 
has Ray mistake Henrietta for Leopold after he had nervously crossed the hall to meet 
with Karen‘s son –  
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Expectation of this had been so knit up with walking behind the fat French maid down the 
hall that when the salon door opened – ‗When the pie was opened, the birds began to sing‘ - 
and Henrietta had started up, staring at him inside her falling fair hair, he thought they had 
all been mad: Leopold was a girl. (HP, 211)   
 
Bowen‘s idea is that to find the other within, the missing link to the child, is to 
find the stranger who makes ―objects clash meaningly upon those broken senses one has 
abroad‖ (HP, 219).  In this sense, if the child ―were with us, he‘d be simply a child, 
either in or out of the room.‖ (HP, 217) In her essay ―The Roving Eye‖, Bowen writes 
that ―Childishness is necessary, fundamental – it involves a perpetual, errant state of 
desire, wonder, and unexpected reflex‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 63) – desire which is a ―state of 
open susceptibility‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 63). ―The child dithers somewhere round the 
margin‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 67) which gives it an equal status of a stranger.  ―While he is a 
dread of yours, he is everywhere‖ (HP, 217).  
It may be impossible to construct womanhood defying patriarchal motherhood 
but it may be viable to have ―another kind of mothering‖ (Hansen, 1997, 52), that of 
mothering of oneself, oneself as another, oneself as a child ―without giving in to 
wanting Leopold [a child]‖ (HP, 220). This, in Deleuzian terms, is the self-
contradictory character of becoming: little Alice in Wonderland does not grow without 
shrinking. It may be possible to write the ―natural mother‖ (HP, 217) if she found the 
natural child – Bowen writes in ―On Not Rising to the Occasion‖,  
 
children in my Edwardian childhood, were decidedly played down rather than played up. 
‗Just be natural‘- they used to say, before the occasion; ‗nobody wants you to show off.‘ 
What a blow to ambition – what a slap in the face! ‗Be natural‘; really, what a demand! 
(Bowen, 1999k, 65) 
 
Elizabeth Bowen does devote much of her writing energy to writing about 
childhood, usually her own, since she did not have children herself. Her almost 
autobiographical writing on children may be understood as a way of self-analysis, a 
closing-off the chapter which was traumatic and left Bowen with literal and 
metaphorical stammer as a way of retrieving ―my mother, my mother, always my 
mother‖ (HP, 223).  
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 Yes, I think as a child I did better with my back to the wall – in extreme situations, 
among strangers. Whatever strangers could do to me, they could not bite, and there was 
the hope I might never meet them again. It was my near ones, my dear ones, the found, 
the anxious, the proud-of-me, who set up the inhibition. I could not endure their hopes; I 
could not bear to fail under loving eyes. I detested causing a disappointment. Perhaps I 
exaggerated the disappointment? Perhaps I did less badly than I imagined? You see, it 
mattered too much. I shall never know. For how does one rise – fully, ever – to an 
occasion? (Bowen, 1999k, 69) 
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1. Otherness, Strangeness, and Utopia. 
 
To identify something is to be able to make apparent to others, amid the range of particular 
things of the same type, of which one we intend to speak. It is along this path of identifying 
reference that we encounter the person for the first time, considering this term in an equally 
modest sense as globally distinguishing this entity from physical bodies. (Ricoeur, 1994, 
27)  
 
Personal identity can only be understood in temporal and dialogical terms. 
Both personal identity and meaning in general are a text that requires interpretation by 
two exclusive practices. The first practice refers to the original condition of inscription 
that is the world of the author. The second inscription refers to the subsequent 
conditions of reception, namely the world of the addressee. As a consequence, as 
Richard Kearney writes in his The Owl of Minerva, ―interpretation can no longer be 
constructed as the exclusive activity of the reflexive philosopher‖ (Kearney, 2004, 30). 
Interpretation and extension of being is no longer the fruit of Cogito. Instead 
interpretation becomes the primordial condition of our being. We exist within language 
which we need to constantly translate just like Eva Trout exists within her own syntax. 
Moreover, interpretation distantiates us from subjective consciousness and is a 
dialogical counterpart of belonging. A character that is mobile and constantly swept 
away from any stable positioning within discourse faces a need to re-interpret itself and 
re-invent itself anew. In doing so it is invited to extend its actual horizons of experience 
to otherness and remains torn between the desirable and the potential within the 
inherited meaning. In this analysis, the subject is involved in a constant process of de-
codification and semantic detour.  
Self-recognition can be achieved in dealing with the other. The other is the 
source of information for the self. Various modern theorists have based their teachings 
on the relation between the I and the other, where the other influences both the I-for-
myself and the I-for-other. Mikhail Bakhtin has written about obligatory dialogism and 
the necessity to know the other so as to know oneself. Julia Kristeva has found the other 
to threaten the borders of the self and to be necessarily expelled through the process of 
abjection. Slavoj Zizek wrote about the difficult relationship with the other, constructed 
on the borders of the fantasy of the real and the symbolic, as well as, the source of 
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abjectable enjoyment. His analysis of identity was based on the other‘s fluctuating 
influence from the real to the symbolic and back to the real. Zizek devoted much of his 
theories to the subject‘s relation with the language – an event that brings to life the 
distinction between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the enunciated – the I 
and the other within same consciousness. Paul Ricoeur spoke about oneself as ‗an‘ other 
in his studies of identity formation – the self stands for a cluster of sameness and 
selfhood. Ricoeur‘s personal identity took into full account the temporal character of 
being, which by existing with others in the course of history is transformed. One found 
his/her identity in the process of becoming oneself - a notion similar to that of 
Deleuzian becoming and at the same time ontologically different from Deleuzian 
impersonality.  
The self has been involved in the uncanny relationship with the other - a 
relationship of ambiguous character that is antagonistic and pacifistic at the same time. 
According to Samuel Huntington, ―For people seeking identity (…) enemies are 
essential.‖ (Huntington, 2002, 20) According to Julia Kristeva writing on uncanny ―(…) 
we know that we are foreigners to ourselves, and it is with the help of that sole support 
that we can attempt to live with others.‖ (Kristeva, 1991, 170) 
The processes of semantic detour as well as the relationship between the self 
and the other are at the core of what one finds in feminist studies on metaphor and 
feminist utopianism as its offspring. In general semantics of feminist metaphors 
acknowledges the non-allness of language. This is of importance to feminism since it 
strives to acknowledge the secondary details of metaphors as they refer to the unheard 
and invisible female experience. The metaphor, as Ricoeur acknowledges, gives shape 
to the language and invokes something else, something beyond the language – a surplus. 
The paradox of the metaphor lies in the tension between is and is not. The metaphor is 
evocative, its function is to evoke an absent, or metaphysical truth or us, which 
paradoxically is not. Feminism, and then more narrowly utopian feminism, suggests 
alternative truths, realities and values. Through alternative metaphors and myths 
feminism creates questions, disjoined narrative of counter-discourses.  
If one reads Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes directly through the dialogical 
paradigm of selfhood and otherness the reading of the novel through the paradigm of 
feminist utopianism is of equal value and in fact adds up to the hermeneutics of the self 
and the other. Many of Bowen‘s metaphors in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes are far-
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fetched, setting and timing seem unreal, and Eva herself seems grotesque. What Eva 
strives for is utopian but there is a latent message in her carnivalesque. Eva herself can 
be perceived as a transgression of the spirit /matter connection as well as body and mind 
dichotomy. She forms to a certain extent a new position of enunciation in favour of 
respect towards diversity. Eva carries within herself both the spirit, originally associated 
with masculinity, as well as matter, as related to her strongly embodied presence. The 
later can be further seen in Eva/Eve‘s overflowing carnality/materiality – Eve equals 
evil and absence of spirit, as well as abundant sexuality. What Eva Trout is and desires 
can be considered experience and expression of utopian thought. She herself can be 
considered an engagement of utopian dreaming. However, a distinction should be made 
between feminist utopian desire and utopianism as it has been considered in the 
masculine discourse as ―a place, state or condition ideally perfect in respect of politics, 
laws, customs and conditions‖ (Sargisson, 1996, 2). 
If one surveyed the examples of feminist utopianism the most salient idea is 
that it resists the idea of perfection. Sargisson writes in her Contemporary Feminist 
Utopianism that  
 
The absence, though, of a detailed plan for a perfect society is a characteristic of many of 
the texts that I have studied. Some writers treat such a plan as synonymous with death 
(Cixous and Clement, 1986; Slonzcewski, 1987). Others satirize the concepts of perfection 
(Carter, 1969: p.19). Most simply avoid closure of their utopian vision and leave it 
openended. (Sargisson, 1996, 3) 
 
Somehow feminist utopianism is an expression of fear of perfection-seeking, 
and as such it creates alternative images of the desirable. Furthermore, as Sargisson 
argues, a new approach to utopianism and understanding of feminist utopianism needs 
to be ―contextualised within these debates on how meaning is constructed‖ (Sargisson, 
1996, 3).  
 
Debates concerning equality and difference, the construction of meaning through language, 
and the construction of subjectivity, it is argued, provide a backdrop to this new approach 
to utopianism. It is suggested that current concerns about essentialism and female 
subjectivity create a tension which threatens the coherence and existence of feminism itself. 
(Sargisson, 1996, 3-4) 
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It is in and through language that we gain a heightened awareness of the 
interplay between selfhood and otherness. In a language where the narrative technique 
is disjoined and convulted it functions, according to Sargisson, as means of 
remetaphorization. In remetaphorization, as Drucilla Cornell writes in Beyond 
Accomodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction and the Law the ―as if of the 
imagination is implicated in the very act of ‗seeing‘ the real‖ (Cornell, 1991, 168). 
Cornell writes further that, 
 
The necessary utopian moment in feminism lies precisely in our opening up to the possible 
through the metaphoric transformation. (. ...) Here, I am using utopia in a (...) traditional 
way, but not in the sense of the establishment of a blueprint of an ideal society. Utopian 
thinking demonstrates the continual exploration and re-exploration of the possible and yet 
also the unrepresentable. Without utopian thinking, however, feminism is inevitably 
ensnared in the system of gender identity that devalues the feminine. (Cornell, 1991, 168-
169)  
 
Metaphors encompass what Ricoeur found the basis of dialogical narrativity - 
detour of reflection by analysis, dialectic of selfhood and sameness, and dialectic of 
selfhood and otherness. Elizabeth Bowen‘s attestation of difference lies in her 
awareness of a three-fold structure of the subject divided between sameness, otherness, 
and selfhood. 
The attestation of time too depends on the three-fold structure of the present of 
a subject‘s life. St Augustine‘s suggestion, later corroborated and used by Heidegger, 
has been that the present should not be understood as a singular notion, but rather a 
three-fold structure that includes the idea of expectation for the future events, memory 
of the past events, and attention to the present events.  Time is constituted by this three-
fold structure embedded in human experience, so that time soon becomes just one 
aspect of human experience, others being the notions of dialogism, selfhood and 
otherness. Time is, at times, a discordant experience. When we think of the past with 
regret or nostalgia we automatically create a present that is unchangeable or cannot be 
returned to. By the same token, the future may appear to us as fearful or too hopeful, 
while the present becomes frail, fleeting and unsatisfactory. Such dissatisfaction with 
the present may steer us towards an embracement of utopia, and against being-in-time, 
as well as being-in-the-world.  
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However, there is no hope in bringing back the past or calling forth for the 
future. As Mark Currie writes in his About Time, 
 
Remembering is never real, in the sense of making present again the former present of the 
past. In the act of remembering we transform the former present, and this is particularly 
clear in the memory of forgetting, which is identified as  forgetting only by becoming what 
it was not. (...) 
When narrated time catches up with the time of the narrative, there is nothing left to 
remember but memory itself, and nothing left to write about but the act of writing. (Currie, 
2007, 64) 
 
Temporality is nothing more than a three-fold present, aimed at giving more value and 
importance to the now and here, rather than then and there, where all past and future is 
transformed into the present. Still, we can only make sense of the three-fold present if 
we relate it to some external, objective point of reference, for example, the cosmological 
time or the bodily time, that is a human body in a transformatory process of aging, or 
else the somatic memory. The fact that, in the cosmological sense Eva Trout‘s body 
remains the same throughout the narrative – i.e. it remains giant, monstrous, out of 
proportion – carries the message of the novel out of time, making it universally true and 
omnipresent. Eva‘s instantaneous bodily reactions translate memory into direct, first-
hand experience, the static three-fold present. Eva‘s travelling translates the three-fold 
present into the cosmological extension of time – ―the lack of extension of the present is 
compensated for by the distension of the three-fold present‖ (Currie, 2007, 71). The 
body is eternal and finite at the same time, and thus serves as temporal frame for action. 
Oppression, as Deleuze argues, is not only a violation of our eternal values, but also a 
restriction of our movements – the bodily movements.   
Ricoeur believes that an exploration of narrativity of time, that is the process of 
fulfilling the three-fold present, can provide a deeper understanding of human 
experience. For that reason, he goes back to Heidegger and his division of experience 
into multiple thematic centres, which all inevitably lead the subject towards a better 
embracement and understanding of the other. The first Heideggerian thematic centre 
stands for human presence among the world of goals – how much time is needed to 
meet someone or do something – and is understood as the subject‘s relation to someone. 
The second centre – historicality – is that of awareness of oneself as a being with a past 
and dependable on that past, as well as all relations to the other that have been created 
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over time. The third centre – temporality is understood as personal finitude. This means 
that human life experience is a unity with a marked beginning and an end, therefore the 
subject has responsibility over its life, and the others that are part of it, which again 
takes us to what Levinas had to say about the I and the other.92 
This multiple and collective within-time-ness, gives one a sense that ‗living‘ is 
a shared experience to which others are connected. There exists interaction between the 
subject on the public and the private scenes, and the actions of others can be both a 
source of success and failure of our being and vice versa. There too exists an audience 
within us at which our narratives are aimed. In short, self is a narrative, as according to 
Nietzsche, the self is not a unity but something that one becomes and constructs. The 
self does not know itself directly but only through de-codification of signs and symbols 
that are projected onto the self and the other. As in Nietzsche, a person worthy of 
admiration is that whose desires, thoughts and actions are not haphazard but inter-
connected into a distinct style. Since the stories of one‘s life could be read from 
different perspectives of different others, Nietzsche‘s fear was a subject might adopt the 
dominant, hegemonic and culturally given plot.93 However, any alteration of our 
perception of time leads to an incorrect re-metaphorisation of selfhood and otherness, as 
well as, re-invention of reality, and poses a threat to narrativity. 
In re-metaphorization and re-invention of reality, utopian transgression of the 
barriers between fiction and reality is fairly potent. It is connected with the use of 
legends, myths and fairly tales to legitimate the new reality. In this way it argues for the 
deconstruction of any given world view as myths and legends do make bigger art of the 
hegemonic reality. As such it denaturalizes and what is more denies the desirability of 
                                                 
92 The question of the other challenges the tradition of transcendental philosophy. According to Levinas, 
(Nine Talmudic Readings 1994; Totality and Infinity 1961) the presence of the other evokes 
responsibility, where the single I is incapable of either self-reflection or intentionality of consciousness. 
The I feels responsible for the other confronted with him or her face-to-face.  In its turn the other grounds 
both subjectivity and objectivity of the I. Without the other, the I is incapable of assuring the independent 
reality of the other or the social world. 
93 According to Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols, 1888/2006; Beyond Good and Evil, 1886/2006), the self 
is not a constant and stable entity, but rather a plot one constructs and becomes. An admirable self, in 
Nietzsche‘s opinion, consists of a myriad of conflicting tendencies – a person of admiration gives the 
tendencies their own harmony and style of coherence, refraining from adopting a weak culturally given 
plot (like i.e. Christianity).  
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the reality constructed through the operations of myths and legends. The process of re-
invention and re-installation of the fantastic or unreal is very often inverted. Similarly, 
Bowenesque transgression is that it begins as a fairly-tale, if we take Eva to be a 
fantastic character, and ends as brutally realist and gratuitous with the shooting of Eva 
on her wedding day. That said, Margaret Whitford argues in Luce Irigaray: Philosophy 
in the Feminine that, 
 
A genuinely different future cannot be entirely foreseen, certainly not predicted in any 
detail; it can only be the product of freeing our genuine creative abilities. However, at the 
same time, this view itself is subject to uncertainty, in its belief in the possibility of a 
radically different future. (. ...) Feminist utopian visions, then, are mostly of the dynamic, 
rather than the programmatic kind; they do not seek to offer blueprints, of the ideal future, 
still less of the steps towards attaining it. (Whitford, 1991, 20)  
 
Joan Scott writes in an influential article ―Deconstructing Equality- versus – 
Difference‖ (1992) that, 
 
When equality and difference are paired dichotomously, they structure an impossible 
choice. If one opts for equality, one is forced to accept the notion that difference is 
antithetical to it. If one opts for difference, one admits that equality is unattainable. (Scott, 
1992, 260 in Sargisson, 1996, 73) 
 
Scott‘s rejection of the double dichotomy between equality and difference is echoed in 
many other thinkers to whom the relationship of equality to difference is intertwined 
rather than based on exclusion. Contrary to that, in patriarchal understanding of 
difference its philosophy leads to dissemination of distrust and fear of the other. As 
Sargisson writes, ―the patriarchal conceptualization of difference produces the concept 
of difference as deviance: difference as inferiority‖ (Sargisson, 1996, 74).  
Elizabeth Grosz is one of the philosophers who manage to reconsider 
difference to be a positive state that leads the subject towards a more plentiful 
embracement of identity designated as sameness with oneself. Grosz writes in Jacques 
Lacan: A Feminist Introduction that, 
 
For patriarchs, difference is understood in terms of inequality, distinction, or opposition, a 
sexual difference modeled on negative, binary or oppositional structures within which only 
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one of the two terms has any autonomy; the other is defined only by the negation of the 
first. Only sameness or identity can ensure equality.  
In the case of feminists of difference, however, difference is not seen as different from a 
pre-given norm, but as pure difference, difference in itself, difference with no identity. This 
kind of difference implies the autonomy of the terms between which the difference may be 
drawn and thus their radical incommensurability. Difference viewed as distinction implies 
the pre-evaluation of one of the terms, from which the difference of the other is drawn; pure 
difference refuses to privilege either term. (Grosz, 1990, 339-340)   
 
As such Grosz sees difference for women as ―transformable and thus potentially 
emancipatory‖ (Sargisson, 1996, 75). It is no more a deviancy from a norm but rather 
interplay of sameness and otherness that is organized neither symmetrically nor 
hierarchically, but is lived in its full multiplicity. There rather, the difference becomes 
multiple and the woman is no longer defined as ―other than non-man‖ (Braidotti, 1989, 
in Sargisson, 1996, 76) in Braidotti‘s ―The Politics of Ontological Difference‖.  In 
feminist thought, it is potentially harmful for women to be considered less than or 
within the patriarchal dichotomy of power.  
Luce Irigaray is an author of an even more refined theory of femininity and 
difference, where she makes an attempt at separating women from men not based on 
mutually exclusive categories but as belonging to two separate discourses. As such she 
creates her own feminist symbolic, where man remains a subject with the phallus, and a 
woman is now symbolized as the two lips of her external sexual organs. According to 
such thinking, social difference should be considered based on the theory of gender as 
sexed separately with all its social rights and obligations. To illustrate this approach 
Luce Irigaray uses the metaphor of touching lips to highlight the fact that the difference 
should not be grounded in dualistic understanding, but as pure and exclusive.  
Based on that, it can be argued that any attempt to transgress the binary 
difference of male/female is to a certain extent an expression of feminist utopia. From 
Irigaray to Grosz women strive towards a better understanding of their subjectivity, as 
well as dissemination of equality, and yet they still face discourse that is full of bias, 
misunderstanding and cruelty.  
Patriarchal discourse on difference feeds the fear of the other and installs the 
idea of essentialism that all women are different from men and posses common qualities 
as a natural category. Whereas it can be argued that women form a social class, an 
economic group etc, an essentialist idea of common qualities is considered wrong and 
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demeaning. The differentiation of other/otherness derives from an a priori assumption 
of the same, since the other the I must become the other minus certain attributes whose 
paradigm is morphological. In masculine order the female subject is the other minus the 
possibility of representing oneself as the other normal person. This is the +/- logic, 
where ―what makes a woman is a specific relation to a man‖ (Witting in Sargisson, 
1996, 172).  
  Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes shows that people are different and not 
gendered symmetrically within their sexual difference, and that these processes are not 
direct. Eponymous Eva Trout becomes the other in the novel both in the social context 
and the sexual context, where otherness is something no one can escape. However, 
Eva‘s otherness is perpetuated by otherness that surrounds her. Otherness is elevated to 
the main theme of the book – all characters are sources of difference, all are ‗otherness‘ 
or to their inner-law that opposes the idea of morality-for-all. The question is which 
characters remain faithful to their perpetuating difference, where being different is 
perceived as being same/similar to oneself.  
Positive understanding of difference stands for not being different as such but 
for constantly becoming different thus forging a pattern, performing one‘s identity as in 
Butler. Like the fish trout, Eva is not considered ‗of her species‘ for being similar to the 
rest of the species, in as much as trouts vary in colour and size. She is considered trout 
for constant moving from one place to another, from salt to fresh waters, moving 
upstream and upriver.  
In feminist fiction, the concepts of otherness and the other mingle, whereas 
traditionally the other, as in Adorno, stands for the utopia and otherness stands for God. 
In Bowen the term ‗otherness‘ floats somewhere in between. The tragic nature of 
feminist utopia is similar to Adorno‘s utopia in that it is a kingdom of God without God, 
and here respectively, a kingdom of women without women – a kingdom where the 
other is omnipresent and otherness is forbidden and banned. What marks either a 
utopian or dystopian feminist text is its manifesto of otherness. This means that 
otherness can be perceived as essentially positive encapsulating all that is positive in 
multiplicity of the other. What marks a feminist text and here Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes is its manifesto for otherness and the other, that in the end have a place to be – 
can co-exist in an encumbering reality. Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes as a feminist 
manifesto encompasses the relationship of the other/otherness in one text, and the 
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eponymous character is both the other and otherness – both femininity and other than 
feminine. It is worth remembering that Eva comes from Eden, past Christian utopia and 
cannot transgress any further, and yet is promised to return to Earth on the judgment 
day to close the temporal frame of the embedding present.  
Having said that, what can be considered a utopian subject is the one that in 
keeping same with oneself lives plentifully the states of other and otherness within 
oneself. Utopian thinking or rather utopian imaginary is a process of hermeneutical 
character.  It vacillates within the gap between memory and projection. It is dialectic 
between innovation and sedimentation, between the effects of history on us expressed as 
suffering and our active response to this process, where we refuse to synchronize past 
and present. Our personal utopia centres on the discourses of the past and present, 
opening symbolically towards the future, and yet remaining faithful to the power of 
‗elsewhere‘. Phenomenological hermeneutics hinges at two extreme poles of attachment 
and detachment - attachment and detachment from the other, as well as attachment and 
detachment from otherness. However, the utopian imaginary is only liberating when its 
utopian forward look ―critically reappropriates its archeological backward look, in such 
a way that history itself may be creatively transformed‖ (Kearney, 2004, 87). Utopia 
focuses on the aspirations opened by symbols – ―Utopian symbols (…) tend to be 
inclusive rather than exclusive modes of representation; they free us from the narrow 
security of conservatism‖ (Kearney, 2004, 85).  
 
Hermeneutics is concerned with the permanent spirit of language (…) not as some 
decorative excess or effusion of subjectivity, but as the creative capacity of language to 
open up new worlds. Poethic and mythic symbols (for example) do not just express 
nostalgia for some forgotten world. They constitute a disclosure of unprecedented worlds, 
an opening onto other possible meanings which transcend the established meanings of our 
actualworld (…) and (function as) a recreation of language (Ricoeur, 1982 in Kearney, 
2004, 85-86) 
 
And according to Ricoeur the philosophy of being is an appropriation of our existence 
effort and our desire of being despite of the ways that witness this effort and desire. And 
all in all, this is a utopian manifesto of being against all odds. Ideology and utopia are 
reconceptualized by
 
Ricoeur as integration/identity and rupture/critique, and this 
corroborates the idea of selfhood being conceptualized as other/otherness within 
oneself. This utopian philosophy bears in itself the existentialist pangs expressed by 
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Camus. According to Camus, solidary identification with the other results from the 
process of assimilation of the other‘s otherness, through the other who is becoming 
increasingly oneself (myself). As such we acknowledge as constitutive of existence the 
interplay between my and the other‘s otherness. The utopian tension in these processes 
may result from the difference between Levinasian reading of Camus‘s Les Justes or 
―L‘Hôte‖, where the self perceives the extent of the other‘s otherness and wishes to 
protect him in his vulnerability and strictly authorial and solely Camusian reading of 
L‟Etranger as the Arab‘s strangeness is seen as intolerable for unjustifiable at the same 
time.94  
Utopian feminist thought approximates itself to the early idea of the Absurd in 
Camus. And this can only be mediated through what Camus believed a safety door to 
our situation where the absurd universe erases all meaning through death- after all 
meaning can be created, however provisionally, through our decisions and 
interpretations.  
The absurd, the strange, and the other are as much present in Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes as in Camus‘ L‟Etranger. Both Eva and Meursault show a stunning 
incapability to lie that threatens thinning social structures. They are not punished by 
their otherness but rather for the failure to embrace the other as same in society. 
Meursault embraces the gentle indifference of the world and Eva lives it, making hers 
the claim for action, mobility and the fight against ―the plague‖, which eventually leads 
to her death. And according to Bakhtin something exists only if it means, meaning 
being a social event happening between selfhood and otherness. The meaning that 
Bakhtin describes necessitates lived social relations that are then allocated within a 
Janus-faced sign that is representative of the multiplicity of those social relations.  
Bakhtin strongly believed that the sense of self is constituted in its inevitable 
relationship with the other and any aesthetic activity is an expression of the relationship 
the self fosters with the other – all meaning has phenomenological intersubjective 
quality.   
                                                 
94 In the short story ―L‘Hôte‖ and the novel Les Justes we grapple with the notion of subjectivity and 
otherness, as well as identity re-figuring itself through alterity. In L‟Etranger human kind is seen as 
deeply murderous and altericidal. According to Levinas, and primarily to that in Camus, the proximity of 
the other makes impossible the killing of the other, even when a permissible killing must achieve the 
status of the greatest of all exceptions.  
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As in the writing of Emmanuel Levinas, embracing the other derives the 
primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the other. As such it is a 
privileged epiphany, the irreducible relation that the subject can live. The revelation of 
the other makes a demand for the responsibility of the other. One‘s responsibility for the 
other is not a derivative feature of our subjectivity; instead it is an obligation derived 
from our subjective being-in-the-world. Responsibility gives a meaningful direction and 
orientation to the subject‘s life according to discourse. This is connected to motherhood. 
For Levinas, the I lives out its embodied existence according to modalities95, but no 
other modality excites the I and prompts it to dialogue more than the encounter with the 
other. For Levinas, to escape deontology and utility, ethics must find its ground in an 
experience that cannot be integrated into logic of control, prediction, or manipulation, 
and ideally such ethics is to be found in the operations of motherhood, whereas all else 
belongs to the patriarchal hegemonic discourse of power and slavery. As in 
motherhood, the face-to-face encounter inflects the I towards the possibility of 
responsibility and of hospitality. 
Levinas‘s idea of identification does not only refer to actions but to dialogue 
and discourse as well. It demands from the subject that it takes responsibility for the 
language it produces and thus the subject it creates. In fact, what Levinas prompts us to 
leave behind is the negative paradigm of agency that presupposes that the subject is 
solely an effect of discoursive structures. This negative tendency overlooks ideas of 
self-interpretation
 
that introduce more active dimensions into understandings
 
of subject 
formation and agency. Ultimately, structural accounts of subject formation need to be 
integrated more closely with hermeneutic
 
perspectives of the self that contradict 
indeterminacy as the founding tenet in subjectification.  
Hermeneutics of selfhood takes us back to Lois McNay‘s theory of feminist 
narrative identity96, as well as her development of the concepts of personal identity, 
                                                 
95 Levinas introduces the concept of non-reciprocal relation of responsibility where the I is approached by 
the other from different perspectives (contrary to Husserl who lacked the idea of inresubjective life). 
According to Levinas no other modality of human life (building shelter, consuming the gifts of the earth, 
enjoying life) excites the I as much as the encounter with the other. Responsibility is the affective, 
immediate experience of transcendence and fraternity in response to a silent call of the other that 
immediately originates language and dialogue.  
96 Lois McNay‘s work (2000; 2005) is committed to understanding female subjectivity and 
subjectification in relation to the place of individuals in creating change. McNay deploys critical work of 
241 
 
materialist and symbolic feminism. Thanks to McNay‘s writing it becomes possible to 
account for either larger social change or individual spontaneity and resistance while 
trying to understand female subjecitivy and subjectification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Judith Butler and Pierre Bourdieu. She highlights Pierre Bourdieu‘s idea of habitus, though criticizes his 
failure to see its gendered character. She speaks about performative practices and symbolic production in 
both Judith Butler and Pierre Burdieu, making an attempt to escape Butlerian idea of performance as 
sedimentation in time in favour of Paul Ricoeur‘s fluctuation of personal narratives to better account for 
the plurality of subject identifications. In the end of the book, Lois McNay states that autonomy is an 
active-passive relation with the other. 
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2. Eva Trout‘s Eternal Journey as a Subject. 
 
According to the German idealist conception of subjectivity reflexivity is the 
essential feature of subjectivity. What is more, reflexivity is solely the property of the 
subject – if the subject does not possess an ability to be self-reflexive, it is not a subject. 
Reflexivity of the subject is apparent for the first time in the moment of recognition in 
the Lacanian myth of the mirror stage. It is the moment of coming-into-being of the self 
– ―the body image reflected by the mirror strikes(s) the child as being something 
exceptional, as different in kind compared with the array of other  objects in his or her 
visual field‖ (Johnston, 2008, 12). In a sweeping criticism of Lacan, Manfred Frank 
writes in his work, (among many in What is Neostructuralism? 1989) that:  
 
the Lacanian disctinction between the Symbolic je (i.e. the subject as subject of the signifier 
and of the unconscious) and the Imaginary moi (i.e. the reflected, specular ego tied to 
circumscribed conscious awareness), like so many other structuralist-inspired theoretical 
devices, is an inadequate, unsatisfying substitute for the German idealist conception of the 
self-reflexive I. (Frank, 1989 in Johnston, 2008, 11)  
 
According to Frank the Lacanian I is not reflexive, and to say more, it is ―a 
mere permutation of functions forming part of the trans-subjective symbolic linguistic 
network in which the individual is embedded.‖ (Frank, 1989 in Johnston, 2008, 12) And 
since it is not reflexive it cannot gain consciousness ex nihilo since ―nothing comes out 
of nothing‖ (Frank 1989, in Johnston 2008).To this accusation Zizek answers with a 
rebuke for Frank for not noticing the distinction between the Lacanian moi and je. 
To this, however, one can answer by looking for clues in the conception of the 
mother in the child‘s eyes and its relation to her as pre-symbolic plenty. To a certain 
extent it is the mother who is the source o subjectivity and therefore the self does not 
arise ex nihilo but draws from the image of the other – the mother.  And one may argue 
that Eva‘s apparent and ridiculed inability to become a subject – her overt fluidity and 
uncertainty as an individual stems from her trauma of having lost the mother.  Already 
her son Jeremy is the reflection of this problem not being able to enter into symbolic as 
a deaf and dumb child. The order of the language likes to divide the dream of ego ideal 
into third person pronoun moi, first person pronoun je and second person pronoun tu. In 
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discourse je presents itself as autonomous and its certainties and affinities try to convey 
so. Je has the knowledge that the other‘s desire and fiction are embedded in one, a 
process which decentralises the control over one‘s discourse. As in Aristotle the society 
was not constructed for the sake of life, but from defect, from death and the flight from 
death, from fear of separation and fear of individuality. By problematizing the 
difference between I and me, one sees the unclear division between subject and object, 
inside and outside, self and the other. The space between moi and the other that is thus 
created is the space of intrasubjective desire. Desire has no final resolution. 
In discourse ―what the je does not understand is that it is only a cultural 
signifier controlled both from within and without‖ (Regland-Sullivan, 1986, 64). As for 
awareness of cultural hegemony and control Bowen switches often into the third person 
one, making it a distinctive trait of Eva‘s guardian Constantine. This idea of being 
entangled within the dialectic between moi and other: ―hypothetizes language as a 
discontinuous system, because language contains both conscious and unconscious 
meaning systems in a double inscription‖ (Regland-Sullivan, 1986, 64).  
Thus, the mirror stage never goes away but continues to repeat in adult life in 
the spatial lures of identification with perceived likenesses. All that is external to the 
subject becomes moi‘s object in its narcissistic quest for fulfilment. The primordial pre-
mirror moi is a scaffolding of individuality formed through a primary identification with 
images, objects and others as a strategy of defence. The secondary, mirror stage 
identification brings an intimation of unity and continuity via the human Gestalt: when 
the other (the image, the mother) supports one‘s moi identification, when it recognises 
one's being, it establishes for the self that moment of desired unity upon the ground of a 
fundamental discord. The narcissistic moi always depends on the other since it does not 
yet have self-signification, which only happens with the signifier je. And at the same 
time je too depends on the other to fulfil its meaning ascribing function.  
In motherhood, similar to language acquisition, we see an unveiling linguistic 
structure of the self breaking through the unconscious in a vertical manner resembling 
that of metaphor in language. In the first place, the child is part of the mother and sees 
itself as such until the mirror stage. The subjectivity of the mother is therefore displaced 
in a metonymical way and horizontally – the child stands for my unconscious as a 
prolonging element of my self. When the child separates from the mother it becomes a 
metaphor for her subjectivity, even more in the child‘s process of abjection of the 
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mother, as has been explained to in the ―Discussion. The Dialogue and the Difference,‖ 
– the introductory chapter of the thesis making vast reference the writings of Julia 
Kristeva.  
In Kristeva the mother becomes both the agent of culture who induces in the 
child the ability to differentiate between the abjectable and not abjectable – she also 
remains one of the bodies that needs to be abjected to enter the dominant discourse. As 
Kristeva puts it ―maternal authority is the trustee of mapping of the self‘s clean and 
proper body‖ (Kristeva, 1982, 72). In separating from the mother‘s body a child 
banishes the imagery of the comforting body of the mother and child‘s and creates a 
substitute imaginary anatomy. This imaginary anatomy stands for a totalized object of 
desire but is never attainable, which leads to playing with successive substitutes. As 
such, Kristeva rightly stresses the porousness and inefficiency of the process of 
abjection that results in something I would call ―abject androgyny‖97. Nevertheless, the 
child remains always dependent on the mother, replicating the narcissistic drive for the 
other‘s recognition, the recognition on the part of the mother. The mother enables moi 
to reconstitute itself continually since it is the mother who becomes the mirror.  These 
others hold the human subject together by their recognition and reflection. The 
imaginary as parole (the way in which I make meaning mine, voice my desires, going 
beyond the "content" of what is said to what is unsaid in the utterance as well). In 
conscious life moi reappears as this narcissistic and aggressive intentionality, repeatedly 
constructing the self via such successive identifications, each like the layer of an onion. 
It is thus the nexus of unifying and moralising tendencies, of ethical judgements (this is 
good because I like it). Lacan's point is that moi or ego is not something that is in reality 
integrative, holding the person together, a core that one has from the very outset. If it 
functions as this (if it appears in this fashion) it is because it is others in Real situation 
that enable moi to reconstitute itself continually. One can never get rid of the narcissistic 
moi since this is the source of identity, and thus the real object of love or desire is not 
                                                 
97 According to Kristeva, ―In women‘s writing, language seems to be seen from a foreign land; it is seen 
from the point of view of asymbolic body‖ (Kristeva in Nikolchina, 2004, 166). Androgyny may stand for 
a deprivation of citizenship within language, and women must try to escape the topology of androgynous 
voice as foreign land and must search for a female voice. Abject androgyny points to a difference 
between abjection as obligation of the dominant discourse and abjection as a natural identificatory 
process. 
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the person or object desired but the identification with the object or person of love, that 
is, to be recognised, to be loved by another, to put oneself in the place of the one who is 
desired. It marks always therefore a sense of lack, of one's dependence upon others to be 
oneself, the dependence upon specular recognition for its own existence and 
perpetuation. 
In psychoanalysis a need is purely physical and aims at immediate satisfaction 
and survival; Desire replaces the Freudian wish and is rooted in the unconscious as a 
referential content for desire as libidinal function, which is displaced into conscious life. 
Demand or appeal to the other reveals the presence of unconscious Desire and 
narcissism in conscious life as an intentional pressure within language. Fort/Da: (1) 
replaying and mastering absence (2) object a, the bit of the real to which Desire gets 
attached as its object (3) repression of mirror stage identification (desire for mother's 
recognition of self - primary unconscious) and the entrance of language, an alienation of 
self into words (secondary unconscious). 
The focus on the mouth may be synonymous with the oral stage fixation 
dominating within the plot of Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. In psychoanalysis the 
oral stage is the earliest phase in the child‘s development and stands for drawing 
pleasure and a sense of fulfilment from stimulating the mouth. If undeveloped into the 
anal stage and then further on, oral stage can develop into mouth/oral fixation, that is an 
excessive fixation on the mouth, speech, the idea of devouring etc. Oral fixation can too 
be linked with madness and narcissism as self-devouring love. Also if oral fixation is 
representative of child‘s discourse it leads to unresolved trauma from the mother or of 
not having a mother. 
The idea of devouring takes us back to the Anglo-Irish concept of devouring 
children in literature. The taboo of a vampire, now mostly homosexual, an un-dead who 
devours children has been widely argued for by Margot Gayle Backus98 (1999). In the 
plot of Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes the un-living characters import living characters 
export. Whether Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes draws on the idea of systematic of a 
priori perpetuation of children into loyalty and animosity is, in my opinion, a complex 
                                                 
98 As has been referred in the introductory chapter ―Discussion. The Dialogue and the Difference.‖ 
Margot Gayle Backus focuses in her book The Gothic Family Romance: Heterosexuality, Child Sacrifice, 
and the Anglo-Irish Colonial Order on child sacrifice, demon lovers, and incestual relationships among 
Protestant English settlers in Ireland.  
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matter. It also is a treatise on maternity and otherness via a parallel trope of retributive 
violence and the gothic return of the repressed. It also questions the idea of voluntary 
and involuntary. 
As Mladen Dolar, a co-founder with Slavoj Zizek of Ljubljana Schooll of 
Psychoanalysis and an expert on phenomenology, as well as structuralism, wittily 
postulates it in ―Cogito as the Subject of the Unconscious‖ written as part of Cogito and 
the Unconscious and edited by Slavoj Zizek, ―the subject is precisely the failure to 
become the subject‖ (Dolar, 1998, 77-78). In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes, Eva is no 
less the subject because of her de-centeredness, but more so the subject of the novel 
thanks to her final discoursive annihilation – the final trickery of the text and of the 
discourse. The subject is always ‗subject‘ to death in dynamic processes of 
textualization.  
As Adrian Johnston, who has fostered many interesting discussions with 
Zizek‘s ontology and subjectivity, writes in Zizek‟s Ontology: a Transcendentalist 
Material Theory of   Subjectivity 
 
The sujet, as a dynamic negativity standing apart from the standard visual and linguistic 
mediators of selfhood, is forever attaining a perfect sense of ipseity vis-à-vis some 
adequate and satisfactory reflective equivalence. Given Lacanian conception of 
subjectivity, any form of self acquaintance alienates the subject from itself, derailing this 
emptiness into the fleshed –out fullness of the ego and its embodied avatars. (Johnston, 
2008, 9) 
 
This would mean that the principal subject is split, resembles a split, failing 
character and yet remains strongest in his or her quest for identification. Eva Trout, 
seemingly a failed subject, remains the strongest character in the novel. According to 
Zizek death is the ultimate moment when subject attains fullness, which to a great 
extent means that Eva‘s death is her strongest figuratively moment within discourse, 
when all concatenation becomes legible and signified. This, therefore, may point to the 
necessity of Eva‘s death by the hand of her adoptive child. The original subject is 
nothing more than a failure in symbolization. The death of Eva is inscribed in the 
apparition of Jeremy, since he fulfils a role of a prophet appointed to reveal the sins of 
the people and the coming consequences resulting in the fall of Jerusalem. Jeremy, like 
Jeremiah, is the child prophet, summoned in his youth to prophecy and initially refusing 
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the burden on the grounds of not knowing how to speak to people. In a similar manner, 
Jeremy too has no words to utter since he is dumb and deaf, and yet his presence speaks 
louder than words. Jeremiah is appointed over nations and kingdoms: to uproot and pull 
down, to destroy and overthrow, to build and to plant. When Eve/Eva loses her childlike 
innocence and acquires the knowledge of things - cultural knowledge. In this way, it is 
argued, Eve/Eva wrests knowledge from the realm of the divine, takes the first step 
toward culture, and transforms human existence. Eve/Eva changes the rules of the 
garden and becomes, if only momentarily, as God - the arbiter of right and wrong. Not 
satisfied with the role of servant of the law, she aspires to be its master and maker. By 
becoming maker of the rules, divine authority is displaced by her own. She is an 
originator of a counter-discourse to God‘s own, and as such needs to be sacrificed at the 
end. Eva is the thinking subject for even before she takes the forbidden fruit she is able 
to discuss the rules and the covenant humankind has with God. Therefore her sin does 
not come from being herself but rather from becoming – gaining autonomy from God.  
Even Descartes, who is so well known as the father of the much influential 
concept of cogito, is wary of the completeness of such thinking subject. ―The nature of 
the ‗I‘ has yet to be determined‖ (Johnston, 2008, 12).   
Slavoy Zizek depicts Descartes‘ subject as a monster, borrowing a ―tarrying 
with the negative‖ phrase from Hegel, who on his part associates the phrase with the 
negative, death, devastation and utter dismemberment (Johnston, 2008, 21). Zizek 
associates this negativity and spuriousness with the lack of annihilation, meaning that 
it‘s only in death that we achieve completeness. 
This insight is corroborated by Mladen Dolar in ―Cogito as the Subject of the 
Unconscious,‖ which examines the two Lacanian readings of the cogito, the standard 
account of Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, and the other, less known, 
account of ―La Logique du Phantasme‖ (―The Logic of Fantasy‖). In the first, cogito is 
founded on the primary repression of being: cogito ergo sum chooses thought over 
being. The subject has disappeared as being and the signs of this disappearance have 
been transferred to the other. Modifying Descartes for whom God remains the ultimate 
guarantor of knowledge, Lacan bars the other, making the other‘s desire inscrutable. 
Thus, if the disappearance of being sends the subject in search of an object inside 
him/her that might be on a level with the other‘s desire, this search resolves in 
alienation in the signifier, the stand-in for something inaccessible that the other lacks. In 
249 
 
the second reading, Lacan rejects the dialectics of desire. Having inverted Descartes‘s 
terms (sum, ergo cogito), he posits a primary alienation. This alienation before the 
alienation in the signifier (and the intervention of the unconscious) rejects the other 
because it covers the foundation of signification in being. Parallel to this, the 
significance of the story of Eve‘s original sin resorts to the idea of sin being shifted 
from the reserve of possibility for the unspecified subject within the set of rules towards 
specification of the agent of desire, ascribing it to the subject‘s autonomous search 
within oneself for the object of desire.  
Dolar‘s point is that Lacan‘s return to Descartes reverses the succession of the 
two phases of the subject. In the phase of primary alienation there is the espousal of an 
imaginary being (false being) of an ‗I‘ sustained by the grammar of the drives as similar 
to the espousal of the other through drives – an espousal that takes place when Eva stays 
in her chambers with Elsinore and shifting the thought originally ascribed to the other to 
the self.  
What made Eva visualize this as a marriage chamber? As its climate intensified all grew 
tender. To repose a hand on the blanket covering Elsinore was to know in the palm of the 
hand a primitive tremor – imagining the beating of that other heart, she had a passionatelly 
solicitous of this other presence. Nothing forbade love. This deathly yet living stillness, 
together, of two beings this unapartness, came to be the requital of all longing. (ET, 56) 
  
Dolar speculates that having rejected thought, this false ―I‖ still experiences itself as the 
subject of thought – having been snatched away from Elsinore, having been orphaned 
Eva still experiences the fundamental doubts of a subject – that there is nothing beyond 
it and nothing beyond thought. Clearly, the revised succession is instrumental to 
Lacan‘s theorization of a subjective position before enunciation. The pre-enunciative 
position - as this position might be termed - testifies to the non-transcendental nature of 
the subject as it has everything to do with a ―stain of sum‖ prior to enunciation. Without 
neglecting the extremely informative trio of essays on the critics of cogito (Robert 
Pfaller on Althusser, Marc de Kessel on Bataille, and Zizek on cognitive sciences‘ 
dismissal of the philosophical subject), Dolar‘s piece remains crucial to the thesis of the 
reverse. At a time when the philosophical subject is under all sorts of attacks, 
psychoanalysis makes visible the traces of traumatic passage from the abyss of self-
withdrawal (formerly misunderstood as Descartes‘s spectral vanishing point) to the 
open of rationality. However, if, according to Lacan, a woman does not exist, how is the 
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female subject to proceed from self to otherness and from inward withdrawal towards 
open rationality? 
When writing ‗all sorts of attacks‘ one is reminded that both feminism in 
Adriana Cavarero‘s ―the monstrosity of the universal subject simultaneously male and 
neuter‖ (Cavarero, 1987, 47) and linguistics in Kristeva have been critical of the 
monstrous universal cogito. 
This problem of the inconsistency of universality was first posed by Kant99, 
in terms of its antinomies. Kant, in specifying two types of antinomies, was the first 
philosopher to articulate sexual difference insofar as the mathematical antinomies of 
―not-all‖ parallel the feminine relation to the symbolic order, while the dynamical 
antinomies of universality parallel the masculine relation to the said symbolic order. 
Lacan‘s famous maxim, ‗woman does not exist‘ helps clarify the different impossible 
structures of masculine and feminine processes of subjectification. It is precisely insofar 
as women are necessary objects for the fabrication of a symbolic order as in Levi-
Strauss‘ ‗exchange of women‘ that the symbolic order cannot account for the category 
of woman. The particulars exclude totalization according to a logic of ―not-all‖ just as 
the individual phenomenal existence of objects of experience exclude judgement about 
the universe as a whole (according to the structure of the mathematical antinomies). 
Man, contrarily, can enter the symbolic order categorically, but only under the condition 
that he has no particular existence, but simply enacts the phallic function. As such, a 
woman functions in a discourse as a disabled male subject within the paradigm of +/-, 
that is as the one that lacks the penis. She is represented as mere functional link between 
two other males in a triangle of exchange. This idea finds its problematization in Eva 
Trout as much as we perceive Eva/Eve as a link between evil/snake and Adam, the first 
man and the discursive father of mankind. Eve/Eva is a link that leads human subject 
towards the symbolic and on her rests the whole patriarchal discourse laid on the 
covenant between man and God. However, Eve/Eva is an active agent and in the text of 
                                                 
99 Kant‘s four major antinomies included: the limitation of universe in relation to time and space; whole 
as invisible atoms; free will against universal causality, and the existence of a necessary being – these 
four, divided in mathematical and dynamical antinomies, Kant believed to be obstacles to logical 
reasoning. Dynamical antinomies concern an object that does not belong to experiential reality, but dealt 
with as if it could be conceived of as part of such a reality, and here women were perceived as such 
dynamical antinomies. 
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the novel she creates many ‗Deleuzian‘ mechanisms. It can be said that in the novel 
desire coincides with the living of femininity. The final allegorical concatenation can be 
well referred to as mutual coordination, where there is no advancement without mutual 
balanced understanding and cooperation.  
Originally, Levi-Strauss‘s model of exchange of women attempted to offer a 
single explanation for cross-cousin marriage, sister-exchange, dual organization and 
rules of exogamy. Over time marriage rules have created social structures, as marriages 
have been primarily forged between groups and not two individuals involved. When 
groups were exchanging women on a regular basis, each marriage created a 
debtor/creditor relationship was established to balance the repayment of wives, either 
directly or in the next generation. Levi-Strauss proposed that the initial motivation for 
the exchange of women was the incest taboo100, which he deemed to be a beginning and 
essence of culture, as this was the first rule to curb a palimpsest of natural drives; and 
secondarily a sexual division of labour. The former, by prescribing exogamy, created a 
distinction between ‗marriageable and non marriageable‘ women and thus ordered to 
search for women outside of one‘s kin system. The latter created a need for women to 
carry out women‘s chores. According to Levi-Strauss, by necessitating wife exchange 
arrangements, exogamy came to promote inter-group alliances and served to form 
structures of social networks. It must be said, however, that kinship systems were one of 
the founding tenets of the Anglo-Irish society, and to certain extent of Irish society in 
general logic contradictory to the also present claustrophobia and close-knitenness of 
the Anglo-Irish). To exemplify this, Bowen has Lady Naylor from The Last September 
exclaim to an English soldier Gerald Lesworth in her attempt to bring his engagement 
with Lois to a halt: ―We must seem ridiculous to you, over here, the way we are all 
related‖ (Bowen, 1929/1998c, 178).  Within this logic, some feminists postulate that 
marriage can be seen as an eternal triangle, where according to Sedgwick women are 
just links, and where Gayle Rubin interrogates herself over the idea that these are only 
men who distribute value and never women.   
                                                 
100 Levi-Strauss wrote on incest taboo in The Elementary Structures of Kinship. (1949), The Savage 
Mind. (1962), and The Raw and the Cooked. (1964). His concepts of social exogamy and alliance theory 
claimed that those groups of society that wish to flourish must force their members to marry outside to 
create new kinship systems. The exchange of women, thus, served as a uniting force in strengthening 
families and consequently hegemonies. 
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In much of feminist writing the triangle is dissolved by men‘s limited 
influence over the exchange of women. In much of Bowen‘s literary oeuvre, both long 
and short fiction, men‘s participation in the exchange of women is either curbed or 
delineated by other women101. In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes this message is taken a 
step further. Life is said to be an endless stream of events joined together through 
concatenation. Concatenation occurs everywhere, it is creative of new forms of life. The 
weakest form of concatenation is that of exchange of women and is doomed to demise. 
Similarly to that Eva is killed by Jeremy in the event of her marrying Henry. According 
to Elizabeth Bowen, as according to Levi-Strauss, women do not only represent value 
but signs too, and are capable of begetting other signs; women‘s circulation is 
comparable to the circulation of language. As such, Eva ‗mothers‘ a son – Jeremy, who 
is more of a textual/narrative invention rather than a biological fruit of Eva‘s womb. 
Jeremy is a narrative. He is fatherless so that Eva becomes symbolically a prophet of a 
demise of an old patriarchal structure (this also bears some similarities to the situation 
the Anglo-Irish found themselves in late ninetenth century and early twentieth century 
as a culture depending on the parole of the father and kinship awaiting its demise). If 
we borrow from Descartes, women function within the logic ‗I am thought therefore I 
exist‘. If, now they begin to exist within the logic ‗I think therefore ...‟ or rather „I beget 
narratively, therefore... they may cease to exist‟, but the you will do so as well. What 
will be strengthened is the discursive kinship women might start. 
Mothering in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes can also be viewed as one of the 
first attempts in Irish writing at writing about single mothering, a leading motif of Irish 
modern feminist writing in response to a social taboo in Irish society. Single mothering 
can only be an aftermath of a long literary distance Bowen had covered until the 
publication of her last novel – a path that was paved by her first two novels The Hotel 
and The Last September, where the two young heroines Lois and Sydney are unwilling 
                                                 
101 In much of her fiction Elizabeth Bowen uses the character of the archaic mother or other femme-
fatallic strong female character, whose influence other characters fear or are under the spell of. To name 
the few, this idea is exemplified in Bowen‘s The Hotel and its Mrs Kerr, and The House in Paris and 
Max‘s relationship with Mrs Fisher, in The Heat of the Day and Robert Kelway‘s relation to his mother, 
in The Death of the Heart and Eddie‘s relationship with Anna Quayne and Mrs Heccomb, in The Last 
September with Hugo Montmorency‘s inability to act against most of female characters in the plot or 
Gerald Lesworth‘s devotion to ‗mother country‘. Most of the male characters who qualify as future 
husbands are killed away by Bowen as in The House in Paris, The Hotel, The Heat of the Day. 
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to imitate their mothers but unable to fulfil other destinies. In The Hotel Ronald Kerr, 
whom Mauld Ellmann calls ―a convinced feminist‖ (Ellmann, 2003, 82), says: ―‘There 
is nothing now to prevent women being different‘, said Ronald despondently, ―and yet 
they seem to go on being just the same. What is the good of a new world if nobody can 
be got to come and live in it‖ (Bowen, 1927/2003b, 94).  
This logic of causal thinking has been used in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes 
under the name of concatenation that appears to bind the very end of the novel into 
meaningful whole. Concatenation is a word that has been used in Gilles Deleuze‘s 
writing. In fact, many translators of his work have argued that this is the most fitting 
term for his ré-enchaînement rather than already suggested linking. The task of 
redefining discourse runs through re-concatenation of already used images and 
representations, as much as Rosi Braidotti (1994) writes that  
 
the task of redefining female subjectivity requires as its preliminary method the working 
through the stock of culminated images, concepts, and representations of women and of 
female identity, such as they have been codified by the culture we are in. (Braidotti, 1994, 
123) 
 
 In actuality the empirical produces something new and unforeseeable 
through the concatenation of forces. It is then through a specific genealogical account 
that differences and singularities can be grasped in their uniqueness and positivity. And 
the specific genealogical account includes the narratives and histories of women, in our 
case the narrative of Eva Trout so neatly divided in the novel into two parts of her 
‗upbringing‘ (Bildungsroman) and its consequences. As Eibhear Walshe writes, 
―Bowen structures the novel in two parts, and in the first part she explores Eva‘s 
derelict upbringing. The second part of the novel deals with Eva‘s adult life, where the 
consequences of this upbringing are ultimately tragic‖ (Walshe, 2009, 157). 
Why is it, then, that Eva Trout retains her integrity? An answer can be found 
in the idea of feminine concatenation that should be based on Irigaray‘s notion of the 
feminine sea. Tamsin Lorraine writes in Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral 
Philosophy that: ―Just as at each moment the Dionysian subject can affirm the being of 
becoming as the unity of multiplicity, so can the feminine subject experience each 
moment as a whole with nothing lacking‖ (Lorraine, 1999, 160). The integrity of 
women is preserved because they have been used to dissect it into separate experiences 
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that do not strive towards masculine totality but rather towards feminine multiplicity. 
And as Lorraine writes Irigaray remains very close to the Nietzschean idea of ―the 
differentiating synthesis of the groundless form of time‖ (Lorraine, 1999, 160) that 
corroborates Bowenesque creation of timeless spaces of alterity in Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes.  
The feminine sea of experiences forms in the process of concatenation a 
feminine psyche/feminine subject. However, it is not subordinated to any orderly chain 
of events. Similar to that, when Deleuze writes about his being of becoming he does not 
mean a linear stimuli-response-based becoming but believes that the conception of a 
creature forever in transformation is based on becoming active rather than becoming 
reactive. Following this logic, Irigaray‘s feminine sea escapes the idea of a ‗fusional 
abyss‘ to become ―an elemental differentiating movement which flows according to 
cosmic rhythms rather than adhering to any logic of the same‖ (Lorraine, 1999, 161). A 
fulfilled feminine subject strives towards becoming active and destroying reactiveness 
through repetition that affirms difference (iterability of the different) rather than the 
same. This interplay of moments is well illustrated in Bowen‘s text ―The Dancing 
Mistress‖ where ―the character of Peelie (...) shows both equivocal gendering and desire 
finding its object without discrimination as to gender, indeed in implicit though 
concealed defiance of conventional social regulations‖ (Coughlan, 2008, 52). However 
Coughlan‘s argument (and its negative implications) that Bowen is tarrying with ―a 
limit-case of extreme femininity: the dancer who must subdue and distort her whole 
bodily and emotional being to the performance of a quintessence or apotheosis of 
feminine beauty and grace, and as a result becomes ‗not like a person at all‖ (Coughlan, 
2008, 52-53) can too have its positive implications. Each dance takes the dancer out of 
herself towards a new momentary experience of selfhood and femininity, contradicting 
the idea of becoming same as in the year of 1920‘s of ―fashionable and partly permitted 
transgression‖ (Coughlan, 2008, 53). Each dance represents plenty in symbolic 
ambiguity of performance. 
It is of importance to return here to Descartes who is very much present in the 
novel. Not surprisingly he is the unfortunate field of study of Prof Portman C. 
Holman‘s; who is mysteriously delayed is his research by his subsequent illnesses of 
bowels. This leads to Prof. Holman‘s later leave from the university and fortunate 
meeting of Eva Trout on the plane and his consequent struggle to translate the event into 
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his discourse. This logic of ‗sexualization‘ is duplicated in the contradictory options 
given in the Cartesian cogito. According to Lacan‘s analysis, the cogito creates a 
rupture between the pure form of the ―I think‖ and the res cogitans, the substantial entity 
thought. What the Cartesian deduction actually performs is not to create equivalence 
between a substanceless act of thought and the contentless thinking substance, but rather 
to posit a choice between the two. The two possible choices force the differentiation of 
sexual identities: the masculine choice is the choice of being, at the price of thinking; 
the feminine choice is the choice of thinking/acting, at the price of existence. Moreover, 
according to Zizek, the exclusive masculine and feminine choices are that of being and 
that of thought, but neither allows for a thinking-being within the symbolic. The choices 
that await the Deleuzian subject are that of having to engage in a process of becoming 
imperceptible, instead of locating itself vis-à-vis the subject matter. The subject must 
follow the lines of flight that penetrate its being as well as the multiplications it is part 
of. This process involves betraying any recognizable positioning and ignoring 
conventional boundaries. As such the subject becomes a nomadic subject ready to 
inhabit both masculine and feminine positions and its survival depends on its 
faithfulness to the idea: ‗I change therefore I am‘ – ‗I become therefore I am what I 
cannot remain to be‘. Such should be a nomadic or rather travelling subject. What 
Bowen wishes for Eva is to map the terrain of such nomadic travelling subjectivity with 
her amoeba-like self. Such subjects are not tenets of history, they cannot be captured 
through a process of representation that would anchor them in one specific moment of 
the chronological time but rather a series of lines of flights happening ―behind one‘s 
back‖ (Lorraine, 1999, 129). For Rosi Braidotti, in her Nomadic Subjects, a nomadic 
subject strives against dominant narratives and it has given up all longing for stability, 
fixity. It desires transitions and change. Nomadism entails for Braidotti a constant state 
of ―in-process‖ or ―becoming‖, which she chooses to designate as the states of ‗as if‘. 
The practice of ―as-if‖ is a ―technique of strategic re-location in order to rescue what we 
need of the past in order to trace paths of transformation of our lives here and now‖ 
(Braidotti, 1994, 6). Braidotti also understands ‗as if‘ as ―the affirmation of fluid 
boundaries, a practice of the intervals, of the interfaces, and the interstices‖ (Braidotti, 
1994, 6). Deleuze and Guattari write in their Anti-Oedipus that a nomadic subject is,  
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A strange subject, without fixed identity, wandering over the body without organs, always 
alongside the desiring machines, defined by the portion it takes of what is produced, 
gathering everywhere the reward of a becoming or an avatar, born of the states it consumes, 
and reborn with each new state (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 23). 
What is more the nomadic subject is born within the formation of a compound 
machine that is the celibate machine that is ―a new alliance between the desiring 
machines and the body without organs that gives birth to a new humanity or a glorious 
organism‖ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 24). To what extent one can call Eva Trout a 
glorious organism102 is arbitrary yet her nomadism bears traces of all: the celibate 
machine, the wanderer and the consumer. In short, an analysis of Eva‘s nomadism could 
fall within the above three categories. The first term is indicative of the effect of the 
opposite sex on Eva throughout the novel as well as her unconsummated relationships 
with Elsinore and Iseult. The wanderer is Eva‘s eternal status of a child and then an 
adult living her life under the roofs of countless hotels in different countries. The 
consumer is a term that best describes her allocation of identity within the material, and 
her endless use of the material goods, as exchanging what she came deprived of – the 
other, the maternal – for possessions. According to Deleuze, complex subject can only 
arise between contradictory forces of repulsion and attraction and prompts such 
reactions on other similarly to Eva whose monstrosity both attracts and repulses. 
                                                 
102 The idea of becoming a glorious organism – Deleuzian compound of molecular energies – parallels 
the idea in which bodies are inscribed as sociocultural artefacts consequently projecting their bodily 
practices onto the sociocultural environments they inhabit. Bodies become cities, machine-like specimens 
as in Eva and her bicycle or the discoursive practice of The House in Paris and travelling by car (a taxi in 
the novel) penetrating the foreign cities – the bodies of the other. Such post-modern compound bodies 
become simulacra of women, according to Sue Best, in opposition to nineteenth century bosomy and 
vaginal feminine flesh, and twentieth century clitoral and appendage-like female harbours. The new 
simulacrum of woman is, according to Best: ―just a stretch of white skin, a surface without openings or 
depth…. An erotic encounter with this (…) [woman] is an arid affair, mediated, of course, by the car. The 
car becomes a hand seeking out the remaining erogenous zones of this vast, stitched, patchwork body: 
‗The blindness of the car in the labyrinth of (…) [woman] is none other than the blindness of the palm as 
it traverses the length of the thighs, the span of shoulder, of groins.‘‖ (Best, 1995, in McDowell, 1999, 
67) Moreover, the idea of a penetrating hand of a car understood as a bodily machine through those who 
are driving inside reminds us of the concept of desire in Deleuze, as in his desiring machine. Hence, the 
relationship between selfhood and otherness becomes based on the idea of mutual desire that percolates 
discourses and precedes objects, delineating, for the first time, Bowen‘s implementation of the idea of 
de„siring‟ of language. 
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According to Lacan, such multifarious subject can be a site of contradictions, as so is 
Eva. Being split between the opposing forces creates certain de-centeredness of the self, 
so that ―while the perception of Eva‘s body is central to this text, she is rarely herself 
presented as one who is ‗centered‘ in her own body, to the extent that in some episodes 
she does not appear to be at home within a human body at all‖ (O‘Toole, 2009, 168). 
For rightly so, Eva becomes a nomad venturing out of and within her corporeality in a 
simultaneous movement to and fro – the semiotic ebb of femininity. The inquiry for the 
human sciences is the realm of human experience, both present and hidden from a 
subject‘s awareness, and then manifest in somatic and mental production. Human 
experience means not only the narrative of the word, but also the narrative of the body 
from an angel to a monster. Experience does not produce control over and prediction of 
human life; it produces, instead, knowledge that may deepen or enlarge the 
understanding of human experience, as well as participation in life. Experience does not 
pave a unique path for the body – rather it opens it up onto a myriad of possible 
outcomes and meanings.  Experience does not centre but rather de-centers personal 
narrative. It is the logic behind the concatenation processes that ultimately lead Eva to 
transcend herself and die. As Maud Ellmann writes about The Last September in 
Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow Across the Page, ―The price of gaining flesh and blood 
however, is mortality.‖ (Ellmann, 2003, 63)  
More so, Eva Trout‘s ambiguous embodiment of a monstrous, formless 
substance bears great influence on the realizations of embodiment of those whose life-
paths she crosses. 
 
In short, the opposition of the forces of attraction and repulsion produces an open series of 
intensive elements, all positive, which never express the final equilibrium of a system, but 
an unlimited number of stationary metastable states through which a subject passes. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 26)  
 
Whether or not one agrees with Lacan‘s notion of subject position as a place of 
contradiction, one can always take away two of his ideas of subjectivity. The first idea 
is related to the strategy of positing the reader and author as a site of differences. The 
second idea refers to the process constructing the I as a negotiation amongst discursive 
subject positions, which the I may or may not choose to fulfil, as in relative autonomy. 
We may also infer from this that subject positions are a matter of assignation, and in 
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fact, following Gayatri Spivak103, they can be understood as culturally modelled I-slots 
that is, in short institutional positions. Elizabeth Bowen‘s struggle is understood here as 
being torn between relative autonomy and social vacancies. As in structural subject 
positioning it is of less importance what the subject is saying or doing than that it is 
saying or doing something, meaning that Bowen too is torn between social discourse 
and the call for authenticity of each subject.  
Eva Trout is an ironic subject that does not leave anyone indifferent and un-
stirred. She passes by along people‘s lives as a dynamic destructive force, and yet sets a 
pattern of behaviour. The greater trickery or irony, however, is posed in the fact that 
Eva passes too – that is the subject of the text, as in Zizek, she is erased from the 
discourse passing, namely dying. Eva‘s friend Henry compares the heroine to the 
eponymous Pippa of Robert Browning‘s poem ―Pippa Passes‖ from a series of dramatic 
texts devoted to more disreputable characters. Henry proposes that Eva buys a house 
and turns it into a social venue which will promote her talent to impress. 
It is Proust‘s paradox that states that the most intense art comes out of the bits 
of life least responded to at the time, out of sorrows of inaction and inexperience. Eva is 
both work of art and new discourse made out of her clumsiness and inexperience. She 
goes through life like an unstoppable wave with her innocence and naivety very often 
stretched to retardedness. Eva experiences de-territorialization and dislocation; she is 
uprooted from place, time and the maternal but yet again fulfils as such the pre-
requisites for being a nomadic subject.  
De-territorialization or dislocation are terms used to name the processes by 
which sediment social practices and meanings are disrupted so that their historical 
contingency and that of the identities which they ground becomes apparent, and it is a 
process explicitly associated with the transformatory power of capitalism of the modern 
era (Laclau, 1997, 41-60) - these are understood as preconditions of any positive 
political developments. They designate certain deconstructive processes which 
destabilize established configurations of power, meanings, materiality and practice.  
―Your lengthy and unencumbered physique with its harboured energy seemed 
to me, and not at the first glance only, that of the dedicated discus thrower‖ (ET, 123). 
At first glance, Eva did not seem a mother or capable of having offspring. And yet she 
                                                 
103 This is specially highlighted in Spivak‘s A Critique of Post-Colonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing Present. (1999)  
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occasioned things to happen. She was a bundle of energy that passed through people‘s 
lives and ‗gave birth‘. Her ―gaze gives size to what is contained within it‖ – other 
people become. She too incites to sin: ―after the take-off, when you lost an apple. 
Escaping from others in the bag was on and symbolically bounded towards me across 
the aisle‖ (ET, 123). If we posit Eva as the subject of the contorted syntax she becomes 
an apple. Eva not only looses an apple, she is herself the fruit of sin that rolls 
unstoppable. The apple becomes a symbol for knowledge, immortality, temptation, the 
fall of man into sin, and sin itself. 
Henry whose wish is to fulfill the paternal position in the discourse (giving 
such impression in his treatment of his elderly and ridiculed father) wants to do so with 
use of Eva. He incites her to start a social life, buy a house in London where they could 
both be able to throw luxurious parties and live a lively life. Henry says to Eva: ―You‘re 
a trend setter‖ (ET, 179) and she, on her behalf, worries that she may not be able to 
fulfill the feminine role: ―I don‘t sing. No, and you don‘t have an improving effect‖ 
(ET, 179). At this time, Jeremy makes possessively for Eva, leaning against her.  
The most obvious reference to Eva‘s poetics of sin lies in the symbolic of her 
name. Biblical Eva was responsible for the expulsion of human kind from Paradise – the 
place of plenty. It was Eva who tempted Adam with the forbidden fruit and led him to 
sin. However, whereas in the Bible, Eva‘s behavior is judged in terms of good and bad 
here in the novel her acts can be judged in terms of being felicitous and un-felicitous.  
If Eva is the symbolic apple, a fruit that popular culture has associated with the 
original sin, she too becomes a well of knowledge that thrives on the tree of knowledge 
as in Greek mythology. However, as a symbol of spreading sin, Eva gains autonomy 
and agency in the discourse. Bowen‘s discourse is that of feminine transcendence. It is 
about the enabling of ―feminine transcendence‖ in order to wrest women from their 
place in the phallocentric imaginary- earth, womb, matrix - as the condition of the male 
transcendent and speculating subject. Women's transcendence requires a feminine 
divine, effectively a ―She‖ to whom the ―I/she‖ can relate. This idea can be found in the 
writing of Luce Irigaray. Irigaray‘a Je, tu, nous and Elemental Passions undo such 
binaries as discursive/material and sex/gender, partly by rendering the gendered or 
sexed subject in a continual process of becoming, oriented toward an uncertain future 
rather than toward a fixed past as in Freud and Lacan‘s theories. Margaret Whitford 
speaks about Irigaray‘s masculine/feminine binary:  
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The elements allow Irigaray to speak of the female body ... while avoiding the dominant 
sexual metaphoricity which is scopic and organised around the male gaze. She can speak of 
it instead in terms of space and thresholds and fluids, fire and water, air and earth, without 
objectifying, hypostatizing, or essentializing it. These terms are not so easily reduced to the 
body of one sex or the other (Whitford, 1991, 62). 
 
It is not the subject that needs to transcend the pre-symbolic fusion of the 
mother and child, which had already taken place, but rather it is the placental role of the 
mother that needs to transcend the subject. Irigaray writes in her The Sex which is not 
One  
 
It clearly cannot be a matter of substituting feminine power for masculine power.  Because 
this reversal would still be caught up in the economy of the same, in the same economy—in 
which, of course, what I am trying to designate as ―feminine‖ would not emerge.  There 
would be a phallic ―seizure of power‖ (Irigaray, 1985a, 130).  
  
For a woman it is neither a matter of installing herself within this lack, this 
negative gap, even by denouncing it, nor a case of reversing the sexual economy of 
sameness - demands Irigaray. For what can be of self  more than sameness and selfhood 
over time. The discourse that will accomplish this, Irigaray continues, will not be held 
down by the demands of ―oneness.‖   On the contrary, it will work towards a 
proliferation of multiplication.  In a realm of multiplicities, one formulation cannot take 
precedence over another and each can coexist without demanding its own legitimation 
over all other discourses.  This almost exactly reflects the conceptualization of 
postmodern society as defined by Lyotard.  As Postmodernism desires to reflect the 
multiple, subjective nature of existence, so Irigaray‘s feminism recognizes the need for 
multiple discourses.  The mirroring of the postmodern desire for multiplicity does not 
stop merely with the desire for multiple discourses. Female sexuality, like the feminine, 
cannot be defined.  It is the sex which is not one. 
For Spinoza an individual will be considered weak or bad if cut off from its 
power of acting and if in a state of slavery with regard to the subject‘s passions.  For 
Deleuze this is the moment of convergence and new discovery that points towards a 
dynamic subject that is not judged in terms of proximity to external values but rather the 
intensity of modes of behaviour. These modes of behaviour are productive of active 
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affections.  The proper question of morality becomes the one of what one can do or is 
capable of. Ethics of immanence will criticize anything that separates modes of 
existence from their power of acting. However, such understanding of morality takes us 
away from the concept of transcendence and the idea of desire for transcendence that 
people possess. For if the character of Eva Trout represents what may be called a power 
to act and affect, she does so within the paradigm of longing for the other, some 
transcendental truth of desiring Nietzschean servitude and slavery. This is represented in 
her longing for a child, in her affective relationships with Iseult Smith and her husband, 
Elsinore, Jeremy and then Henry. Deleuze‘s way of dealing with this problem lies in his 
interest in drives that precede our conscious desiring. To Deleuze our conscious will 
and preconscious interest are both subsequent to our unconscious drives that never exist 
in a free and unbound state. Our desire, according to Deleuze, is what Nietzsche would 
call individual drives in which momentarily we invest our morality and weaker drives. 
And as such we arrive at the concept of Idea that is nothing other than the problematic 
multiplicity of drives and multiplications – Deleuze replaces the power of judgment 
with the force of decision. He replaces the power of considering within non-autonomous 
matrix of knowledge with no autonomous force of choice. In Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes it is signaled that the heroin might have a limited power of judgment and yet a 
truly resourceful power to act and take on decisions such as leaving the Larkins, leaving 
Constantine, becoming a mother. When a possible obstacle appears against her 
autonomous force to decide misguided as power to judge (Henry) Eva is killed. Since 
our permanent state is that of investing in social systems that repress us, autonomy lies 
in the intensity and multiplications of such investments. Making out what is a product of 
infrastructures. The difference between interests and desires lies within the distinction 
between real and unreal, where interests are ascribed to the paradigm of the real and 
desires to the paradigm of the unreal. The hub of Eva Trout lies within creating spaces 
of alterity, hybrid identities, hermafroditism. As Deleuze writes in ―On Capitalism and 
Desire‖:  
 
Reason is always a reason carved out of the irrational – it is not sheltered from the irrational 
at all, but traversed by it and only defined by a particular kind of relationship among 
irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium and drift. (Deleuze, 2003, 157) 
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What lies at the site of individuality is psychosis and delirium which is 
symbolization of the Real. The autonomy of every subject lies in freedom of desiring 
even if this means symbolization of delirium. Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes may be 
Bowen‘s novel where she fully develops her notion of a desiring subject since in her 
earlier fiction she ―questions the very possibility of desiring subject‖ (Ellmann, 2003, 
71). In fact it has been claimed that Bowen‘s first two novels lack a subject of desire‖ 
(Ellmann, 2003, 74) at all, when this attribute is only imputed to the unloving things in 
her novels – ―the gate that throngs, the car that slides, the door that welcomes its 
destroyers, and the silence that flows over the stairs. The syntax mocks the notion that 
human beings can command their destiny‖ (Ellmann, 2003, 67). Symbolization of 
delirium may be one of Bowen‘s key words as well. There circulates an old Anglo-
Irish joke that time is always mid-afternoon after a heavy Sunday meal, and torpor 
does predominate in most of Bowen‘s fiction. 
 In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes the idea of active desiring underlies the 
entire plot of the novel; it ventures to establish to what extent Eva possesses freedom 
to live her otherness, the otherness of her femininity without demanding empowerment 
over other discourses but rather an equal legitimation of her narrative. 
Nothwithstanding the fact that this idea remains within the realm of utopian discourse 
that in one strives to enclose the traditionality of the past and hope for a better future. 
This idea, takes after Leibniz, as far as the creation of textual Eva bathes in her 
unconsciousness, her unconscious drives, motives and inclinations, which contain the 
differentials of what appears in consciousness.   
At the core of narrative identity lies the idea of temporal discontinuity that 
suggests that change and exchange between genders is uneven ―arising from the 
increasingly dysfuncional effects of the dominant economy of clock time for both 
women and men‖ (McNay, 2000, 112). Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes is a novel 
devoted to narrativity of drives.  
Narrative identity in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes refers to what Alya Khan 
has described as conscious living ―to engage in self-transformatory practices of the self‖ 
(Khan, 2006). It means journeying through life, weaving very often contradictory plots, 
and re-inventing oneself in an ongoing narrative of the self. Narrative identity calls upon 
female adjectives such as multiple, ongoing and generative allowing one a ―generative 
understanding of subjectification‖ (McNay, 2000, 164). Ricoeurian processes of 
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subjectification such as ‗identifying reference‘ and ‗self-designation‘ (Ricoeur 1995, 
(1994), 31) point the female subject a new way of becoming, a way of intersection and 
interaction on multiple levels in society. As much as the subject‘s notion of belonging to 
the dominant narrative may vary in intensity, his or her consistent idea of the self may 
change over any period of time. Moreover, the concept of intersectionality 
problematizes the idea of the outsider within, which further complicates the idea of 
otherness and the other within oneself. Intersectionality is too an aftermath of the idea 
of multiplicity within human experience and consequent de-centeredness of human 
body, as in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes‘s line ―The Evas exchanged a nod, then 
stayed rapt in mutual contemplation‖ (ET, 105).  
Intersectionality in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes undercuts well the idea of the 
wealthy heiress, who even though rich continues to feel an outsider to the hegemonic 
order. It means that Eva is both the outsider and an insider, to language, to society, to 
gender, to motherhood. She is both the angel and the monster of the text, just like all 
women remain mothers, whores and angels. Intersectionality stands for belonging to 
different decentred groups – ―‘Negative,‘ mourned Constantine, ‗after negative‖ (ET, 
104). , and yet making a claim for a unified narrative, a consistent pattern of 
performance.  
Intersectionality is a concept that can also be found to underlie the idea of 
feminist rogue, who not only finds herself decentred as a woman, but also dwells on the 
periphery as a female picara. Similar to the female picara Eva occupies middle ground, 
to a certain extent she‘s both a whore and a virgin, both a monster and an angel- the 
emphasis being not on the negative construction neither/nor but the positive 
construction both. As such, the construction of female picara moves from that of 
exclusion to that of inclusion. It moves from the desire to escape towards the desire for 
recognition. It is the Hegelian tradition that links desire with recognition, claiming that 
it is only through recognition that one becomes a socially accepted subject.  As Judith 
Butler postulates: ―This means that to the extent that desire is implicated in social 
norms, it is bound up with the question of power and with the problem who qualifies as 
the recognizably human and who does not‖ (Butler, 2004, 2).  Such thinking, in its turn, 
has widely informed the New Gender Politics, of which Judith Butler writes in her 
Undoing Gender, that it should be of new discourse to be able to return the social 
recognition to those who do not fit the orthodox, phallic thinking of gender. The New 
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Gender Politics has emerged in recent years adding to the debate on transgender, 
intersex and the complex relations these terms foster with feminist and Queer theory. 
The problematic of intersectionality and hybridity of a subject thus becomes the 
problematic of intersex, intergender, and transsex. As such the subject continues to 
desire ‗identifying reference‘ and ‗self-designation‘, but these cannot be hegemonically 
imposed. The performance of the subject should be free of dogmatically established 
norms – being ‗negative after negative‘ (ET, 104) should not signify confinement to 
decenteredness and periphery. As Butler writes in her Excitable Speech: ―the question 
of performativity is bound up with the question of transivity.‖ (Butler, 1997, 42) 
Performativity should be perceived as a process with a new sensibility of discourse. The 
discourse, in its turn, should be able to accomodate to J.L. Austin‘s eponymous question 
‗How to do things with words?‘ There is no necessity to erect a totem pole of 
importance of various aspects of autonomy. However, there is a need to see how 
different aspects of the perfomative contribute to continuously thinking identity anew.  
This, in Elizabeth Bowen, is visible in her awareness of growing social, moral 
and psychological dislocations of the twentieth century, as well as the experience of 
decline that inform her disruptive satirical mode. In an almost catastrophic vision of the 
world, it is the little steps further that count. 
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3. Maternal and Abjection.  
 
 
The novel Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes describes what in psychoanalysis 
can be called early mother/infant symbiosis. This, in fact, remains both in the book and 
in theory an oral phase. Infancy is the best described as oral incorporative libidinal 
attitude. Between infancy and mature object relationship all object relationships, both 
internal and external, are primarily based on oral incorporative (Chodorow, 1999, 67). 
Primary narcissism is eventually transformed into some object relationship. Eva‘s 
ventures into maternity can be seen from the daughter‘s perspective in search of the 
archetypal, symbolic mother. Her maternal narrative is encompassed by her 
undercurrent filial narrative, as somebody uprooted from the maternal. Nancy 
Chodorow claims that mothering is a repeating pattern. The danger posed by an 
extended mother-daughter or mother-child relationship is of insufficient separateness, 
the loss of the self for the other, lack of autonomy, etc. It stands for an over-feeding 
with the mother.  
In the novel the relation of Eva‘s motherly narcissism engulfs her childhood 
narcissism, as in her appropriation of Jeremy whose dumbness and deafness Eva 
struggles to fill in with her orality/discourse. As such she only serves her own 
narcissistic oral cravings.  
―This accountability then entails that we open up the arguably self-contained 
boundaries of this us/them distinction and draw on the non-complicit assumption that 
the practice of analysis itself shapes the meaning of ―outlaw‖ sexuality or "woman".‖ 
(Barat, 2007) My analysis will always remain biased. 
Since my analysis emerges at the intersection of text/context boundary, they 
should be able to reveal the spurious, discontinuous and ‗often contradictory logic‘ of 
discourses on gender and sexuality both formed by us and the writer. ―It is an often 
troubled yet necessary intersection that I see as the ontological condition for any change 
for a less exclusionary discourse of sexuality and gender to emerge as the result of our 
analytical practices.‖ (Barat, 2007) 
However, the research should not be obsessed with the origin of constituent 
plots and events. It is not of academic value to my project to focus on the identification 
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of the mediated discourses since that would stand for the enactment of the dominant 
ideology, which tries to determine ‗the real‘ category of a woman, of a woman‘s 
discourse, etc. 
The maternal, the abjection and the matricide are undeniably keywords 
essential to dissecting Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes‘s narrative as well as to 
uncovering the structural dimensions of what is the study of the mother, the maternal 
and the subject. These concepts inevitably uncover the ideas of anxiety of authorship, 
female affiliation conflict, the fear of generative powers of the archaic mother leading 
towards the organizing principle for the subject‘s symbolic capacity. The strength and 
harshness of the relationship a subject lives with the mother is best described in 
Kristeva‘s famous phrase – ―I feel like vomiting the mother‖ (Kristeva, 1982, 47). The 
apparently irrevocable loss of the mother that is ―tantamount to the death of the mother‖ 
(Kristeva, 2001, 129) in imaginary dimension of the discourse is clearly symbolised in 
Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes first with the tragic death of Eva‘s mother, and second 
with the killing of Eva herself. The extreme nature of matricide is emphasised by the 
impossibility of incorporation or integration of the murdered mother, which in Eva is 
heightened by the society‘s conditioning against the maternal as necessary to plentiful 
individuation. Abjection being closely knitted with the maternal, in Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes it keeps coming back as the structuring element of narrative focus on 
the eponymous Eva Trout. Abjection as such poses again a signifying problem since it 
is never fully achieved but rather exists as a term in process. What does rather present 
itself in the discourse is a process of abolishing the mother that in itself is not as violent 
and irreversible as abjection, and can lead to further recovering of the mother. Like the 
maternal body, every subject is what can be called a subject-in-process. As subjects-in-
process we are always negotiating the other within, that is to say, we negotiate between 
the other‘s influence and our own otherness. Like the maternal body, we are never 
completely the subjects of our own experience, but rather, in case of the female subject, 
we are eternally enclosed in a triangle relationship on a level of a psychic structure104. 
This, according to Nancy Chodorow, is symbolized in a woman‘s relation to a man 
signified only through the appearance of the child, as well as, and here more 
                                                 
104 This idea is worked upon in Nancy Chodorow‘s The Reproduction of Mothering (1999) and most of 
her later writing, where she takes on the teachings of Freud and above all Melanie Klein and her more 
theoretical psychoanalytic feminism.  
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importantly, through the appearance of the archaic mother. As such, the latter triangle 
gains a somewhat meaningful expression in mother-child-mother positioning of the 
subjects. In mothering, as Nancy Chodorow (1999) writes ―The mother-child 
relationship also recreates an even more basic relational constellation. The exclusive 
symbiotic mother-child relationship of a mother‘s own infancy reappears (…).‖ 
(Chodorow, 1999, 201) In creating the close-knit symbiosis with the child, a woman 
reaches back to her close-knit symbiosis with the mother lived in pre-language oral 
phase, as well as described by Kristeva as the chora. Chora is to Kristeva a place of 
abundance, the semiotic associated with the rhythms, tones, and movement of 
signifying practices naturally bound with the rhythms, tones, and movements of the 
body, here the maternal body. In much of Bowen‘s fiction love for the other is mistaken 
for ―back-to-the-wombishness” (Glendenning, 1977, 222) – Bowen‘s term to describe 
her longing for a return to Hythe, her childhood summer home, and a place of plenty, as 
described in a letter to the lover Charles Ritchie and quoted by Victoria Glendinning in 
her Elizabeth Bowen: Portrait of a Writer. 
The novel Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes encloses eponymous Eva and her 
son Jeremy in the semiotic chora, where their movements are directly a result of Eva‘s 
corporeality, and where the language of the father has no place since Jeremy is 
fatherless, as well as deaf and dumb. Referring to compatible corporealities, Bowen 
writes that  
 
Each of their interchanges was marked by this sort of gravity, which they had in common. 
(...) His features were to an extent in the trout cast, having an openness which had been 
Willy‘s and was Eva‘s; yet his alikeness to her, at moments striking, had about it something 
more underlying, being of the kind which is brought about by close, almost ceaseless 
companionship and constant, pensive, mutual contemplation (ET, 147).  
 
Even though Jeremy seems perfectly interwoven into the text against his 
disability, the symbolic seems to be catching up with him over the course of the 
narrative. Even at the very beginning of his first visit to England and the Dancey‘s 
household, Mr Dancey thinks it abominable of Eva not to have tried everything to insert 
Jeremy within language. ―... But surely, Eva,‘ he said most earnestly, ‗in these days, and 
in that progressive country you‘ve been in, something could have been done, has been 
done: what is being done?‖ ―‗Everything! – that is to say, very, very much‘‖ (ET, 155) 
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responds Eva pointing out Jeremy‘s reluctance to enter the symbolic and his fear of it. 
―‗But Jeremy doesn‘t like it; he doesn‘t want to. He not only doesn‘t co-operate, they all 
tell me, he puts a resistance up. He is angered at what they attempt to do to him. It 
upsets him. He would like to stay happy the way he is.‘‖ (ET, 155)  
After her conversation with Father Clavering-Haight, Eva ponders her life with 
Jeremy – a life that, to her, stretches from a semiotic, womb-like, chotraic existence in 
America towards their obligatory return to England, the land of the fathers. 
 
Did this make her traitorous to the years with Jeremy? – the inaudible years? His and her 
cinematographic existence, with no sound-track, in successive American cities made still 
more similar by their continuous manner of being in them, had had a sufficiency which was 
perfect. Sublimated monotony had cocooned the two of them, making them near as twins in 
a womb. (ET, 188) 
 
Jeremy‘s return was brought on by the onset of his eminent manhood – ―She 
had been brought to it by sighting premonitions of manhood in his changeable eyes‖ 
(ET, 189). However, Eva was unaware of the costs that were involved in bringing 
Jeremy into the symbolic, even after dwelling within the maternal for so many years – 
something that was taken away from Eva – ―She had not computed the cost for him of 
entry into another dimension. What he had been thrust in the middle of was the 
inconceivable; and the worst was its not being so for her. He was alone in it.‖ (ET, 189)  
Apparently, however, it is not a matter of personal choice whether one is 
allowed to stay in the chora, close to the maternal. It is a society‘s obligation and a 
necessity a subject is encumbered with to enter the father‘s parole. For as Mr Dancey 
says many of us would like to linger within the semiotic – ―‗Many of us would; but 
that‘s not the thing. – Oh come, Eva, who would not wish to speak?‘‖ (ET, 155)  And 
here the thread of the uselessness of language is brought back forth, towards which Eva 
bears eternal anxiety, once expressed in her school days conversation with Iseult Smith 
– the ever present fear of having nothing to say, of not being able to fit into the 
discourse not as an object but rather a subject. Here in the ―Visits‖ chapter Eva responds 
to Mr Dancey that she has never seen a point in using the language: ‗I have never 
wished to. What is the object? What is the good?‘‖ (ET, 156)  Or rather, what is the 
object of a language with a narrowly pre-defined subject out of which women are 
excluded as Rosi Braidotti‘s nomadic subjects: women, monsters and mothers in her 
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Nomadic Subjects (1994b)? However, these fears are invalid for Mr Dancey, himself not 
much of a patriarch, whose speech is most of the time ‗doomed‘ by endless bouts of 
allergic fevers, constant coughing and nose-blowing. Having his capacity of speaking 
impaired by his allergic condition, Mr Dancey continues to hold the position of local 
vicar, and is a father to five children, of which he is most defied by his son Henry, Eva‘s 
future husband yet her junior of twelve years. In Henry‘s constant accusation of his 
father there is no mistrust of the patriarchal, but rather disdain Henry feels towards his 
father‘s weaknesses. Henry believes that he would do better in the paternal role, with his 
male gaze on matters, and he accuses Mr Dancey of feeling guilt for not being able to 
hold the paternal position in the society and within the family – ―‗What you are 
suffering from,‘ diagnosed Henry, blinking at his reflection in the glaze of the teapot, ‗is 
guilt, not penitence.‘‖ (ET, 159)  
Mr Dancey believes that Jeremy is doomed if kept away from audible 
discourse.  
No, this child has come into your life, however he did, and you must not doom him. I do 
mean ―doom‖; you doom if you acquiesce. You dare not,‘ he added, abating the verb a little 
by his compassion. ‗There cannot – somewhere? – be someone who cannot help, cannot 
handle him. I cannot believe you have yet tried everything: try everything! Search Europe.‘ 
He looked at her sadly and said: ‗You‘re a rich woman.‘ (ET, 156)  
 
Or else, Eva is a rich woman because of the wealth her father accumulated – she carries 
with her certain responsibilities of the Father‟s order. Furthermore Mr Dancey‘s words 
have a deeper meaning for what it means to be a female subject capable solely of a quiet 
and tacit compliance, a voiceless existence – hence Jeremy is said to be of the same 
kind that Eva is: their both being strangers in language who can only be empowered 
through the father‘s heritage. If the status quo of the semiotic chora remains unchanged 
this will lead Jeremy to doom, that is in Christian terms Eva/Eve will lead the child 
prophet Jeremy, who in the Bible did not refuse the gift of the Word, to doom, that is 
precisely to The Last Judgement. In Biblical understanding it was Eve‘s original sin that 
led humankind to abandoning Paradise that is to return at the end of the world when the 
good will be separated from the bad. Eva in Bowen‘s novel meets her doom, her 
Judgement Day from Jeremy‘s hands. 
Henry‘s belief in the father‘s power and omnipotence can be a false dream 
after all- as the Ivory Tower in Virgil that permits the false dreams to ascend to the 
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upper air. Far more truth can be found in the sermons of St Paul‘s whom Mr Dancey 
cites – ―‗Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things...‘‖ 
(ET, 159) Mr Dancey highlights that St Paul wrote like an angel – Eva too is a demon 
and an angel - similar to Iseult Smith, whose metamorphosis and Janus-like femininity 
is described in the Metaphysical poem in the ―Genesis‖ chapter of the novel.  
For the most part of Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes‘s narrative Jeremy 
remains immersed within the maternal chora, where he is kept away from the father‘s 
language. There all experiences are pleasurable, and no boundaries are set. To Kristeva 
in Desire in Language chora reveals ―heterogenousness to meaning and signification... 
detected genetically in the first echolalias of infants as rhythms and intonations anterior 
to the first phonemes, morphemes, lexems and sentences‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 133) and 
later ―reactivated as rhythms, intonations, glossalias‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 133) in poetic 
language.  
Chora is a place of plenty. This can be expressed in Jeremy‘s accumulation of 
toys, sweets, singing birds, and other ‗material goods‘ so much cherished by children. 
The pleasurable moments that have place away from home, in constant journey from 
one hotel to another, are safeguarded by a plethora of things that Eva buys Jeremy and 
which he then stacks up in their hostile hotel rooms. Chora is the place when there is no 
father, no lover ―There is not such person‖ to ―communicate with‖ (ET, 199), and yet 
there is understanding and cooperation. It seems so intense that Mr Dancey asks Eva if 
she is ―quite sure Jeremy cannot lip-read?‘‖ (ET, 158) ―Only mine‖ – Eva answers – 
―Extra sensory‖ applauds Henry, in awe of Eva and Jeremy‘s extra-verbal 
communication, as in maternal chora. 
 
Jeremy‘s presence, since they had sat down to the table, was never to be felt. Eva, 
habituated, was least aware of it. There he sat, enthroned on a cushion brought from the 
drawing-room, on a level in every sense with the rest of the company. His manner of eating 
and drinking conveyed a pleasure which was in itself good-mannered – he was not greedy.  
This did not, though, occupy him entirely: at intervals, he turned his candid attention from 
face to face, from speaker to speaker. (...) The boy, handicapped, one was at pains to 
remember, imposed on others a sense that they were, that it was they who were lacking in 
some faculty (ET, 158). 
 
All in all, Jeremy does possess knowledge, that all learning and ‗knowledge‘ 
as presented is speech is false – ―What Eva‘s little boy knew, what he always had 
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known, and, still more, what he was now in the course of learning, there was no 
knowing. There was a continuous leakage and no stopping it‖ (ET, 158).  
The knowledge Jeremy possesses is a threat to the symbolic knowledge of the 
master narrative, so that everybody present at the table with Jeremy fear the place has 
been ‗bugged‘, which gives ―an increasing hold on the father and son‖ (Bowen 158) 
disseminating the hold on narrative so that ―it increased their recklessness with regard to 
each other‖ (ET, 158). The knowledge that proper schooling could offer him poses a 
threat to his semiotic existence, and extra-sensory understanding – ―‘What are you 
going to do about that boy?‘ (...) ‗No. His future, his schooling. His disability. (...) ‗He 
might understand you,‘ said Eva. ‗Please do not, Constantine.‘‖ (ET, 173) 
However, it should be noted here that the phase of chora, although peaceful 
and directed at drawing pleasure, is a phase of basic drives operating throughout. This 
refers itself not only to the life drive but to the death drive too. The chora is a place of 
planet but it also is a place of semiotic fuzziness and wandering into language, which is 
―from a synchronic point of view, a mark of the working of drives... and, from a 
diachronic point of view, stems from the archaisms of the semiotic body‖ (Kristeva, 
1980, 136).  The semiotic tries to reclaim and appropriate the ―archaic, instinctual and 
maternal power embodied in husbands, politicians, empire builders, and oily-eyed 
professional men‖ (Little, 1998, 189).  
Jeremy‘s assassination of Eva can be thus understood in a three-fold 
intersectional manner, where all interpretations can be valid. First, Jeremy‘s killing of 
Eva can be seen as his consensual entrance to the paternal – the little pistol Jeremy 
carries around is his symbolic passage to the paternal law. Second, Jeremy‘s 
assassination of Eva can be result of his growing revolt against the paternal steadily 
infiltrating his world through Eva‘s subsequent marriage to Henry, the natural 
‗concatenation‘ of events that inevitably lead towards obligatory entrance into the 
father‘s parole. This understanding can be corroborated by the idea that not all subjects 
are able to enter the symbolic, and it is not a viable and natural process that universally 
encompasses all processes of identification. After all, Jeremy will not be able to learn to 
speak or hear, as much as his mother/guardian Eva was unable to do so – her marriage 
being an incorrect and unfortunate concatenation that led to her death as subject. After 
all, a male child cannot linger within the chora. 
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Third, Jeremy‘s assassination of Eva can be a natural result of the choraic 
drive towards death that the child misinterprets as a source of pleasure.  
Who knows, however, whether the little gun Eva is killed with was not 
destined for Henry, having appeared in the narrative after Henry‘s encounters with Eva.  
 
She had locked behind her the room in which lay Jeremy, still asleep – the metal-tabbed 
key rattled in her pocket, knocking a miniature alloy revolver which had fallen from 
Jeremy‘s when she shook out his jacket. (How had he come by it?) (ET, 206)  
 
In the end, Henry is snatched by ―a woman bystander to whom nothing was 
anything (...) before he could fall over the dead body‖ (ET, 268). Who is standing 
behind Eva is no one else but Henry who gives ―a great cry of terror‖ (ET, 268). The 
assassination of Eva might have been an unfortunate concatenation, of which apparently 
Constantine is so much afraid of:  
 
I do not say there is no method of human madness. Our affections could not, I suppose 
survive – as they do - were they entirely divorced from reason, though a tie is rather a 
tenuous one. Well, bless you, Eva; and bless you Henry! I regret the wholly secular nature 
of this occasion, but father Clavering – Haigh could not be with us. Let this sunshine we 
stand in be a good omen! Things may break well for you: that has been known to happen. 
Er – life stretches ahead. May a favourable concatenation of circumstance... (ET, 268) 
 
Death does embed narrative, and so do guns. Miss Smith is said to have given 
up her typewriter –symbolically language – to her former husband Eric, and instead she 
takes his revolver with her. Eva suspects her of being strangely dead ―Had this been 
Miss Smith, or was she dead and somebody impersonating her?‖ (ET, 192) 
Kristeva locates on the margins of male symbolic discourse an alternative 
feminine mode of signification understood as preoedipal chora. There the eruptions of 
the semiotic are most visible from Eva‘s spontaneous speech to ―the things people don‘t 
say‖ (Woolf, 2001, 220) in Jeremy‘s and Elsinore‘s silences. A heterogeneous, 
assymbolic, asymmetrical discourse is connected to Eva‘s enigmatic speech, even to 
Constantine‘s very often undecipherable discourse punctuated strongly with verbs in 
passive tense.  The apparent unity of his speech gives way to the carnivalesque impulse 
of Mennipean satire. Disguised as a male master narrative, Constantine‘s discourse is 
perpetually subverted by semiotic elements of heterogeneity, chaos, and 
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imperceptibility. Constantine is a parody of patriarchal world, yet he too is an outsider 
to it with his ambiguous sexuality, material possessions and money that are not his – as 
Iseult tells Eva, Constantine ―... is not a bloodhound‖ (ET, 192). Even more, one may 
say that in his paranoid existence Constantine mimics the paralogical discourse of the 
female hysteric, since the maternal functions are sexually denied to him.  
When Miss Smith leaves her husband and goes back to her Lumleigh, 
unmarried, maiden state, her language and manner of speaking seem to change too, 
which Eva too ponders to be a distortedness provoked by the phone wire. 
 
Something – who was to say what, exactly? - had not rung true. The voice‘s inflections, 
even, had been, if not quite parodied exaggerated, over-stretched, harshened; more than 
once a hallow ring had been given them. The Lumleigh intonations had been winners, give 
X that! (ET, 193) 
 
Miss Smith is now told to live an almost angelic, volatile life, ―giving an 
―impression of dissolution‖ (ET, 193), as Bennet and Royle agree- -the dissolution of 
language, discourse, syntax. ―An impression of upborne, gas-filled flight, cable cut, 
ballast cast overboard. Miss Smith was tied to ordinary earth no longer; in some ways 
she eluded the law of gravity‖ (ET, 193). Most importantly the changes in Miss Smith 
lead Eva to her epiphanic moment on identity, where she says ―Anyhow, what a 
slippery fish is identity; and what is it, besides a slippery fish? (...) What is a person? Is 
it true, there is not more than one of each?‖ (ET, 193) This can too be a moment of 
semiotic jouissance as in Clarissa‘s love for Sally in Woolf‘s Mrs. Dalloway ―It was a 
sudden revelation... Then, for a moment, she had seen an illumination; a match burning 
in a crocus; an inner meaning almost expressed‖ (Woolf, 1992, 47). However, such 
moments of jouissance, assymbolic and anti-phallic pleasure cannot be articulated or 
sustained within normative narrative. As such it only offers pleasure if remained 
unanswered – ―The great pleasure my letters to you gave me was bound up with the 
impossibility of your answering‖ (ET, 206) writes Miss Smith after her telephone 
conversation with Eva. 
After that event, Eva decides to look into possible multiplicity within every 
human nature – its singularity in encompassing many points of view – the many I‘s that 
change over time. Identity is an enigma where sameness and otherness play the bigger 
parts – sameness with oneself and otherness within oneself. Eva decides to see to the 
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matter and ―see by examining many. She telephoned for the Jaguar and drove it to the 
National Portrait Gallery, of which she had heard‖ (ET, 194), and where she resolved to 
find what ‗real life‘ was. In the National Portrait Gallery Eva is struck by the 
meaninglessness of symbols. Hermetically sealed in the microcosm of a dream-like self 
sufficiency Eva ―mirrors the fragmented turbulence of the lives of those around her‖ 
(Henke, 1992, 333) yet seems unable to see true life in the portraits of people that she 
sees. Eva herself occupies any subject position the world encumbers her with. The child 
Eva has serves as a link between the archaic maternal unconscious she craves and the 
castrated inscription into the symbolic. Eva‘s fragmented position as a subject keeps her 
away from fulfilling the Heideggerian plentiful existence of being – being-there, where, 
on the contrary, to Eva and Iseult ―All had been nothing. Life is an anti-novel‖ (ET, 
206). Life had no hegemonic narrative structure but rather was a detour from selfhood 
to otherness, and it was a discovery of layers of personalities embedding the non-
existent centre as in Slavoy Zizek‘s onion-like structure of identity. As a woman she 
may only be becoming. Iseult has long served Eva as (M)other, offering her a womb-
like shelter at Lumleigh, where both were bound in a pre-oedipal attachment. Now, Eva 
is reminded of the multiplicity she has lived with Iseult – ‗a non-relationship‘ that was 
stable and unimpaired, just as the relationship between mother and child. 
That relationship was guarded safely by Iseult, since she believes herself to 
suffer from Hedda Gabler‘s complex105 – an early feminist accused of vindictiveness 
towards men. The character of Hedda Gabler is considered by many a female Hamlet, 
who ends up shooting herself in the head and provoking other calamities. In the plot of 
the play Hedda is the one who burns the word – the manuscript of Ejlert Lovborg‘s 
masterpiece – a sequel to his recently published work.  
Language does not work with Miss Applethwaite, the sculptress with whom 
Jeremy is left while Eva is crossing the rooms of the National Portrait Gallery. For Miss 
Applethwaite may not offer Jeremy lessons in verbal discourse, yet she teaches him the 
art of sculpting – art of imitation and looking at the image of the other, which Father 
Clavering-Haigh: ―The road to narcissism‖ (ET, 183). For during the struggle to become 
                                                 
105 Henrik Ibsen‘s play Hedda Gabler (1990) has been considered to present one of the best dramatic 
female roles in theatre. The eponymous Hedda is believed in her multiplicity that constantly invites 
interpretation to be the female version of Hamlet, a feminist fighting for the society, as well as a cunning 
villain.  
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subject within the symbolic realm, the abjection becomes a precondition of narcissism 
according to Kristeva.  
From Miss Applethwaite‘s house Jeremy is taken away by a mysterious 
woman, whom Eva suspects to be Iseult Smith. Eva is visibly shaken by the possibility 
of Jeremy‘s disappearance, yet finds it difficult to talk to Miss Applethwaite, who seems 
to her more a witch - ―Are you human, Miss Applethwaite? At such moment as this – 
you must be infernal‖ (ET, 200). ―‗Words‘, said Eva, do not seem to disconnect from 
you, Miss Applethwaite.‘‖ To that Miss Mapplethaite responds: ―‗It is simply that I 
cannot describe people.‘‖ (ET, 201)  
Eva sees Miss Applethwaite as incomplete, just like the rooms she inhabits. 
Miss Applethwaite herself is conscious of her insignificance, where her art has taken her 
nowhere into the symbolic world – ―Applethwaite‖ would have been a name to have 
made. I have sometimes thought, just the kind of name; but no one has ever heard it. No 
one has heard of me. My work means nothing to the world‖ (ET, 200). Art, the semiotic 
expression of femininity seems to be condemned to doom in the father‘ s gaze – ―Why 
has nothing put a stop to the blindness, their blindness that I am right in the middle of?‖ 
(ET, 200) Again, curiously for women the only means of circulating wealth, money is 
having children, if not giving birth to them, then sheltering them - ? I have nothing on 
but rich children (...)‖ (ET, 200), admits Miss Applethwaite.  
It is also true that Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes is yet another of Bowen‘s 
novels that seeks for the dissection of the question: what it means to be a mother? Is 
there anything as synthetic motherhood, structures of privilege in mother-child 
relationships, or else motherly inborn empathy? In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes 
Bowen poses the ever feminist question, whether adult identity is constructed on the 
basis of desire for the missing child – Mother without Child - or the missing mother.  As 
Elaine Hansen writes in her Mother without Child, ―Mother without Child‘ may (…) 
suggest, in another spirit, the impossible figure of the woman who defies patriarchal 
motherhood but celebrates another kind of mothering‖ (Hansen, 1997, 52). Eva Trout, 
or Changing Scenes is Bowen‘s exploration of the idea of nonprocreative motherhood: 
hence, Bowen repeatedly works the concept from different possible angles, of 
nonexclusive and sometimes overlaid variants of the mother without child: the 
unbiological mother Eva; the surrogate emotional mother Iseult, the biological mother 
(sleeping mother) who loses one of her children and is a patriarchal representation of a 
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mother withdrawn from the society, and to a certain extent withdrawn from the family 
itself - Mrs Dancey and Elsinore‘s mother. Miss Applethwaite is also a woman involved 
with other‘s children though remaining childless. Eva‘s narrative is also overshadowed 
by the figure of her long-dead mother, whom Constantine blames for all the 
inadequacies of Eva‘s character – she is the woman who should have not had any 
children. Like so many of Bowen‘s protagonists, the female characters in Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes go on living entangled within the maternal dependence and affinities 
that order their lives. Motherly love, motherly presence, and craving for a mother are 
particularly strong motives in Bowen, though they are never represented as affective or 
emulating as in their traditionally patriarchal representation. However, the presence of 
these motives does lead to a certain self-discovery, even when this presence is expressed 
by a lack since many of Bowen‘s characters are orphaned explicitly or their mothers are 
simply never mentioned. Motherhood in Bowen constantly wavers and it is not a fixed 
point that any woman reaches as given reference in discourse – it is yet another 
becoming in life. It may be said that not only is Bowen interested in redefining female 
desire and its inscription into the official discourse, she, too, aims at redetermining the 
concepts of motherhood and its consequences for firstly the female subject and secondly 
the male subject.  
In her monstrosity, Miss Applethwaite, whose name reminds one of the 
symbols of sin – the apple, which, as we have seen, has many times figured in Bowen‘s 
fiction and in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes itself, seems to bear some resemblance 
with Mrs Bettersley, the she-werewolf and exorcist from Bowen‘s short story ―The 
Apple Tree‖. Miss Applethwaite, like Eva seems to be an outcast of the narrative – a 
stranger to language – and the abject. There is, however, a difference between Eva and 
the sculptress, whose sole occupation is imitation of life, and who envies Eva her 
freedom and generative powers – ―I have no future, for reasons which I have told you; 
but you have, and yours might take any course – yes, really any, I should imagine.‖ (ET, 
200) Both women search for the archaic powers of a mother – the sculptress, however, 
only manages to achieve some sort of existence through ‗feeding‘ on the other‘s 
children, and Eva strives towards the maternal in possessing Jeremy. For both the 
women there is no future without children – ―‗If he is in the past, there is no future. He 
was to be everything I shall not be.‘‖ (ET, 199) The mother must retain a hold on the 
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child for it serves as a link to authenticate her existence- an existence that needs 
validation from the symbolic order.  
The want for children reveals itself to be a primary one, as in the want for 
reunification with the archaic mother – being a mother, getting back to the mother one 
has never had. Miss Applethwaite tells Eva: ―I am sorry, but it is a known fact that 
people most dread what they subconsciously desire, or, if not desire, could assent  to 
with little trouble‖ (ET, 201). And what people subconsciously desire, according to 
much of theoretical psychoanalysis, is the abjection of the mother, literal, and secondary 
through the devouring of the child. In theory this idea has led critics to write extensively 
on the idea of autophagy of self and discourse in narrative identity. This means not only 
feeding on the child within – the Kristevan transference - but also feeding on one‘s own 
post-symbolic idea of the self to produce a discourse for the consumption of the other. 
Autophagy becomes a means of ―assertive action that symbolically recapitulates the 
infant‘s original break with the nursing mother‖ (Backus, 1999, 52) - the abjection of 
the maternal that both dynamically threatens and delineates the borders of the self – 
while the consumption of the other becomes a mode of being within the symbolic 
discourse.  
As Kristeva writes in her Powers of Horror, 
 
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a 
threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope 
of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be 
assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire, which nevertheless, does not let 
itself be seduced. Apprehensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects. A certainty protects 
it from the shameful – a certainty of which it is proud holds on to it. But simultaneously, 
just the same, that impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an elsewhere as tempting 
as it is condemned. Unflaggingly, like an inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons and 
repulsion places the one haunted by it literally beside himself. When I am beset by 
abjection, the twisted braid of affects and thoughts I call by such a name does not have, 
properly speaking a definable object. The abject is not an ob-ject facing me, which I name 
or imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of 
desire. What is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with someone or 
something else as support, would allow me to be more or less detached or autonomous. The 
abject has only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to I. (…). (Kristeva, 1982, 
4) 
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Both the desires for regaining the child and for regaining the mother are at the 
same time embedded in the process of abjection of that which the subject cannot 
embrace. Is not the process of subjectification based on the triangle of subjects both 
fascinating and repelling to each other? Toril Moi writes about positionality of subjects, 
 
We can view this repression of the feminine in terms of positionality rather than of 
essences. What is perceived as marginal at any given time depends on the position one 
occupies. (…): if patriarchy sees women as occupying a marginal position within the 
symbolic order, then it can construe them as the limit or borderline of that order. From a 
phallocentric point of view, women will then come to represent the necessary frontier 
between man and chaos; but because of their very marginality they will also always seem to 
recede into and merge with the chaos of the outside. (…) It is this position that has enabled 
male culture sometimes to vilify women as representing darkness and chaos, to view them 
as Lilith or Whore of Babylon, and sometimes to elevate them as the representatives of a 
higher and purer nature, to venerate them as Virgins and Mothers of God (Moi, 1985, 165-
166). 
 
According to Kristeva, the occluded generative power that reveals itself under 
concepts of the phallus, the name of the father, the phallic mother, and of the dead 
father inscribes into the signifying patterns layers of uncertainty and complementarities. 
―If there is a texture of a sorts that might seem as underlying this fundamental 
uncertainty, it is a texture of nothingness: the death drive‖ (Nikolchina, 2004, 41), 
where the subject is deconstructed by various, simultaneously operating discourses. 
Life, the ethical life implies as Zizek writes tarrying with the negative (Zizek, 1993), 
instead of succumbing to the demand of the other – and this may ultimately take us to 
death. Doing so, and abandoning the neutral position, subjects engage in the death 
drive‘s reiteration, from the abjection of the mother, through the death of the father 
towards the death of the subject. As such subjects are eternally implicated in a death 
process that paradoxically makes death produce life and signification – the signification 
of concatenation. Nothingness and death are the ultimate sources of knowledge, since 
symbolically they are represented in Zizek as a skull facing inwards through the 
hollowness of empty eye sockets – something Eva too is allowed to see in the sculpture 
of her head Jeremy prepares for her during a day spent at Miss Applethwaite:  
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It was a large knob, barely representational – only, he had gouged with his two thumbs 
deep, deep into the slimed clay, making eye-sockets go, almost, right through the cranium. 
Out of their dark had exuded such non-humanity that Eva had not know where to turn. (ET 
190) 
 
For Kristeva chora is a ―non-expressive totality formed by the drives and their 
states in a totality that is as full of movements as it is regulated. This regulation is 
defined by Kristeva as a mediation of social symbolic law, which is assumed through 
the mother‘s body (Kristeva, 1984, 93). Eva mediates the symbolic to Jeremy – chora 
empowers women to mediate the symbolic. 
According to Kristeva in Powers of Horror the semiotic life is accompanied by 
the processes of sublimation, just as the ―sublimated monotony‖ (ET, 188) that 
‗cocoons‘ Jeremy and Eva in a ‗womb‘-like state,  
 
 Sublimation, on the contrary, is nothing else than the possibility of naming the pre-
nominal, the pre-objectal, which are in fact only a trans-nominal, a trans-objectal. In the 
symptom, the abject permeates me, I become abject. Through sublimation, I keep it under 
control. The abject is edged with the sublime. It is not the same moment on the journey, but 
the same subject and speech bring them into being (Kristeva, 1982, 11).  
 
Through sublimation, the abject is transferred to an object able to exist in the 
symbolic. On the other hand, Zizek says the sublime object can paradoxically only exist 
in shadow ―as something latent, implicit, evoked‖ (Zizek, 1992, 54) because it is 
impossible, it is a nonentity. On both levels, above-mentioned happiness is impossible 
per se and even if it does exist as a result of a conscious choice it is indefinable. The 
death of Eva is her sublimation into an angelic state pre-mentioned in the narrative. The 
semiotic life with Jeremy obeys the rules of certain sublimating rites, of which harmony 
is only occasionally broken by the discourse of strangers – ―Their repetitive doings 
became rites. Harmony had been broken in upon only by the tussles with ear-and-
speech men, or women, to whom she faithfully took him.‖ (ET, 189)  
In Powers of Horror Kristeva writes that, ―Abjection preserves what existed in 
the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be‖ (Kristeva, 1982, 10). Jeremy‘s 
abjection of Eva can be seen as a preservation of the maternal within him – sublimation 
of the maternal, and possible entrance into the symbolic – the rituals. And if we have 
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inferred that abjection is the founding tenet of excluding the maternal on entering into 
the symbolic, it is also a palpable sign (since it occurs throughout one‘s life) of the 
continuous indefferable presence of the maternal. Even the concept of autophagy – self-
consummation- that has been mentioned in this chapter, points towards the 
inseparability of the child/self from the (m)other. Thus, if in phaloccentrism abjection, 
which reveals itself in the concepts of ritual cannibalism and autophagy, should be 
directed at excluding the mother, in feminist theory, it points to her overt and 
undeniable presence within the matrix of the subject. 
Raymond Hilliard‘s describes ritual cannibalism in his text entitled ―Clarissa 
and Ritual Cannibalism‖ (Hilliard, 1999). Hilliard reminds us of Pierre Fauchery‘s 
delineation of ritual sacrifice of women as a topos central to the representation of 
women in the eighteenth century European novel. It is not merely a ritual sacrifice, 
according to Hilliard, but ritual cannibalism that depicts the discourse on femininity 
starting with eighteenth century novel. And as we have mentioned earlier, as an 
aftermath of suffering, subjects auto-consume themselves. Parallel to that, they engage 
in consummation of the other, resulting from partaking with the other, which brings 
suffering. 
Barbara Creed writes in her The Monstrous Feminine that a ―ritual is a means 
by which societies both renew their initial contact with the abject element and that 
exclude that element. Through ritual, the demarcation lines between human and non-
human are drawn up anew and presumably made all the stronger for that process‖ 
(Creed, 1993, 8). The fully ritualised symbolic body must bear no indication of its debt 
to nature, it can therefore abide within the world of fantasy – cinema, just like Eva and 
Jeremy did in America, or else it should shed its affiliation to the semiotic and enter the 
symbolic. Communal rituals, as well as the religious ones serve as prohibitions against 
contact with the mother, warding off the fear of one‘s own identity sinking irrevocably 
into the mother – Eva‘s wedding seems to be one of such rituals. Eva becomes the 
beginning and the end – the parthenogenetic mother, the archaic mother, the point of 
origin and of end, of which apparently all children dream according to Freud.  
In his ―Fetishism in the Horror Film‖ Roger Dadoun describes such an archaic 
mother in detail, 
 
A mother-thing situated beyond good and evil, beyond all organized forms and all events. 
This is a totalizing and oceanic mother, a shadowy and deep unity, evoking in the subject 
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the anxiety of fusion and of dissolution; a mother who comes before the discovery of the 
essential béance, that of the phallus. This mother is nothing but a fantasy inasmuch as she is 
only ever established as an omnipresent and all-powerful totality, an absolute being, by the 
very intuition – she has no phallus – that deposes her (...). (Dadoun, 1989, 53-4)  
 
Eva Trout passes to exist as ‗a non-presence‘ which can be understood as a very archaic 
form of presence. Her dead rigid body will now be a substitute for the archaic mother‘s 
phallus that has managed to transform the child into her desire – annihilation of the 
dominant order. Instead, in the course of the narrative, her still living body served as a 
mesmerising fetish for the other in the novel.  
If we look back at feminist theories, according to Elizabeth Grosz, in 
psychoanalytical theory there are three possibilities for female fetishism. In the first 
place, femininity itself can be seen to be a fetish, the substitution of material signs on 
the woman‘s own body for the ―missing‖ phallus, thereby remaking the entire body into 
the phallus through narcissistic self-investment. In the second place, the hysteric offers 
an externalized version of fetishism and invests a part of her own body with displaced 
sexuality. Finally, Freud‘s ―masculinity complex‖ in women most closely illustrates the 
disavowal proper to fetishism through the substitution of an object outside of the 
woman (another woman‘s body), rather than her own or part of her own. Differently 
from Elizabeth Grosz, Butler‘s ‗lesbian phallus‘ illustrates the potential detachability of 
the phallus as an idealized signifier of desire in Freudian and Lacanian theory; thus it 
can be transferred to and re-appropriated by other kinds of bodies and subjects. Teresa 
De Lauretis definitively liberates fetishism from its anchorage in phallocentric theories 
(the positing of the fetish as penis or phallus substitute, the explanation of fetishism as 
related to horror at the sight of female genitals) by arguing that the fetish is not the 
substitution for a ―real‖ lack but constitutes the fetish of a fetish, the material sign of a 
desiring fantasy that marks both matter and its absence, and draws from both the subject 
and the object. As Sarah Kofman106 noted in The Enigma of Woman a fetish is a positive 
                                                 
106 Sarah Kofman wrote extensively on Lacan, Freud and Nietzsche and started her academic career 
under Gilles Deleuze and Jean Hyppolite. She has written in The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freud‟s 
Writings (1985) that fetishism belongs to masculine economy and it is Freud himself who has castrated 
women.  Fetishism for women means the discovery that there is no symmetry between the masculine and 
the feminine. The theory of penis envy conceals Freud‘s exclusion of the possibility of representing 
sexual difference.  
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example of multiplicity of femininity that conforms to the idea that there is no original 
truth in disavowal/acknowledgement of sexual difference. Thus what is fetishized in 
lesbian desire, De Lauretis argues, is the female body itself or something that is 
metonymically related to it. These revisions allow feminist theorists to theorize forms of 
feminine desire—and especially lesbian desire—that do not correspond to 
heteronormative and phallocentric theories of sexuality. They allow one to see the 
intricacies of the archaic mother‘s fetishism, as a latent sign of an inseparable union 
between the child and the mother, as well as the mother as a child, and her own mother.  
The idea of fetish in feminism accompanies the complex theoretical intricacies 
of concepts such as a mother-without-child, consuming motherhood, and child as a 
fetish. Fetishism is closely connected to the subject‘s dwelling within a pre-oedipal 
level, where infantile aggression, splitting of the ego, and the need for a transitional 
object to manage separation from the mother inform the subject‘s relation to fetishism. 
A mother, who uses her child as a fetish, lives a compulsive relationship with either her 
own mother or the father, or any external other that she elects as necessary for her own 
subjectification. Fetish grants us leverage on the absolute strangeness of otherness. 
Fetish is compounded by a particular fascination and revulsion (abjection) with the 
images of otherness that occupy a special place in the alien system of values of that very 
other.  Fetishism stands for a sublimation of otherness, be it motherhood itself, 
childhood, the archaic mother, womanhood or the phallus. It stands, as in Freud, for the 
sublimation of death through the sublimation of mother. Every narrative asks for a 
textual fetish and this seems to partially answer J. L. Austin‘s question – How to do 
things with words? - Through fetishism. A fetish is a story masquerading as an object, 
whereas, in fact, it is rather a subject of our subject. A fetish is a universal part of 
motherhood, as well as selfhood in general, when we mourn the separation from the 
mother, from the child, from completeness before the symbolic order.  
And since fetish is a masquerade of an object, and in fact a subject of the 
subject, masquerade itself is a fetishistic process necessary for identificatory processes 
and equally valid within discourses of femininity. As has been mentioned Joan Riviere 
talked about feminism as masquerade – a notion that has shed much light. Fetishism 
becomes a universal process for both genders pointing not towards a lack but rather 
multiplicity and production of different signifiers.  
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Another argument for fetishism and masquerade being both mutually entangled 
and constitutive processes of female discourse is represented in the fact that, according 
to Freud, maternal pedagogy is always visual pedagogy. Sublimation of the (m)other, 
re-finding of the mother-within, happens through masquerade of femininity by an 
explicit visual sublimation. And it is no mere coincidence that culturally women engage 
often in highlighting the visible in femininity, be it masquerade or not, these became 
equally valid discourses in the making of femininity, or rather: femininities. 
In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes Bowen sublimates monstrosity of her 
eponymous character through fetishizing her body in the narrative. Eva becomes part of 
Jeremy‘s material world, Eva‘s recollections of her mother are no more than objects 
collected during her lifetime with which she surrounds herself. To discover what is the 
riddle of female sexuality would be to discover the mother – to commit incest, as 
Kofman writes. Within phallic economy fetishism, matricide, and castration are the only 
alternatives. Fetishism means having it both ways. Fetishism is a riddle, therefore a 
masquerade. 
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4. Going Back to the Gothic and the Spaces of Alterity. 
 
In Anglo-Irish gothic family romance the locus of action is situated within the 
space of alterity. In this sense the narrative construction of Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes relies on operations of constructing alternative spaces out of the traditional 
time/space paradigm. Action takes place in various alternate sites. The chapter entitled 
―Interim‖, which gives us a chance to look at Eva from a perspective of another 
character/focalizer takes place in the air, that is during the journey made by plane by 
both Prof Holman and Eva Trout herself. In the air, as Portman C. Holman explains 
there comes time of experiencing ―the no-hour: the ever to me enormity of an airborne 
post-noon‖ (ET, 125). At the time when a ―terrible onus is on the plane, elongated the 
longer one looks along it to an all but hypothetical vanishing point‖ (ET, 125-126). This 
time of horror ―an unreal torpor fills the pressurized air; bodies abandon themselves to 
daylit slumber in contorted attitudes to death. Awake or asleep, Mrs Trout, who is not 
afraid?‖ (ET, 125) To this, Bowen adds the monstrosity Eva herself represents as the 
one who deals apples from her possession, the fruit of sin. She herself is so heavy and 
out of proportion that she is having trouble ―finding room for her big feet in the space 
accorded by Economy‖ (ET, 124). Before Eva‘s attention falls on Holman he retains the 
sense of time to an acute extent of counting minutes to his conversation with Eva as 
forty five minutes. Then the time is blurred.  
Another example of the space of alterity is represented in the castle that Willy 
Trout buys for his friend Constantine and where the peculiar boarding school is 
constructed. There Eva becomes ―one of the twenty guinea-pigs‖ (ET, 48). The castle at 
the lakeside is a place where people who dwell there ―are reborn‖ (ET, 51). There the 
children play gruesome tricks on each other, they do the ―Dracula up‖ from balcony to 
balcony and set up pre-Oedipal traps for the teachers. The most curious element of the 
castle is hidden in the presence of near-albino Elsinore ―Ophelia‘s illegit‖ (ET, 56) who 
is supposedly snatched away from a Japanese butler‘s son. She then develops a nervous 
breakdown. Elsinore makes an attempt at drowning herself in the lake but is saved. 
However, she does enter an inexplicable comma after the accident and is put up in Eva‘s 
‗octagonal‘ room since there is no ‗sickroom‘ in the castle. There 
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the watch began. No longer the mornings transform the room, a perpetual makeshift curtain 
having been thumb-tacked over the window, to hide lake – now, only a lightening of the 
fabric on which stood out a cabalistic pattern spoke of the duration of the short spaces, too 
like one another to be days, between night and night: whatever the hour by the clock (ET, 
55-56).  
 
The octagonal room becomes the space of self-discovery for Eva, a space out 
of time and reality where she tends to Elsinore, as we have already seen, where ―to 
repose a hand on the blanket covering Elsinore was to know in the palm of the hand a 
primitive tremor – imagining the beating of that other heart, she had a passionately 
solicitous sense of that other presence (ET, 56). In a room that in its shape resembled a 
Dracula coffin, Eva recognizes her own source of desire for otherness. After all 
symbolically octagonal shape brings to mind concepts of transition, totality, 
regeneration and rebirth, as much as infinity. Bowen writes about the moments Eva 
spends with Elsinore when  
 
Nothing forbad love. This deathly yet living stillness, together, of two beings, this 
unapartness, came to be the requital of all longing. An endless feeling of destiny filled the 
room.  (ET, 56)  
 
Maybe, as Eva says Elsinore ―wants her mother. But nobody heard‖ (ET, 55). 
The same way, in the earlier section entitled ―Two Schools‖, Eva muses on her life with 
the Larkins where she finds herself lying with a heavy cold. While in bed Eva is 
overcome by ―the enormous sadness which had no origin that she knew of‖ (ET, 47). 
She there muses on the emptiness of the motherly chair by the fire that is rejoicing in 
having ―no motherly occupant‖ (ET, 47).  Eva is lying in the dark – ―What are you 
doing, Eva, lying in the dark? Lying in the dark‖ (ET, 47).  
 
‗How is my darling?‘ – but when? where? Some other child had been present, a very sick 
one: ‗Darling.‘ Eva searched through her store of broken pieces of time, each one cut out 
more sharply by fever, looking for an answer. The voice had come in as a door opened – 
but what door? where? (ET, 47-48). 
 
Here we can again recall what we have said about Deleuzian desire as prior to 
need. Deleuze reconfigures the concept of desire: what we desire; what we invest our 
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desire in, is a social formation, and in this sense desire is always positive. Lack appears 
only at the level of interests, because the social formation- the infrastructure – in which 
we have already invested our desire has in turn produced that lack. The true object of 
the immanent ethics is the drives. Bowen shows us both how much Eva is a product of 
alterity and how her world views produces these very same places of alterity.  
Spaces of alterity do not only require a most common spatial understanding but 
are also hidden within speech practices in the novel. Metaphorical gaps within speech 
and lacunae not only appear within the ‗father‘s parole‘ as spoken by Constantine, for 
example. The convulted and contorted language is spoken by Eva whereas actual gaps 
within speech, that is lack of speech in particular, is shown in Jeremy‘s deafness and 
dumbness and his different grasp of communication. Whereas, in many novels that 
perpetuate the Anglo-Irish gothic theme of vampirism and the living dead107 is being 
inflicted on children108, here the children already seem to have been infected. They now 
seem to suffer from a general disorientation, which Bowen believed to be a fundamental 
concept of any Anglo-Irish child‘s self concept, as she expressed in her Seven Winters: 
Memories of a Dublin Childhood. As such, Jeremy is a metaphorical offspring of earlier 
victims of the devouring Anglo-Irish system.  He is an offspring of characteristic 
unspeakability within the Anglo-Irish family, and a product of Anglo-Irish history. That 
said the liminal spaces are embedding not only territories but discourse as well. As 
Backus writes in her The Gothic Family Romance, ―The Anglo-Irish devil‘s compact 
and the figure of the living dead, the gothic literary tropes (…), emblematize the 
capitalist symbolic contract as it has played out within Ireland under and in the wake of 
British colonial rule‖ (Backus, 1999, 33) and literature in Ireland has been steadily 
interpolated by these transhistorical demonic forces.  
To a certain degree Bowen‘s Irish novel The Last September is treated as a 
return of the Anglo-Irish feminism and continues as a dominant trait in Eva Trout, or 
                                                 
107 The concepts of vampirism, infected children, and the undead in Irish and Anglo-Irish literature can, 
for example, be traced as far back as the Irish legendary figure of Devorgilla brought back by Yeats‘ ―The 
Dreaming of the Bones‖. They are present in the wirings of Jonathan Swift (in Gulliver‟s Travels and ―A 
Modest Proposal‖ as an example); in Edmund Burke‘s A Vindication; in Maria Edgeworth‘s Castle 
Rackrent; and in Sheridan Le Fanu‘s ―Carmilla‖. In the present day writing the above themes can be seen 
in Glen Patterson‘s Burning Your On (1988).  
108 As described in Margot Gayle Backus‘s The Gothic Family Romance. 
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Changing Scenes, developing from the importance that women had within the settlers‘ 
philosophy. The death of Eva Trout is therefore a result, to a certain degree, of the 
increasing hybridity of Anglo-Irish women. Anglo-Irish women are victims and 
testimonies of a culture confronting its own demise.  
Alterity, for the last part is represented in monstrosity, hybridity and 
hermaphroditism of eponymous Eva Trout. Eva destabilizes the system by which male 
and female – and hence masculine and feminine – are set off from each other, rendered 
mutually exclusive as well as categorically opposed. The argument that Bowen poses 
here is comparable with a growing need for a counter-discourse on subjectivity and 
specifically on femininity. Donna Haraway would call for a new discourse on cyborg 
subjectivity following Deleuzian idea of machine-like connection ―molded together into 
a monstrous mechanism‖ (O‘Toole, 2009, 168) and well presented in Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes itself: ―(…) no further sort or kind of any further communication has 
been had from you since; though sallies into Broadstairs, in incomplete control of a 
powerful bicycle, have been reported‖ (ET, 118). Hence Bowen does call for a new 
hybrid discourse since as Jennifer Gonzalez remarks in her ―Envisioning Cyborg 
Bodies: Notes from Current Research‖: 
The image of the cyborg has historically recurred at moments of radical and cultural 
change… In other words, when the current ontological model of human beings does not fit 
a new paradigm, a hybrid model of existence is required to encompass a new, complex and 
contradictory lived experience. (Gonzalez 61, in Walshe, 2009, 169) 
 
Hermaphroditism and monstrosity take us back to Mikhail Bakhtin and his 
concept of the grotesque body of the carnival that serves us to revitalize the notions of 
masculinity and femininity. This contributes to a liberated sense of a multiple subject 
which comprises elements of fantasy, openness and play. It is worth remembering that 
Elizabeth Bowen showed an ―innocent taste for incognito‖ (Ellman, 2003, 74) and 
grotesque since her very first novel The Hotel, as noted in Ellman‘s The Shadow Across 
the Page.  
In keeping with the grim textual weather of the castle, the very monstrosity of 
eponymous Eva is highlighted in the question she is asked by her friends while still 
studying at the private school – ―Trout, are you a hermaphrodite?‖ (ET, 51) Eva, 
apparently, does not know, yet we are told that ―At fourteen Eva was showing no signs 
of puberty, which discouraged the matron or house mother‖ (ET, 49). What is more, one 
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of Eva‘s friends remembers the story of Joan of Arc, as an example of hermaphroditism, 
which corresponds to the intersexual and ambiguous character of Eva. And 
consequently, what the figure of Joan of Arc highlights is the mythology of female 
heroism and autonomy, as well as an ideal personification of virtue. It too signals that 
the life of Eva will end in a sacrificial death. To us Eva maps the emergence of intersex 
activism within a woman‘s discourse. Like Joan of Arc she is the hermaphrodite 
progeny of Virgin Mary and the Undine witch, because she is both chaste and 
murderous. Eva combines in her nature two archetypal women, she raises a child though 
she acquires it in an unconventional manner in a clandestine market of unwanted 
children, hence she does not give birth to Jeremy and remains virginal, yet she spreads 
destruction and tempts people to sin. Eva Trout‘s monstrosity corroborates the Anglo-
Irish fascination with and treatment of monsters, and the monstrous. She is told to be 
allowed latitude ―on the grounds of her being partly foreign (this no one queried) and 
partly handicapped‖ (ET, 62-63) mysteriously since ―in what particular or what reason 
she was to be taken to be the latter was not gone into‖ (ET, 63). She bears a double 
meaning of hermaphroditism: a doubly sexed body, and a veiled figure of corporeal 
ambiguity – she can be all things to all readers since as Lidia Curti writes in her Female 
Stories, Female Bodies: ―The accumulation and overflow of bodies and languages, the 
elements of proliferation and giantism, seem oneiric fantasies off compensation for the 
vanishing of stable singular identities‖ (Curti, 1998, 107). Jane Gallop while writing on 
monstrosity and otherness refers to Nancy Chodorow‘s and Luce Irigaray‘s ideas on 
inseparability of the daughter and mother – where the one does not move without the 
other (the mother does not move without the child). To her the term ‗monstrous‘ -   
 
refers to a ‗continuous multiple being‘ (...) a being whose multiple parts are neither totally 
merged nor totally separate (...) whose boundaries are inadequately differentiated, thus 
calling into question the fundamental opposition of self and other. Such being is terrifying 
because of the stake any self as self has in its own autonomy, in its individuation, in its 
integrity. (Gallop, 1989, 90) 
 
However, since monsters have always been associated with the sign from God, 
the figuration of monsters requires perceiving them as such. In fact the word monster 
derives from words monstrate: to show and monere: to warn. Monstrous 
hermaphrooditism has envisioned the possibility of engendered wholeness. It 
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reconnected identity with the wholeness of desire, as object of desire and as dealing 
desire autonomously. Monsters are active and dynamic and this contradicts the idea of 
fixity of female existence that actually reaches back to the myth of Penelope imagined 
as static and ever journeying Ulysses. The monster does not move without its other, or 
rather the self does not move without its monstrous overshadowing other. In a similar 
manner Eva does not move without her son Jeremy in whom she finally allocates her 
longing for belonging. This is not without saying that Eva has not thrived to allocate 
herself within otherness for a long time. In fact, one of the epiphanic moments happens 
to Eva when she realises that Iseult Smith cares for her: ―But – you care for me?‘ As 
much as I can.‘ Then that is enough.‖ (ET, 66) It is enough for Eva‘s narrative when 
such a creature as Iseult with ―a face already becoming unearthly‖ (ET, 78) notices her 
and becomes her guardian angel: ―...But thou art Light...‖ (ET, 65), as well as the 
maternal figure since light is connected to the idea of conception and now used by 
Bowen in the novel‘s chapter entitled ―Genesis‖. It is of far more interest within the text 
when Eva becomes a sort of monstrous fallen angel of annunciation in the novel abused 
by many and yet this having little impact on her inside,  a trope that again follows the 
poetry of the ‗metaphysicals‘ favoured by Iseult Smith: ―- But thou art Light, and 
Darkness both together:‖ (ET, 65). 
 
Eric got hold of Eva by the pouchy front of her anorak and shook her. The easy 
articulations of her joints made this rewarding – her head rolled on her shoulders, her arms 
swung from them. Her teeth did not rattle, being firm in her gums, but coins and keys all 
over her clinked and jingled.  Her hair flumped all ways like a fiddled-about-with mop. The 
crisis became an experiment: he ended by keeping her rocking, at slowing tempo, left-right, 
left-right, off one heel on to the other, meanwhile pursing his lips, as though whistling, and 
frowning speculatively. The experiment interested Eva also. Did it gratify her too much? – 
he let go abruptly. ‗That‘s all‘ he told her. ‗But mind your own business next time. (ET, 
101) 
 
This idea of finding otherness for selfhood repeatedly is overwhelming for ―the 
monstrous heiress‖ (ET, 63) who is unable to speak – talk, be understood, converse and 
yet possesses a panoply of bodily languages which Iseult Smith teaches her to order 
―rightly or wrongly‖ (ET, 62) – ―And then what? – then you begin again‖ (ET, 62).  
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Thanks to Iseult Smith‘s attention granted to Eva the whole school is shaken – 
―how far could compassion go?‖ (ET, 63) As Nietzsche would ask, how deep is our 
longing for servitude and slavery? Yet slowly, credulity overtakes Eva: 
 
Then, through one after another midsummer night, daylight never quite gone from the 
firmament, cubicle curtains round her like white pillars, she was kept amazed and awake by 
joy. She saw (she thought) the aurora borealis. Love, like a great moth circled her bed, then 
settled. Air came to her pillow from hayfields where, not alone, she had walked in trance, 
or the smell, of the rushy and minty and earthy wetness of moments at the fringe of the 
stream returned. The silence of buildings and of garden was now and then distributed by a 
sigh. (ET, 63)  
 
This, I believe, is the most erotically charged fragment in Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes, if not one of the most erotically charged pieces in the whole of Bowen‘s literary 
oeuvre. It all happens  during midsummer at night, where words such as white pillars 
wrapping around Eva in trance and amazed smelling of rushy and minty and earthy 
wetness bring out sighs penetrating silence – Eva thinks she comes to see aurora 
borealis. This is Eva‘s second experience of otherness since the first one that involved 
tender Elsinore too happened within her octagonal chambers at night. Then, however, 
Elsinore is snatched away from Eva‘s bedside after having lied still and in a coma for 
weeks. Now, this encounter with otherness is new to Eva and reveals almost ―too much 
for her‖ (ET, 63) so that she goes about ―haggardly‖ (ET, 63). It stands for a metaphor 
of transgression. At Lumleigh school it is thought that Eva ―had seen a ghost‖ (ET, 64) 
but in fact it is only Ms Smith that realises the transformatory character of the 
experiences Eva is having. ―Are you coming nearer the surface, I wonder?‖ (ET, 64) she 
asks Eva and adds ―I want you to.‘ Yes, I am.‘ Yet there are sometimes times when I 
think you would rather go on being submerged. Sometimes you cling to being in deep 
water. What are you afraid of?‖ (ET, 64) To this Eva responds ―That at the end of it all 
you‘ll find out that I have nothing to declare‖ (ET, 64). She has yet to learn that the 
truth of meaning lies in things beginning over and over again as Iseult Smith puts it, 
where meaning is found in ever-changing and overlapping connections between singular 
drives and desires. Mary Shelley writes in her introduction to Frankenstein or the 
Modern Prometheus ―Invention, it must be humbly admitted, does not consist in 
creating out of void, but out of chaos; the materials must, in the first place, be afforded: 
it can give form to dark, shapeless substances, but cannot bring into being the substance 
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itself‖ (Shelley, 2001, xii). This is not only a renunciation for creative powers ‗in 
making‘, this is too a renunciation of power that women possess to create and 
contradict. The joy of being is accompanied by the terrors of creation, terrors of 
otherness and the very terrors of the new creature. In writing about Eva what Bowen 
highlights is the possibility of female agency that may be a site of female unheimlich, 
and which is then symbolised by the destruction of Eva just like the destruction of 
female monster performed by the doctor in Frankenstein.  
But as we have said, Eva comprises in herself the heroism of Joan of Arc and 
monstrosity of a witch (Bowen very often referred to writing as witchcraft and was 
herself referred to as a witch by her long-standing lover, and Canadian diplomat, 
Charles Ritchie). What Eva Trout can be called then is an angel of renunciation of truth 
– renunciation of a new discourse: a counter-discourse for women.  
If we go back to the citation where Eva is abused physically by Eric we may 
see it as a dance macabre from a carnivalesque scene by Mikhail Bakhtin. The above 
fragment takes us back to the already mentioned ―The Dancing Mistress‖ where both 
scenes represent a construction of something anew, through going out of one‘s body. 
According to Bakhtin, it is only the classical bourgeois body whose boundaries are 
meticulously regulated. This is a body that appears perfectly finished and unchanging. 
Contrary to that the carnivalesque and grotesque foreground proturberances and 
orifices: the teeth that rattle, ―coins and keys (...)‖ – that – ―clinked and jingled‖ (ET, 
101). Carnivalesque highlights activities such as eating, drinking, defecating, love-
making and giving birth that reveal the permeability of bodily boundaries. It also draws 
from the medieval idea of dance macabre where death joins hands with the living and 
where apparent binaries are done away with – the image of death being itself a 
grotesque monstrosity. The dance macabre is the dance of Carnival that oversteps the 
boundaries of a body, laughs at hegemonies and thus creates new discourses on power 
and hegemony. Bakhtin calls the dance macabre ‗the dialogic open form‘, in which 
conventions and expectations are routinely undone and overthrown. Here in Bowen the 
dance is a darkly funny force that mutates forms – it subsumes individuality to an 
emerging gestalt so that the new voices can be heard. 
Carnival is an immaterial force that embodies difference and relations between 
subjects. It too draws attention to multiplicity of roles and acts that are culturally 
produced rather than naturally ordained. On an individual subject‘s level acts can be 
293 
 
performed and reiterated freely in opposition to hegemonic values and in relation to the 
subject‘s iterability. Subjects are therefore intercorporeal and intertextual. In carnival 
the body becomes a body in mutation and is described in Bakhtin‘s Rabelais and his 
World as  
 
a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, never completed: it is continually built, 
created, and builds and creates another body. Moreover, the body swallows the world and is 
itself swallowed by the world (…) Eating, drinking, defecation and other elimination 
(sweating blowing of the nose, sneezing), as well as copulation, pregnancy, 
dismemberment, swallowing up by another body – all these acts are performed on the 
confines of the body and the outer world, or on the confines of the old and new body. In all 
these events, the beginning and end of life are closely interwoven.‖ (Bakhtin, 1984, 317) 
 
In the dance macabre performed by Eric and Eva – the scientist and 
Frankenstein become one another‘s visions. Even though it is obvious that it is Eric who 
abuses Eva, we do not know who subjects the performance of drawing satisfaction – as 
in carnival ―it is precisely each other that they share‖ (Holquist, 1990, 91). The illusion 
of closed-off bodies is shattered and concepts of ―isolated psyche in bourgeois 
individualism‖ (Holquist, 1990, 90) are erased. There is no static, closed-off identity. 
When Eric finds out that ―the experiment interested Eva also‖ (ET, 101), he is swept by 
the lack of the uniqueness in his vision and closeness of the other he so much wishes to 
abject – so he let‘s go abruptly. According to Bowen Eva is the monster, Frankenstein, 
the creator, the Modern Prometheus and the fallen angel – when she yawns, ―so 
dismissive a yawn‖ (ET, 109), the yawn distends ―her  rib cage to cracking-point, just 
not dislocating her jaw by the grace of heaven‖ (ET, 109). The removal of Eva‘s 
autonomy can only be temporary since sexual slavery provides sexual adventures for the 
picara that Eva personifies in the masculine discourse. 
As such, Eva becomes a distorted version of an angel in the house, who may 
well be banished by the father‘s parole but welcomed by a feminist attempt at 
discourse. Even though originally the angel in the house referred to women taking care 
of the home, it was a purely masculine invention. Like angels she is of ambiguous 
sexual nature or rather asexual since theologically they are neither male nor female. As 
such the angelic Eva can be identified with the third sex.  
Sexual ambiguity has been at the centre of feminist debates where one of the 
pivotal points was Virginia Woolf‘s novel Orlando. One of the cinematic re-visitations 
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of Woolf‘s Orlando made by Sally Potter in 1992 gives the viewers a new angle on 
sexual ambiguity in the creation of the asexual angel singing at the beginning and the 
end of the film – an image which has already been linked to Benjamin‘s angel of history 
―to the black and white angels that inhabit the fragmentary, dream-like cinema of Isaac 
Julien‖ (Curti, 1998, 87). To this Iain Chambers presents his short theory on angels as 
such in his Migrancy, Culture, Identity writing that: 
 
The angels condense past, present and future. Under their gaze we find ourselves caught 
between the apparent ineluctability of time and its continual crisis (...) For the angels 
announce history as a perpetual becoming, an inexhaustible emerging, an eternal 
provocation, a desire that defies and transgresses the linear flow of historicist reason with 
the insistent now, the Jetz, of the permanent time of the possible (Chambers, 1994, 134-
135).  
 
Eva Trout becomes such an ambiguous angel. Not surprisingly Bowen writes in the 
novel that, 
 
Not far off, in one of those chance islands of space she stood tall as a candle, some accident 
of the light rendering her luminous from top to toe – in a pale suit, elongated by the 
elegance of its narrowness, and turned-back little hat of the same no-colour; no flowers, but 
on the lapel of the jacket a spraying-out subcontinent of diamonds; a great brooch (ET, 309-
310).  
 
 
 
. 
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5. Autonomy and Irony. 
 
―In the commodity a relation between people takes on the character of a thing 
and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly rational 
and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation 
between people‖ (Lukács, 1971, 83). To Lukács commodity stands for an expression of 
alienated sociability, where ―the definite social relations between men themselves 
assumes here, for them, the fatastic form of a relation between things‖ (Lukács, 1971, 
165). Commodities have come to signify emblems of identity and articulations of 
difference. The relationship towards commodities has become an embodiment of 
suspended, obfuscated or arrested sociability. Eva‘s relationship towards her 
commodities can, among many things, be understood as Bowen's signal in favour of 
liberty and freedom. Nowadays, one of the post-feminist claims seems to be the 
reinvention of the youthful womanhood myth for whom freedom has now been won, 
and who partakes freely in the global market of commercial goods. If this ―popular 
feminist appropriation permits more subtle modalities of gender re-inscription and re-
subordination to be pursued‖ (McRobbie, 2005, 533) its claims may coincide with 
Bowen's pursuing of new female discourse in directions contrary to those of hegemonic 
male narratives. Pleasurable participation in the dominant culture can ―mark out 
moments of (...) empowerment and subversive identity formation‖ (McRobbie, 2005, 
534). As postulated by the 1990's feminism, Bowen too in her last novel had already 
ventured on caving a path towards a more independent and individualized girl with her 
ironizing of romantic narratives  and use of consumerist guise. This she did juxtapose 
against elements of patriarchal power or the heterosexual matrix, which included female 
anxieties about the body, the need for male approval and search for a husband. However 
these can be understood as nothing more than endless masquerade of the cloying girlie 
infantilism (looking into the mirror, trying on dresses, taking teeth out - as Livvy, from 
The Last September, after getting engaged as if she has been put/sublimated into 
masculine discourse and had her 'vagina teeth taken out' bleeding from a wound as if 
deflowered, blushing109) that offer many critical possibilities for analysis for more 
                                                 
109 Blood, deflowering, vagina dentata etc are here signaled as inhibiting attributes of masculine 
symbolic. Women need to be sublimated through the process of marriage from the danger they pose as 
296 
 
feminist and Queer readings. Irony and feminine performativity is by no means 
deliberately deployed by Bowen. As McRobbie admits after Butler ―femininity is 
always a doing (...) femininity is indeed a kind of drag‖ (McRobbie, 2005, 542) and so 
is Bowen‘s Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. In patriarchal discourse the category of 
child finds itself replaced by the category of girl, which misleadingly permits the quest 
for identity within the parole of the father.  
Relational autonomy does not exclude actions parallel with the dominant order 
which at the same time claim a new identity in their discourse. As Judith Butler admits, 
any ―regime of truths sets the invariable framework for recognition: it means only that it 
is in relation to this framework that recognition takes place or the norms that govern 
recognition are challenged or transformed‖ (Butler 2005 in McRobbie, 2005, 532). 
Constantine epitomizes Foucault's resonant ideas of hegemonic power that 
works not only through the restriction of liberty or freedom, but positively, by enabling 
certain sorts of action by subjects. Thus Constantine representing Eva Trout‘s father 
financial empire and enabling Eva‘s life style is nothing more than a representative of 
the male hegemony. Tactics, agility and irony are essentially individual categories 
ascribed to autonomous subjects. Initially action was only imputed to unliving things in 
Bowen‘s fiction but in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes this characteristic has been 
shifted back to some of the characters. Making individuals agile is a means of making 
them able to move within a framework of contradictions where irony is absolutely 
crucial.  Bowen's claim may be also that this individual movement between 
contradictions is opened up to other movements - feminism and the course of history. 
If there is a claim to consumerism in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes it by no 
means escapes the ideology of what has been called ironic consumerism by an ironic 
subject110. Irony is historically that which dialectics strives to be in the consciousness of 
the fragmented individual. Eva Trout may ironically be called a prototype of a modern 
                                                                                                                                               
overtly sexualized and carnal figures, as believed in the phallic system. An example of both  masculine 
fear of and fascination with women can be The Last September‘s character Marda, who infatuates all men 
in the plot of the novel, but whose main attributes are proneness to forgetfulness and bleeding, and whose 
name is an anagram of the word drama. 
110 This, in pragmatics, assents on the idea of nihilistic and ludic mischief maker that invites an ability to 
decode a realm of irony and textual bliss. Since romanticism an ironic subject exempts himself or herself 
from making ethical judgments and postpones the determination of the self. 
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trickster/outsider who no longer wishes to be an outsider in the neo-liberal age. The 
outsider operates here as an insider who shows the tendency of turning everybody into 
outsiders. This is visible when Bowen highlights Eva‘s dislocating character that has 
power of exercising a mesmerizing and shaking effect on people. 
Eva Trout's agility is ironically limited and uneven. The hegemonic discourse 
stops her from developing in the discourse attentively to her individuality. As Thomas 
Barfus notes in his essay entitled ―Active Subjects, Passive Revolution. Agility, 
Cleverness and Irony in Contemporary Society‖ fascism was one of the hegemonic 
discourses that earned the label passive. Taking as an example Gramsci‘s notion of 
passive revolution, Barfus writes ―Fascism keeps the people who move forward into 
new and more complex forms in production and the division of labour from moving into 
a corresponding role in society‖ (Barfus, 2000, 845). To what extent, than, is male 
hegemonic power a propeller and a supporter of passive revolutions? 
Much attention in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes is devoted to the form rather 
than thinking. Expressions of Eva‘s stature and pose are highlighted in opposition to her 
mental clumsiness and lack of reflection. Apparently form can be a purified expression 
of identity, and certainly it is so in Gilles Deleuze‘s and Feliz Guattari‘s Thousand 
Plateaux (1987). In Thousand Plateaux (1987) we are constantly warned against 
becoming too obsessed with our humanity and potential supremacy thanks to Carthesian 
Cogito. Clumsiness has generally been associated with Elizabeth Bowen notably if one 
thinks of her syntax and choice of vocabulary. Maud Ellman writes that Bowen‘s ―(...) 
syntax – with its double negatives, inversions, and obliquities; its attribution of the 
passive mood to human agents, and of the active mood to lifeless objects – constantly 
ambushes our ontological security.‖ (Ellmann, 2003, 7) Susan Osborn, in her 
introduction to Elizabeth Bowen: The New Critical Perspectives, repeats an already 
recurring question ―How else can we account for the often apparently arbitrary use of 
punctuation; the odd seemingly rash and indiscriminate word choices; the convulted and 
at times insensible syntax- the whole ungainly thing?‖ (Osborn, 2009, 39) Is Bowen‘s 
style a ―blatant disregard for the accepted norms of intellectual decorum‖ (Osborn, 
2009, 39)? Or is it rather the result of inexperience? Certainly it is not a matter of lack 
of artistic discipline but rather a study in transgressions and irregularities within 
apparently neat form. Applying of unfamiliar tropes and unintelligible signifiers Bowen 
disrupts ―the traditional hegemonic compact between the reader and the text by 
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interrupting what Frank Kermode refers to (...) generically determined ‗probability 
system‘ (...) (Osborn, 2009, 41).  The probability system bears in itself a nucleus of 
literary mimesis. However, one may wish not to refer to the probability system here but 
rather to the conjunction of three different stages of mimesis as described by Paul 
Ricoeur. The meaning of narrative and its transformative effect on the reader are 
dynamic processes. These corroborate the idea of fusing of horizons between the text 
and the reader. How does the ungainly and the ugly refer to this idea? The ungainly 
contains potentially a narrative structure of a three-fold present that intersects itself 
between the world of the reader and the world of the text. It is grounded as Ricoeur 
writes in Time and Narrative (Ricoeur, 1984, (1983), 45) ―in a pre-understanding of the 
world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources and its temporal 
character‖ (Ricoeur, 1984, (1983), 45). And the pre-understanding itself is not 
straightforward but rather as mimesis two: ‗as if‘. The understanding of the concept of 
deformation is mediation between pre-understanding of action and post-understanding 
of text within a ‗as if‘ paradigm. Our reaction to the text endows it with meaning. The 
conflict between the text as discourse and the text as story reveals the polyglossic and 
normative nature of discourse. Distracting proliferation of detail is another Bowenesque 
technique of disruption. The concept of Ricoeurian mimesis is important to highlight the 
idea of circularity of discourse. To Ricoeur mimesis does not merely represent a set of 
signs, but an unfolding circular narrative. The circular mode however can be associated 
with the feminine. Mimesis in Bowen does not merely work ―to infer the unfolding of 
causal sequences that allow us to recognize the represented objects as the same again‖ 
(Osborn, 2009, 53). It tries ―to grasp the laws underlying reality and history, putatively 
revealing the world in its innermost principles‖ of unintelligibility (Osborn, 2009, 53). 
Bowen‘s mimesis images invite the reader ―to decode them, to make meaning of them, 
and yet that meaning often eludes recognition‖ (Osborn, 2009, 53). The task before us is 
to see through mimesis reconciling the feminine and the masculine through their 
particular embodiment. One should promote the original Plato‘s mimesis, reinstalled by 
Luce Irigaray, where mimesis is productive and not enclosed in a set of reproductive 
imitations. Feminine mimesis is that of translations and adjustments and masculine 
mimesis is that of systematic copies. Feminine mimesis is interplay between the 
interpreters. Even the text does not have total dominion over signifiers. Luce Irigaray 
follows this idea which is originally Plato‘s idea. 
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Deleuze prefers to look outside the proliferation of humankind as the supreme-
being in favour of the study of geology that marks the beginning of non-human 
expressivity and identity.  
The first change in expressivity111, also known as the specialisation of language 
in linguistics, took place, according to Deleuze, when the three-dimensional 
expressivity of crystals and atoms was perceived as one-dimensional and this concept 
was relocated into areas of linguistics and philosophy.112 The one-dimensionality has 
been known to take as an example the DNA representation of identity. Human thinking 
acquired such cogitation and pattern- setting abilities that they inevitably led to a rise in 
hegemonies in human thinking, behaviour and expression. And yet, apart from the call 
for certain unification, the creation of one-dimensional code for DNA made textual and 
artistic production possible, thanks to the interweaving and interrelating of multiple 
elements. With that, two more elements of expressivity become of great importance in 
the differentiation of human production – sensitivity towards the external and internal 
elements (excitability and self-awareness) as well as territoriality, when the code 
becomes a signature. Both sensitivity and territoriality resulted in the elevation of the 
other. DNA-like understanding of personality highlighted enhanced multiplicity and 
plasticity of the so-called (Bowenesque) slippery-like identity. The plasticity, now 
transferential has been directed not only at the other but at the self too. It heightened 
self-awareness. Identity became known as an assemblage.  
On the horizontal axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, 
other of expression. It is a mechanic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, and 
intermingling of bodies reacting to one another, as in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes 
when one bodily reaction lead to a chain of others – from a look to a word, from eating 
to abjecting. Then, it is also a collective assemblage of enunciation of acts and 
statements of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies – on the action-reaction 
pattern. 
                                                 
111 This idea has been widely used by the Mexican writer and philosopher of the so-called ‗new-
materialism Manuel DeLanda, mainly in his A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997), and 
Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002) 
112 Deleuze and Guattari write about DNA in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
(2004b) 
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On the vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, which stabilize it, 
and cutting edges of de-territorialisation, which carry it away. De-territorialisation 
stands for oppression as it restricts random movements proving once more the 
importance of a personal space and territory through which subjects connect with each 
other freely.  
According to Deleuze becoming animal means learning to identify with all the 
non-human expressions, among which there is sensibility and territoriality. Truly 
enough, humans too have their own expressions of affirmation of life. Among them 
there are solidarity and legitimacy. However, Deleuze warns us that those cannot be 
limited to words. On the contrary, talk is cheap and actions speak louder than words. 
Expressivity of what we do or what we perform on a regular basis is far more 
transcendental than speech. In becoming an animal, Deleuze prompts us to one more 
important aspect of animal-like capacity, that is, towards the concept of ―affordance‖. 
Affordance is a neo-logism coined by James Gibson who devoted himself to the study 
of animal behaviour. According to the concept of affordance113 environment expresses 
its capacities to affect us in our daily life and behaviour. It steers us towards our ways of 
being, influences our daily choices and strides. Architecture, as an example is a form of 
human work of art that stands for lay-outs that grant humans possibilities to live. That 
said we may now look into how becoming an animal makes of an important facet in Eva 
Trout‘s behaviour. Eva Trout sees her environment that supplies her with potentials for 
action. She sees affordances directly. To her talk is cheap, so that her inability to speak 
fluently in the symbolic code allows her capacity to see and act beyond the words – the 
words that stand for the dominant order. In yet another Deleuzian concept of becoming-
woman, it is not expected of anyone to become woman literally, but rather to see into 
women-like expressivity, animalesque answer to the call of nature in nurturing the 
other, into the place of plenty, Kristevan maternal chora. It follows that one is pushed 
towards understanding how our actions are adapted to the non-human expressivity, as 
well as how female actions are adapted to the environment and affordances by the 
means of what has come to be known as relational autonomy.  
                                                 
113 James Gibson developed an interactionist view of perception and action that focused on information 
that is available in the environment, of which the key concept is the idea of affordance – a quality of an 
object that affords the subject to perform an action and is latent in the environment. Gibson‘s ideas on the 
subject can be found in his Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. (1986) 
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If, like Eva, we wish to go beyond language, we need to see into the elements 
that inject the obsolete, every-day language with expressivity. As such we need to 
concentrate more on the face, capable of hundreds of muscular spasms reflecting our 
thoughts. We need to focus on the face-to-face interaction with the other, as writes 
Levinas114. Affordance of such intersubjectivity and dialogism will be understood as 
relational and not merely subjective or intrinsic. The encounter with the other, in such 
affordable circumstances, will constitute the epiphany of the face-to-face irreducible 
relation of selfhood with otherness.  
The face-to-face interaction is inevitably a source of antagonistic anguish and 
over protectiveness, as depicted in Leonardo da Vinci‘s Madonnas, and already 
described in the chapter referring to Bowen‘s The House of Paris. On one hand, anguish 
is what makes the primal condition of our lives, as in Heidegger. On the other hand, 
over protectiveness is what in mother-child relationships originates overaccentuated 
narcissism. Narcissism is what Julia Kristeva found to underscore the artistic production 
of Leonardo da Vinci. Over-protectiveness and anguish are the key themes that underlie 
the mother-child relationship in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes of the eponymous 
character and her son Jeremy. This, generating an internal conflict leads partially 
towards the abjection of the mother at the end of the novel and her death – the exclusive 
feelings create a background of affordability of death. Jeremy, having access to Eva‘s 
body, experiences the triggering of the processes of matricide similar to the triggering of 
his gun. 
In yet another of her novels, The Death of the Heart, Bowen too uses the 
themes of face-to-face interaction and affordance to do so. The moment of epiphanic 
disembodiment takes place in The Death of the Heart when Thomas Quaine speaks to 
Portia, his recently orphaned step sister, an image of abjectable motherhood is unveiled. 
Portia tries to explain the financial difficulty of living with her now deceased mother. 
During their conversation Thomas realizes that Portia no longer sees him and then we 
are presented with Portia‘s hallucination on the final days she spent with her mother. It 
is an image of a fugitive mother, visiting churches and drawn to Catholicism. However, 
the image here is neither of overprotectiveness nor anguished distance provoking 
abjection– it is an image of a profound emotional communion between mother and child 
                                                 
114 As mentioned in previous parts of this chapter. Further reading can be found in Emmanuel Levinas‘  
Totality and Infinity (1961),   
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as between the equal I and other that does not fit the normative discourse on maternity. 
And yet, Kristeva admits that both versions of the myth –the Virgin and the Mother are 
equally submissive – hence the weakness and difficulty they present within the 
phallocentric discourse. However, the motif of maternity-in-performance as shown in 
the relationship Irene and Portia foster juxtaposes the negative image of Irene we are 
given in Anna‘s witty remarks.  
As Julia Kristeva notes matricide can only occur in the case of male 
child/mother dyad since the relation of daughters and the maternal body is different. The 
motif of abjection appears in a reverse way in the case of Karen and Leopold, since it is 
Leopold who is the other – a child who ―will never be born to be my [Karen‘s] enemy‖ 
(HP, 155), thus he is the child to be abjected.  
In the case of the female subject the concepts of intersectionality, affordance 
and autonomy gain even a further ground. A female subject is destined to live in 
affordace, as in James Gibson, with the narrowing territory, and limited possibilities. It 
perceives the world as composed of opportunities, and threats, and affordable situations. 
The mother or the female subject in general is epistemologically well-connected to the 
affordances that surround her, because she is engaged in meaningful, face-to-face, 
otherness promoting activities. The alleged chasm between subject and object does not 
seem very deep or wide to the female subject. It is also true that the latest feminist 
philosophy that has widely used the idea of affordances is cyberfeminism that addresses 
the new and complex conditions created by global technologies. Cyberfeminism115 
means theorizing the impact of new technologies on the lives of women, employing the 
traditional strategies of feminist resistance and social and political activism, and when 
appropriate, shifting feminist practice to employ subversive ―cybertechniques‖ within 
the new global communication order. Cyberfeminism, drawing on the work of Hélène 
Cixous and l‟écriture feminine movement,  proposes that hypertext in particular might 
allow for an embodied writing process and experience, a feminist practice that affords 
women the opportunity to claim agency amid a history of phallocentric language and 
                                                 
115 Cyberfeminism sprang as an offshoot of Donna Haraway‘s influential essay ―A Cyborg Manifesto: 
Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the late Twentieth Century‖ in ―Simians, Cyborgs and 
Women‖ (1991). Contradicting masculinist nature of techno-science, cyberfeminism has been known to 
be interested in the interactions between feminism and cyberspace – internet, digital art, and further 
computer crime since the 1990‘s. 
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writing practices. In using affordance of cyberspaces women may become subjects 
rather than objects, and act as cultural agents disrupting the status quo. Certainly, there 
is not much of cyber space in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. However, the novelties of 
the mid-twentieth century are embraced thoughtfully by Bowen, who makes use of all 
the technological novelties in her novel. For it is a fact, that Eva surrounds herself with 
objects of material and technological value, such as cars, radios etc, and we may infer 
from the text that if translocuted to the twenty-first century she would certainly make 
use of cyber-spaces.  
Peter Blos in his classic psychoanalytic study of adolescence claims that the 
main process of adolescence is ‗object relinquishment and object finding‘116.  As such a 
child of either gender must give up the incestuous love for one object and move on to 
another one from non-familiar relational world. A girl‘s transition from her Oedipal 
situation is not as easy as a boy‘s because the moment she manages to escape her 
familial relationships she must confront her new familial and conflicting entanglements 
again. In adolescence and in adulthood, identity can be described as a dynamic process 
somewhere beyond stasis and change. Already Ricoeurian dialectic of ipse-idem has 
important ramification for a social and theoretical understanding of identity that yields 
the conception of the self somewhere between the pseudo-alternative of pure change 
and absolute dominant identity. In a sense identity is so dynamic that it becomes our 
own temporal frame. In understanding the processes of identification, Butler presents a 
dynamic where the internalization of historically variable norms is formative of the 
psyche. It is an uneven process whose dynamics are shaped by prevailing social and 
historical relations – the instability of identity, both corporeal and psychic arises from 
this complex dynamic process of mediating between what is socially accepted and what 
is not, what is socially normative and what is not, and consequently what is ‗affordable‘ 
and what is not ‗affordable‘.  
Elizabeth Bowen in her Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes tries to overcome the 
foreclosure on the normative identity by making it a changeable dynamic process, 
where agency remains primarily a strategy of displacement of constraining symbolic 
                                                 
116 This idea can be found in Peter Blos‘s theory of adolescent developmental processes in his On 
Adolescence: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation. (1966). It refers to the idea of negotiations between 
teenagers and parents the process of separation and further regression. According to Blos teenagers are 
split between wanting to separate themselves from the parents and to remain dependant.  
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norms. Bowen ventures to overcome the foreclosure that in other words may be called 
the melancholia over a loss of subjective attachments that cannot be openly grieved for 
as repudiated identifications. ―To give expression to that grief is to acknowledge a loss 
which is denied‖ (McNay, 2000, 131) to turn it into humouring narrative is to voice an 
anger, which can be understood as an act of resistance.  
The humour, the hybrid, and the drag in Bowen are the changes which emerge, 
not as opposition or externality ―but as dislocation arising from the reinscription of the 
tools and symbols of the dominant into the space of the colonized‖ (McNay, 2000, 58), 
the space of women, even if this identity politics means a fetishization of the other. Not 
to turn theses manifestos into a self-identical principle that effaces the specificity of the 
feminist struggle, Bowen‘s notion of the hybrid, ideas of performative resignification, 
parody and masquerade are emplotted into the narrative of Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes using a somewhat grotesque and Bakhtinian concept (see also Bourdieu ―On the 
Family as a Realized Category‖, 1996117) of the lucidity of the excluded. The 
perpetuated exclusion of the feminine by the masculine adds up to its ability to gain a 
certain critical insight. However when subordinate position to such order means that 
women remain complicit with the dominion, the insubordinate and disruptive attitude 
means a chance of a new counter-discourse in identification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 In his ―On the Family as a Realized Category.‖ (1996) Bourdieu dissolves the category of a family to 
better analyze how people form the representations of what people refer to as a family – operations 
formed on the idea of exclusion and translation. A family is created as a classificatory term subject to a 
process of naturalization, the term family being both descriptive and prescriptive encompassing fields 
such as jurisdical, residential, alliance.  
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6. From Timelessness and Laughter towards Subjectivity. 
 
There is no intelligence that can come out of the mind that is considered mad. 
There are no words, no coherent speech, but rather a mass of being expelled.  
Feminists were once accused of having no sense of humour, a charge they have 
long managed to overcome against the patriarchal restraints. In feminism humour is not 
resigned but rebellious and liberating. Julia Kristeva writes in her ―World, Dialogue and 
Novel‖ that feminist laughter has much to do with the genre of Menippean satire in its 
multiplicity, fluidity and polifony. Kristeva writes, 
 
Menippean discourse is both comic and tragic, or rather, it is serious in the same sense as it 
is carnivalesque. Through the status of its words, it is politically and socially disturbing. It 
frees speech from historical constraints and this entails a thorough boldness in 
philosophical and imaginative inventiveness. (Kristeva in Booker, 1991, 9) 
 
As follows, Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes bears traits of a Menippean satire 
to the extent that its comic moments in discourse are very often tragic and serious at the 
same time. The seriousness of Eva‘s life plot is juxtaposed against blatant comedy 
stemming from her awkwardness, monstrosity and stupor. The tragic is intertwined with 
the comic disturbing what is political and social within the narrative of the novel as well 
as the narrative that the reader brings with himself or herself in the act of reading. In 
Bowen‘s fiction, the laughter comes from the complex reversals that are neither against 
dominant discourses nor are total parodies of them – instead the reversals become 
something new – another discourse, or the discourse of the other that does not come 
from the mutually exclusive binary of male and female. Bowen‘s humour is 
carnivalesque as it constructs though constant deconstruction. Again, Kristeva writes 
about carnival that, 
 
The laughter of the carnival is not simply parodic; it is no more comic than tragic; it is both 
at once, one might say that it is serious. (...) Modern writing offers several striking 
examples of this omnified scene that is both law and others – where laughter is silence 
because it is not parody but murder and revolution. (Kristeva in Booker, 1991, 8) 
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In Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes, Bowen‘s humorous style does lead to a 
murder, both of Eva and of the phallic discourse. And to admit in a Freudian manner – 
humour is liberating – means to laugh at the end of the book, to laugh at Eva‘s awkward 
death that is humour‘s roar of invulnerability – the invulnerability of a new feminine 
discourse. 
Within the plot of the novel Eva Trout is a giant literally and figuratively – she 
is herself a satire on what is usually considered feminine and gracious. She cannot be 
contained within a form or a pattern of norms, so she remains the outside and 
untheorisable by the centre. She is a slippery fish and yet abides within the female 
paradigm of water. She herself becomes the centre since she centres everybody‘s 
attention on her. Eva‘s last words before she dies, after being shot by her adoptive son 
Jeremy, seek for the meaning of the noun concatenation, as used in post-nuptial speech 
delivered by Constantine. Concatenation means things linked together in a series or 
chains – the way Eva herself links all the narratives in the novel‘s plot. However, since 
her death leaves all the possibilities open, Eva says ―There is invariably more, nothing 
is final I suppose.‖ (ET, 296) For since it is Constantine who explains to Eva the 
meaning of concatenation and injects it into her discourse it can only endure in a 
masculine dictionary. Feminine dictionary has its own definition of discourse, and Eva‘s 
death confirms it and invites further interpretation.  
Regina Barreca writes in her Untamed and Unabashed (2004) that ―Bowen‘s 
prose is emblematic of the way women‘s humour questions, mocks and demystifies the 
world of inherited and institutionalized power.‖ (Barreca, 2004, 109) She continues to 
say that ―Satire created by Bowen does not have a corrective action; indeed, her work 
remains fascinatingly problematic because while she mimics the accents of the ruling 
class, she mirrors power only to ridicule it (…) she mocks the certainties of the 
authoritative discourse‖ (Barreca, 2004, 111).  Humour in Bowen proves the point that 
women live under artificial boundaries.  
A verb rather than a noun gender categorization allows construction of verbs 
such as to man and to woman. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the sole 
practice of being a woman, a man, a mother or a father does not become a social 
discourse until it receives a reaction, thus before it gains dynamic momentum of being 
exchanged between the addresser and addressee. Whatever social practice of a subject it 
only becomes a discourse when it is contextualized. As such we may want to understand 
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how humour works and what is the purpose of using it. We will be unable to find the 
answer without analyzing how humour works with and without external other, for if 
there is any kind of speech act that requires audience, this will certainly be humour. 
Elizabeth Bowen does make humour of her subsequent chapters making 
parody at her earlier literary oeuvre. In the part entitled ―Saturday Afternoon‖ Eva visits 
Henry and his family to reveal her secret plans of escape, which in the end may be 
nothing more than ‗macaroons out of her head‘. If we go back to the short story 
―Sunday Afternoon‖ (1941) we remember the subtext of this short text ingeniously 
replicating the retardendness, torpor and yet a repressed idylism of the enclosed Irish 
life to which a visitor brings news from the war-time London.  
Bowen makes the serious matters laughable and carnivalesque. In the 
fragment where Constantine visits sick Eva at the Arbles, and once again violates her 
integrity and the right of choice, Eva‘s bodily frame, though visibly shaken, reacts in a 
surprisingly self-protective manner. Eva is pictured as a guarding fortress or a castle, in 
which many locks can be used for self-protection. When Bowen speaks about the house 
Eva inhabits, she may, in fact, be understood to be speaking about Eva‘s bodily self – 
the mysterious ‗she‘. 
 
She now yawned: so dismissive a yawn that it distended her rib-cage to cracking-point, just 
not dislocating her jaw by the grace of heaven. She checked on the silence, waiting another 
minute before going out to make fast the porch door. She then double-locked, grinding the 
key round twice. She waggled bolts into long-forgotten sockets, wheedled the ball end of 
the door-chain along its groove. Surveying her work as an absolute, she was not content yet 
– a barricade should have been added, had that been possible. (ET, 109) 
 
Female humour serves to transform frustration into action. As such it can be 
considered an inflammatory device. As comedy may become violent, destructive and 
murderous, there is a strong connection of humour and anger. In fact, a nervous bout 
may easily be misinterpreted for an attack of laughter or else manifest itself as such. For 
women laughter may easily be interpreted as the destructive laughter of the medusa for 
which the pleasure is drawn from both jouissance and terror. As Regina Barreca writes 
―For women, therefore, there is a different set of endings, or non-endings, leading to 
pleasure‖ (Barreca, 2004, 19); hence the traditional humoristic narrative does not hold 
for for the female subject. As Cixous and Clement speculate, from a woman‘s ―own 
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anarchic point of view, it is pleasure in breaking apart; but from the other‘s point of 
view, it is suffering, because to break apart is to aggress. The suffering is not originally 
hers: it is the other‘s which is returned to her, by projection‖ (Cixous and Clement, 
1996, 34). The experience of such painful laughter sets the subject on an entirely 
different path of destruction not catharsis towards the continuation of status quo. There 
is no hope in continuing as before, thus the pleasure is drawn from the destruction of the 
familiar and the dominant. These, for women, include the destruction of the father‘s 
parole, the idea of marriage, or motherhood as they are presented in the dominant 
discourse. Somehow, the laugh of the Medusa is final and tragic, as the laugh of 
Bowenesque Medusa in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes that is tragic, consuming and 
more representative of a laugh from the abyss of the Bakhtinian and grotesque vagina 
dentata, consuming all that is on its way. According to Barecca, female pleasure 
depends on ―surprises, disruptions, reversals, disunity and disharmony. The experience 
cannot be absorbed into the prefabricated cultural structures; it doubles on itself, not 
purged but strengthened.‖ (Barreca, 2004, 19) 
In writing humour, a woman writer must be prepared to embrace madness as 
natural aftermath of the humoristic experience and as one of its tools. As Annette 
Kolodny writes, a woman writer must be able to,  
 
depend on a fund of shared recognitions and potential inference. For their intended impact 
to take hold in the reader‘s imagination, the author simply must (...) be able to call upon a 
shared context with her audience. When she cannot, or dare not, she may revert to silence, 
to the imitation of male forms or (...) madness (Kolodny, 1980, 256).  
 
According to Juliet Mitchell the laughing woman must become a hysteric. As 
such, a woman writer may have to resort to silence – as Eva‘s silent semiotic 
observations of the outside; to drag – which may be similar to Eva Trout‘s 
hermaphroditism; or to madness- as literary Eva‘s madness pointed out to her by 
Constantine. Therefore, a woman writer needs to realize that she progresses from one 
rhetorical illusion to another, from one drag to another, from one utopia to another.  
In contrast to male comedy, female comedy takes as its aim the powerful and 
the dominant rather than the pitiful, and is written from the point of view of the outsider 
rather than the insider. It easily targets hypocrisies, affectations, thoughtless following 
of social structures.  
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Writing about the dangerous quality of female humour, Barreca says that, 
 
Directing the comedic vision in all its forms – irony, puns, repartee, irreverence and 
sarcasm – towards those arrogantly occupying positions of power is a hallmark of women‘s 
humour. And it probably accounts for why women who publicly exhibit their mocking 
response have always been considered dangerous. (Barreca, 2004, 22)  
 
It has been said, that women‘s writing is very often apocalyptic. As such, the jouissance 
it brings is accompanied by the experience of pain, of unhappiness and of feeling 
disgust. As a result it is a writing that depends rather on the process than resolution – 
the plot rather than the ending; becoming rather than being. In women‘s writing linear, 
masculinist progression paves the way for the circular and feminine progression, along 
with the recognition of multiplicity, diversion and rebellion. As Kate Clinton writes in a 
somewhat poetic but unnerving way - women‘s humour has 
 
the potential of splitting the world apart. Light shines through the whys cracks we make and 
illuminates all aspects of our oppression. Consider feminist humour and consider the lichen. 
Growing low and lowly on enormous rocks, secreting tiny amounts of acid, year after year, 
eating into the rock. Making places for water to gather, to freeze and crack the rock a bit. 
Making soil, making way for grasses to grow. Making way for rosehips and sea oats, for 
aspen and cedar. It is the lichen which begins the splitting apart of the rocks, the changing 
of the shore line, the shape of the earth. Feminist humour is serious, and it is about the 
changing of this world. (Clinton, 1981, 39)  
 
There is nothing more powerful than, as Mary Daly writes in her GynEcology, ―the 
sound of women really laughing. The roaring laughter of women is like the roaring of 
the eternal sea‖ (Daly, 1990, 17) of semiotic pulsions and ebbs. It carries within, as has 
just been said, a roar of female invulnerability. Like the eternal sea the laughter seems 
eternal and lacks closure and resolution.  
As noted earlier, not only can female humour be considered madness, it too can 
be connected to the monstrous (see Cixous‘s The Newly Born Woman) since women 
have long been considered to inhabit the liminal spaces. There is no denying then that 
Eva Trout is the monster in the book who laughs the louder and whose laugh is 
apocalyptical, final and yet open-ended. Hers is the germinating laughter of no 
comparison to belittling titter of Henry and Constantine – their giggling along with the 
patriarchal laugh. In fact, it is their laugh that is profoundless and soundless, and it is 
310 
 
Juliet Mitchell‘s final laughter in her Women: The Longest Revolution, that might be 
other women‘s and might have been Eva‘s: 
 
I, too, overflow; my desires have invented new desires, my body knows unheard-of songs 
(…) And I, too, said nothing, showed nothing, I didn‘t open my mouth, I didn‘t repaint my 
half of the world.  I was ashamed. I was afraid, and I swallowed my shame and my fear. I 
said to myself: You are mad! What‘s the meaning of these waves, these floods, these 
outbursts? Where is the ebullient, infinite woman who (…) hasn‘t accused herself of being 
a monster? Who, feeling a funny desire stirring inside her (to sing, to write, to dare to 
speak, in short, to bring out something new), hasn‘t thought she was sick? Well, her 
shameful sickness is that she resists death, that she makes trouble. (Mitchell, 1984, 226) 
 
Bowen‘s renegade humour is therefore far more complex that it has been thought when 
Bowen was enclosed within the cliché of light feminine comedy of class and manners. 
As Eva concludes during her visit to the National Portrait Gallery - ―there was no real 
life‖ (ET, 216) in mimesis and thus imitation but there is real life in the subject‘s own 
way of life – the Nietzschean forging of personal pattern. The preservation of the real 
life reiterates and safeguards autonomous selfhood (via performances of subjectivity), 
of which sense of humour constitutes inseparable part. Humour, and rightly so, can be 
judged in either felicitous or infelicitous terms, however this depends on the idea of the 
subject included or excluded from the group laughed at. What is more, the idea of 
felicitous humour is very often utopian. Humour creates concepts anew and disrupts the 
old order. Mimicry, similarity and resembling are slippery ground, though taken out of 
context they can be used as dislocating ingredients of discourse, as, for instance, in 
drag. Furthermore the drama of hegemonic order is that most of it relies on continuous 
simulated representation.  
Mimesis in feminism, as described in Luce Irigaray, has been called strategic 
essentialism118 (originally coined by Gayatri Spivak), where women imitate imperfectly 
the traditional roles that have been imposed on them. Strategic essentialism, although 
                                                 
118 Strategic essentialism refers to temporary solidarity among women and denial of the heterogeneity of 
female discourse for the purpose of enactment of social causes. It refers to a positivist essence or core of 
femininity, which all women have in common. See, Spivak‘s In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural 
Politics. (1987) 
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abandoned in ‗austere‘ theory, initially from Spivak‘s own initiative has, in my opinion, 
been transformed into carnivalesque drag and grotesque performance.  
If we were to research back for the trickster of strategic essentialism in the 
history of literature, our gaze would certainly fall on the concept of female picara, 
whose exaggerated feminine attributes served as deadly means of annihilation and 
mischievousness towards men. These included conversational wit and ingenious 
behaviour, physical attractiveness, duplicity and ingenuity – all that the dominant 
discourse postulated to be the abyss of female madness, trickster and vagina dentata. 
Although, Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes as a novel does not present us with a 
straightforward case of female picara we may argue the idea of her as such as 
distributed between some of the female characters, namely the eponymous Eva and her 
Lumleigh teacher Iseult Smith. In Eva there may be no blatant beauty but rather a way 
of influencing men, as already signaled in her similarities to Browning‘s Pippa Passes. 
To a degree Eva does not crave success but does seem to want a certain social position 
in the society, which is to be prepared for her by her future husband Henry. And even 
though Eva‘s reasons for wanting a lady-like status and a home are extremely complex 
and related to the maternal, it does seem, in a Bakhtinian carnivalesque way, that Eva as 
a monster craves a safe refuge to lay her discursively poisonous seed – her child Jeremy. 
Living in the middle ground, between centred and de-centred positions, Eva does retain 
certain picara attributes. Being neither a whore nor a virgin, she enjoys a social and 
economic freedom. Her certain tomboism and hermaphroditism do signal picaresque 
attributes too. Fitting partially in the category of the New Woman, she gains more and 
more mobility against social constraints, her confinement being now more of a 
discoursive kind. She also is a typical city girl, moving from hotel to hotel, city to city, 
country to country. Although she does not engage in practices considered typical of a 
picara119, for example prostitution, she is seen as ‗distributing apples‘ from her bag – 
that is dealing the sin, even though there is a difference between an archetypal sacred 
prostitute and a common one. Eva, as the picara120 undergoing literary development 
                                                 
119 As described in Anne K. Kaler‘s The Picara: from Hera to Fantasy Heroine. (1991) 
120  Picara or the female rogue seeks her identity through a masculine quest of the anti-hero and is 
prompted on her journey through abandonment as a child or later as a wife. She openly uses her wit and 
sexuality. In the later development of the literary concept of picara her wanderings have a sequential 
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towards the autobiographical and moral point of view, moves in the direction of moral 
thinking and of recognizing the hypocrisy of the society. At the same time she has 
trouble escaping it. And yet Eva acts as an autonomous entrepreneur, one who 
circumvents the social codes of ethics when justice is denied her – she does escape the 
tantalizing powers of Constantine, and seems to be carving an autonomous way of life 
for herself. She may not beg for money, as some original picaras did, yet she skillfully 
extracts it from Constantine before the lawful inheritance opens after her twenty-fifth 
birthday. She even deploys disguise to a certain degree – being a Mrs Trout in the 
States, and weaves carefully plans for escape, both from Britain, the Danceys and in the 
first place – the space of ignorance and abandonment managing to be placed in school 
out of her own will. Unfortunately, Eva‘s deception extends beyond mere disguise, 
since she must manipulate and deceive in order to preserve her life. Yet such controlling 
of her own destiny is not a consequence of her trickster-like nature but of the operations 
of oppressive dominant discourse. As a female pilgrim, a wandering saint, or a mystic, 
ever-journeying Eva is suspected of hysteria and deception, paralleling the accusations 
of witchcraft attached to the picara. And yet, to a certain degree, the picara tries to 
reform her original world and make it better as a result of increased integrity and 
knowledge, even though it means allowing the final trickstery of the text – the death of 
the picara, and here the death of Eva Trout. As Kaler writes in her The Picara: from 
Hera to Fantasy Heroine,  
 
What each fantasy the picara considers to be her worst crime depends on her created world: 
to the sorceress, the misuse of her power; to the political picara, the corruption of a 
government; to the wanderer, the imprisonment of other; to the sexual being, the 
dehumanization of the individual. (Kaler, 1991, 147) 
 
As mentioned earlier, Iseult Smith approximates herself to the ‗ideal‘ of a 
picara in her narrative, as well. As a deceiver, the picara is used to masking her 
emotions, and as a slave her autonomy must be hidden if she is to survive. If not 
married, the picara is left with less nobilitating roles the society ascribes women, 
namely joining the nunnery, boarding school, or prostitution. When outside the bonds of 
                                                                                                                                               
mode towards a greater self-reflection. Although picara refrains from motherhood, the creativity 
symbolized by being a mother can be found in her ‗self-mothering‘. 
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marriage, the picara receives as much pleasure from discourse, as she gives, similar to 
Iseult Smith receiving a great amount of pleasure in writing the letters of 
autobiographical kind to Eva that she never sends in the end. She too remains outside of 
law – and as Iseult is ready to play with her similarities with Hedda Gabler and stealing 
Eric‘s gun. As in Iseult‘s narrative, the nature of the picara is to remain emotionally 
unstable since all of her relationships seem to be based on an instant pleasure rather than 
long-term emotional engagements. What does however, distance Iseult Smith from her 
role as the narrative picara is her lack of success and cunning in living her life, so that 
she becomes yet another ‗silent‘ victim of the dominant discourse.  
The new discourse on the dislocated, the apocalyptical, does not only underlie 
the idea of humour in Bowen, but the way it is expressed, in a dry, renegade manner – 
the Italian neo-realism in cinema. The idea of cinematographic art is very present in the 
text of Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. Time is kaleidoscopic in Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes‘s narrative similar to the kaleidoscopic time if Gilles Deleuze writing. 
As such we are given different facets of Eva, her action when taken away having no 
core. Also we are given female multiplicity as related to kaleidoscopic notion of time.  
Bowen writes that ―Time, inside Eva‘s mind lay about like various pieces of a 
fragmented picture‖ (ET, 46).  
 
She remembered, that is to say, disjectedly. To resemble the picture was impossible; too 
many of the pieces were lost, lacking. Yet, some of the pieces there were would group into 
colour, and each probably had meaning, though that she did not seek. Occupationally, this 
pattern-arriving-at was absorbing, as is a kindergarten game, and, like such a game, made 
sense in a way. (ET, 46)  
 
This description parallels the conversation Eva has with the Danceys in the episode 
entitled ‗Saturday Afternoon‘. There as a matter of momentarily misunderstanding and 
interposition of utterances, Eva starts to believe that these are macaroons that come out 
of her head rather than thinking. And macaroons are a well-known type of pastry known 
for its sweetness and a long history in British and Italian and Jewish cuisines for being 
edible during the observation of Passover. Macaroons come to resemble Proust‘s 
Magdaleines in the novel for standing for re-lived memories and celebration of human 
imagination for its power to reach hidden truth. Eva‘s memories however felt at the 
sensory level are ironically child-like, meaningless ‗food for thought‘. Food is a strong 
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image in feminist criticism as it conveys, as well as destructs social conventions, 
ideological and gender hegemonies. In literature food has been known as a means of 
exploring women‘s strategies to develop alternative discourses. According to Sarah 
Sceats, ―Food is a currency of love and desire, a medium of expression and 
communication‖ (Sceats, 2000, 11). Food is ambiguously linked with female body as 
the educator and nurturer, and the hunger for the mother and the motherly love is one of 
the most recurring motives in literature dealing with mother-child relationships. In this 
light, the novel Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes can be an allegory of an almost ecstatic 
hunger for the mother, and ‗the macaroons in her head‘ are a symbol of a discoursive 
emptiness and linguistic ‗pulp‘, which are results of a lack of a nurturing relationship 
with the other. Through the allegory of ‗macaroons in Eva‘s head‘ mothering in Eva 
Trout, or Changing Scenes is invariably portrayed as monstrously absent and 
ineffectual. This, acting upon Eva‘s adult appetites and her own capacity to nurture, 
reveals itself in the protagonist over-nurturing of Jeremy with tempting though low 
quality foods such as chocolate and sweets. Jeremy is hooked upon these, as he is 
hooked upon Eva‘s narrative and remains under control and apparent safety of the 
choraic jouissance, suckling at its breast like a small child –  
 
Jeremy, losing his way on the dark staircase, battered and banged on the door – the third he 
had tried – before getting a grip on the handle. Having let himself in, he defiantly out-stared 
Henry (though so far, everything between them had gone swimmingly) before making 
possessively for Eva, whom he leaned up against. A residuum of panic was about him; his 
hair was in rats‘ tails, at every angle, after the towel-scrubbing given it on the return from 
the rainy river. He extracted from Eva‘s pocket a blackcurrant jujube, which he went on to 
suck. ‗That should do him good,‘ she observed, ‗if he has caught cold.‘ (ET, 189) 
 
And when visiting strangers‘ homes what clearly draws Jeremy‘s attention is the ―pots 
and pans‖ (ET, 156) at which he looks with ―admiring attention‖ (ET, 156). 
In relation to food, as Susan Bordo writes in her Unbearable Weight. Feminism, 
Western Culture and the Body, the body is like a monstrous huge bear, ―capable of 
random, chaotic violence and aggression‖ (Bordo, 2003, 2). It is a creature of instincts 
and of primitive needs, ―ruled by orality, by hunger, blindly ‗mouthing‘ experience, 
seeking honey and sugar (…)‖ (Bordo, 2003, 2). The bear‘s body is the female body as 
caretaker of the other – it is too a monstrous body – like Eva Trout‘s. The body is a site 
of non-teleological reality informed by the history of nature and nurture. We deduce 
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time from non-time, or rather bodily manifestations of aging process and hunger. The 
non-time apparently does not seem to flow (being geographical rather than temporal), 
and is enclosed in a three-fold temporal present.  
It is the manifestations of relentless, non-teleological time that are seen and felt, 
not through expressionistic images or dialogue, but through the eye‘s observing of 
subjects in the geographical reality of their exterior life within a very immanent spatial 
and temporal real. An example of it can be found in the fragment when Eva, sick with 
flu, is lying in bed and thinking, where the emphasis is given to the heavy materiality of 
space and temporality as embedding the solitary subjects. There time almost stops, or 
rather, is dragged by the embodiment of it through the imagery of Eva‘s bulky body and 
her material possessions. 
Central to this is both on- and off- screen subjects‘ constant awareness of the 
body's excavation by temporality. Deleuze says ―the daily attitude is what puts the 
before and after into the body, time into the body‖, and that this ―attitude of the body 
relates thought to time (...).‖ (Deleuze, 2004b, 189) Within twentieth century 
modernism‘s general crisis of forms, the idea of temporality as perhaps the only 
omnipresent form (one that has heterogeneous, non-teleological modes and affects) may 
cause troubled reactions ultimately because it positions the subject itself as both 
epistemologically and ontologically vertiginous. According to Deleuze, the tiredness of 
the affected body forces the brain to a new and difficult thought, reminding the subject 
of its own ―embodied‖ time within that of the world. The time-image world is ―no 
longer a motor extension which is established‖ between subject and real world ―but 
rather a dreamlike connection through the intermediary of the liberated sense organs. It 
is as if action floats in the situation, rather than bringing it to a conclusion or 
strengthening it‖ (Deleuze, 2004b, 4). And does Eva not relate more to space? Here, a 
question of Eva‘s hermaphrodite body ‗embodying‘ time is raised – this being a new 
way of showing the authority/autonomy dyad through one‘s bodily time (here female 
body) as the omnipresent time. Eva is her own enclosing space. 
This floating action is often in the form of characters being forced into simply 
looking and thinking, the evolution of the subject Deleuze saw in Italian neorealism121 
                                                 
121 According to Deleuze in Cinema 2: The Time Image (2004b) Italian neorealism introduces the time-
image cinema innovative in its social context and cinematic language. Italian neorealism makes unstable 
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from doer to seer. Deleuze discusses how in Italian neorealism, this epistemologically 
impoverished but very open gaze is both directed outwards upon the world, and 
internalized as characters attempt to reconcile the difficult thought which this new 
seeing generates with the tired emotional investments of their bodies. Here both the 
seen and the unseen gaze seek the lost ―self‖ rather than the maternal or erotic ―other‖, 
Deleuze, suggesting the deserted space from which the characters have been emptied, 
refers back again to the lost gaze of the being who is absent from the world as much as 
from himself. 
 The cosmological understanding of time destabilizes the subject‘s ability to 
master space, both in the way we look at the world on-screen and in the way the people 
interact with their strange diegetic home, as lost subjects under their own gaze. We 
watch the people in their desperate acting out of the erotic impulse, seeking to avert 
their eyes and minds from both the abyss of their presumed essence and the grasping of 
their brains' difficult future potentiality, while the temporal and spatial decentredness 
they seem to experience also induces vertigo in the viewer.  Yet how is Eva gazing? Her 
gaze is not surely external for she is dumb and commits many mistakes – her gaze can 
only be inwards, seeking the lost self. Her gaze is prompted by the floating space 
propelled by her moving and travelling. It may be a new concept of feminine since 
women are not connected to gaze, but rather the man are thought to exercise the culture 
of an oppressive male gaze. But if the male gaze seems to be external hence excitable 
by the external world, the female gaze may be internal, and outwardly static. 
According to Deleuze122, the subordination of time to movement has been 
reversed, so that time became out of joint (Hamlet123). This resulted in movement being 
extracted from time, and time being subordinated to the subject. This may be seen in 
dream-like fantasies and ghost short stories Bowen wrote – where the action was 
                                                                                                                                               
the distinction between the subject and the object of the narrative field. The mental and physical spaces 
overlay one another rather than merely correspond to one another. 
122 Deleuze‘s notion of time-image (2004b) together with his search for its real and necessary conditions 
consists of liberating the experience from its external limitative conditioning. As such, a new kind of 
subjectivity is constructed within new temporality that is ‗out of joint‘. This means that the time is 
subordinated to the seer rather than doer – time becomes subordinated to the subject and the space it 
covers with his or her gaze and discourse. 
123 Here I paraphrase the famous quote from Shakespeare‘s Hamlet ―Time is out of joint – O cursed 
spite‖ (Hamlet, Act1, scene 5, 186 – 190). 
317 
 
subordinated to the other time of the day, the other time of unseen. In Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes, moving has been subordinated to the eponymous subject. In Cinema 
2 Deleuze implies, then, with his concept of time-image that there is another time within 
the subject constituting a kind of propelling power to delineate reality. Time is 
indeterminate and multiple as the subject upon which it hinges. As such Hamlet 
becomes the hero of this other time, and so does Eva. Time is out of ‗joints‘ – cyclical 
or linear joints – time is now subjective. Also, it might be said that there is another time 
within feminist discourse that will propel itself forward; a time that does not end with 
death, but continues with the death‘s laughter. The feminist time-image, not hinged at 
cardinal numbers of its ancient measure that stand for the masculine and symbolic 
discourse, will now condition movement of bodies, thoughts and narratives. 
The post-war period created spaces, which no one knows how to react to; we 
have become dislocated, as Bowen liked to write. We, too, form now surprising 
machines with the inanimate world a substitute for life‘s lost vivacity and dynamics – 
hence the emphasis on the car, and on the bicycle124, like in Vittorino de Sica‘s film 
Bicycle Thieves (1948).  
Even the body has become no longer exactly what undergoes movement, but 
rather it has become a ‗developer‘ of time that shows through its tiredness, loneliness 
and waitings.  
The narrative image itself has become a system of relationships between its 
elements, ―a set of relationships of time from which the variable present only flows‖ 
(Deleuze, 2004b, xii).  A narrative image has become a tool to show the multiple 
relations of time underlying it that cannot be seen in the present. In such image the real 
is no longer represented but aimed at, and it is said to be elliptical, wavering, dispersive, 
and ambiguous. When deciphered it should produce an additional reality.  
The subject of such imagery may not be mad but rather his or her actions obey 
the rules of slackening of sensory-motor connections. The external world is filtered 
through the subject, accumulated in disjoined images and then purged out again. One is 
prey to a vision; one records rather than reacts, so that even the present is heavily 
dependent on odd memories and fantasies. 
                                                 
124 This idea takes us back to what Sue Best (1995) wrote about the simulacrum of a female body and the 
penetrating hand of a car that, again, I have compared to the idea of Deleuzian desiring machines in the 
section of this chapter entitled ―Eva Trout‘s Eternal Journey as a Subject.‖ 
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The subject that reveals itself to be the most fitting into the above schemata is 
the child. The child reveals itself in visual and sound nakedness where sensory-motor 
schemata are no longer pre-established and automatic - as in the world of adults.  The 
world that the child inhabits now give in to the pace of a nightmare or a dream and may 
become unbearable leading to crisis. The imagery that the child constructs embeds the 
sensory-motor descriptions that now are controlled by the optical and sound ones, but 
almost undecipherable. Deleuze writes in his Cinema 2 about the child and its place 
within such discourses,  
 
In neo-realism the sensory-motor connections are now valid only by virtue of the upsets 
that affect, loosen, unbalance, or uncouple them: the crisis of an action-image. No longer 
being induces by an action, any more than it is extended into one, the optical and sound 
situation is, therefore, neither an index nor an synsign. (…) And clearly these new signs 
refer to very varied images – sometimes everyday banality, sometimes exceptional or limit-
circumstances – but, above all, subjective images, memories of childhood, sound and visual 
dreams or fantasies, (…). (Deleuze, 2004b, 6)  
 
Even though Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes is neither politically committed nor bears 
witness to the desiccation of reality after the Second World War, it does seem to 
constitute ground for possible transference from Italian neorealism onto the text, along 
with the intersection of the verbal, non-verbal and the visual. Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes was published long after the rise of the neo-realist trend, not having 
accompanied its rise as much as  Bowen‘s war-time novel The Heat of the Day that was 
published in 1949, only a year after Vittorino de Sica‘s famous film Bicycle Thieves 
(1948). Bicycle Thieves was a film that gained de Sica instant critical acclaim and 
worldwide recognition introducing a full palate of neo-realist changes into the cinema 
spanning from the idea of the new time-imagery, involvement of the liminal, the 
passive, the sensory and the child‘s point of view. Again, as Deleuze wrote in his 
Cinema 2 in the new neo-realist art 
 
Time ceases to be derived from the movement, it appears in itself and itself gives rise to 
false movements. Hence the importance of false continuity in modern cinema: the images 
are no longer linked by rational cuts and continuity, but are relinked by means of false 
continuity and irrational cuts. Even the body is no longer exactly what moves; subject of 
movement or the instrument of action, it becomes rather the developer (révélateur) of time, 
it shows time through its tirednesses and waitings. (Deleuze, 2004b, xi)  
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Bearing the above in mind, there seem to be some uncanny resemblances to the 
neo-realist art in cinema and the narrative of Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. The figure 
that belongs to the luminal – Eva Trout – is capable, like Bicycle Thieves Ricci, of 
bringing different worlds together in her hermaphrodite, intersectional form. She coaxes 
together the world of men and women, the outcast and the insiders, the angels and the 
monsters, the active and the passive. Eva moves constantly from stability to instability. 
She stays out of the ordinary routine every day, which enables her to visit different 
spaces and places.  
In the course of the narrative from Eva‘s schooling to her flee, freedom and 
return, all the events seem both visually distinct and yet logical for her narrative 
development. The plot embeds the two ideas: the first one being of search for the 
language, the meaning, the child and the mother; the second being that of escape from 
the father, the guardian, the mother, and the possible snatcher of Jeremy. However, 
much of the movement seems overtly passive in character, taking Eva from one liminal 
space to another, from one hotel to another. Even Eva‘s grasp of memories and time is 
‗disjected‘, possibly linear but lacking many pieces- like the neo-realist paratactic text it 
is impoverished but not essentially dis-ordered and illogical. 
Time is, therefore, derived simultaneously from the strange movement and the 
lack of it. At the end of the novel, Eva passes from the passive observer to the role of 
agent and dies, which in Italian neorealism is metaphorical of the idea of the futility of 
life and the wasted time. Life itself is meaningless in Italian neo-realism, and utopian in 
feminist understanding, and yet, even though there is no felicitous resolution, there is a 
stronger manifesto of a process undergone by a female subject towards a fulfillment of 
her life.  
Eva‘s narrative, even though ending in her death, retains the idea of open-
endedness, which invites the readers into a more active participation. The above is also 
true thanks to Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes‘s portrayal of a more diagetic world – 
known hotels, streets and places, even though it may be a world not accessible to those 
who were deprived of the jet travel. Still, the setting brings the reader closer to the 
unresolved and ambiguous events. 
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Eva herself is not a common person, an untrained actor, as would be the case of 
Italian neo-realism. In fact she is an untrained speaker of the father‘s parole and a 
subject from the periphery of discourse – a woman.  
As in the plots of Italian neorealism, which obviously are difficult to transfer 
onto the literary, the stories are finite and still their message continues to germinate into 
the unconscious of the audience. The story/the telling in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes 
seems concluded, yet the told is not resolved – the proposed problems lack any form of 
resolution. Similar to finitude of life expressed by St Augustine and Heidegger, Eva‘s 
narrative has a clear-cut beginning and an end, and yet the message of the text, the battle 
between the hegemonic and the revolutionary remains unresolved. Again, it may end up 
untold, since Jeremy will certainly not master the father‘s parole, but it will certainly be 
re-lived in the lives of those whom Eva encompassed with her narrative.  
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7.  Eva Trout‘s New Habitus. 
 
 
What makes and is there anything as monstruous Eva Trout‘s ‗feel for the 
game‘ that could be understood as her narrative gendered habitus? Food, eating, ridicule 
and humour are all Bakhtinian concepts serving the disruption of hegemonic discourses. 
Bowen takes into account the notions of Kristeva‘s abjection and Grosz‘s volatility to 
understand how the preconscious and unknowable elements of incorporated experience 
might control the ethics of the self, especially if we take into consideration masculine 
control over feminine identity. To Bowen it is of great interest to see Eva‘s feel for the 
game that is her acute sense of discourse sustainability and self and social recognition 
based on her disruptive idea of autonomy and intersectionality. A special emphasis is 
given to Eva‘s corporeality as subjectivity‘s chronotope, the boundary between selfhood 
and Otherness, the site of identitarian disruptions and operations of motherhood, the 
semiotic and the symbolic, and the alternative as surfacing in laughter and monstrosity.  
In general, the concept of embodiment is of great interest to feminism because 
it ―mediates the antinomic moments of determinism and voluntarism‖ (McNay, 2008, 
3). Gender is deeply inscribed in our bodies, and yet because of the cultural necessity of 
its reiteration, it appears fragile and spurious. Reflective awareness is predicated on a 
distantiation of the subject from the dominant order and this process of distantiation and 
proximity usually takes place within the body. Our deepest moral and ethical judgments 
are not rational or cognitive but based on emotional and intuitive responses to the world. 
Being a woman or a mother, as in Eva Trout or Changing Scenes, is an emotional and 
intuitive process though the hegemonic discourse works towards enclosing it within 
linguistic and pre-established paradigms. Being a mother or simply a woman is directed 
at reaching understanding with the other as well as the self.  
Reflexive awareness through approximation and distantiation from the other: 
‗the changing of scenes‘ – the subject‘s eternal journey – is a means of action. Action 
cannot be grasped only from an abstract account of structural contradiction or linguistic 
indeterminacy but must also be understood through ideas of intention, aim and 
commitment ―that can also be refused‖ (McNay, 2008, 5). This intention of action 
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should include in itself a paradigm of relationality and autonomy. It is not enough for 
the subject  to maintain itself with the to and fro flux in relation to the other – this action 
needs to be intentional and conscious, calling for a constancy of the self  and 
interpellation that underlies the concept of identitarian becoming. Recognition is 
generated through embodied practice – as de Beauvoir famously said: one is not born 
but becomes a woman. Recognition of femininity is an ongoing process and needs to be 
accomplished in relation to two different standpoints; the first one being the gaze of the 
other, the second one‘s own recognition of one‘s continuously performed gender. As 
such subjectivity and identity are neither fully willed nor fully determined.  
The idea of self-recognition expresses the notion that individuality is an 
intersubjective phenomenon formed through pragmatic interactions with others. By 
highlighting the intersubjective features of individuality, the idea of recognition has 
both descriptive and normative content and it has important implications for a feminist 
account of gender identity. The idea of recognition too is neither willed nor determined.  
 Furthermore, Zizek sees in Hegel‘s struggle for recognition a paradigm of the 
ideological double interpellation of the subject. Interpellation in itself is a form of 
recognition. Interpellation is fully achieved when the subject perceives itself as too 
complex a person to be encapsulated in one set of ideological identifications – 
intersectional femininity equals self-recognition that follows the pattern of: one is not 
only that, but …also that. Women, as Nancy Fraser writes, are not a homogenous group 
redistributed along the logic of either/or but they are both status and class. Interpellation 
works to logic of a double disavowal – one disavows that one is a product of ideological 
interpellations and one disavows that one‘s autonomy is an illusion. The more one acts 
autonomously the more one misrecognizes the illusory nature of autonomy. However, 
the interpellation of autonomy is in itself a courageous act of self-definition, as in Eva 
Trout‘s setting of standards similar to Browning‘s Pippa and as a way of voicing a new 
discourse. As in Sartre, from an intersectional point of view, a woman must transcend 
the hegemonic definition of the body that weighs her down and go beyond it towards 
objects or truths subject to reason as in Sartre‘s Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of 
Etiology of Hate. She must go beyond the time that hinges on the external and move 
towards the three-fold present of her subjective time. 
Subjectivity cannot be understood from the point of view of abstract social 
structures but from the perspective of lived reality of embodied social relations. As such 
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one cannot fail to consider the gendered habitus. One needs to understand that  while 
gender cannot ever be thought to stand alone, separate from socio-economic status, 
ethnicity, race, and historical location, it is a mistake to think that those larger 
classificatory systems somehow produce a thoroughly limited, finite and unified field in 
which, therefore, all male subjectivity and all female subjectivity are self-same and 
mutually exclusive.  
 
Habitus understands emotions as engendered through the complex of embodied tendencies, 
intentional relations with the world and social structures. This disrupts the tendency to 
explain agency through a naturalized set of emotional dispositions (recognition) or a single 
dimension of embodied identity (sexuality). (McNay, 2008, 16)  
 
Gender habitus is an affective habitus – a habitus charged with physicality as 
well as autonomous relationality. It has even been termed a new feminist materialism – 
affects have interest and interests have matter. Habitus combines both a 
phenomenological and a structural anthropological understanding of embodiment, yet at 
the same time it avoids naturalization, leaving this way spaces for operations of alterity 
that come to be known as the familiar.  
In general, habitus is a narrative, not only a personal one, as in Butler, but 
dialogical too as in Ricoeur. Habitus escapes the notion that subjectivity is a process of 
sedimentation in time. It is, rather, a pattern of changing scenes within a subjective 
temporal and narrative frame. For feminism, it is of utmost importance that women 
develop dispositions in response to the objective conditions they encounter: and they 
must do so through their everyday intersectional discourses and bodily practices as in 
gendered habitus to counterfeit androcentrism of social, ideological and narrative state 
apparatuses.  
As Nancy Fraser writes on the unjust binary division between the masculine 
and the feminine in ―Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional 
Approach to Gender Justice,‖  
 
Thus, a major feature of gender injustice is androcentrism: an institutionalized pattern of 
cultural value that privileges traits associated with masculinity, while devaluing everything 
coded as ‗feminine,‘ paradigmatically—but not only—women. (Fraser, 2004, 4125)  
                                                 
125 In her article Fraser proposes a broad understanding of social justice capable of addressing the non-
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The injustice is deeply rooted in our cultural consciousness, not being merely 
superstructural but intrinsic to any culture.  
 
Androcentric value patterns also pervade popular culture and everyday interaction. As a 
result, women suffer gender-specific forms of status subordination, including sexual 
harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence; trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning 
stereotypical depictions in the media; disparagement in everyday life; exclusion or 
marginalization in public spheres and deliberative bodies; and denial of the full rights and 
equal protections of citizenship. These harms are injustices of misrecognition. They are 
relatively independent of political economy and are not merely ―superstructural‖. Thus, 
they cannot be overcome by redistribution alone but require additional, independent 
remedies of recognition. (Fraser, 2004, 4) 
 
The above needs to be overcome by re-introduction of the feminine, even if 
that equals re-appearance of the spaces of alterity that is dissolution of what has been 
familiarized into its myriad of discourses originating within the margins. 
Recognition is not only what women must achieve but also what should, in 
general, be confered to women on their passage from the strictly private to the public 
sphere as engendered and embodied subjects. 
 
From the standard perspective, what requires recognition is feminine gender identity. 
Misrecognition consists in the depreciation of such identity by a patriarchal culture and the 
consequent damage to women‘s sense of self. Redressing this harm requires engaging in a 
feminist politics of recognition. Such a politics aims to repair internal self dislocation by 
contesting demeaning androcentric pictures of femininity. (Fraser, 2004, 4) 
 
The outcome of successful recognition is a positive relation to oneself. 
Subjectivity is not an abstract phenomenon but the outcome of an ongoing 
process of subject‘s engagement with the world and the other. Through reiteration of 
interpellation processes new kinds of identities are produced. Both our minds and 
bodies are constructed through this discursive power. According to Butler, discourses 
live within our bodies, entering our bloodstreams and propelling the life forward. 
                                                                                                                                               
identitarian account of recognition capable of being intertwined with redistribution, and yet counterposing 
gender maldistribution and misunderstanding.  
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However, as much as these discourses of interpellation are socially and hegemonically 
constructed (Althusser) they carry within them principles of autonomy and self-
narratvity. Psychology constitutes an object in the process of knowing it; self constitutes 
its subject in the process of knowing it as well. Interpellation, self-narratives are both 
cause and effect happening simultaneously. Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes 
problematizes ―repression of crude material techniques of surveillance and physical 
coercion‖ (Backus, 1999, 49) that ―correspond to Foucault‘s earlier emphasis on 
discipline and punish‖ (Backus, 1999, 49), where mothers are abjected and children are 
consumed retroactively by an internalized family romance. In Eva Trout, or Changing 
Scenes the powerful techniques of action/discourse and silence reflect powerful forces 
where physical and mental repression stimulates discourse, which then inevitably 
stimulates further violence and repression, nevertheless setting up in motion the 
processes of active subjectifiction. The figure that consequently emerges blurs the 
constitutive boundaries between the internal and the external, the present and the past, 
the living and the dead, victim and persecutor, and very often the female and the male.  
What is then the Bowenesque habitus in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes? Eva 
Trout represents a performance of the form of feminist and sexual agency. Being must 
coincide with doing, the way in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes the eponymous 
character not only is but too ―occasions‖ (ET, 123) things. Eva‘s body harbours the new 
kind of habitus that diverges ―you are to know how widely, from mother-image hithero 
entertained by me: Your lengthy and unencumbered physique with its harboured energy 
more seemed (…), and not at the first glance only, that of the dedicated discus thrower.‖ 
(ET, 123) 
Female desire must coincide with female practice, the living of femininity. 
Bowen‘s concern is how not normative but ‗habitus‘ womanhood – the sum total of the 
private and the public practice – can be negotiated and lived – ―and what the living of it 
might do to the self‖ (Coughlan, 2009, in Walshe, 2009, 52) as for instance to Lois, 
Karen, Stella and Eva, in four of Bowen‘s major novels. Patricia Coughlan writes in her 
text entitled ―Not like a person at all‘: Bowen, the 1920‘s and the ‗Dancing Mistress‖ 
that women are like ―the dancer who must subdue and distort her whole bodily and 
emotional being to the performance of a quintessence or apotheosis of feminine beauty 
and grace, and as a result becomes ‗not like a person at all‘‖ (Coughlan, 2009, in 
Walshe, 53). Living a habitus womanhood means becoming as a person, a woman but it 
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also means entering ―a process of mental disintegration‖ (Coughlan, 2009, in Walshe, 
2009, 54). As Slavoy Zizek postulates the meaning of life is only revealed in death. 
According to Bourdieu, our social identities are neither imposed upon us, nor 
voluntarily chosen, but rather acquired as a result of the experiment of living, an 
experiment that is not consciously undertaken. 
Bowen works from different angles ―to trouble the category of the feminine 
and to interrogate feminine (…)‖ (Coughlan, 2009, in Walshe, 54) in Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes so that her discourse can multiply through concatenation – influence 
the reader and to see that this new kind of femininity ―ha[s]ve offspring (ET, 123). If 
not troubled women run the risk of discursive and symbolic madness that will not even 
be granted the symbolic of madness, like the ancestors of Stella from The Heat of the 
Day: ―Ladies had gone not quite mad, not even that, from in vain listening for meaning 
in the loudening ticking of the clock‖ (Bowen, 1949/1998b, 174).  
Still what for some critics madness is a form of falling prey to an illness, in 
psychoanalysis it is a way women have for survival – it is a means of averting the 
crushing threats of dominant symbolic order (see Barbara Rigney126). Madness is figure 
does not
 
exclusively symbolize the restrictions of feminist theory through
 
dominant 
discourses but that it aids postmodern authors such
 
as Luce Irigaray in the creation of an 
excessive politics
 
of enunciation, which destabilizes and reconfigures the conditions
 
of 
representation.
 
 
To some critics madness is a way of withdrawing from the artificially 
constructed self, in search for the mother figure, towards a female signified, very often a 
female Doppelganger, and then towards a new sanity. If madness is a form of female 
speech, then depriving women of that means continuous, double deprivation of women 
of language, and their double disavowal.  
As can be colloquially said there is a method in Eva Trout‘s madness that is a 
direct response to Bourdieu‘s violence, a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible 
even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of 
communication and cognition, recognition, or even feeling. As in Bourdieu Eva Trout is 
an example of the way in which symbolic violence, of which the words are verdicts, 
redounds on those who initially benefit from it, those who are in Marx‘s phrase, 
                                                 
126 See Barbara H. Rigney, Madness and Sexual Politics in the Feminist Novel:  
Studies in Bronte, Woolf, Lessing and Atwood. (1980). 
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dominated by their domination, who are granted the double-edged privilege of 
indulging in the games of domination. Exposed to violence and violated into death, Eva 
Trout gives a reader an alternative voice, a testimony of love and life that endures. 
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Conclusion. 
 
Until recently Elizabeth Bowen‘s work had been relatively neglected by a vast 
group of critics and academics. This has created an atmosphere of ―inapproachability, a 
sort of endlessly repeated preliminary throat-clearing‖ (Corcoran, 2009, xi). It has been 
written that the lack of a more profound and theoretically oriented reading of Bowen has 
amounted to insufficiency of ―comparative focusing and judgment of a kind which can 
only develop within a sustained critical continuum‖ (Corcoran, 2009, xi). That such 
deficiency originated in little attention to Bowen, it too, in my opinion, has been a result 
of a lack in theoretical, philosophical and cultural tools that needed certain maturing to 
be able to dissect Bowen‘s writing. After many, quite successful, attempts at reading 
Elizabeth Bowen from different and yet solitary angles of Queer theories, 
deconstruction theories, as well as biographical point of view, the time has come to 
conjugate all of the above and still more to read Bowen as a profoundly complex writer 
devoted to the idea of subjectification, identification and engenderment as fundamental 
voices in literary creation and beyond. A new understanding of Elizabeth Bowen‘s 
discourse would establish her more firmly in the preserve of twentieth century writing, 
as much as within the new twentieth first century perspective. It should then be 
postulated that such reading of Bowen would be a sufficient reason to re-thinking her 
life and consequently re-write her biography without fear of exposing anew the 
conflicting discourses of history, nationality, gender, vocation, and identity. What this 
would contribute to would be an exposure of Elizabeth Bowen‘s life – her real life 
devoted to better understanding of the complexities of selfhood and otherness.  
This thesis has had no intentions of constructing Bowen‘s new biography, 
however, an attempt has been made at exposing Bowenesque labyrinthine discourses of 
selfhood and otherness, above all of selfhood and otherness in the feminine. 
So far, it has been shown to what extent Elizabeth Bowen‘s style undergoes not 
so much a change in style and interest but rather how it is intensified in ―formidable 
structural and thematic daring and risk‖ (Corcoran, 2009, xiii). There is in Bowen‘s 
writing, starting with her first novel The Hotel through The Heat of the Day and The 
Little Girls but above all in The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes, 
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unquenched commitment to the task of exposing the operations of the symbolic, 
hegemonic discourses of power and cultural apparatuses. There is an effort to expose 
―love‘s inherent principles of disorder and pain‖ (Bowen, 1945 in Walshe, 2009, 96) 
and the breach between ―interior selfhood and societal modes of identity‖ (Walshe, 
2009, 96), which Bowen believed to be one of the tenet ideas of the ‗European novel‘ as 
opposed to the textual investments of the ‗English novel‘. As Neil Corcoran writes ―In 
Bowen‘s prose the normative structures of fictional coherence, and sometimes of 
linguistic coherence too, are exposed in the most radically unsettling ways to a potential 
writerly incoherence‖ (Corcoran, 2009, xiii). Truly enough, Elizabeth Bowen‘s syntax 
is as arresting and complex as her ‗intellectual‘ style127 and convictions as much as are 
her ―hard writers[‘s]‖ (Compton-Burnett, 1941 in Walshe, 2009, 95) identities. 
One of the most important conclusions of the thesis is that Elizabeth Bowen 
contradicts the idea of essentialism and fixity of female existence, a theme that reaches 
back to the myth of passive/static Penelope and dynamic/ever-journeying Ulysses, as 
already signaled in this text. For example, Eva Trout‘s corporeality is a reflection of her 
mobility; Eva wallows not so much in her abject embodiment, but in dynamic, 
somewhat ruthless autonomy that originates in her body. Much profound is Eva‘s 
rejection of corporeality for corporeality‘s sake, of entertaining its needs and of 
corporeality as sole reflection of identity – to her corporeality is a means and a vehicle. 
As stated in this work, the mesmerizing force of the body of the modern picara is Eva‘s 
tool and weapon used to achieve her goals. It is a body whose attributes are not steadily 
exhausted through a series of relationships and tricks but a body that serves as a 
propeller and chronotope of subjectivity. However, the very idea of goals should be put 
                                                 
127 In The Heat of the Day, the wartime novel she dedicated to Charles Ritchie who shared her 
burden of a fractious nature, Bowen writes, ―In the street below, not so much a step as the semi-stumble 
of someone after long standing shifting his position could be, for the first time by her, heard.‖ (Bowen, 
1998b, 290) Would an editor today let that pass? Bowen‘s editor at Cape was Daniel George, and he 
wrote four pages of notes on The Heat of the Day, which he admired for many good reasons. One of the 
Bowenisms in the novel that he questioned was this sentence: ―‘Absolutely,‖ he said with fervour, ―not.‖ 
(Bowen, 1998b, 221) George‘s comment on this particular Bowenism is witty, and Glendinning rightly 
immortalizes him for it in her biography. He wrote, ―Far, I diffidently suggest, fetched.‖ (George in 
Christensen, 2001, 82) In her innate stubbornness and accordingly Irish insubmissiveness, Bowen did not 
consider the editorial remark necessary and did not change the line.  
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under scrutiny as well if by goals one means arriving at a concrete moment of symbolic 
revelation. Instead, to Bowen the idea of goals lies in motility and becoming; it can only 
be understood through the concept of work-in-progress and not through finitude.  
Against dominant understanding of femininity, female desire must coincide with 
female practice - with the living of femininity and the performance of femininity. The 
realizations of desire, power, and inner compulsion must coincide with female practice, 
while reaching as far beyond as the dominant systems of interpellation.  
As I have said in this thesis, cultural, hegemonic interpellations work against the 
logic of double disavowal. They work parallel to the logic that creates a subject that is, 
in fact, there already refusing the dominant discourses. Interpellation becomes an active 
means of questioning the world, a tool curiously borrowed from the hegemony.  
Interpellation may be considered a frequent trope in Bowen‘s writing who gives well 
informed and deeply meaningful opinions about the world, reality and the nature of 
human conduct indirectly prompting the reader towards a more conscious participation 
in the world. If these judgments seem too many and ubiquitous we may infer from this 
fact how many unanswered questions and unrested doubts Elizabeth Bowen fosters 
about the world. As has been shown here, Bowen‘s interpellation of the feminine 
masquerade exposes the processes opposing the development of a potential person.  
Above all, interpellation works as a dialogue between the reader, the narrator, 
the characters, and the author – it is both internal and external. It makes visible how the 
truth refuses to be moulded to the general, hegemonic and phallocentric metaphysica.  
 In the end it should be concluded that Bowen deliberately uses her art of 
words to serve the construction of and ―adequate maintenance of femininity‖ 
(Coughlan, 2009, 55) in its natural multiplicity and complexity. Furthermore, one of 
Bowen‘s achievements is the ascription of self-empowerment to women through the use 
of materials other than their flesh – material goods, money – along with their maternal 
and regenerative powers ―against the odds and all rules of polite, that is still rigidly 
hierarchical, society‖ (Coughlan, 2009, 55), as well as her unique and deliberate 
exposure of the subjects to the internal and external sources of suffering.  
If the interpellation is conducted through the authorial participation, it is also 
revealed in an acute understanding of history, memory and tradition. This conjugated 
with a tripartite character of structural nostalgia takes the female discourse into a new 
dimension. The concept of Bowenesque nostalgia refers to the consumption and 
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personal deployment of historically produced definitions. It works on the constant 
assumptions of better times gone with the past and common values for all. As such 
Bowen‘s ideas fall short from Pierre Bourdieu‘s ideas on structuralism in anthropology 
that prove how anthropology of feeling can incorporate cognition and emotion without a 
mind/body dualism. Female emotional knowledge and memory should be incorporated 
into discourse.  
After reading of The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes it can 
be concluded that while feelings may be physiologically similar their interpretations 
vary. These interpretations are closely linked to the bodily movement and body praxis: 
bodily participation in culture production and re-production. We may have to go back to 
Bourdieu‘s concept of hysteresis where there is no harmony between habitus and 
structure as exemplified in both the novels analyzed here. Hysteresis stands for a 
retardation of the effect when the forces acting upon a body are changed and this again 
means that history and discourse depend on physical systems. Hysteresis is also related 
to the outsider/insider theory applicable in feminist studies. It may appear in discourses 
of outsider and insider groups in more moderate version, often called persistence. 
Hysteresis with its reactional time lag can be referred to hysteria in women as described 
by Freud. All above concepts can be, and should be shifted towards present and future 
understanding of female discourse in Elizabeth Bowen‘s literary oeuvre.  
 As much as in Elizabeth Bowen‘s writing the discourse is a reiterated 
performance, her narrative is a spectacle, where identities are continuously re-assembled 
and re-montaged. This only happens if one bears in mind that the term identity does not 
only refer to the plots of Bowen‘s works but also to the identity of the reader who 
chooses to embark on the adventure of being ‗changed‘ in the process of responding to 
Elizabeth Bowen‘s discourse. Here, I defend that the operations of assembling identities 
and discourses are Deleuzian. The role of such re-assembling narratives is to allow the 
subject ―to engage in self-transformatory practices of the self‖ (Khan, 2006)  
As often mentioned in this study, the idea of assembled identities sheds new 
light on the theories of feminism. To feminism Deleuzian thinking offers a chance of 
theorising the difference and becoming a category free from its previous patriarchal 
encumbrances. It points to motility and iterability of the/any subject, especially to the 
female subject that has been historically considered stative. The later idea of iterability 
refers to the trope of narrativity of the self – the ipse-dynamic self, ―where the subject 
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becomes, to borrow a Proustian formula, both reader and writer of its own life. Selfhood 
is a cloth woven of stories told‖ (Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004, 108-109). This notion 
includes the elements of mutability and change too; however, it does retain a special 
kind of moral compromise towards the self. As such it has a compromise of  
 
enduring identity of a person, presupposed by the designation of a proper name (…) 
provided by the narrative conviction that it is the same subject who perdures through its 
diverse acts and words between birth and death. (Kearney, 2004, 108) 
 
In narrativity of identity that constitutes a part of Bowenesque style ―Speech is 
what the characters do to each other‖ (Bowen, 1999, 41). Narrativity is a way of 
reaching out to incomplete identity. Speech embeds the change that characters inflict 
like a wound on one another; it is also what the plot does to the reader as an effect of 
open-ended narratives that fit the neo-realist, Bazinian notion of the spectator‘s active 
participation arising from portraying of a more open diagetic world. This form of 
portraying of reality goes against the false argument that assumes salvation can be 
achieved only as the result of the exclusive cult of the real. Even if the world is not an 
objective reality, the objective truth that originates from open-ended point of view 
remains that presentation and discourse cannot manipulate reality – reality manipulates 
itself in creating its hegemonic narrative. However, the subject can achieve relative 
autonomy through being conscious of the status quo. The real or reality here is a 
complex structure and functions as a magical incantation: as long as there is submission 
to the effect of the real, there is freedom, where freedom cannot be found within a rigid 
structure. Similarly, the truth that is created through narratives of Eva Trout, or 
Changing Scenes and The House in Paris may as well be an effect, a fetish but also the 
only palpable and productive truth. It may also be a tool for gaining relational agency, 
as defended here in the thesis, agency that paves its own path within the hostile reality.  
Should we remain conscious of the fact that according to Levi-Strauss women 
are value we can follow Elizabeth Bowen‘s belief in femininity as signs too – signs 
capable of giving life to other signs. Women are signs in the processes of concatenation 
or begetting – two processes that are able to connect the Deleuzian idea of rhizomes and 
the feminist idea of maternity. This work concludes that both of the processes 
(especially if we bear in mind Deleuzian becoming-woman) have feminine qualities that 
underlie mother-child relationship, the idea of care for the other, as well as Levinas‘s 
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idea of responsibility for the other. Language has, in fact, a female quality, which is not 
solely female-essential but engulfs both genders. As in Cixous, women are less fixed in 
the symbolic than men, women - and their language - are more fluid, more flowing – as 
in maternal chora, more unstable than men. The instability of female language allows it 
to take on different Deleuzian combinations that together form an identity–in-process. 
L'ecriture feminine means rupture and reconfiguration of meaning, instability of the I 
and yet fixity in the process of becoming. Seen by various critics, female discourse is 
believed to comprise two elements of patriarchal discourse – the female and male 
elements, making female discourse truly bisexual discourse. Nina Baym in ―The 
Madwoman and her Language‖ (1984) argues that the idea of female language as open, 
nonlinear, unfinished, fluid, exploded, fragmented, and polysemic - and of female 
discourse as silent, unconscious, and disoriented - are not compatible because it is 
evidential that women are obliged to use and many times do not avoid using the rational 
sequential discourse of men. She states that such an idea seems to be congruent with the 
idea of irrational, weak women. According to her, women are competent both in male 
and female discourse and can speak in public life as organizers and rulers of social 
unions. The linguistic theory of gender difference and the misogynistic theory of female 
difference are both discriminatory and incomplete and should be replaced by the idea of 
rhizomatic Body – without - Organs. 
Again, it is also the idea of rhizomatic connections that points to Bowen‘s 
interest in the transition of the concepts of tradition and historical truth128. Very likely it 
may be that families and homes are undone, and yet there should always remain - and so 
it does - a vital force of transition of knowledge and systems of truth that can function, 
as in rhizomatic connections, on a vertical plane. This vital force no longer obeys the 
vertical way of transmitting codes and knowledge, something that scientists believed in 
for a very long time, and something whose uniqueness came to be challenged with the 
                                                 
128 This proves how ingeniously Bowen anticipates Irish feminist scholarship whose expression can be 
found in the Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing: Irish Women‟s Writing and Traditions. (Bourke et al 
Eds.) The study‘s many volumes are proposed by its editors to follow the style of rhizomatic connections. 
The authors gathered in the book follow multifarious and multi-directional connections and are ordained 
by their ‗concrete assemblages‘ and ‗abstract machines. The work has met with great critical acclaim and 
is thought to be an entirely ―new kind of anthology‖ (Kelleher, 2003, 89) in its profoundly ―new scale, 
ambition and structure.‖ (Kelleher, 2003, 89) 
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revelation of viral and organic transition. The later idea had been picked up by Deleuze 
who used the idea of horizontal transmission in his studies on culture and literature. 
Undeniably, Bowen would too admit that now the horizontal way of transmitting 
knowledge becomes a vital form of the proliferation of cultures and discourses. And 
horizontal transmission requires other ideas to be acknowledged – relationality, 
randomness, destiny, activity and dynamic, generative power. The horizontal 
transmission erases the necessity for binary oppositions, the begetting signified and 
signifiers without which there can be no meaning. 
In ―Eva Trout – a Journey towards new Discourse‖ I consequently remember 
scholar Joan Scott‘s work who in her essays manages to undo the dangerous binary 
dichotomy of difference. Scott writes in her influential article ―Deconstructing Equality- 
versus – Difference (1996) that, 
 
When equality and difference are paired dichotomously, they structure an impossible 
choice. If one opts for equality, one is forced to accept the notion that difference is 
antithetical to it. If one opts for difference, one admits that equality is unattainable. (Scott in 
Sargisson, 1996, 73) 
 
With the horizontal understanding of dissemination of life the above negative 
dichotomy is undone. This way, the relationship of equality to difference becomes of an 
intertwined nature rather than based on exclusion. As stated in this thesis, for the 
patriarchal hegemony, difference is understood in terms of inequality, distinction, or 
opposition, a sexual difference modeled on negative, binary or oppositional structures 
within which only one of the two terms has any autonomy- this way life strives for 
greater unification and solidification of pre-given ideas, where the other is defined only 
by the negation of the first – a man is defined through the negation of a woman and a 
woman is defined through lacking what is male. However, only sameness of identity 
can ensure equality, where this sameness signifies sameness with oneself, one‘s own 
pattern of becoming and not sameness with the hegemonic culture. Sameness may 
curiously signify difference. 
In the case of feminists of difference, however, difference is not seen as simply 
different from pre-given schemata, but as pure difference, difference in itself, difference 
with no identity that contributes to a greater possibility of multiplication. This, again, as 
has been mentioned in ―Eva Trout – a Journey towards new Discourse‖ includes the 
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systems of affordances and hermeneutical re-reading of linguistic and non-linguistic 
signs. The system of signs offers a means of the articulation of different interpersonal 
affordances, and thus possibilities. The systems of signs in female discourses do not 
only include language, but a myriad of other non-linguistic possibilities, namely the 
body, the food and eating, begetting, birth as well as sexual practice.  
 It may be reasoned that psychoanalysis and theoretical insight were not absent 
from Bowen‘s intellectual horizons and must have informed, if indirectly, her 
realizations in fiction. Thus, there is, in her literary oeuvre, a connection between 
female desire, performance and female language, seen not from the essentialist angle, 
but quasi psychoanalytical standpoint.  
 
To rediscover the intonations, scansions, and jubilant rhythms preceding the signifier‘s 
position as language‘s position is to discover the voiced breath that fastens us to an 
undifferentiated mother, to a mother who later, at the mirror stage, is altered into a maternal 
language. It is also to grasp this maternal language as well as to be free of it thanks to the 
subsequently rediscovered mother, who is at a stroke (a linguistic and logical stroke, 
mediated by the subject‘s position), pierced, stripped, signified, uncovered, castrated, and 
carried away into the symbolic. (Kristeva, 1980, 195) 
 
It is through ideas of motherhood, autonomy and female discourse that Bowen 
touches upon subjects such as female desire. Parallely, Bowen borders with the idea of 
MacKinnon‘s radical feminism where women are solely a product of men‘s desire. 
Early womanhood buds in the confrontation with the masculine just as in Henrietta‘s 
epiphany of the other in her contact with Leopold and in Eva‘s epiphany of the self in 
her encounter with Eric. On the whole, in Bowen desire is productive. 
If we may want to disagree with part of what Helene Cixous writes about the 
characteristics of l‟ecriture feminine, a key term that has been used in describing her 
feminist manifesto remains of great utility and refers to ambiguity of female language as 
well as of female position in discourse. The key-term ambiguous has concrete 
consequences for both the self and the other as spectators of dialogical narratives, as it 
stands for a subject as a nomadic entity in constant flow between discourses. As 
mentioned in ―Eva Trout – a Journey towards new Discourse‖ nomadism entails a 
constant state of ‗in-process‘ or ‗becoming‘. This Rosi Braidotti, one of the major 
feminist critics used in the dissertation, chooses to designate as the states of ‗as if‘. The 
practice of ―as-if‖ is a ―technique of strategic re-location in order to rescue what we 
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need of the past in order to trace paths of transformation of our lives here and now‖ 
(Braidotti, 1994, 6). Braidotti also understands ‗as if‘ as ―the affirmation of fluid 
boundaries, a practice of the intervals, of the interfaces, and the interstices.‖ (Braidotti, 
1994, 6) 
Female discourse and femininity as such have already been described as 
performances rather than palimpsests of essences. Joan Riviere, drawing on the highly 
influential Melanie Klein and her ―Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict‖ (1928), 
observes women‘s reluctance in accepting what has been given to them as complete 
feminine development. She then admits that what women perform as femininity is a 
masquerade ―a mere guise which is assumed more or less pragmatically but devoid of 
inner assent‖ (Coughlan, 2009, 58). In her ―Womanliness as Masquerade‖ Riviere 
writes that  
 
Womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the possession 
of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was found to possess it - much as a 
thief will turn out his pockets and ask to be searched to prove that he has not the stolen 
goods. (Riviere, 1929, 3) 
 
In her article Riviere gives various examples of women whom she considers to 
guard latent homosexuality and who engage in performing femininity as a mask to 
compensate for unsatisfactory relationships with their mothers and fathers. Riviere 
highlights the fact that it is impossible to decide which way of being a woman is the true 
way, because, in her opinion, the very character of gender lies in its performativity. This 
performativity, however, is very often prompted by negative drives such as fear of 
castration, want of possessing authority (penis) etc. In so doing the desire for manliness 
in performance hides a desire for another woman, very often the one that figures from a 
maternal viewpoint that speaks in two voices – omnipotent, all-powerful mother and 
nurturing friend. As such what Riviere shows is not pathological femininity, but 
femininity as it is – performative, constructed and fluid. This again proves that female 
discourse is based on ideas of motherhood, if we take motherhood to be not a merely 
biological instance but a carrier of various and often contradictory symbols closely 
connected to motility, fluidity and the performative.  
Interested in operations of adolescence, Bowen shows in both The House in 
Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes the reactivating experience of childhood, and 
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re-living of the relationship between the child and the mother, to have utmost 
importance in an identity‘s development. Following Kristeva, this can be called the 
Dionisiac birth – the birth into the life-death opposition, and laughter as an expression 
of identitarian development and a symbolic counter-discourse: 
 
Perhaps what is involved is the possibility of reactivating the experience of early childhood 
(the Oedipal stage), after the period of latency, into puberty, and undergoing the crisis of 
this particular reactivation in the midst of language, with no delayed action, directly onto 
the body ―proper,‖ and with the already ripe symbolic-logical system that the subject will 
have at its disposal in his future experience. This second birth – the Dionysiac birth – 
probably comes at the moment of puberty: then the subject and the Oedipal, maternal body 
come together again, her power collides with the symbolic (which the mature subject-body 
has already mastered during the period of latency), and the subject experiences the trauma 
of this collision. (Kristeva, 1980, 195) 
 
The subject is reunited with the maternal again and is put together and pulled apart. The 
maternal allows the subject reconnection with his or her own oral, anal and phallic 
stages, the language now can break ―successfully through everything but the mother‖ 
(Kristeva, 1980, 196).  
The Dionisiac birth, as described in Kristeva, takes Bowen towards the 
preserve of laughter and the hysterical woman in both of the analyzed novels. Kristeva 
writes that ―Every hysterical woman, as symptom of symbolic weakness in relation to 
the overflowing instinctual drive, index a poorly controlled phallus, and drama of the 
word/body (…)‖ (Kristeva, 1980, 196). As postulated in ―Eva Trout – a Journey 
towards new Discourse‖ feminine concatenation is based on Irigaray‘s notion of the 
feminine sea, the choraic place of plenty. Tamsin Lorraine writes in Irigaray and 
Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy that:  
 
Just as at each moment the Dionysian subject can affirm the being of becoming as the unity 
of multiplicity, so can the feminine subject experience each moment as a whole with 
nothing lacking. (Lorraine, 1999, 160) 
 
 Plato had already connected chora to the mother category, as an amorphous 
and generative power. Bowen now connects the processes of identification with 
maternity whose fluidity allows the subject to switch between monster and angel, as in 
both The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. We are given a way back 
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home from the imprisoning symbol of the shapeless Medusa head as substituting the 
fear of female genitals and female reproductive powers that in the beginning of the 
twentieth century Freud ascribed to women. The maternal, abjection and matricide are 
undeniably part of Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes‘s narrative as well as uncover the 
structural dimensions of what is the study of the mother, of the maternal and of the 
subject. Semiotic chora is what Bowen‘s narratives construct for the characters and the 
readers. 
In both novels analysed here, the desiccation of identity is closely linked to the 
idea of suffering. Suffering is a means of consummation and translation of the other and 
of the self, as well as way of narrativization of one‘s life, and exposure. Mental violence 
and repression stimulate forms of bodily performance and this perpetuates the 
operations of further repression directly resulting from the search of the perpetrator 
inside oneself. The bodily chronotope changes into that of living dead – escaping 
Butlerian sedimentation of living, but also marking bodily desiccation. Bowen‘s work 
dramatizes the stilling of the body through her narrative description of failure to reach 
the other. This process may be called the Bowenesque ―burgeoning discourse‖ (Backus, 
1999, 49) that reflects the subject‘s most concentrated expressions of the psychological 
and emotional wounding such as parentlessness and otherness. Bowen‘s novels 
problematize ―repression of crude material techniques of surveillance and physical 
coercion‖ which ―correspond to Foucault‘s earlier emphasis on discipline and punish‖ 
(Backus, 1999, 49). Violence is one of the key-terms that should be applied to Bowen‘s 
writing, where we encounter malevolence re-directed and reversed so that identity 
becomes ―traversed by the endless mobilities of desire‖ (Corcoran, 2003, 128). And if 
so, mobility of desire marks the subject‘s passage into maturity, whereas the 
maintenance of the mobility of desire safeguards the subject‘s signification within 
discourse. 
Both The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes picture male and 
female passages to the symbolic. They picture this travel not as merely towards but as 
most importantly from – from the maternal and the choraic. Leopold‘s passage into 
maturity symbolizes hope whereas Jeremy‘s passage results in tragedy. This goes 
parallel with what Nancy Chodorow writes about difficulties in learning masculinity by 
boys which is, on the whole, not an effect of an affective relationship with the father but 
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of an abrupt attempt at ending of the mother/son dichotomy. Very often, it results in a 
psychological depression as Chodorow writes in Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory. 
To girls a close affective and more prolonged relationship to the (M)other is 
too of utmost importance, since as Chodorow writes about the female subject: 
 
Her later identification with her mother is embedded in and influenced by their on-going 
relationship of primary identification, which are mediated by and depend upon real 
affective relations. Identification with her mother is not positional--but rather a personal 
identification with her mother's general traits of character and values. Feminine 
identification is put on the gradual learning of a way of being familiar in everyday life, 
and exemplified by the person with whom she has been most involved. (Chodorow, 1989, 
52) 
 
Chodorow postulates that feminine identity is ascribed, and masculine identity is 
achieved, whereas for Bowen‘s dynamic subject both masculine and feminine identities 
are achieved. Rather, in fact, they are to be acquired but never to be achieved as such, 
thanks to the malleability of identity – identity being a slippery fish. In the end, 
Elizabeth Bowen‘s writing envisages the production of a female symbolic which should 
exist in a co-operative and dialogical relationship with a necessarily transformed male 
symbolic. In Bowen multiple and heterogeneous relationships can exist and be 
symbolized between a multiplicity of ‗women-selves‘. This multiplicity inevitably 
offsprings from a new understanding of the mother-daughter relationship that strives 
towards not merely Irigarayan erasure of biological reproduction ascribed to mothering 
but its multiplication onto different planes – a new panoply of symbols. 
Hence, it must be stated here that this thesis has been clearly inspired by the 
idea of female identity and female discourse as open-ended. Similarly, Dale Bauer 
writes in ―Gender in Bakthin‘s Carnival‖ (1996): 
 
To open another‘s discourse is to make it vulnerable to change (...). (T)he feminine voices 
(...) draw out the others' codes by which their authority is formulated. These resisting voices 
violate the codes, and with those linguistic impulses, their views come into view (...) 
(I)dentity is always tested and altered (...) (A) feminist dialogic is a new paradigm which 
acknowledges an experience of others and challenges powers which force us to restrict the 
otherness. (Bauer, 1996, 673) 
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Despite the critical attention based on feminist theory that values individualism 
and multiplicity, it must be reiterated here that Bowen situates herself within the 
masculinist tradition129. Bowen constructs Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes‘s eponymous 
character ―as an outsider in a gender-divided and heteronormative environment, who 
struggles to understand the dominant culture as evinced in the ways, manners and views 
of its people around her‖ (O‘Toole, 2009, 163). In Pictures and Conversations Bowen 
writes about the early fragmentation of her budding identity through her dislocation 
from one country to another, from one world to another. She writes that,  
 
At an early, though conscious age, I was transplanted. I arrived, young, into a different 
mythology – in fact, into one totally alien… Submerged, the mythology of this ―other‖ land 
could be felt at work in the ways, manners and views of its people around me. (Bowen, 
1999k, 23-24) 
 
 As much as this transplantation caused pain, it was necessary, as any 
transplantation should be in order to live. For, according to Bowen, identity is cracked 
and dislocated; such is its eternal nature which should be pursued through operations of 
transplanting and translating the other. Like any mythology, identity is a system of 
signs, symbols, narratives and performances – identity is a mythology that ―cause(s) the 
girl to express herself like a displaced person‖ (ET, 18). Dinah in The Little Girls 
complains about the hollowness of contemporary mythologies 
 
There‘s a tremendous market for prefabricated feelings… and I‘ll tell you one great centre 
of the pre-fabricated-feeling racket, and that is, anything to do anything between two 
people: love or even sex… So many of these fanciful ways people have of keeping 
themselves going, at such endless expense of time and money, seem not only unnecessary 
but dated. (Bowen, 1963/1991, 193) 
 
Identity, being a dynamic process, cannot come into stasis let alone at the 
moment of death as a revelation. As Slavoy Zizek postulates, the subject is an empty 
space filled in by the operations of different discourses. Yet to reach this final revelation 
                                                 
129 This has been noted to persist ―at least within Ireland, within cultural, academic, and literary practice 
and institutions at all levels, and visibly within the practices of reading and writing, both more generally 
and in the academy.‖ (Coughlan, 2008, 1) 
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the subject must face its death, as Zizek‘s skull of the subject needs to face inwards for 
the better comprehension of its ‗inside‘. It is as in Bowen‘s The Little Girls, and their 
box of eternal treasures – ―It was there. It was empty. It had been found.‖ (Bowen, 
1963/1991, 182) And the emptiness of the box/life in The Little Girls leads Clare to 
announcing ―And now nothing. There being nothing was what you were frightened of 
all the time, eh? Yes. Yes it was terrible looking down into that empty box‖ (Bowen, 
1963/1991, 277). And yet the idea of the box was to receive and carry recollections that 
would otherwise reveal themselves useless in the future – just as the portraits Eva 
studies at The National Gallery of Art. 
Eibhear Walshe writes that Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes is a ―fruitless 
search for a selfhood, a home, and a child.‖ (Walshe, 2009, 156) whereas, I believe, that 
the bottom line in all Bowen‘s narratives is that the reward is in the searching. Life is 
about expecting to move forward, travelling out of oneself, just like travelling in a 
swaying taxi in search of a continuous future similar to what happens in the final part of 
The House in Paris. Life irrevocably leads to death; time is distended into the over-
enveloping present like in St Augustine‘s theories of a three-fold present and the divine 
eternity. Only this way does a subject arrive at meaningful nothingness.  
Both novels, The House in Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes depict a 
journey towards strangeness and otherness. They constitute a journey towards both 
death and change. Against the more traditional notion of stative femininity, 
identification gains a more masculine dynamic and Odyssean character.  As previously 
mentioned in the thesis, this takes on a different meaning if analysed accordingly to 
Jurij Lotman‘s theories of exceptional characters, whose exceptionality is expressed 
through their mobility and motility above boundaries.  In Bowen, the journeys are not 
only extra-identitarian but they are journeys to and from the metaphorical house whose 
emptiness depends on how deep and rooted are the processes of desiccation of identity, 
Bowenesque processes of ubiquitous and metaphorical ‗parentlessness‘. 
Life, on its part, is a creation of such personal mythology that is not one and 
unified, but consists of various stories and narratives. In life, the others one encounters, 
the strange alienating places are what dislocates or rather re-locates identity, of which in 
Bowen we have had examples of her textual Paris, the United States, Rome, as well as 
various local British and Irish sites such as different towns, tourist sites and hotels, etc.   
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In relation to ‗changing places‘, the theory of locality is of utmost importance 
to feminism since ―one of the similarities between women is their experience of an 
anatomically female body, but the meaning of this experience is patently different 
depending on women‘s (…) locational identities.‖ (Hanson in Coughlan, 2009, 70) As 
such ―a locational feminism makes it possible to view identity as transitory, only ever 
temporarily fixed‖ (Hanson in Coughlan, 2009, 70) and non-essentialist. 
As much as one believes that feelings cannot be artificial, they may be 
transplanted and re-organized. In this context, selfhood becomes a modern cyborg as 
Donna Haraway would certainly agree in her ―A Cyborg Manifesto‖ (1991). Thus, 
identity is cyborg-like and made up of various selves and various others. Such is the 
condition of life that identity must be spoken of in various discourses. This explanation 
clearly locates Bowen‘s writing within the discourse-oriented tradition. The articulate 
female subject becomes a figure on which depends the outcome of the struggle among 
competing ideologies. Bowen sees the value of ideology associated primarily with the 
freedom and proliferation of speech. What Bowen is most afraid of in her fiction is ―a 
future without language‖ (Lee, 1999, 197) and thus she defends the proliferation and 
maintenance of the new discourses of femininity – the new discourse of words and 
signs. 
Central to the discussion on multiplicity is the aforementioned idea of 
motherhood. Modern motherhood too has been analyzed with the tools of cyborg 
theories as in Farquhar‘s The Other Machine (1996) and Corea‘s The Mother Machine, 
or Irigaray‘s The Speculum of the Other Woman (1985b). All of the above discuss the 
incorporation of the material with technoscience and its representation arguing for the 
potential of reproductive technologies for women. Technoscience can challenge and 
disrupt the understanding of difference. The idea of cyborg may take away the category 
of motherhood as signifier of difference between male and female, and yet it may add 
up to the discussion of motherhood, or more broadly parenthood as symptomatic of our 
basic need for coexistence of selfhood and otherness. 
In Irigaray‘s book The Speculum of the Other Woman, a doctor‘s examining 
tool – the speculum is used as a metaphor for better understanding of women, where the 
mirror of analysis has to be the one that can mirror what dwells inside. And since 
Irigaray refers to the mother figure as the paradigm for femininity, the new discourses 
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use and see the mother category to look inside the female subject, through the 
metaphors of cavities, holes and the womb, 
 
The idea (of) Truth-like, and unlike, the cave – is the room womb (of/for) the speculum. 
Like and unlike the soul, a place of pivoting, and reversal – turning inside out and back to 
front – where representations are collated and bilocated: place of meeting and mingling. 
(Irigaray, 1985a, 291) 
 
Where the father-figure denies ‗specula(riza)tion‘, ―the mother-matter‖ (Irigaray, 1985a, 
301) actively gives birth to images, it not only reproduces like a looking-glass but 
distorts as one too. Specularization or speculation itself stands for active theorization of 
identity, that is, narrativization of identity as proposed by Ricoeur (1984, 1985a, 1985b, 
1992). Making sense of or understanding identity through motherhood appears almost 
irrefutable in understanding Bowen‘s literary oeuvre and her authorship. 
In the thesis, I devote much attention to the intricate relations between the 
concepts of the adult and the child that have grown to be understood as mutually 
exclusive and inclusive. In relation to the adult and the child dyad, the category that, as 
already mentioned, gains more importance is that of mother and the child. Since, as has 
been written on various occasions in this study, Deleuze prompts us to become-a-child 
on our way towards fully fledged identitarian becoming on  
 
Bowen‘s intense interest in childhood and its formation of the adult self is one of the most 
characteristic aspects of her vision, and potentially aligns her with Klein‘s pioneering work 
in child analysis. (Coughlan, 2009, 57) 
 
 All of Bowen‘s child figures for which she is so well known as a writer, are 
sentimentally imagined, as already pointed out by A. S. Byatt in her Introduction to The 
House in Paris, where she elect some of her favourite moments in the novel – ―there is 
no end to the violations committed by children on children (…)‖ (Byatt, 1976, 7). 
Similarly, there is no appeasement for the fact that it is child Jeremy who kills Eva at 
the end of Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. As Patricia Coughlan writes about Bowen‘s 
psychoanalytical side ―Bowen‘s fiction is nevertheless deeply akin and congenial to 
psychoanalytic theory, not least in the brilliance and modernity of its insight into the 
significance of childhood experience‖ (Coughlan, 2009, 58).  
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In writing about children, we may infer, Bowen writes about adults (super-ego 
is present from birth according to Klein) since it is the child-within that forms the basis 
of our adult behavior through many symbolic operations, among them: object relations 
theory and its derivative projective identification theory. Both are formed during early 
interactions with primary caregivers. The patterns the child creates for his or her 
interactions with the other in adult life stem from his or her childhood experiences of 
the others, especially the primary caregivers – the mother, and are usually inalterable. 
The mother teaches the child to tolerate ambiguity and difference, and if this process of 
learning does not take place the child‘s future dialogical being in the world may be at 
stake. His or her unconscious phantasy production can be altered, a process where the 
other is pre-projected in the ego defense mechanism projection. The whole self-
fulfilling prophecy can be altered and this process involves not only the subject but the 
object too. There aggression is an important force as in paranoid-schizoid position. 
Also, the depressive position is of utmost importance in adult/child development. 
By inducing the projected experience in another, one is more able to avoid the 
reality that the projected content is part of one‘s own experience – male discourse 
interpolates female discourse, but it too can happen vice versa. In ―Discussion. The 
Dialogue and the Difference‖ as well as in ―Eva Trout – a Journey towards new 
Discourse‖ I touch upon the problematic of Italian neo-realism and its introduction of 
the philosophy of becoming. In neo-realism the experience is not synthesized but 
continuously projected. The neo-realist technique of time-image makes all relationships 
serial. It refigures, as has been said in earlier chapters, the traditional masculine-action 
image and femininity as marginal through the introduction of children into 
observational roles – children become observers of the difficulties, and as such, hold the 
key to the future, as well as to the interior of the self, where the boundary between the 
child and the adult becomes blurred. Similarly, it has been said in the introductory 
chapter to the thesis: ―Discussion. The Dialogue and the Difference‖ that Bowen too 
admits that if she ―could read (...) [her] way back, analytically, through the books of (...) 
[her] childhood, the clues to everything could be found‖ (Bowen, 1999, 51). 
Neil Corcoran writes in his ―Forward‖ to the latest critical collection on 
Bowen‘s fiction that,  
 
Prominently in Eva Trout, but in other novels and in short stories too, Bowen is a writer 
capable of formidable structural and thematic daring and risk; and what she is always 
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willing to risk is that her books might not find the absolutely alert, concentrated and 
attentive readers they need (…). In Bowen‘s prose the normative structures of fictional 
coherence, and sometimes of linguistic coherence too, are exposed in the most radically 
unsettling ways to a potential writerly incoherence (Corcoran, 2009, xii).  
 
By fiction written to follow in its ―own footsteps‖ (Corcoran, 2009, xii), Bowen makes 
her writing a kind of interpellation to the reader‘s moral, ethical and intellectual 
background. 
Alterity is also a key-term to Bowen‘s writing when thought of as a result of 
searching for different locations, discourses and selves. It is represented in monstrosity, 
hybridity and hermaphroditism of the eponymous Eva Trout, as well as springs to life in 
the diabolic house in Paris belonging to its equally diabolic inhabitants. Mme Fisher 
consumes the masculine and feeds on the foreign essences of life, metaphorically 
understood as feeding on blood. Eva Trout destabilizes the system by which male and 
female – and hence masculine and feminine – are set off from each other, rendered 
mutually exclusive as well as categorically opposed. As a result of those textual 
operations, the argument that Bowen poses in her work is comparable with the call for a 
growing need for a counter-discourse on subjectivity and specifically on femininity. As 
mentioned earlier, Donna Haraway would respond with a call for a new discourse of 
cyborg subjectivity. It could copy the Deleuzian idea of machine-like connection 
―molded together into a monstrous mechanism‖ (O‘Toole, 2009, 168). This monstrous 
mechanism is well presented in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes where Eva is thought to 
be part of her bicycle ―(…) no further sort or kind of any further communication has 
been had from you since; though sallies into Broadstairs, in incomplete control of a 
powerful bicycle, have been reported‖ (ET, 118). On many occasions have I postulated 
that Bowen does call for a new hybrid discourse since as Jennifer Gonzalez remarks in 
her ―Envisioning Cyborg Bodies: Notes from Current Research‖: 
 
The image of the cyborg has historically recurred at moments of radical and cultural 
change. (. …)  In other words, when the current ontological model of human beings does 
not fit a new paradigm, a hybrid model of existence is required to encompass a new, 
complex and contradictory lived experience. (Gonzalez in Kirkup, 2000, 61) 
 
In writing about Eva what Bowen highlights is the possibility of female agency 
that may be a site of female unheimlich, and which is then symbolised by the 
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destruction of Eva just like the destruction of female monster performed by the doctor 
in Frankenstein. 
As mentioned in the thesis, the idea of unhemlich has been linked to the figure 
of archaic mother and fetishism. One of the first authors to do so was Roger Dadoun in 
his influential essay ―Fetishism in the Horror Film‖. This article was later used as the 
theoretical backdrop for feminist Barbara Creed in her The Monstruous-feminine: Film, 
Fetishism, Psychoanalysis cited on various occasions in this study. The fetishist mother 
figure, which Creed describes, is what we may stumble upon in Bowen more as a 
symbol and discourse omnipresent in every self. It is, then,  
 
a mother thing, situated beyond good and evil, beyond all organized forms and all events. 
This is a totalizing and oceanic mother, a ‗shadowy and deep unity‘, evoking in the subject 
the anxiety of fusion and of dissolution. (. ...) This mother is nothing but a fantasy 
inasmuch as she is only ever established as an omnipresent and all-powerful totality. 
(Dadoun, 1989, in Creed, 1993, 20) 
 
Akin to that, Bowen rejects simple binary oppositions and normative 
essentialism in favour of multiplicity, ―It is in being seen to be capable of alternatives 
that the character becomes, for the reader, valid‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 38). She does want to 
go beyond the attributes of good and evil in order to exhaust the neutral mother function 
that can be believed to be hidden within any subjectivity. 
The important question that arises when contemplating the studies on alteriry is 
whether it is sufficient to recognize the stranger – whether it is sufficient to welcome 
and accept the stranger within oneself as postulated by Kristeva? After all, her theories 
have already been found politically unsatisfactory and repetitive on various occasions. 
As an example, Elizabeth Grosz has written that Kristeva‘s transgressive subjectivity 
fails to escape phallocentrism by presenting a myth of men taking up women‘s 
discourse women cannot speak. Kristeva‘s discourse has been considered that of men 
penetrating the space of women to mimic women who reproduce men.  
It is for this reason that the thesis postulates a greater focus on the becoming-
little-girl function in identification. The stranger one dialogues with needs to be the 
stranger represented as the child or the little girl. In the process of reconfiguring the 
mother function it is not the dialogue with the archaic mother that should be highlighted 
but rather attention should be given to the event of finding the little child within oneself. 
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In the light of all theoretical implications this study reveals the constituent parts 
of Elizabeth Bowen‘s terrain. Elizabeth Bowen writes in her posthumously published 
article ―Autobiography‖: ―How shall I write ―The End‖ to a book which is about the 
essence of a beginning‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 512) 
―After tea, the piano candles were lit, and before my going to bed we sang 
hymns around the piano. ―Shall we gather at the River?‖ was always the last, because it 
was my favourite hymn.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 512) 
How can we connect Bowen‘s contradictory ideas on femininity, gender, the 
making of and experiencing literature? Some common concepts have already been 
described; concepts and theoretical tools that have helped us bind together the vast 
Bowen terrain that the study aims at delineating. On one hand, Bowen writes 
―Characters operating in vacuo are for me bodiless. Were I to meet a writer, living or 
dead, whose work has so percolated into my own experience as to become part of it, his 
places would be what I should first want to discuss.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 282) On the other 
hand Bowen admits that  
 
The Bowen terrain cannot be demarcated on any existing map; it is unspecific. Ireland and 
England, between them, contain my stories, with occasional outgoings into France or Italy: 
within the boundaries of those countries there is no particular locality I have staked a claim 
on or identified with. Given the size of the world, the scenes of the stories are scattered over 
only a small area: but they are scattered. Nothing (at least on the surface) connects them, or 
gives them generic character of the kind to claim or merit consideration. (Bowen, 1999k, 
282) 
 
What, therefore, is Bowen‘s topography? It stretches from the public to the private 
scene, escapes being generic and homogenous, and yet it seems to be relational – 
relational in the sense that it relates both to the subject and object and the concrete 
discourses they produce.   
 
Failing to throw a collective light on my art, my places tend to thought of as its accessories, 
engaging enough to read of but not ‘meaningful‘. Wherefore, Bowen topography has so far, 
so far as I know, been untouched by research. Should anyone give it a thought after I am 
dead, that will be too late. To it, only I hold the key. (Bowen, 1999k, 282) 
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Bowen topography oscillates somewhere between amorphousness and a concrete 
material detail, her idea being that however fluid and alternative identity it still requires 
estimation. Bowen writes:  
 
For a main trait of human nature is its amorphousness, the amorphousness of the drifting 
and flopping jellyfish in a cloudy tide, and secret fears (such as fear of nonentity), 
discouragement and demoralizing misgivings prey upon individuals made aware of this. 
(Bowen, 1999k, 295) 
 
She further writes: ―Shape – shape is the desideratum‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 295). To give 
shape to amorphousness may be a fallacy, yet to try to embrace it is an obligation. In the 
intrauterine symbolic, Bowen returns to the mother that had been taken away from her 
far too early. She returns to her through her text, in this thesis through The House in 
Paris and Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes. 
The amorphousness and tenuousness of identity are in Bowen generative 
elements of plots, and in general, generative elements of subjectivity. The experience of 
war, otherness and culture poses a threat to a subject of obliterating the self that 
constantly runs the risk of becoming ―the uncertain I‖, as Bowen writes in the postscript 
to The Demon Lover collection of stories. In Bowen characters live in the reality of 
loosing identity or being lied to about other‘s identity. The amorphousness never 
disappears but it can be made sense of by narrating identity who does not give the self 
an overt shape but a subjective momentum. Similar to that Stella in The Heat of the Day 
admits: ―‗Whoever‘s the story had been, I let it be mine (…) it came to be my story, and 
stuck to it. Or rather, first I stick to it, then it went on sticking to me: it took my shape 
and equally I took its.‘‖ (Bowen, 1949/1998b, 224)  
On discontinuity of identity Bowen writes in The Heat of the Day  
 
By the rules of fiction, with which the life to be credible must comply, he was [Robert] as a 
character ―impossible‖- each time they met [Stella and Robert], for instance, he showed no 
shred or trace of having been continuous since they last met. (Bowen, 1949/1998b, 140) 
 
If we are not shape, we are shreds – Deleuzian lines of flight, and semiotic 
amorphous beings. We may say that we are unchilded mothers through our ongoing 
relationships with the other. 
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In the end the interest in identity, personal isolation and denial of love, as well 
as anesthetized morality prefigure works of many other feminist writers, even though 
Bowen herself tried to escape the cliché of feminist. After all, she had The Hotel‘s 
female character Mrs Kerr exclaim: ―I‘m not a Feminist130 but I do like being a woman‖ 
(Bowen, 1927/2003b, 11) in an abrupt response to the inadequacies of the phallocentric 
discourse on femininity and motherhood. In Mrs Kerr‘s case dismissing her alternative 
way of being and of mothering may mean as much as denying her right to selfhood. 
Through the theme of dispossession, especially the dispossession of children, 
Bowen says something very profound about the complexities of our identities that 
overlap with the infantile and maternal voices of otherness. Neil Corcoran writes that 
―The world becomes a place, into which you can never comfortably fit, a place, in 
which, because you are permanently missing something, you are also missing yourself‖ 
(Corcoran, 2004, 85). However, on the contrary, as I have suggested in this work, the 
idea of plenty can only be encountered in the idea of a lack, as in Deleuzian desire that, 
as we have mentioned, is productive. It is productive of new rhizomatic identities that 
are multiple and fluctuant resulting in blurring the boundaries between individuals. In 
Bowen to desire to persevere in one‘s own being is to desire one‘s own desire. As in 
Deleuze life in Bowen is desire‘s variable immanence of being, that is, life is about 
striving and becoming, and not simply residual being. 
Bowen writes against reading her Pictures and Conversations as an 
autobiography, explaining that ―The book is not to be an autobiography. It will differ 
from an autobiography (in the accepted sense) in two ways. (I) It will not follow a time 
sequence. (II) It will be anything but all-inclusive.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 297) However, the 
book as any identity solidifies after following the above prerequisites; it is random, 
multiple, polyphonic and overtly non-sequential. The underlying theme of this new 
counter-identity is the relationship between living and writing, that is, living and 
constructing texts, engaging in discursive practices of the self that percolate the themes 
already ―written - and published.‖ (Bowen, 1999k, 297): themes such as childhood, 
                                                 
130 Bowen also reiterated in 1936 and subsequently in 1961 that she was neither a feminist nor believed 
in the longevity of the feminist cause. In 1936 she stated that ―broadly, the woman‘s movement has 
accomplished itself‖ (Bowen, 1936 in Barbeito, 2001, 65) and in 1961 admitted that ―I‘m not, and shall 
never be, a feminist.‖ (Bowen, 1961 in Barbeito, 2001, 65) 
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motherhood and femininity. As in Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes and The House in 
Paris, 
 
The underlying theme – to which the book will owe what it is necessary that a book should 
have, continuity – will be the relationship (so far as that can be traceable, and perhaps it is 
most interesting when it is not apparently not traceable) between living and writing. Dislike 
of pomposity inhibits me from saying, ‗the relationship between life and art‘ (meaning my 
own). (Bowen, 1999k, 297) 
 
Hopefully, the new, counter-discourses of femininity capture the dynamics of 
identification through its resemblance to Bowen‘s fascination with Alice‟s Adventures 
in Wonderland that has been taken up in this thesis. As in Deleuze, this will inevitably 
incorporate the ideas of multiplicity and dialogue, but especially the ideas of 
‗becoming-homeless‘, ‗becoming-little-girl‘, and ‗becoming-woman‘, which will 
inevitably contribute to a new understanding of  the transformative power and desire of 
the female and male subjects. This will help pinpoint Bowenesque ‗lines of flight and 
escape‘ which will constitute her way of understanding the identitarian nomadology 
from the self to the other, from the outside to the inside. As such the key term of the 
new Bowenesque discourse will be among many others ‗travel‘ as has been discussed in 
Eva Trout, or Changing Scenes and The House in Paris – travelling as means of looking 
through the glass to better understand the self and the other – travelling as Bowen‘s 
definite means of encapsulating her private and public topography. 
―It is not easy to make a synopsis of this (projected book) [projected identity] – 
of which the title is drawn from page 1 of Alice‟s Adventures in Wonderland.‖ (Bowen, 
1999k, 296) but the results should be ―a fairly good or at least an engaging book.‖ 
(Bowen, 1999k, 297) 
Above all our reading should be hermeneutical, as in Ricoeur who has been 
extensively used in this thesis. This means that hegemonies tend to reiterate in everyday 
discourses, but it also means that they do not escape (re)interpretation, translation and 
new readings. It can be said that hermeneutics is a study in interpretation which is a way 
of escaping domination. In the travelling to and from hermeneutical symbols of 
Bowenesque topography, a point of departure needs and has been established – the idea 
of suffering – the suffering child, the suffering mother, and the suffering orphan. Bowen 
not only exposes the structures of suffering of women she exposes suffering in general 
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through her use of discourses inevitably linked with femininity, making the symbolism 
of femininity her analytical tool. Reading Bowen stands for reading of the pattern that 
ascribes value to any individual who manages to give meaning to suffering. 
The careful investigation of Bowen‘s texts can open up a path towards a new 
discourse that will assent on the ideas recent to feminism of restlessness, namely, the 
idea of restlessness, of desire and openness to cinematic ellipsis of which Bowen was so 
fond of. In what relates to restlessness this concept maintains the discourse ‗restless‘ 
and unquenched, as well as non-linear and ambiguous. The second concept of ellipsis 
gives narrativisation a possibility of imagetic, subjective and, again, non-linear 
presentation of ―The non-poetic statement of the poetic truth.‖ (Bowen, 1950, Lee, 
1999, 36) Ellipsis corroborates the idea of performance and making a pattern of a 
subject. As such new narrativization of discourse is hinged upon the I of the subject. 
The role for the reader is to pursue, follow and respond to these ‗lines of flight‘ of 
subjectivity, so that links between discourses, authors and addresses are established 
based on the idea of care: moral and ethical responsibility for the other. The interaction 
between the I and the other becomes based on the idea of an endless interplay of desire, 
where one constantly seduces the other, constituting the way to ―de-sire131‖ the 
language. 
De‗siring‘ the language stands for creating a new discourse and investing in 
creating identity narratively through hermeneutical understanding of the past, the 
present and the future within one‘s habitat and geographical self. This, for a female 
subject, may reveal itself a very powerful means of escaping the constraints of the 
encumbering, hegemonic and phallic society, and it, nevertheless, indicates other key 
concepts used in this thesis such as relational autonomy and agency. Writing, any means 
of narrativization, as Kristeva explains in her Tales of Love, can be considered 
―semblance of willpower‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 308) that enables one ―to hold fast to 
renunciation. Such holding confers authority to the Self, which can claim ‘emptiness‘ 
provided it simultaneously proceeds with a true work of pinpointing and reconstruction 
by means of a text‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 308). Such willpower, Augustine‘s 
enduring/perduring and Ricoeur‘s holding fast is ―a writing of phantasmatic 
consumption and destruction amounts[ing] to something like associative speech set 
                                                 
131 This idea has been postulated by Hilde Staels during her talk ―Restless Border Crossings in Aritha van 
Herk‟s Writing.‖ at „From Sea to Sea: Canadian Literature and Culture in Lisbon, November 20, 2009. 
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adrift...‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 308) Such speech looks for the pre-Oedipal link with the 
semiotic through the insufficiency of the maternal figure, as in Bowen, expressed 
through the idea of pre-Oedipal elusive mother and child, apparently retarded, but in 
constant search for a new language, through the visual, elliptical and subjective 
operations of the roving eye towards the ―fantasy love [that] does not seek out 
satisfaction, but feeds on obstacles that are challenged by the eyes‖ (Kristeva, 1987, 
349). 
Bowen‘s preoccupation with language stems from her belief that there are too 
many people caught in the process of (re)-negotiating their individual and group 
identities, while running the risk of becoming ‗place-less‘ or ‗displaced‘. As a result too 
many ―placeless, ‗dis-placed‘ peoples of the world, [are] condemned to the limbo of not 
belonging, whether to a nation with a national territorial base, to a class or to a religion‖ 
(McDowell, 1999, 2).  
Thus Bowen‘s discourse on femininity and identity encompasses her interest in 
territory as a metaphorical space, to which, rightly so, a key can be found in the 
subject‘s dynamic becoming until its demise in nothingness. The problematic of 
language and its placedeness or displacedeness for the subject, which stands for 
mapping of the identity, may involve no actual bodily or geographic movement, even 
though, in Bowen, it does so very often. Instead, the displacement results in challenging 
circumstances, renegotiating gender divisions though venturing, as Bowen proposes, 
into our private, pre-Oedipal self constructed upon the ideas of the roving eye, 
subjective ellipsis, otherness, trans-temporal transition, hybridity, and above all – 
ungendered maternal function.  
In her quasi revolutionary thinking Bowen envisages many problems with 
identification in modern times. Hers is the belief in non-placennes of the post-modern 
subject even though it continues to be propelled to and from various and concrete 
geographical destinations. Through non-placeness there appears a growing gap between 
people, who lose interest in each other far too easily and become stripped of all symbols 
of social and private identity. As Linda McDowell writes in her Gender, Identity and 
Place (1999)  
 
The focus of feminist scholars, (...), has also changed, from a dominant emphasis on the 
material inequalities between men and women in different parts of the world to a new 
convergence of interest on language, symbolism, representations and meaning in the 
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definition of gender, and on questions about subjectivity, identity and the sexed body. 
(McDowell, 1999, 6-7) 
 
These being the ideas popular only in the eighties and nineties of twentieth century 
feminist scholarship, they nevertheless prove one more time the revolutionary character 
of the Bowenesque counter-discourses as early as first decades of the past century. Any 
analysis of feminine identity should include, according to Bowen, a prolonged 
discussion of what it means to be a woman through the varying categories of ―space and 
time, and how those understandings relate. (... .) [to] the concept of gender and gender 
relations‖ (McDowell, 1999, 7). Similar to post-modern feminist scholarship, Bowen 
belief is that gender can be seen as ―either (...) a symbolic construction or as a social 
relationship‖ (Moore, 1988, in McDowell, 1999, 7). All accepted standards of 
femininity change over space and time, yet it is of utmost importance to define 
hermeneutically the stories, origins and traditions that underlie these processes in their 
private and public expressions. 
For any future investigation a more profound and broader insight should be 
given to changing economic, social, and cultural circumstances that will inevitably 
remind us of Bowen‘s new concept of discourses of identity, especially feminine 
identity. 
Hopefully, this thesis will stimulate further research and critical enquiry into 
the feminist aims and possibilities of English and Irish literatures  
 
in order to stimulate theoretical and ideological diversity and to redress the structure 
dividing ‗writing‘ (i.e. mainstream, men‘s, work) from ‗women‘s writing‘ (received as a 
kind of supplement) (Coughlan, 2008, 1-2)  
 
- so as to return to the female subject its equal position within a new discourse of 
identity – new discourses of femininity.  
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